In response to King’s article on cohesion, this author submitted a critique, “The Essence of Military Group Cohesion” (2007), based on 20 years of research. The critique noted that King had set up several strawmen and presented a narrow focus. Furthermore, the critique introduced the Standard Model of Military Group Cohesion as a more widely useful approach. The Model was further articulated in “Key Questions and Challenges to the Standard Model of Military Group Cohesion” (2011) and “The Misconceived Construct of Task Cohesion” (2015). This current article describes major conceptual and measurement efforts leading up to the development of the Model, critiques and expansions of the Model, and needed future research to refine the Model as well as combine cohesion with other key variables such as motivation, combatant capacity, and leadership to more fully explain variation in key military outcome variables such as unit performance and retention.
A prior special issue of this journal attempts to broaden the perspective on military cohesion. While such broadening is desirable, the lead issue author incorporates only a narrow portion of relevant literature, makes misleading assertions, does not distinguish the difference between conducting studies and carrying out social scientific research, and fails to appreciate the advances made in scalable microlevel cohesion research. This commentary notes the limited literature cited, summarizes the distinction between a study and science, and suggests issues and concepts to be addressed to make a stronger start in research on military cohesion at the meso- and macrolevels.
Following the publication of Anthony King's 2006 article in Armed Forces & Society (The Word of Command: Communication and Cohesion in the Military), Guy Siebold and Anthony King debated the issue of cohesion, in our Disputatio Sine Fine section. King's new book The Combat Soldier grew out of that exchange. The following essay continues the debate by reviewing King's book. The pieces gathered in in this Disputatio are intended as atemporaryconclusion to these discussions.
Group cohesion is very basic to the human condition and derived from the most fundamental nature of humans as found in the terminology of I am, I go, and I do. Group cohesion is found in the relationships of group members and their perceived capacity for joint action to achieve their missions. For some time the construct of task cohesion has been incorrectly or ambiguously included in the conceptualization of group cohesion. However, task cohesion, if used at all in the context of military group cohesion, should be considered part of the set of performance criteria as in cohesive task performance rather than as part of the cohesion predictor space. The author requests future researchers adopt this preferred word usage.
The Standard Model has become the primary approach to military group cohesion. Yet the key theoretical drivers that explain where the Model came from have not been well articulated. This article addresses that deficiency by presenting those main drivers in past research and the key questions derived from the research that guided development of the Model. Additionally, recent research has brought several potential challenges to the Standard Model, which also have not been well articulated or presented together in one place. This effort addresses those theoretical problems as well as logically deduced challenges, which in all have been labeled by the author as the Horizon Problem, Individual Differences Problem, Roman Road Problem, Reductionist Problem, Life Cycle Problem, Frame Problem, Common Goal Problem, and Action Problem. Some limits to the Standard Model are noted in the process of showing how the Model can accommodate these challenges.
A wide array of variables was used to determine those critical for peer group cohesion in the Finnish Defence Forces. Data were collected by questionnaires and records from 977 conscripts over 6 months of service. The best predictors of peer cohesion were personal sociability, primary group relationships, and secondary group experiences (R 2 = .52). Changes in cohesion were associated with changes in company climate, expected group performance, hazing, leadership, social adjustment, and training motivation (R 2 = .26). Higher cohesion was related to more positive training performance, expected combat performance, and attitudes toward national defense. Categories of variables needed to conduct peer group cohesion research are identified.
This paper looks at how well a sample of basic trainees in the Finnish Defence Forces expected to adjust to military service and whether their expectations were related to their later adjustment and other criteria. (...) The paper is divided into several sections. The first section describes the call up and training process in the Finnish The second section portrays prior research findings about adjustment to military service. The third section presents the sample, methods, and main measures used in the analyses for the paper. The fourth section provides the findings from the analyses, and the fifth section contains a discussion of the findings and their implications concerning adjustment of service members to the military.
: The research note contains a literature review of research on the transfer of training; it is intended for use by educational researchers and psychologists. The note includes information and comments on the relevance of transfer of training to what it labels as Army XXI environments, i.e., environments that might be found in the Army in the future and similar to those in what have been called the digital force and the objective force. The note presents different conceptualizations and measures of the construct of transfer of training, criticism of experimental findings in the area. a listing of the instructional and non-instructional sources of variation in the transfer of training, transfer enhancement through constructivist methods, additional thinking skills research, and the role of technology. Future research directions are suggested.
The military has been a fertile source of data to address broad sociological theories and problems that cut across several areas of inquiry. Research on the military has contributed to attitude research, small groups, race relations, social change, the family, professions, and political economy. However, missing is a generally accepted core to military sociology, i.e., central issues and theory. This core must be identified and researched so that findings can be accumulated and the field can contribute fully to sociology. Candidate issue areas are: (a) the ethos of the military profession, (b) the military as an institution and organization, (c) civil-military relations, and (d) military relations with other governmental agencies and militaries. These issue areas require clarification and more articulated theories that are addressed by empirical research.
: This research examined the perceptions of 995 soldiers in light infantry platoons concerning standard incentives in their unit and whether the incentives were given to the right soldiers. Incentives examined were (1) public recognition for a job well done, (2) passes, (3) awards, (4) specialized training courses, (5) letters of appreciation or commendation, and (6) promotions. About 70% of the soldiers reported that the incentives were only seldom or occasionally used; about 50% responded that they were sometimes given to the wrong people. Use of the incentives was significantly correlated with the levels of soldier motivation, job satisfaction, identification with the Army, pride in being a platoon member, cohesion, unit climate, perceived training proficiency, and positive unit training expectations. The report includes suggestions to improve the management of incentives.
: For this research, leaders from a battalion that had completed a rotation through the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 3 weeks earlier were given a questionnaire and/or were interviewed. They responded that training at the JRTC was realistic and somewhat stressful and that JRTC after-action reviews were very useful. The capabilities most important for platoon leaders at the JRTC were technical and tactical proficiency, initiative, and decision making; those for company commanders were planning, decision making, and communication. Platoon cohesion correlated significantly with perceived platoon performance (r = .40). The leaders provided many suggestions on how to train for a JRTC rotation. (cp)
: This report describes the relationships between measures of cohesion obtained on nine U.S. Army light infantry platoons at home station and the subsequent performance of those platoons at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The JRTC performance was measured by observer/controllers using tank evaluation and observation checklists and also by company commanders using summary ratings. When outlier cases were controlled, bonding among leaders, soldiers, and between leaders and their soldiers was strong and correlated significantly with platoon performance as measured by the observer/controllers. Correlations with company commander ratings were positive but not significant. The strongest correlations were between the types of bonding listed above and the preparation subtask of task performance. However, because of the limited number of platoons involved, replication is needed to confirm the results, and caution must be used in drawing conclusions.