Cooperation is a factor that emerges often in Homans's view of social process. Cooperation was a rewarding group response; individual behavior was a nonsocial alternative. Although the focus of our investigation was on the conditions that promote or inhibit cooperation, it differed from most previous research in not being concerned with how or when groups learn to make such responses. The large-risk effect was also replicated using a modified apparatus and procedure and a non-American subject population. The apparatus permitted selection of cooperation, individual responding, and taking as did the original one, but required an experimenter to deliver task rewards. The extremely high levels of noncooperation observed at the molar level may arise either from individual-level regularity, in which almost all subjects tend to respond to the situation with taking, or from a more complex process in which a smaller proportion of subjects is inclined toward taking but is distributed so as to assure conflict in most groups.

Current social movement theory commonly refers to the collective action problem posed by Olson, but has provided little sustained attention to linking collective action theory with social movements research. Although sharing a central emphasis on instrumental or goaloriented behavior, collective action and social movements cannot be directly equated because their levels of analysis are different. After reviewing the usual treatments of units of analysis in social movements research, we propose the concept of a·collective campaign-timeand space-bounded sets of activities oriented towax:d the same goal-as a mediating concept useful for research. We then outline four prescriptions for social movements research: identify the relevant interest and its characteristics; define the ecological-temporal populations at risk of action and their characteristics; identify the set of actions likely to be involved; and identify the full range of possible outcomes. These prescriptions are discussed in some detail. Finally, we show how this approach might be applied in a specific case, resistance to school closings. The past few years have seen a dramatic resurgence of sociological interest in social movements. In 1973, Quarantelli and Weller presented a paper at the American Sociological Association meeting lamenting the lack of a critical Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, Vol. 7, pages 1~27. Copyright © 1984 by JAI Press Inc. All rigbts of reproduction in any form reserved. ISBN: 0-89232496-1

In this chapter we describe the “building blocks” of our analytic strategy – the major concepts and simplifying assumptions that we use for modeling collective action – and discuss many of the scope conditions that circumscribe the applicability of the models. The real world of collective action is obviously much too complex to be captured by any single theoretical model. Real events are always the result of the conjunction of many processes and accidental occurrences. We make drastic simplifying assumptions in our models not because we believe they are “true,” but as a way of isolating a tractable part of a complex phenomenon.

The day after had read a dose of The Culture of Public Problems, my local campus newspaper, The Daily Cardinal, ran a front-page article headlined Truckers Aid Cops in Traffic Arrests. As Joseph Gusfield could have told me, the aid seemed to be aimed at drunk drivers, not speeders or other miscreants. As the administrator of the State Patrol told reporter Dave Umhoefer, truckers don't like drunk He did not expect them to report speeders, though, because that's ratting on their buddy. A Rice Lake trucker said, I hope it works, hope they keep it going. I've reported drunks before. Speeders were another story. No, like to zip down the road. There is a paradox here (Paradox 1). From the standpoint of safety on the road, the fact that someone drinks is not in itself a hazard. What is a hazard is poor driving behavior, like tailgating, or weaving, or speeding. But the law and public opinion are much harsher with drivers caught drinking than with drivers who simply drive dangerously. Joseph Gusfield is an aficionado of paradoxes, and this book is filled with them. Gusfield finds in paradox the stimulus to lay bare the cultural and social processes that underlie the making and enforcement of law. He is a sociologist and enthnographer, not a lawyer. Through sociological irony he seeks to look at the world a new angle and create a new view of the drinking-driving problem. Ironists use paradox as lawyers use precedents, and it seems there are few sociallegal phenomena as replete with paradox as the mixture of alcohol and gasoline. Paradox 2. Many factors contribute to accidents, and many ways could be found to reduce accidents involving drinking drivers. Why do we place all the emphasis on the driver himself (or herself, but much less often) in our public consideration of the problem? For example, the auto industry could make safer cars, or cars that require passing a breath test before they could be started; or bars could be kept away from roads, or not allowed parking lots, or made responsible for preventing persons who drink from driving. We learn from this paradox the individualistic biases of our cultural way of thought, and the individualistic needs of our blame-assigning legal institutions.

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Previous articleNext article No AccessCommentary and DebateReply to ShippeeGerald Marwell and Ruth E. AmesGerald Marwell Search for more articles by this author and Ruth E. Ames Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Sociology Volume 86, Number 2Sep., 1980 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/227245 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1980 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Charles R. Plott Public Choice and the Development of Modern Laboratory Experimental Methods in Economics and Political Science, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2014).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2479792