Building on a review of pertinent literature, we draw attention to preference‐expressive choice — decisions that appear to reveal a well‐established individual preference — and propose that such choices can be shaped by a distinct epistemic metacognitive state: the feeling of preference (FOP). FOP is the perception that one has, or should be able to form, a preference in a given domain, even before encountering specific options and without retrievable prior preferences. Building on research in metacognition, preference fluency, and preference expression, we theorize likely antecedents and consequences of FOP and test its viability in the context of the compromise effect, where having a preference often entails “picking a side” rather than choosing the middle option. Across multiple studies, FOP — situationally triggered by preference‐related cues — reduced compromising and increased preference‐expressive choice, independent of preference retrieval, certainty, or social desirability. Identifying FOP as a distinct driver of choice integrates and extends existing theory on metacognition and decision‐making, and highlights it as a promising, underexplored piece of the puzzle in understanding when, why, and how people feel ready to make bold and self‐expressive choices.

Over the past 50 years, consumer researchers have presented extensive evidence that consumer preference can be swayed by the decision context, particularly the configuration of the choice set. Importantly, behavioral research on context effects has inspired prominent quantitative research on multialternative decision-making published in leading psychology, management, economics, and general interest journals. While both streams of research seem to agree that context effects are an important research area, there has been relatively limited interaction, communication, and collaboration between the two research camps. In this article, we seek to initiate an active dialogue between the two sides. We begin by providing a critical overview of the two literatures on context effects, discussing both their strengths and weaknesses, as well as disparities and complementarities. Here, we place particular emphasis on deepening consumer researchers’ understanding of context effects by drawing on prominent quantitative research published in non-marketing journals over the last decades. Importantly, we provide a roadmap for the future that can inspire further research and potential collaborations between the two camps, overcoming silos in knowledge creation.

Purchase decisions typically involve tradeoffs between attributes associated with desirability (e.g., quality) and feasibility (e.g., price). In this article, we examine how the decision context impacts consumers' preference between a high-desirability (HD) option and a high-feasibility (HF) alternative. Nineteen studies demonstrate a novel context effect, the "upscaling effect," whereby introducing a symmetrically dominated decoy option to a set (i.e., an option that is inferior compared to all alternatives in the set) leads to an increase in the choice share of the HD option. To account for the upscaling effect, we advance a two-stage model of consumer decision-making for decisions that involve tradeoffs between desirability and feasibility. According to our model, when the decision context provides a reason for choosing either option, such as when a decoy option is added to the set, consumers prioritize reasons that support choice of HD options over HF alternatives. Our model can explain the upscaling effect, as well as other findings reported in the literature, such as asymmetric attraction effects () and asymmetric sales promotion effects (). Furthermore, the upscaling effect holds important managerial implications because it provides an effective way to increase sales of high-end products.

In this research we reexamine and update prior research on the association between decision conflict and choice deferral. Decision conflict has featured prominently in psychology literature, going back to the seminal work of Lewin (1933) , Miller (1944) , and Janis and Mann (1977) . Building on this earlier work and the assumption of conflict as an inhibitor of choice, Tversky and Shafir (1992 ; see also Dhar 1997 ) argued that the tendency to defer a decision can increase when decision makers experience conflict because of the need to make trade-offs between options in a set. Tversky and Shafir (1992) showed that decision makers may defer choice more when faced with two options presenting trade-offs compared with when they are offered either a single option (see also Dhar 1997 ) or two options where one alternative dominates the other. Relatedly, Luce (1998) showed that decision makers may be more likely to defer choice when faced with multiple options presenting relatively difficult (versus easy) trade-offs. We reexamine published data and report the results of 40 well-powered direct and conceptual replications of these effects (total n = 26,703) that cast doubt on the replicability of prior research. Our data suggest that additional research is needed in order to reveal a robust association between experimental manipulations of decision conflict and choice deferral. We conclude our investigation by delineating a set of directions for future research on this topic. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: The data and e-companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4484 .

To explain trade-offs in choice, researchers have proposed myriad phenomena and decision rules, each paired with separate theories and idiosyncratic vocabularies. Yet most choice problems are ultimately resolved with one of just two types of solutions: mixed or extreme. For example, people adopt mixed solutions for resolving trade-offs when they allow exercising to license indulgence afterward (balancing between goals), read different literary genres (variety seeking), and order medium-sized coffees (the compromise effect). By contrast, when people adopt extreme solutions for resolving these exact same trade-offs, they exhibit highlighting, consistency seeking, and compromise avoidance, respectively. Our review of the choice literature first illustrates how many seemingly unrelated phenomena actually share the same underlying psychology. We then identify variables that promote one solution versus the other. These variables, in turn, systematically influence which of opposite choice effects arise (e.g., highlighting versus balancing). Finally, we demonstrate how several mistakes people purport to make can potentially instead be reinterpreted as mixed solutions for resolving trade-offs. We conclude with guidance for distinguishing mistakes from mixed solutions.

Most options considered by consumers are ultimately rejected or not chosen, yet not all rejections are created equal. This research examines the impact of “explicit” rejection (i.e., decision to tentatively “reject” an option) vs. “implicit” rejection (i.e., decision to continue looking for better options) on perceptions of the “rejection survivors” and the likelihood of making a purchase. Specifically, the authors propose that compared to implicit rejections, explicit rejections increase psychological closure with respect to the rejected options, thereby increasing the perceived attractiveness of and subsequent commitment to the rejection survivors. Eight studies test (a) the predicted differences between explicit and implicit rejection, (b) the mechanism underlying these predictions, and (c) the behavioral consequences of the rejection survivor advantage (e.g., purchase, reconsideration of forgone options, expectations about future options, stopping points). The authors employ a range of methods, including real-world data from a “swiping” mobile app for pet adoption. The implications of alternative rejection modes for consumer decision-making in the current information environment are discussed.

Most options considered by consumers are ultimately rejected or not chosen, yet not all rejections are created equal. This paper examines how decision interfaces that allow consumers to make “explicit” rejection (i.e., decision to explicitly exclude an option from further consideration) can influence the evaluation process and ultimate purchase likelihood. Specifically, the authors propose that compared to “implicit” rejections in which option exclusion is implied (i.e., decision to not add the option or to look at more options), explicit rejections increase psychological closure with respect to the rejected options, thereby facilitating a sense of evaluation closure and readiness for commitment (i.e., purchase) to one of the nonrejected options. This research tests a range of decision interfaces commonly employed in the web—including like-or-dislike buttons, left-or-right swipes, and shopping carts—and the resulting decision processes across different product categories. The implications of explicit option rejection for our understanding of consumer decision-making in the current information environment are discussed.

After reviewing prior work regarding components of experience value, I present the concept of "Concurrent Experience Evaluation" ("CEE"), which expands the prior focus on experienced pain and pleasure in response to a stimulus/event. Specifically, the value of an experience is also determined by the concurrent (during-the-experience) cognitive assessment of the event relative to the person's associated goal progress/regression. CEE can account for during-the-experience and subsequent choices that people make. Examples of CEE include cognitive evaluations that enhance the experience value such as "good for me" (while eating kale), "I'm getting my money's worth" (while using a new camera), and "I'm having a cultural experience" (while visiting a museum), or detract from the experience such as "I shouldn't be doing this" (while smoking or overeating) and "should have chosen the other line" (while waiting at the supermarket checkout). Although prior research has examined hedonic experiences and their context (e.g., being with friends, commuting, colonoscopy) as well as what else the mind may process during an experience (e.g., wandering, thinking of past and future decisions), the concurrent value derived from the cognitive evaluation of the goal implications of an experience has not been identified as a separate experience value component. I examine and illustrate the CEE concept, its determinants, moderators, and implications, as well as its distinctive characteristics as compared with other value perspectives and during-the-experience mental processes. Integrating the CEE framework with prior work regarding experience evaluations, I outline a program for future CEE research.

People invest much time and money in consuming knowledge. We argue that people systematically vary in the types of knowledge they prefer to know and that such preferences can have broad implications for consumer behavior. We illustrate this in the context of the preference for practical versus theoretical knowledge. Specifically, we propose and show that some people prefer to know more about how to apply and make use of phenomena they encounter, whereas others prefer to know more about what explicates and underlies the phenomena. We further propose and demonstrate that the extent to which people prefer practical versus theoretical knowledge can help predict their behaviors in a wide variety of consumption domains such as education (e.g., choice of learning materials, preference for different MBA programs), marketing information (e.g., skepticism toward advertising and reference prices), and intertemporal discounting (e.g., reaction to service delays; preference for fast food restaurants).

AbstractRecent technology advances (e.g., tracking and “AI”) have led to claims and concerns regarding the ability of marketers to anticipate and predict consumer preferences with great accuracy. Here, we consider the capabilities of both traditional techniques (e.g., conjoint analysis) and more recent tools (e.g., advanced machine learning methods) for predicting consumer choices. Our main conclusion is that for most of the more interesting consumer decisions, those that are “new” and non‐habitual, prediction remains hard. In fact, in many cases, prediction has become harder due to the increasing influence of just‐in‐time information (user reviews, online recommendations, new options, etc.) at the point of decision that can neither be measured nor anticipated ex ante. Sophisticated methods and “big data” can in certain contexts improve predictions, but usually only slightly, and prediction remains very imprecise—so much so that it is often a waste of effort. We suggest marketers focus less on trying to predict consumer choices with great accuracy and more on how the information environment affects the choice of their products. We also discuss implications for consumers and policymakers.

In a choice between two options, decision makers can often be divided into three segments: those who strongly prefer the first option, those who strongly prefer the second option, and those who might choose either option depending on the particular conditions ("Switchers"). In any reference state, such as the experimental control, most Switchers are likely to favor one of the two options. Thus, the limited growth potential of the option favored by Switchers in the reference state creates "effect propensity" in the opposite direction, whereby any condition or manipulation applied to the reference state is more likely to increase the share of the other option. We test this proposition in a series of studies in the context of choices between safe and risky options and between lower-price/quality and higher-price/quality options. The results indicate that a large majority of conceptually unrelated manipulations tend to increase the choice share of risky and higher-price/quality options. This effect propensity can be reversed when the risky and higher-price/quality options are the status quo alternatives or asymmetrically dominating in the reference state. Alternative explanations for effect propensity are examined. We discuss the implications of effect propensity for the interpretation of research findings, the selection of controls, and theory tests.

Decision conflict is featured prominently in psychology literature, going back to the seminal work of Lewin (1935), Miller (1944), and Janis and Mann (1977). Building on this earlier work and the assumption of conflict as an inhibitor of choice, Tversky and Shafir (1992; see also Dhar, 1997) argued that the tendency to defer a decision can increase when the offered set is enlarged because of decision conflict. They showed that decision-makers defer choice more when faced with two options presenting a trade-off compared to when they are offered a single option. Despite its intuitive appeal, we argue that the association between decision conflict and deferral has been overstated, and adding options rarely increases deferral. We reexamine published data and report the results of 35 well-powered replications of the effect (total n = 21,686), raising doubts about the generality of the impact of conflict on choice and deferral. Our data show that, when provided with two alternatives that present trade-offs, decision-makers are predominantly less—rather than more—likely to defer choice compared to when they see one of the two options in isolation. We discuss and test potential moderators that can reconcile our findings with earlier research.

Delayed gratification is the ability to postpone an immediate gain in favor of greater and later reward. Although delayed gratification has been studied extensively, little is known about the motivation behind children's decisions. Since values are cognitive representations of individuals' motivations, which serve to guide behavior, we studied the relationship between children's values and delayed gratification. Two main distinct motivations overlapping with values may underlie this decision: conservation - the desire to reduce uncertainty and preserve the status quo, and self-enhancement - the desire to maximize resources and profit for the self. Accordingly, we hypothesized that conservation values would relate to children's preference to hold on to what is given as soon as possible, and that self-enhancement values would relate to children's preference for delaying gratification. Seven-year old children (N = 205) ranked their values with the Picture-Based Values Survey (Döring et al., 2010) as part of the Longitudinal Israeli Study of Twins (LIST) (Avinun and Knafo, 2013). The children also played a decision-making animation game that included delayed gratification decisions. In support of our hypotheses, greater delayed gratification related negatively to conservation values, specifically to security and tradition, and related positively to self-enhancement values, especially power and achievement. This is one of the first demonstrations that children's values relate meaningfully to their behaviors.

Although we disagree with some of Gal and Rucker's (2018 – this issue) specific evidence and with their overstated conclusion regarding loss aversion, their overarching message makes a worthwhile contribution. In particular, loss aversion is less robust and universal than has been assumed while its most prominent empirical support — the endowment effect and the status quo bias — is susceptible to multiple alternative explanations. Instead of accepting loss aversion as true unless proven otherwise, we should treat it like other decision properties and psychological accounts that are contingent on various moderators and call for an analysis of psychological mechanisms. In this commentary, we suggest that gatekeepers, such as reviewers, tend to favor loss aversion and other widely accepted tendencies, while demanding a much higher support‐threshold for alternative or newer accounts. Although building on prior theories and concepts is of course important, the bias in favor of incumbent assumptions can impede scientific progress, bar new ideas from the literature, and reinforce well‐established but contingent notions that may apply under some conditions but not others.

People routinely make choices among options characterized by environmental, utilitarian, and/or hedonic (i.e., enjoyable) dimensions (or attributes). Familiar examples include a choice between paper and plastic (bags), biking versus driving to work, buying a hybrid car or a sports car, buying the chocolate that promises to donate 15% to protect the rain forests or the one that tastes a little better, and going to a recycling center versus conveniently putting in the garbage. Despite the prevalence of such choices, so far such decisions have received only limited attention from decision making researchers, economists, and environment studies researchers. Even in areas that are related to environmental issues, most research has focused, for example, on consumer valuation of public, environmental goods, and in particular, the use and limitations of the contingent valuation method [1].