Webinaire organise par Concurrences, en partenariat avec McDermott Will & Emery, avec Jacques Buhart (Associe, McDermott Will & Emery), Martin D'Halluin (SVP, Global Competition Law &…

European Union (EU) competition law and the protection of the environment may not be the most obvious bedfellows. Nonetheless, how the EU competition rules can contribute to the EU’s mission to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 is a subject of keen debate – both by the European Commission (EC) and at Member State level. It is submitted, however, that the manner in which Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) are applied by the EC is unconducive to the achievement of the EU’s ambitious climate goals. As such, it requires adaptation. A principal, though not the only, stumbling block in this regard pertains to the EC’s insistence on the need to demonstrate economic ‘in-market’ efficiencies with a view to offsetting any alleged competition concerns. Environmental benefits, however, tend by definition to be ‘out-of-market’. Drawing upon recent developments at national level, in particular, this article therefore seeks to offer some food for thought on how the rules relating to Article 101(3) TFEU and the EUMR could be amended/ applied differently as a means of accommodating environmental benefits and supporting the 2050 climate neutrality objective. European Green Deal, Climate neutrality, Environment, Article 101(3) TFEU, EU Merger Regulation, In-market efficiencies, Out-of-market efficiencies, CECED, UK CMA, Netherlands ACM

On 8 April 2020 the European Commission issued its first comfort letter for a competitor collaboration in the context of its Temporary Framework in response to Covid-19. The issuance of this comfort letter is remarkable, particularly given the paradigm shift from the system of comfort letters before 2003 under Regulation 17 towards a system of self-assessment under Regulation 1/2003. While the EC has since ushered in comprehensive guidance – via block exemptions and guidelines – to assist businesses with the task of self-assessing their compliance with the EU competition rules, such guidance still leaves too much room for error und uncertainty. This is notably the case with respect to non-full function joint ventures, and in particular those that are long-term, complex and high in value. A corollary of this is that, rather than enter into pro-competitive collaboration for fear of antitrust repercussions, companies may prefer to desist. With a view to achieving enhanced legal certainty for such joint ventures, and capitalizing on the good work it is currently doing under the Temporary Framework, the EC may wish, therefore, to give meaningful thought to the introduction of a more generalized system of comfort letters – at least for non-full function joint ventures. COVID-19, Temporary Framework, comfort letter, non-full function joint venture, Regulation 17, legal certainty, Regulation 1/2003, Article 101(3), self-assessment, Informal Guidance Notice

The unexpected shock provoked by the Covid-19 crisis and the measures taken to limit the spread of the pandemic have affected the functioning of many markets. Throughout the world, competition…

Dans Dow/DuPont (2017) et Bayer/Monsanto (2018), la Commission europeenne (la Commission) a conclu que la propriete commune doit etre consideree comme un element de contexte dans l'appreciation d'une…

INTERIM MEASURES IMPOSED ON BROADCOM: THE RE-AWAKENING OF A ONCE-DORMANT TOOL?* The European Commission (EC) has found, on a prima facie basis, that Broadcom abused its dominant position. In…

BIGGER IS BETTER . . . OR MAYBE NOT: THE SIEMENS/ALSTOM RAILWAY ME* The European Commission recently reaffirmed that industrial policy objectives have no role to play when it comes to applying…

This series of articles presents different points of view about the priorities of the newly established Commission on competition policy in Europe in the aftermath of the decision prohibiting the…

On 27 July 2018 the French Competition Authority (FCA) imposed a EUR 20 million fine on Fnac Darty for failing to comply with its divestment commitments following Fnac's acquisition of the Darty…

All State Aid decisions taken by the EC can be subject to an action for annulment. In practice, however, it has been very difficult for complainants to successfully bring admissible actions for…

Conference-dejeuner Droit et Economie organisee par la Revue Concurrences en partenariat avec les cabinets Mc Dermott Will & Emery et MAPP.

This judgment of the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt/Main of 12 July 2018 applying the preliminary ruling of the CJEU of 6 December 2017 in the case Coty Germany GmbH v Parfumerie Akzente GmbH…

CJEU REFERS SMART CARD CHIPS CARTEL CASE BACK TO GCEU, DISMISSES PHILIPS APPEAL On 26 September 2018, the CJEU considered that the GCEU had not taken into account certain possibly mitigating…

On 25 July 2018 the CJEU dismissed an appeal by Orange Polska SA against a GCEU judgment upholding an EC decision that imposed a fine of more than EUR 127 million on Orange for abusing its…

The CJEU held that a finding of a “competitive disadvantage” as the result of discriminatory pricing by a dominant undertaking on a downstream market does not require demonstration of an actual and…

When drawing up an acquisition agreement in a transaction that will be notifiable to the EC for clearance under the EUMR, the acquirer must ensure that any veto or similar rights that it has…

This judgment of the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt/Main of 12 July 2018 applying the preliminary ruling of the CJEU of 6 December 2017 in the case Coty Germany GmbH v Parfumerie Akzente GmbH…

By order of 12 June 2018, the Vice President of the CJEU dismissed the appeal lodged by Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA (collectively, Nexans) against the order of the President of the GCEU of 12…

On 24 January 2018 the EC fined Qualcomm EUR 997 million for hindering competition on the market for Long-Term Evolution (LTE) basebands chips, in breach of Article 102 TFEU. Baseband chipsets,…

The Higher Regional Court of Hamburg had the opportunity to establish a position regarding potential restrictions of competition in selective distribution arising out of bans on selling products…