To esteem something is to value it and to view it as having worth. Self‐esteem (sometimes also referred to as self‐worth ), therefore, refers to valuing one's self and viewing one's self as having worth. There is a cognitive component (beliefs about one's value and worth) and an emotional component (how one feels – happy, sad, angry, fearful) to evaluating the self and appraising one's own worth. Self‐esteem is usually distinguished from self‐concept , which is a set of beliefs about one's characteristics, attributes, and abilities but without the evaluative component. Self‐esteem is the result of the evaluation and appraisal of one's characteristics and attributes as more or less positive, adequate, and competent or more or less negative, inadequate, or incompetent. Self‐esteem is also distinguished from self‐efficacy , which is a set of beliefs concerned with one's abilities to accomplish valued life goals.

Research on subjective well-being (SWB) goes back at least 90 years. Much of this research has been concerned with correlates and predictors of SWB. Much research has also been concerned with differentiating different types of SWB—specifically the distinction between hedonic well-being and eudaimonic well-being. This research shows that people can distinguish between activities and experiences that are more or less "meaningful" and "personally expressive" and those that are more or less enjoyable but that measures of "eudaimonic" well-being and measures of "hedonic" well-being are so highly correlated that they appear to be measuring the same construct. Research on theories of SWB strongly supports dispositional/construals theories that posit that SWB is primarily the result of inherited and learned predispositions to perceive and interpret life events in certain ways over life circumstance theories that propose that SWB is primarily the result of life events and life circumstances not mediated by interpretations of them. Among the problems with measuring subjective well-being and life satisfaction are lack of agreement on the conception of SWB (e.g., hedonic versus eudaimonic), an almost exclusive reliance on self-report measures, overreliance on correlational studies, a lack of consensus on how to measure SWB regardless of conception, and the tendency to reify scores on measures of SWB.

Engaging with the arts and humanities (in all their myriad forms) can add a richness to life that can enhance the quality of life and subjective well-being. Too many people, however, often avoid such engagement because they do not believe that they have sufficient knowledge and experience to enjoy and appreciate some of the finer things in life, such as classical music art, literature, theatre, and dance. Self-efficacy theory and research can offer some practical suggestions for how to encourage people to experiment with the arts and humanities, not only as observers and consumers, but also as students and producers of their own work.

This chapter deals with conceptions of psychopathology. From the social constructionist perspective, sociocultural, political, professional, and economic forces influence professional and lay conceptions of psychopathology. The psychopathology can be viewed as deviation from statistical psychological normality. The major problem with the conception of psychopathology as maladaptive behavior is its inherent subjectivity. Some conceptions of psychopathology invoke the notions of subjective distress and disability. Psychopathology has been conceived as behavior that deviates from social or cultural norms. Any discussion of conceptions of psychopathology has to include a discussion of the most influential conception of all – that of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. From the essentialist perspective, psychopathologies and mental disorders are natural entities whose true nature can be discovered and described. The chapter considers the methods of science to understand the origins of the patterns of thinking, feeling, and behaving that a culture considers psychopathological and to develop and test ways of modifying those patterns.

This study tested the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) in conjunction with two sets of variables from the Health Action Process Approach (HAPA) and the Subjective Exercise Experience Scale (SEES) to predict exercise behaviour. This study included 454 participants who exercised in a fitness centre. We collected measures of the TPB (attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, and intention), HAPA (planning), and SEE (positive well-being, psychological distress, and fatigue) and assessed exercise behaviour at a three-month follow-up. Structural equation modelling found partial support for the TPB model (explaining 10% of the variance in exercise behaviour) and adequate fit indices for an adjusted model of the TPB that includes a positive well-being dimension (explaining 11% of the variance in exercise behaviour). In sum, the original TPB partially predicts exercise behaviour; when considered together with other predictors, limited evidence was found for its utility in explaining exercise behaviour.

This study tested the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) in conjunction with two sets of variables from the Health Action Process Approach (HAPA) and the Subjective Exercise Experience Scale (SEE) to predict exercise behavior. This study included 454 participants who exercised in a fitness center. We collected measures of the TPB (attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and intention), HAPA (planning), and SEE (positive wellbeing, psychological distress, and fatigue) and assessed exercise behavior at a three-month follow-up. Structural equation modeling found partial support for the TPB model (explaining 10% of the variance in exercise behavior) and adequate fit indices for an adjusted model of the TPB that includes a positive well-being dimension (explaining 11% of the variance in exercise behavior). In sum, the original TPB partially predicts exercise behavior; when considered together with other predictors, limited evidence was found for its utility in explaining exercise behavior.

The basic premise of self-efficacy theory is that “people’s beliefs in their capabilities to produce desired effects by their own actions” (Bandura, 1997, p. vii) are the most important determinants of the behaviors people choose to engage in and how much they persevere in their efforts in the face of obstacles and challenges. Self-efficacy theory also maintains that these efficacy beliefs play a crucial role in psychological adjustment, psychological problems, physical health, as well as professionally guided and self-guided behavioral change strategies. This chapter provides an overview of self-efficacy theory and research by addressing three basic questions: (a) What is self-efficacy? (b) Where do self-efficacy beliefs come from? (c) Why is self-efficacy important? The chapter also discusses “collective efficacy”—group members’ beliefs in their ability to collectively accomplish shared goals.

This chapter describes the traditional view of clinical psychology as a discipline and profession steeped in an “illness ideology” that has roots in clinical psychology’s early connections with psychiatry and medicine and limits clinical psychology to the study of what is worst and weakest about people rather than what is best and bravest about people. The historical, cultural, and professional causes of this ideology are discussed, emphasizing on the social construction and deconstruction of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) as the manifestation of the illness ideology that has the greatest detrimental influence on clinical psychology. The chapter also proposes that the illness ideology be replaced with a positive psychology ideology that emphasizes well-being, life satisfaction, and what makes life worth living. Updates include discussions of the new DSM-5 and additional research on the problems with using diagnostic categories as a framework for understanding problems in living.

Changes to definitions and theories of psychopathology result less from scientific advances and more from changes in social and cultural values. Herein, the historical and contemporary diversity in definitions and theories of anorexia nervosa is used to illustrate this point. First, we offer a discussion of diachronic diversity (diversity over time) and synchronic diversity (diversity at a given point in time) in conceptions and theories of psychopathology in general. Second, we elaborate a social constructionist perspective on psychopathology in general. Third, to illustrate this perspective, we provide a diachronic and synchronic analysis of definitions and theories of anorexia nervosa. Fourth, we discuss the implications of this analysis for clinical practice. We conclude that whatever view eventually prevails will depend not on which one is better at rooting out some hidden truth about anorexia nervosa but, rather, on which one is viewed as more compatible with evolving social and cultural standards, views, and norms regarding health and illness in general and self-starvation in particular.

A textbook about a topic should begin with a clear defi nition of the topic. Unfortunately, for a textbook on psychopathology, this is a diffi cult if not impossible task. Th e defi nitions or conceptions of psychopathology and such related terms as mental disorder have been the subject of heated debate throughout the history of psychology and psychiatry, and the debate is far from over (e.g., Gorenstein, 1984; Horwitz, 2002; Widiger, 1997). Despite its many variations, this debate has centered on a single overriding question: Are psychopathology and related terms such as mental disorder and mental illness scientifi c terms that can be defi ned objectively and by scientifi c criteria, or are they social constructions (Gergen, 1985) that are defi ned entirely by societal and cultural values? It is important to address this issue in the opening chapter because the reader’s view of the rest of this book will be infl uenced by his or her view on this issue.

Part I: Thinking About Psychopathology. Maddux, Gosselin, Winstead, Conceptions of Psychopathology: A Social Constructionist Perspective. Smith, Biological Bases of Psychopathology. Lopez, Guarnaccia, Cultural Dimensions of Psychopathology: The Social World's Impact on Mental Disorders. Winstead, Sanchez, The Role of Gender, Race, and Class in Psychopathology. Widiger, Classification and Diagnosis: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues. Garb, Lilienfeld, Fowler, Psychological Assessment and Clinical Judgment. Stewart, Chambless, Psychotherapy Research. Part II: Common Problems of Adulthood. Williams, Anxiety Disorders. Alloy, LaBelle, Boland, Goldstein, Jenkins, Shapero, Black, Obraztsova, Mood Disorders. Kestler, Bollini, Hochman, Mittal, Walker, Schizophrenia. Presnall, Widiger, Personality Disorders. Gosselin, Sexual Dysfunctions and Disorders. Eifert, McCormack, Zvolensky, Somatoform and Dissociative Disorders. Klostermann, Kelley, Substance Use Disorders. Fiske, Ciliberti, Gould, Nadorff, Nadorff, Nazem, Stahl, Clegg-Kraynok, Mental Health and Aging. Part III: Common Problems of Childhood and Adolescence. Zeman, Suveg, Developmental Psychopathology: Basic Principles. Kimonis, Frick, Externalizing Disorders. Ollendick, Sander, Internalizing Disorders. Martinez, White, Jochim, Nellis, Language, Learning, and Cognitive Disorders. McFarlane, Trottier, Polivy, Herman, Arsenault, Boivin, Eating Disorders.