The aim of this study was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the potential linkages between intelligence and psychopathology across the full IQ range, while considering both absolute IQ scores and discrepancies between them. We drew data from the EDEN mother-child birth cohort, gathered at two time points: 5.5 and 11.5 years of age. We examined three instruments assessing psychopathology: the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire, the Child Behavior Checklist, and the Mental Health and Social Inadaptation Assessment for Adolescents. We focused on four distinct scales: internalizing disorder, conduct disorder, social problems, and ADHD symptoms. Our analyses first examined correlations between Full-scale IQ, Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, and psychopathology scores. Subsequently, we explored correlations between absolute and relative verbal-performance IQ discrepancies and psychopathology scores. In general, we found that relations between intelligence index scores and psychopathology scales were generally null or negative (high IQ associated with fewer psychopathology symptoms). Our results do not lend support to the hypothesis that high intelligence or index score discrepancies are risk factors for psychopathology in children and adolescents.

UK Biobank participants do not have a high-quality measure of intelligence or polygenic scores of intelligence to simultaneously examine the genetic and neural underpinnings of intelligence. We created a standardized measure of general intelligence (g) relative to the UK population and estimated its quality. After running a GWAS of g on UK Biobank participants with a g of good quality and without neuroimaging data (N = 187,288), we derived a g polygenic score for UK Biobank participants with neuroimaging data. The g factor from eight cognitive tests for individuals with at least one test (N = 501,650) explained 29% of the variance in cognitive test performance. The polygenic score for British individuals with neuroimaging data (N = 27,174) explained 7.6% of the variance in g. We provided high-quality g factor estimates for most UK Biobank participants and g factor polygenic scores for UK Biobank participants with neuroimaging data.

Objective Studies reporting that highly intelligent individuals have more mental health disorders often have sampling bias, no or inadequate control group, or insufficient sample size. We addressed these caveats by examining the difference in the prevalence of mental health disorders between individuals with high and average general intelligence (g-factor) in the UK Biobank. Methods Participants with general intelligence (g-factor) scores standardized relative to the same-age UK population, were divided into 2 groups: a high g-factor group (g-factor 2 SD above the UK mean; N=16,137) and an average g-factor group (g-factor within 2 SD of the UK mean; N=236,273). Using self-report questionnaires and medical diagnoses, we examined group differences in prevalence across 32 phenotypes, including mental health disorders, trauma, allergies, and other traits. Results High and average g-factor groups differed across 15/32 phenotypes and did not depend on sex and/or age. Individuals with high g-factors had less general anxiety (OR=0.69) and PTSD (OR=0.67), were less neurotic (β=-0.12), less socially isolated (OR=0.85), and were less likely to have experienced childhood stressors and abuse, adulthood stressors, or catastrophic trauma (OR=0.69-0.90). They did not differ in any other mental health disorder or trait. However, they generally had more allergies (e.g., eczema; OR=1.13-1.33). Conclusions The present study provides robust evidence that highly intelligent individuals have no more mental health disorders than the average population. High intelligence even appears as a protective factor for general anxiety and PTSD. Question Are high IQ individuals at increased risk of mental health disorders? Findings In the UK Biobank (N ≃ 7,266 - 252,249), highly intelligent individuals (2SD above the population mean) were less likely to suffer from general anxiety and PTSD, and no more likely to have depression, social anxiety, a drug use disorder, eating disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. Meaning Contrary to popular belief, high intelligence is not a risk factor for psychiatric disorders and even serves as a protective factor for general anxiety and PTSD. ### Competing Interest Statement The authors have declared no competing interest. ### Funding Statement This work received support under the program Investissements d Avenir launched by the French Government and implemented by l Agence Nationale de la recherche (ANR) with the references ANR-17-EURE-0017 and ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL. This research has been conducted using the UK Biobank Resource. ### Author Declarations I confirm all relevant ethical guidelines have been followed, and any necessary IRB and/or ethics committee approvals have been obtained. Yes The details of the IRB/oversight body that provided approval or exemption for the research described are given below: All participants provided informed consent (Resources tab at https://biobank.ctsu.ox.ac.uk/crystal/field.cgi?id=200). The UK Biobank received ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee (reference 11/NW/0382) and the present study was conducted based on application 46 007 I confirm that all necessary patient/participant consent has been obtained and the appropriate institutional forms have been archived, and that any patient/participant/sample identifiers included were not known to anyone (e.g., hospital staff, patients or participants themselves) outside the research group so cannot be used to identify individuals. Yes I understand that all clinical trials and any other prospective interventional studies must be registered with an ICMJE-approved registry, such as ClinicalTrials.gov. I confirm that any such study reported in the manuscript has been registered and the trial registration ID is provided (note: if posting a prospective study registered retrospectively, please provide a statement in the trial ID field explaining why the study was not registered in advance). Yes I have followed all appropriate research reporting guidelines and uploaded the relevant EQUATOR Network research reporting checklist(s) and other pertinent material as supplementary files, if applicable. Yes This research has been conducted using data from UK Biobank, a major biomedical database (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/). Restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license for this study: application 46007. Preregistration and code are available on OSF: https://osf.io/cywd6/?view_only=fa9f5091de124d96be3eb1a55a4e7f01

The aim of this study was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the potential linkages between intelligence and psychopathology across the full IQ range, while considering both absolute IQ scores and discrepancies between them. We drew data from the EDEN mother-child birth cohort, gathered at two time points: 5.5 and 11.5 years of age. We examined three instruments assessing psychopathology: the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire, the Child Behavior Checklist, and the Mental Health and Social Inadaptation Assessment for Adolescents. We focused on four distinct scales: internalizing disorder, conduct disorder, social problems, and ADHD symptoms. Our analyses first examined correlations between Full-scale IQ, Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, and psychopathology scores. Subsequently, we explored correlations between absolute and relative verbal-performance IQ discrepancies and psychopathology scores. In general, we found that relations between intelligence index scores and psychopathology scales were generally null or negative (high IQ associated with fewer psychopathology symptoms). Our results do not lend support to the hypothesis that high intelligence or index score discrepancies are risk factors for psychopathology in children and adolescents.

UK Biobank participants do not have a high-quality measure of intelligence or polygenic scores (PGSs) of intelligence to simultaneously examine the genetic and neural underpinnings of intelligence. We created a standardized measure of general intelligence (g factor) relative to the UK population and estimated its quality. After running a GWAS of g on UK Biobank participants with a g factor of good quality and without neuroimaging data (N = 187,288), we derived a g PGS for UK Biobank participants with neuroimaging data. For individuals with at least one cognitive test, the g factor from eight cognitive tests (N = 501,650) explained 29% of the variance in cognitive test performance. The PGS for British individuals with neuroimaging data (N = 27,174) explained 7.6% of the variance in g. We provided high-quality g factor estimates for most UK Biobank participants and g factor PGSs for UK Biobank participants with neuroimaging data.

Abstract Background Studies reporting that highly intelligent individuals have more mental health disorders often have sampling bias, no or inadequate control groups, or insufficient sample size. We addressed these caveats by examining the difference in the prevalence of mental health disorders between individuals with high and average general intelligence (g-factor) in the UK Biobank. Methods Participants with g-factor scores standardized relative to the same-age UK population, were divided into two groups: a high g-factor group (g-factor 2 SD above the UK mean; N = 16,137) and an average g-factor group (g-factor within 2 SD of the UK mean; N = 236,273). Using self-report questionnaires and medical diagnoses, we examined group differences in the prevalence of 32 phenotypes, including mental health disorders, trauma, allergies, and other traits. Results High and average g-factor groups differed across 15/32 phenotypes and did not depend on sex and/or age. Individuals with high g-factors had less general anxiety (odds ratio [OR] = 0.69, 95% CI [0.64;0.74]) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; OR = 0.67, 95 %CI [0.61;0.74]), were less neurotic (β = −0.12, 95% CI [−0.15;−0.10]), less socially isolated (OR = 0.85, 95% CI [0.80;0.90]), and were less likely to have experienced childhood stressors and abuse, adulthood stressors, or catastrophic trauma (OR = 0.69–0.90). However, they generally had more allergies (e.g., eczema; OR = 1.13–1.33). Conclusions The present study provides robust evidence that highly intelligent individuals do not have more mental health disorders than the average population. High intelligence even appears as a protective factor for general anxiety and PTSD.

An outstanding challenge for consciousness research is to characterize the neural signature of conscious access independently of any decisional processes. Here we present a model-based approach that uses inter-trial variability to identify the brain dynamics associated with stimulus processing. We demonstrate that, even in the absence of any task or behavior, the electroencephalographic response to auditory stimuli shows bifurcation dynamics around 250–300 milliseconds post-stimulus. Namely, the same stimulus gives rise to late sustained activity on some trials, and not on others. This late neural activity is predictive of task-related reports, and also of reports of conscious contents that are randomly sampled during task-free listening. Source localization further suggests that task-free conscious access recruits the same neural networks as those associated with explicit report, except for frontal executive components. Studying brain dynamics through variability could thus play a key role for identifying the core signatures of conscious access, independent of report.

The epidemiology of cognitive development is an approach essentially based on large observational studies, which examines individual differences in cognitive abilities throughout childhood and their determinants. Although different in terms of methodology and main interests from developmental psychology, cognitive epidemiology offers complementary viewpoints on cognitive development and addresses fundamental research questions of interest to developmental psychologists. The present paper depicts the contributions of the epidemiological approach to the field of cognitive development and highlights the methodological advances that have made such contributions possible. We discuss the stability and developmental trajectories of cognitive functions, their main predictors, the complex interplay between environmental and genetic predictors, and the relationships between the different domains of cognition from birth to adulthood.

The epidemiology of cognitive development is an approach essentially based on large observational studies, which examines individual differences in cognitive abilities throughout childhood and their determinants. Although different in terms of methodology and main interests from developmental psychology, cognitive epidemiology offers complementary viewpoints on cognitive development and addresses fundamental research questions of interest to developmental psychologists. The present paper depicts the contributions of the epidemiological approach to the field of cognitive development and highlights the methodological advances that have made such contributions possible. We discuss the stability and developmental trajectories of cognitive functions, their main predictors, the complex interplay between environmental and genetic predictors, and the relationships between the different domains of cognition from birth to adulthood.

From an early age, humans intuitively expect physical objects to obey core principles, including continuity (objects follow spatiotemporally continuous paths) and solidity (two solid objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time). These two principles are sometimes viewed as deriving from a single overarching “persistence” principle. Indeed, violations of solidity where one solid object seemingly passes through another could theoretically be interpreted as a violation of continuity, with an object “teleporting” to switch places rather than passing through a solid obstacle. However, it is an empirical issue whether the two principles are processed distinctly or identically to one another. Here, adult participants tracked objects during dynamic events in a novel location detection task, which sometimes involved violations of the principles of continuity or solidity. While participants explicitly noticed both types of violations and reported being equally surprised at both, they made more errors and answered more slowly after continuity violations than after solidity violations. Our results demonstrate that the two principles show different signature patterns, and are thus represented distinctly in the mind.

Is adult Theory-of-Mind (ToM) automatic? Kovács et al. (2010) indicated that adults are faster to process an unexpected event if the event would have been expected from another agent’s point of view. This suggests that 1) adults attribute beliefs to others spontaneously and 2) these belief representations influence subjects’ own perceptual judgments. However, recent replication studies have highlighted alternative explanations for the results, and the available evidence for such processes is inconclusive (Phillips et al., 2015). The present research aimed to take a fresh look at this putative theoretical phenomenon using a novel experimental paradigm. Adults were required to indicate the location of an object revealed at one of two possible locations, after watching one of four different types of animations involving an agent and the object. The animations were such that the object would show up either were the subject believed it to be (i.e. where they had seen it hide last), or where the agent believed it to be (i.e. where the agent saw it hide last). In a second condition, participants had an additional “instructed tracking” task which required them to occasionally report the location that the object visited first, which always corresponded to the agent’s belief about the object’s location. Participants across conditions were consistently better at detecting the object if its final location corresponded to their own beliefs. However, only in the second condition did the agent’s “belief” correlate with participant reactions: subjects made more errors when the object appeared where the agent did not believe it to be, compared to when it appeared where the agent believed it to be. Thus taken together, the results of the current experiments strongly suggest that while first person beliefs clearly influence anticipated object locations, another agent’s beliefs do not do so spontaneously.

Infant looking-time results (Spelke, 1994) have shown that pre-verbal infants grasp the continuity principle (i.e. that objects cannot pop in and out of existence) and the solidity principle (i.e. that solid objects cannot pass through one-another) from around 3 months of age. Early theories assimilated both by treating solidity as resulting from a single, general principle of object continuity. However, more recent work on primates and older children (Santos, 2004; Keen, 2003) has suggested that children and primates have a greater mastery over continuity than solidity in action-based tasks. One potential explanation for this is that the vision/action system places a higher priority on continuity than solidity in object tracking. Here we tested this hypothesis directly using a novel object detection task. Adult participants viewed short videos depicting an object rolling behind one or two occluding screens. The occluding screen(s) then dropped, revealing the ball in a location either indicative of a continuity/solidity violation or non-violation, and participants were required to indicate the location in which they perceived the ball via keypress within 750ms. Participants were tested in one of two learning conditions: a 75% non-violation condition or a 75% violation condition. Across three experiments, we observed (consistent with our original hypothesis): (1) A larger decrease in accuracy for violations relative to non-violations in the continuity than solidity condition. (2) A consistent three-way interaction between learning condition, physical principle (solidity vs. continuity), and violation. This three-way interaction resulted from the fact that in the 75% violation condition, participants learned to overturn solidity but not continuity based anticipations. Taken together these findings suggest that the visual system indeed places a higher priority on object continuity than solidity, and so offer a potential explanation for some puzzling developmental results. Meeting abstract presented at VSS 2015.