AbstractThis cross-disciplinary symposium on Friedrich Kratochwil's The Status of Law in International Society engages with the interconnections between social knowledge (theory) and action (practice). Each contributor reflects critically on one of Kratochwil's nine meditations. These co-meditations cover not only Kratochwil's work, but they deepen discussions on the role of legal norms in international society, the practice turn, pragmatism, the production of knowledge, and human action. Kratochwil's reply to his co-meditators pushes the limits of prevailing thought on praxis. As a whole, the symposium exemplifies how we find ourselves always in the midst of theory and practice.

AbstractThis foreword frames the Symposium in two ways. It summarises the core themes running through the nine ‘meditations’ inThe Status of Law in World Society. Moreover, it places these themes in the wider context of Kratochwil's critical engagement with how we pursue knowledge of and in the social world and translate this knowledge into action. Ultimately, also his pragmatic approach cannot escape the tensions between theoryandpractice. Instead, we are in the midst of both.

Abstract Kratochwil's diagnostic approach identifies specific failures in particular, historical contexts in order to prescribe practically realisable remedies under non-ideal conditions. The diagnostic approach compares actual alternatives against each other rather than against some ideal. Yet, the basis for such an identification is unclear. By reinterpreting Kratochwil's approach with the help of Buddha's Four Noble Truths, one can understand Kratochwil's existential worldview and his aims, but the medium Kratochwil uses hinders the attainment of those goals. He tries to communicate in writing something (phronesis) that belongs in the world of experience.

This chapter outlines some strategies and tactics of conceptual analysis. Concepts are defined and understood through other concepts. Thus, even though conceptual analysis focuses usually on a single concept, it is necessary to consider also the other concepts used for defining and understanding it. In addition to etymology being a simple and effective starting position in conceptual analysis, there are also wider reasons for the evolution of a concept and its meanings. A concept may be expressed with more than one word. Literal synonyms are different words for the same concept. A deeper conceptual analysis goes to the meta-level and considers for instance the beliefs, assumptions and identities one must hold in order for something to be intelligible. The results of conceptual analysis may remain at the level of conveying the meaning and impact of something and the reasons for it.

Abstract This foreword frames the Symposium in two ways. It summarises the core themes running through the nine ‘meditations’ in The Status of Law in World Society. Moreover, it places these themes in the wider context of Kratochwil's critical engagement with how we pursue knowledge of and in the social world and translate this knowledge into action. Ultimately, also his pragmatic approach cannot escape the tensions between theory and practice. Instead, we are in the midst of both.

Different theoretical orientations may be organized with the help of generations, but despite of its benefits, this practice is suspicious. In this article we present the third generation project in social constructivism and apply it to Finnish language securitization theory discussions during this millennium. Our research shows that any theoretical orientation might have a need for its own “third generation” if that is understood as a scientific reminder and as an insurance against neglecting the insights in that orientation’s early research. Yet, despite its benefits, the use of generations entails generalizations, the use of power, and disciplining. It is not self-evident that the use of generations will advance science or scientific discussion. Instead of such generalizing concepts, it would be more beneficial to avoid them and instead to focus on particular studies and their merits and problems.

The history of social constructivism in International Relations (IR) is marked by cognitive change and continuity. This paper’s argument begins by assuming that constructivism is a contested concept. Yet, Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances helps in understanding why an essence of constructivism need not be found. Within this constructivist family, there are different modes of cognition, or different understandings of legitimate processes of knowing. The paper identifies two different modes, one joined, the other separate but equal. Third generation constructivists could contribute to constructivism’s evolution by communicating (better) their mode of cognition. The paper draws from Wittgenstein, Gestalt psychology, and modern physics to suggest cognitive duality, illustrated with an example from global law. Physics-envy may be healthy if it differs from what IR is accustomed to. Keywords : social constructivism, third generation, cognition, Gestalt psychology, duality, Wittgenstein ----- Bibliography: Peltonen, Hannes: Constructivism, Cognition, and Duality, ERIS, 3-2016, pp. 76-86. https://doi.org/10.3224/eris.v3i3.27344

Constructivism in International Relations (IR) is popular, but constructivists seem disappointed. Allegedly something has been lost. Such criticisms are misplaced. There was never a uniform Constructivism. Since constructivism is socially constructed, to argue that constructivism has evolved “wrongly” is odd. This paper explains the dissatisfaction with constructivism followed by a second reading of its evolution as a tale of two cognitions. These two cognitions distinguish genera in the constructivist “family”. A criticism against one genus based on the cognition of the other is unfair. A focus on cognitions and the use of genera helps in perceiving constructivism’s future evolution.

Abstract Constructivism in the social sciences has known several ups and downs over the last decades. It was successful rather early in sociology but hotly contested in International Politics/Relations (IR). Oddly enough, just at the moment it made important inroads into the research agenda and became accepted by the mainstream, enthusiasm for it waned. Many constructivists—as did mainstream scholars—moved from “grand theory” or even “meta-theory” toward “normal science,” or experimented with other (eclectic) approaches, of which the turns to practices, to emotions, to new materialism, to the visual, and to the queer are some of the latest manifestations. In a way, constructivism was “successful,” on the one hand, by introducing norms, norm-dynamics, and diffusion; the role of new actors in world politics; and the changing role of institutions into the debates, while losing, on the other hand, much of its critical potential. The latter survived only on the fringes—and in Europe more than in the United States. In IR, curiously, constructivism, which was rooted in various European traditions (philosophy, history, linguistics, social analysis), was originally introduced in Europe via the disciplinary discussions taking place in the United States. Yet, especially in its critical version, it has found a more conducive environment in Europe than in the United States. In the United States, soon after its emergence, constructivism became “mainstreamed” by having its analysis of norms reduced to “variable research.” In such research, positive examples of, for instance, the spread of norms were included, but strangely empirical evidence of counterexamples of norm “deaths” (preventive strikes, unlawful combatants, drone strikes, extrajudicial killings) were not. The elective affinity of constructivism and humanitarianism seemed to have transformed the former into the Enlightenment project of “progress.” Even Kant was finally pressed into the service of “liberalism” in the US discussion, and his notion of the “practical interest of reason” morphed into the political project of an “end of history.” This “slant” has prevented a serious conceptual engagement with the “history” of law and (inter-)national politics and the epistemological problems that are raised thereby. This bowdlerization of constructivism is further buttressed by the fact that in the “knowledge industry” none of the “leading” US departments has a constructivist on board, ensuring thereby the narrowness of conceptual and methodological choices to which the future “professionals” are exposed. The aim here, in exploring constructivism and its emergence within a changing world and within the evolution of the discipline, is not to provide a definition or a typology of constructivism, since such efforts go against the critical dimension of constructivism. An application of this critique on constructivism itself leads to a reflection on truth, knowledge, and the need for (re-)orientation.

Recently, increasing references are made to the international community that is conceptually and analytically useful when distinguished from the international society. Supposedly, the relations of some international agents can be described as a community due to their shared we-feeling, identity or ethos. This article discusses 'thick' and 'thin' international communities and suggests additional criteria that ought to be considered when determining whether a particular actor or agent is or is not a member of the international community. Moreover, the article suggests a dynamic conception of the international community as a context-dependent configuration rather than as some relatively stable subgroup of the international society. In this sense, this article offers an innovative perspective to collectivities through a focus on the international community. On a different level, this opportunity is used to draw attention to the roles beliefs play in and in the study of international politics.

Th is paper examines the international order envisioned by Responsibility to Protect (R2P). With a heuristic tool it argues that particular international activities can be perceived as communal crime prevention eff orts against internationally condemned crimes. Second, it proposes how the R2P framework challenges the wider international order. For example, the full implementation of the world envisioned from within the R2P framework might require a signifi cant functional transformation of international law. R2P is not only a re-characterization of sovereignty as responsibility but an alternative world order.

Abstract Since its popular appearance in 2001, the responsibility to protect has gained wide attention. Yet, the meaning of responsibility in the R2P report has remained unexamined. The first task of this article is to conceptualise responsibility as it seems to arise from the R2P report. It is argued that the responsibility in the report is collective in nature, and analogous to obligations erga omnes and collective responsibility to extinguish fires before the institutionalisation of fire departments. The second task is to provide a model of collective responsibility with criteria that allow dividing the burden of fulfilling the common responsibility among the members of the collective. The model bridges the conceptual level with the level of practice.