However helpful have been the papers, reports, and books Erik Parens has produced while at The Hastings Center, conversation with him has always been even better. In both his writing and conversation, he goes to core values. As Erik departs Hastings-retiring as of the end of June 2026 to commit himself more fully to teaching, his original professional love-the loss of these conversational interactions will be felt profoundly, not just at Hastings but in bioethics broadly.

Researchers have been using generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) to support writing manuscripts for several years now. However, as GenAI evolves and scientists are using it more frequently, the case for mandatory disclosure of GenAI for writing assistance continues to diverge from the initial justifications for disclosure, namely (1) preventing researchers from taking credit for work done by machines; (2) enabling other researchers to critically evaluate a manuscript and its specific claims; and (3) helping editors determine if a submission satisfies their editorial policies. Our initial position (communicated through previous publications) regarding GenAI use for writing assistance was in favor of mandatory disclosure. Nevertheless, as we show in this paper, we have changed our position and now support instituting a voluntary disclosure policy because currently (1) the credit due to machines for assisting researchers is moving below the threshold of requiring recognition; (2) it is impractical (if not impossible) to accurately specify what parts of the text are human-/GenAI-generated; and (3) disclosures could increase biases against non-native speakers of the English language and compromise the integrity of the peer review system. Consequently, we argue, it should be up to the authors of manuscripts to disclose their use of GenAI for writing assistance. For example, in disciplines where writing is the hallmark of originality, or when authors believe disclosure is beneficial, a voluntary checkbox in manuscript submission systems, visible only after publication (rather than a free-text note in the manuscripts) would be preferable.

What circumstances might justify deliberate, full extinction of a species?

Advancing neuroscience is one of many topics that pose a challenge often called "the alignment problem"-the challenge, that is, of assuring that science policy is responsive to and in some sense squares with the public's values. This issue of the Hastings Center Report launches a series of scholarly essays and articles on the ethical and social issues raised by this vast body of medical research and bench science. The series, which will run under the banner "Neuroscience and Society," is supported by the Dana Foundation and seeks to promote deliberative public engagement, broadly understood, about neuroscience. As a social goal, deliberative public engagement is both ubiquitous and elusive-called for everywhere yet difficult to undertake at a national level on a complex scientific topic. To be meaningful, deliberative public engagement must occur in many locations in a society and be carried forward by many actors. Scholarly writing might contribute in several ways.

In different ways, the November-December 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report contests the view that science is a value-free endeavor to understand the world. The lead article argues that, while most science is commendable, some is inherently “abhorrent,” as it is both harmful and devoid of value. Contemporary “race science”—the work of a “new wave of race researchers” who use “questionable scientific techniques to investigate alarming hypotheses regarding the genomic basis of differences in cognitive abilities between racial and ethnic groups”—is, for the authors, a paradigmatic case of abhorrent science. The intersection of genomics and values is also the subject of a special report, “Toward a More Just Genomics,” published with this issue .

In late December 1973, the United States enacted what some would come to call “the pitbull of environmental laws.” In the 50 years since, the formidable regulatory teeth of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) have been credited with considerable successes, obliging agencies to draw upon the best available science to protect species and habitats. Yet human pressures continue to push the planet toward extinctions on a massive scale. With that prospect looming, and with scientific understanding ever changing, Science invited experts to discuss how the ESA has evolved and what its future might hold. —Brad Wible

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform many aspects of scholarly publishing. Authors, peer reviewers, and editors might use AI in a variety of ways, and those uses might augment their existing work or might instead be intended to replace it. We are editors of bioethics and humanities journals who have been contemplating the implications of this ongoing transformation. We believe that generative AI may pose a threat to the goals that animate our work but could also be valuable for achieving those goals. In the interests of fostering a wider conversation about how generative AI may be used, we have developed a preliminary set of recommendations for its use in scholarly publishing. We hope that the recommendations and rationales set out here will help the scholarly community navigate toward a deeper understanding of the strengths, limits, and challenges of AI for responsible scholarly work.

This essay summarizes key insights across the essays in the Hastings Center Report's special report "Time to Rebuild: Essays on Trust in Health Care and Science." These insights concern trust and trustworthiness as distinct concepts, competence as a necessary but not sufficient input to trust, trust as a reciprocal good, trust as an interpersonal as well as structural phenomena, the ethical impermissibility of seeking to win trust without being trustworthy, building and borrowing trust as distinct strategies, and challenges to trustworthiness posed by the contingent nature of science. Together, these insights stand to advance an area of research that we believe has been historically stymied by conceptual confusion and a long-standing insistence on treating trust as a purely instrumental good.

Several pieces in the Hastings Center Report's May-June 2022 issue concern research ethics issues that arise in learning health care systems. In the lead article, Stephanie Morain and colleagues propose a new ethical framework for pragmatic clinical trials (PCTs), which are trials embedded in clinical care. Their framework consists of eight dimensions of demonstrating respect for patients enrolled in PCTs. In the second article, Robert Steel argues that patients being treated in a learning health care system can be required to participate in a clinical trial even if the risk to them is more than minimal. If they wish to refuse, they must either forgo treatment in the system or seek it elsewhere. Three commentaries explore various dimensions of Steel's argument. A third article in the issue turns in a different direction, to assumptions in bioethics about the quality of lives lived with disability. The authors, Debjani Mukherjee, Preya Tarsney, and Kristi Kirschner, find much that needs to change and offer recommendations for improvements at multiple levels.

In the Hastings Center Report's March-April 2022 issue, Diana Anderson, an architect and physician, and her colleagues examine ways in which aspects of the physical design of health care facilities can function as health interventions. The authors identify the kinds of ethical questions such interventions raise, and they offer recommendations for protecting patients and promoting good and fair patient outcomes. A second article focuses on how clinicians who provide patients with implantable medical devices have become dependent on health support workers who are employed by the device manufacturers themselves. The authors argue that this reliance disrupts the epistemic practices on which clinical decision-making depends and can therefore be damaging to patient care. Accompanying the regular part of this issue is a special report on the antiracism work needed in bioethics.

Both articles in the November-December 2021 issue of the Hastings Center Report reflect bioethics' growing interest in questions of justice, or more generally, questions of how collective interests constrain individual interests. Hugh Desmond argues that human enhancement should be reconsidered in light of developments in the field of human evolution. Contemporary understandings in this area lead, he argues, to a new way of thinking about the ethics of enhancement-an approach that replaces personal autonomy with group benefit as the primary criterion for deciding what enhancements are acceptable. In the second article, Johannes Kniess considers the many attempts within bioethics to draw on John Rawls's work to discuss health care access and social determinants of health, and he comes across as moderately optimistic that Rawls's theory of justice has ongoing relevance.

How strong is the argument for requiring public deliberation by very large publics-at national or even global levels-before moving forward with efforts to use gene editing on wild populations of plants or animals? Should there be a general moratorium on any such efforts until such broad public deliberation has been successfully carried out? This article works toward recommendations about the need for and general framing of broad public deliberation. It finds that broad public deliberation is highly desirable but not flatly necessary before moving forward with any local cases of gene editing in the wild. It also finds that broad public deliberation would be most helpful in generating very general guidance and is unlikely to be appropriate for specific cases. Broad public deliberation is most helpful for cases that involve higher levels of uncertainty and moral ambiguity, but separating out a distinct class of cases for deliberation is not yet possible.

This essay introduces a special report from The Hastings Center entitled Democracy in Crisis: Civic Learning and the Reconstruction of Common Purpose, which grew out of a project supported by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. This multiauthored report offers wide-ranging assessments of increasing polarization and partisanship in American government and politics, and it proposes constructive responses to this in the provision of objective information, institutional reforms in government and the electoral system, and a reexamination of cultural and political values needed if democracy is to function well in a pluralistic and diverse society. The essays in the special report explore the norms of civic learning and institutions, social movements, and communal innovations that can revitalize civic learning in practice. This introductory essay defines and explains the notion of civic learning, which is a lynchpin connecting many of the essays in the report. Civic learning pertains to the ways in which citizens learn about collective social problems and make decisions about them that reflect the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. Such learning can occur in many social settings in everyday life, and it can also be facilitated through participation in the processes of democratic governance on many levels. Civic learning is not doctrinaire and is compatible with a range of public goals and policies. It is an activity that increases what might be called the democratic capability of a people.

This is the concluding essay for a special report from The Hastings Center entitled Democracy in Crisis: Civic Learning and the Reconstruction of Common Purpose, which grew out of a project supported by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation. This essay provides an integrative discussion of various theoretical and practical reform perspectives offered by other essays in the report. It also offers a number of recommendations. It notes that the aim of the special report is not to propose specific reform measures but, rather, to consider larger, more theoretic concerns related to political and economic questions, which are personal and structural-psychological, cultural, and institutional-at the same time. In response, this essay argues that the best relationship between the citizenry and government in a democracy is not one of deference, nor one of contestation, but one that is critically constructive, which in turn is linked to practices of civic learning. To be constructive, citizens need scientific literacy, an understanding of how government and other institutions work, critical thinking abilities, and many open and diverse forums for civic learning to offset the increasingly isolating media "bubbles" that are the only source of information for many. The essay then formulates five recommendations designed to facilitate critically constructive citizenship and civic learning. These are creating a basis for civic participation, acquiring information, talking to each other, designing institutional change, and achieving deliberation.

Social debates about highly technical topics are often driven by values yet dwell on facts. The debate about whether genetically modified organisms are acceptable in food, for example, focuses on causal claims about consumers' health or the environment, but the language and imagery surrounding it often point to underlying misgivings about the human relationship to nature or the use of science. In such cases, it is not always possible to resolve the factual disputes simply by articulating the facts better. Because of various features of human reasoning-cognitive biases and heuristics, the very nature of facts, and the central role of social trust in how people learn-facts cannot be fully disentangled from values. Three lessons can then be drawn. First, values sometimes need to be discussed at the outset of debate, before or while addressing facts. Second, factual issues can and should sometimes be framed in less politicized ways. Third, factual claims that have a limited evidentiary basis may nonetheless need to be aired and discussed.

Genetic editing technologies have long been used to modify domesticated nonhuman animals and plants. Recently, attention and funding have also been directed toward projects for modifying nonhuman organisms in the shared environment-that is, in the "wild." Interest in gene editing nonhuman organisms for wild release is motivated by a variety of goals, and such releases hold the possibility of significant, potentially transformative benefit. The technologies also pose risks and are often surrounded by a high uncertainty. Given the stakes, scientists and advisory bodies have called for public engagement in the science, ethics, and governance of gene editing research in nonhuman organisms. Most calls for public engagement lack details about how to design a broad public deliberation, including questions about participation, how to structure the conversations, how to report on the content, and how to link the deliberations to policy. We summarize the key design elements that can improve broad public deliberations about gene editing in the wild.

I was recently asked to report on editorial trends in the Hastings Center Report, past and future. What I reported is that HCR has been going in two seemingly contrasting directions. One has to do with moral decision-making in clinical ethics-the core theme in bioethics for fifty years, but still developing. A second editorial trend is treatment of larger social and political issues that bear on health, such as public health interventions and access to health care. I could also have noted a continuing stream of pieces on emerging technologies, from whole-genome screening for newborns to artificial intelligence in clinical diagnoses to the so-called de-extinction of extinct animals and plants through various genetic and reproductive tricks. This January-February 2019 issue of HCR reflects all these trends.

The March-April issue of the Hastings Center Report offers another in a series of articles over the last few years on the structure and the ethics of surrogate decision-making. Here, Daniel Brudney addresses how to help the surrogate deal with a treatment decision. A core insight he offers is that the structure of the surrogate's decision has been misunderstood and the misunderstanding makes the task yet harder. As usually understood, the surrogate is supposed to be guided by the question, what would the patient choose, if the patient were making the choice herself? Brudney argues that this conception is impossible, and that the surrogate's task is instead to consider the patient's best interests, as illuminated in part by the patient's expressed values and past choices. This understanding leads, he argues, to a different guiding question: what could the patient choose, given her values?

What are the boundaries of bioethics? Where does bioethics give way to other kinds of ethics-organizational ethics, environmental ethics, social ethics, or just ethics? According to one commonly cited account of the origin of bioethics, the field always had a relatively broad remit; it was supposed to be about the ethics of the life sciences in general. In the early days of bioethics, however, the topic that seemed most in need of critical attention was the encounter between experts in medicine and the laity-doctors or medical researchers on the one hand and patients or medical research subjects on the other. Even given the narrow focal point, however, bioethics very naturally expanded. Much of the September-October 2018 issue of the Hastings Center Report either argues or assumes that bioethics extends well beyond into social ethics. A special report published as a supplement to this issue pushes the point explicitly.