This paper surveys 22 case studies of 21st century instances when financial crisis-fighters implemented ad hoc emergency liquidity (AHEL) interventions, interventions designed to provide liquidity to a troubled institution that the authorities believe is systemically important. While emergency liquidity support is often introduced with the real or communicated intention of preventing illiquidity from leading to insolvency, the liquidity crisis should instead be viewed as the manifestation of the market’s assessing the firm as nonviable as a going concern. For that reason, authorities should provide AHEL assistance only to institutions that they have deemed viable or that they have committed to make viable through additional interventions, most commonly through a government capital injection or merger with a stronger institution. Despite AHEL assistance, which the authorities in several cases sized to meet all potential funding outflows from the troubled firms, in no cases did liquidity provision alone prove a “cure” to the run on the institution. Crisis-fighters also should not use the terms of an AHEL intervention to manage moral hazard. Moral hazard can be addressed in the more structural policy responses that will need to follow AHEL assistance. AHEL programs should focus on providing sufficient liquidity to get the institution through its acute crisis phase.

Government recapitalizations of systemic banking organizations can be costly and unpopular but are sometimes necessary to protect depositors and prevent financial contagion. This paper surveys 23 Yale Program on Financial Stability case studies of ad hoc capital injection programs, defined as programs that provide capital to a single institution or a clearly defined minority of institutions. We saw a marked increase in capital injection programs in the past 50 years, more than half of which were ad hoc. Authorities designing ad hoc capital injections face difficult decisions—when to deploy them rather than let a bank fail; whether to impose losses on shareholders and unsecured creditors; how to protect taxpayers; and how to deal with the management of failed firms. Most advanced countries have updated their tools for managing bank failures since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09, generally in compliance with the Financial Stability Board’s 2011 Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions. Our survey points to the challenges authorities have faced over the years in attempting to adhere to such principles.

Researchers and economic research were essential to the success of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. For example, researchers submitted testimony, briefed commissioners, and spoke with our staff in recorded interviews. They also provided access to key data sources and helped us use them. Although we started our investigation barely one year after the height of the crisis, there was already a strong core of early, empirical research grappling with many of our key questions, such as why investors ran certain markets, why incentive problems pervaded securitization markets, and why risk management failed at so many large companies. We also benefited from the wealth of research exploring developments in financial markets leading up to the crisis. The process to build the research staff on a tight deadline was chaotic, and we needed people willing to work long hours, work on a team, and follow the evidence wherever it took us.

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This paper surveys 19 case studies of bank resolutions and restructurings across 15 Key Design Decisions. It focuses on interventions that occurred in Europe both in the years leading up to the adoption of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in 2014 (when many jurisdictions were constrained by a lack of legal authority) and in the years after the BRRD was in place. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the need for resolution and restructuring to eliminate uncertainty about an institution’s solvency by closing it, recapitalizing it, or merging it with a healthier institution; (b) the importance of effective valuation in achieving this result; (c) the necessity of clarity in the treatment of creditors; and (d) the value of a credible bail-in tool to incentivize creditors to agree to solutions outside of resolution.

Central bank swap arrangements gained new importance during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC) when wholesale funding markets contracted, causing severe liquidity strains. Led by the Federal Reserve, central banks, in their roles as lenders of last resort, redeployed this tool to provide liquidity in their currencies across borders to great effect. Since the GFC, swap arrangements have become key central bank policy tools and have been repeatedly used to address liquidity constraints. In this paper, we survey 67 swap and swap-like repurchase arrangements and frameworks from the 20th and 21st centuries. In addition, we analyze key design decisions of interest to policymakers seeking to design a central bank swap arrangement. We also review structural developments regarding this policy tool, such as the increasing use of repurchase (repo) arrangements in addition to swaps and multilateral regional swap facilities. We conclude that swap arrangements and related repo arrangements have proved an efficient response to liquidity strains, have become a standing tool to enhance the global financial stability safety net, and are likely to see continued use.

This paper is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers seeking to establish a market support program (MSP). Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who have already made the decision to use an MSP in designing the most effective program possible. Our insights derive from 23 case studies the Yale Program on Financial Stability produced and existing literature on the topic. By the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), market-based finance and traditional banking systems were significantly intertwined, and the panic in market-based finance threatened to spread quickly to both traditional banks and the real economy. In response, authorities in several advanced economies rolled out MSPs to ease the stress in wholesale-funding markets. In an earlier study, we surveyed 19 of these GFC-era programs along with two pre-GFC programs of similar design. The GFC programs were just a prelude, however, as central banks established or revived a variety of MSPs during the early months of the COVID-19 crisis. Many countries in both advanced and emerging markets acted quickly to improve liquidity and restore confidence in critical funding markets, as well as restart the flow of credit to households and businesses. In our review of these cases, we identified four major themes: (1) speed is important in the acute phase; (2) clear communication is a valuable policy tool in the acute phase, as announcement effects can be powerful; (3) combining MSPs with backup fiscal support can be a valuable tool; and (4) the use of a special purpose vehicle to house and manage the assets obtained through the program from the markets can be beneficial.

This paper surveys 10 blanket guarantee (BG) programs across 13 Key Design Decisions. The defining characteristics of these programs in terms of their inclusion in our BG series are (a) that they guaranteed a broader range of liabilities beyond deposit accounts and (b) that the guarantees covered existing liabilities in addition to newly issued ones. Each case represents an effort to eliminate creditors’ incentive to withdraw funding from institutions by guaranteeing that the funding will be paid back even if the institutions are unable to do so themselves. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the inability of blanket guarantees to address underlying problems without complementary liquidity support and restructuring measures; (b) the importance of credibility, particularly as related to the amount of liabilities guaranteed relative to fiscal resources; (c) the need to address the moral hazards that a blanket guarantee creates, by restricting banks’ behavior during the acute phase of a crisis—for example, through interest-rate caps or bans on aggressive marketing—and by promising to increase official supervisory oversight as the crisis extends into its chronic phase; (d) the importance of effective communication; and (e) the importance of clear political support for a program that represents potentially substantial fiscal costs, which authorities may be unable to quantify at the time of the announcement.

In this paper, we analyze broad-based emergency liquidity (BBEL) programs. Our main purpose is to assist policymakers who are considering establishing a BBEL program in designing the most effective program possible as efficiently as possible. Our insights are derived from 33 case studies the Yale Program on Financial Stability produced and existing literature on the topic. Liquidity provision is a long-established mandate of central banks and was a function that private entities performed even before the establishment of central banks. We survey a sampling of cases from the 19th through 21st centuries, drawn from 10 countries and regions, to distill what elements make for effective BBEL programs and which factors can jeopardize a program’s effectiveness. In our review of these cases, we identified five major themes: (1) early deployment of credible BBEL assistance in the acute phase of a crisis can serve to arrest or moderate the crisis and stop it from evolving into an extended chronic phase; (2) relying on existing authorities, programs, or administrative frameworks enables the efficient design and deployment of BBEL programs; (3) if the liquidity constraint persists, we often see the use of multiple BBEL programs to provide wide access to a broad range of participants; (4) other interventions also commonly employed alongside BBEL programs include credit and account guarantees in the acute phase and asset purchases, recapitalizations, and loan guarantees in the chronic phase; and (5) in all phases, clear communication is a valuable policy tool to drive utilization, and positive announcement effects are possible.

This paper surveys 27 account guarantee (AG) programs across 14 Key Design Decisions. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the importance of considering the effects of AG programs on other parts of the financial system or other jurisdictions, (b) the ability to address moral hazard through heightened supervision, which removes a potential obstacle to adopting AG programs in response to the acute phase of crises, (c) the necessity of developing guarantees that are credible and timely, and (d) the need to design standing AG programs with an eye toward how they will function during crises.

Banks have a private motive to hold some level of cash and liquid reserves, but the negative externalities of bank runs create a public interest in setting a regulatory level higher than the privately optimal level. We can think of such reserve requirements (RRs) as the original form of liquidity regulation. In this paper, we focus on 14 cases in which central banks adjusted RRs after crises hit, typically to deal with liquidity shortages in the banking system. We observe that RR adjustments have several advantages in a crisis: (1) such changes require little process, and the change for banks can be quick; (2) stigma concerns may be much lower than with emergency lending operations; (3) RRs can be used to fine-tune incentives for holding various types and maturities of assets; and (4) RR easing can complement a central bank’s other liquidity support programs.

In the fall of 2008, credit markets tightened amid a broader economic downturn that severely impacted the US auto industry, especially the three largest domestic manufacturers, General Motors (GM), Ford Motors, and Chrysler. The companies requested assistance from the government in a bid to stay afloat, but Congress declined to authorize funding. The Bush administration, however, provided bridge loans to GM and Chrysler under the Auto Industry Finance Program (AIFP), funded through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), to sustain them until the Obama administration was in place. Within months, the Obama administration decided that a speedy bankruptcy would be the appropriate way to restructure the companies into viable organizations. Treasury provided financing via TARP as Chrysler, then GM, went through an expedited bankruptcy process. In support of the restructurings, Treasury also provided assistance to GMAC, Chrysler Financial, and to certain auto suppliers, in addition to supporting consumer warranties, bringing total government support for the industry to approximately $80 billion. Although the government lost money on the AIFP, the rescue was relatively popular politically and both companies returned to profitability in 2011. This case discusses the various aspects of the government’s assistance to the auto industry that began in December 2008 and wound down in December 2013.

This paper surveys 36 broad-based capital injection (BBCI) programs and attempts to identify some best (and worst) practices. We argue that it is crucial to distinguish between programs implemented during acute (“panic”) and chronic (“debt overhang”) phases of a crisis, where the goals of program design should be different. In an acute phase, programs should be designed to influence the behavior of bank counterparties, while in chronic phases, the focus should be on bank behavior itself. With this framing, we identify seven themes to guide program design, and provide many illustrative examples for the policymaker’s tool kit.

Ten years after the Federal Reserve’s crisis-era bank stress test, it is time to recalibrate the stress tests for “peacetime.” Outside of a crisis, supervisors should tailor stress tests to focus on their comparative advantages by taking a macroprudential focus, with severe scenarios that enable them to learn about emerging risks in both traditional and shadow banking sectors. In peacetime, also, supervisors should emphasize risk management practices and be wary of forcing rapid changes in capital levels for individual banks, while linking stress-test results with countercyclical capital buffers across the system.

Dealing with high levels of nonperforming assets (NPAs) on bank balance sheets is one of the most challenging aspects of financial crisis management. High levels of NPAs can interfere with both bank profitability and general economic growth by increasing uncertainty about bank solvency and therefore funding costs, tying up resources and attention, and inhibiting new lending. One potential solution to the NPA problem is a centralized, government-driven effort to remove these assets from troubled institutions and then manage and sell them. Though such broad-based asset management (BBAM) programs existed even earlier in history, they appear to have become more common beginning in the 1980s and 1990s with the shift toward market-based financial systems in Africa, South America, and the former Soviet bloc, as well as with the advent of the Asian Financial Crisis. They were also a feature of the response to the Global Financial Crisis. While BBAM programs have been widely used, whether or not such a program makes sense to address a given situation is highly context-specific, and special attention must be paid to the incentives of those involved. Important considerations include the political and legal context in which the program will operate, the nature and extent of the NPAs to be managed, and the availability of the necessary expertise. There is also evidence to suggest that BBAM programs are ineffective in isolation and must be coupled with recapitalization.

The virulence of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC) was explained in large part by the increased reliance of the global financial system on market-based funding and the lack of preexisting tools to address a disruption in that type of system. This paper surveys market liquidity programs (MLPs), which we define as government interventions in which the key motivation is to stabilize liquidity in a specific wholesale funding market that is under stress. Most of the MLPs surveyed in this paper were launched during and after the GFC, but two pre-GFC MLPs are included. A subsequent survey on MLPs in response to the COVID-19 crisis is forthcoming. MLPs focus on markets that a central bank believes are critical to financial stability. Stress in these markets could be interfering with monetary policy transmission or disrupting the smooth flow of credit to the real economy. MLPs depart from traditional central bank responses to a systemwide liquidity crisis. MLPs have used a variety of techniques that central bankers would typically consider nonstandard for the purpose of promoting liquidity in wholesale funding markets. These include (1) targeted lender-of-last resort activities, (2) lending securities for securities, (3) lending cash for securities, (4) largescale asset purchases, (5) targeted asset purchases, and (6) indirect asset purchases.

One of the hallmarks of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 was the rapid evaporation of the non-deposit, wholesale funding many financial institutions had become increasingly reliant upon in the years leading up to the crisis. In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, governments became increasingly concerned about even fundamentally sound institutions’ ability to access necessary funding. In response, beginning in October 2008, authorities across the globe began introducing guarantee programs enabling institutions to issue debt that would be backed by a guarantee from the government in exchange for a guarantee fee. While the specific details of these programs varied (sometimes widely in ways that allow for interesting comparisons), some version of this basic idea was implemented by over twenty countries. The programs saw significant use in the aggregate but were not uniformly utilized. They are generally seen as having achieved their objectives but may also in certain circumstances have had unintended consequences such as market distortions based on flawed fee structures and the crowding out of non-guaranteed debt.

We examine the role of assetbacked security collateralized debt obligations (ABS CDOs) as a primary catalyst for the financial crisis. We show how ABS CDOs became the main investment vehicle for the riskiest investment-grade securities in the private-label mortgage market. We estimate a final tally of writedowns on ABS CDOs, $410 billion in total, with $325 billion assumed by AAA and "super-senior" securities, which had minimal capital, margin, or liquidity requirements. Pre-crisis regulations allowed excessive leverage at some firms investing in these securities, imperiling their solvency and placing them at the center of the financial crisis.

Stress testing, which has its roots in risk management, should be adapted to support financial stability monitoring and to incorporate the interconnections and dynamics of the financial system. Since the 2008 financial crisis, bank supervisors have honed their financial stability monitoring tools and significantly expanded the use of stress testing in the supervision of the largest financial institutions. This paper describes areas in which further research could contribute to the development of best practices in stress testing and how stress tests can be made more useful for macroprudential supervision. Both near-term and longer-term objectives are discussed.

Since the financial crisis of 2007-2009, policymakers have debated the need for a new toolkit of cyclical 'macroprudential' policies to constrain the build-up of risks in financial markets, for example, by dampening credit-fueled asset bubbles. These discussions tend to ignore America's long and varied history with many of the instruments under consideration to smooth the credit cycle, presumably because of their sparse usage in the last three decades. We provide the first comprehensive survey and historic narrative of these efforts. The tools whose background and use we describe include underwriting standards, reserve requirements, deposit rate ceilings, credit growth limits, supervisory pressure, and other financial regulatory policy actions. The contemporary debates over these tools highlighted a variety of concerns, including 'speculation,' undesirable rates of inflation, and high levels of consumer spending, among others. Ongoing statistical work suggests that macroprudential tightening lowers consumer debt but macroprudential easing does not increase it.