In the last decade many researchers have obtained evidence for the idea that cognition shares processing mechanisms with perception and action. Most of the evidence supporting the grounded cognition framework focused on representations of concrete concepts, which leaves open the question how abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor processing. One promising idea is that people simulate concrete situations and introspective experiences to represent abstract concepts [Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005). Situating abstract concepts. In D. Pecher, & R. A. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, and thinking (pp. 129-163). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.], although this has not yet been investigated a lot. A second idea, which more researchers have investigated, is that people use metaphorical mappings from concrete to abstract concepts [Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press.]. According to this conceptual metaphor theory, image schemas structure and provide sensory-motor grounding for abstract concepts. Although there is evidence that people automatically activate image schemas when they process abstract concepts, we argue that situations are also needed to fully represent meaning.

Numbers might be understood by grounding in spatial orientation, where small numbers are represented as low or to the left and large numbers are represented as high or to the right. We presented numbers in concrete (seven shoes in a shoe shop) or abstract (29 - 7) contexts and asked participants to make relative magnitude judgments. Following the judgment a target letter was presented at the top or bottom (Experiments 1-3) or left or right (Experiment 4) of the visual field. Participants were better at identifying letters at congruent than incongruent locations, but this effect was obtained only when numbers were presented in concrete contexts. We conclude that spatial grounding might have a smaller role for numbers in abstract than in concrete context.

In the last decade many researchers have obtained evidence for the idea that cognition shares processing mechanisms with perception and action. Most of the evidence supporting the grounded cognition framework focused on representations of concrete concepts, which leaves open the question how abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor processing. One promising idea is that people simulate concrete situations and introspective experiences to represent abstract concepts [Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005). Situating abstract concepts. In D. Pecher, & R. A. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, and thinking (pp. 129–163). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.], although this has not yet been investigated a lot. A second idea, which more researchers have investigated, is that people use metaphorical mappings from concrete to abstract concepts [Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press.]. According to this conceptual metaphor theory, image schemas structure and provide sensory-motor grounding for abstract concepts. Although there is evidence that people automatically activate image schemas when they process abstract concepts, we argue that situations are also needed to fully represent meaning.

In the present study we investigated whether the mental representation of the concept categories is represented by the container image schema (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In two experiments participants decided whether two pictures were from the same category (animal or vehicle). Pictures were presented inside or outside a frame that should activate the container schema. We found that performance to pictures was influenced by the frame in congruence with the metaphorical mapping (same category - inside bounded region; different category - not in same bounded region). These results show that the concept categories is metaphorically represented by containers.

Thinking about the abstract concept power may automatically activate the spatial up-down image schema (powerful up; powerless down) and consequently direct spatial attention to the image schema-congruent location. Participants indicated whether a word represented a powerful or powerless person (e.g. 'king' or 'servant'). Following each decision, they identified a target at the top or bottom of the visual field. In Experiment 1 participants identified the target faster when their spatial position was congruent with the perceived power of the preceding word than when it was incongruent. In Experiment 2 ERPs showed a higher N1 amplitude for congruent spatial positions. These results support the view that attention is driven to the image schema congruent location of a power word. Thus, power is partially understood in terms of vertical space, which demonstrates that abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor processing.

Previous studies (e.g., Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Wagenmakers, 2005) found that semantic classification performance is better for target words with orthographic neighbors that are mostly from the same semantic class (e.g., living) compared to target words with orthographic neighbors that are mostly from the opposite semantic class (e.g., nonliving). In the present study we investigated the contribution of phonology to orthographic neighborhood effects by comparing effects of phonologically congruent orthographic neighbors (book-hook) to phonologically incongruent orthographic neighbors (sand-wand). The prior presentation of a semantically congruent word produced larger effects on subsequent animacy decisions when the previously presented word was a phonologically congruent neighbor than when it was a phonologically incongruent neighbor. In a second experiment, performance differences between target words with versus without semantically congruent orthographic neighbors were larger if the orthographic neighbors were also phonologically congruent. These results support models of visual word recognition that assume an important role for phonology in cascaded access to meaning.

The conceptual metaphor theory states that abstract concepts are represented by image schemas from concrete domains. In the present study we investigated the mapping for SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS using tasks with nonlinguistic materials. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants decided whether two squares were similar or dissimilar in colour. The spatial distance between the squares was varied. Performance to similar colours was better at shorter distances, whereas performance to dissimilar colours was better at longer distances. In Experiments 3 and 4 participants made distance decisions to similar and dissimilar colours squares. Performance was not affected by similarity. These results show that metaphorical mappings can be found even beyond the context of linguistic metaphors and that the mapping between SIMILARITY and CLOSENESS is asymmetrical.

We report an experiment that compared two explanations for the effect of congruency between a word's on screen spatial position and its meaning. On one account, congruency is explained by the match between position and a mental simulation of meaning. Alternatively, congruency is explained by the polarity alignment principle. To distinguish between these accounts we presented the same object names (e.g., shark, helicopter) in a sky decision task or an ocean decision task, such that response polarity and typical location were disentangled. Sky decision responses were faster to words at the top of the screen compared to words at the bottom of the screen, but the reverse was found for ocean decision responses. These results are problematic for the polarity principle, and support the claim that spatial attention is directed by mental simulation of the task-relevant conceptual dimension.

Many models of word recognition predict that neighbours of target words will be activated during word processing. Cascaded models can make the additional prediction that semantic features of those neighbours get activated before the target has been uniquely identified. In two semantic decision tasks neighbours that were congruent (i.e., from the same category) or incongruent (i.e., from the opposite category) were presented in a long-term priming paradigm. Performance to targets was better if they were primed by congruent neighbours than if they were primed by incongruent neighbours. The same effect was found for rhyming and nonrhyming primes. The results support cascaded models that allow semantic information to become activated before lexical selection has finished.

Participants studied lists of nonwords (e.g., froost, floost, stoost, etc.) that were orthographic-phonologically similar to a nonpresented critical lure, which was also a nonword (e.g., ploost). Experiment 1 showed a high level of false recognition for the critical lure. Experiment 2 showed that the false recognition effect was also present for forewarned participants who were informed about the nature of the false recognition effect and told to avoid making false recognition judgments. The present results show that false recognition effects can be obtained even when the critical lure itself is not stored during study. This finding is problematic for accounts that attribute false memories to implicit associative responses or spreading activation but is easily explained by global familiarity models of recognition memory.