Consider a society where the prestige of orthodox views is linked to the prestige of the elite. Heterodox individuals are less likely to express their views if other peers refrain from doing so and if the elite is prestigious. In turn, corruption by the elite is less easily detected if orthodox views dominate. We characterize equilibrium self-denial and corruption and show that an exogenous increase in the range of orthodox views may result in a decrease in the total number of individuals truthfully expressing their views. Some features of the model are shown to be compatible with US data.

We study the impact of local immigration inflows on natives' wages using a large French administrative panel from 1976 to 2007. We show that local immigration inflows are followed by reallocations of blue-collar natives across commuting zones. Because these reallocations vary with the initial occupation, and blue-collar location movers have wages below the blue-collar average, controlling for changes in local composition is crucial to assess how wages adjust to immigration. Immigration temporarily lowers the wages of blue-collar workers, with unskilled workers experiencing larger losses. Location movers lose more than stayers in terms of daily wages but move to locations with cheaper housing.

We model a two-region country where value is created through bilateral production between masses and elites (bourgeois and landowners). Industrialization requires the elites to finance schools and the masses to attend them. Schooling raises productivity, particularly for matches between masses and bourgeois. At the same time, only country-wide education (“unified schooling”) renders the masses mobile across regions. Alternatively, schools can be implemented in one region alone (“regional education”) or the regionally dominant group can choose to implement schooling in its own region but refuse to share the costs/proceeds within the wider country-level group (“secession”). We show that schools are more likely to be set-up when the bourgeoisie dominates, but that this is not necessarily socially efficient. Unified schooling is always chosen if the identity of the dominant elite at the regional and country level is the same and/or the industrialization shock is sufficiently high. If instead the bourgeoisie is dominant in one region and landowners are dominant countrywise, the bourgeoisie of that region may promote the secession of the region, and this can be socially efficient. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence for 19th century France and Spain.

Exploiting a large French panel for 1976-2007, we examine the impact of low-educated immigration on the labour market outcomes of blue-collar natives initially in jobs where immigrants became overrepresented in the last decades. Immigrant inflows generate substantial reallocations of natives across locations and occupations. Location movers are negatively selected while occupation movers are positively selected and move towards better paid-jobs characterised by less routine tasks. As a result, controlling for composition effects has an important quantitative impact on the estimated effects of immigration. Low-educated immigration generally lowers the wages of blue-collar workers, but its impact is heterogeneous across sectors.

We characterise how the assimilation patterns of minorities into the strong and the weak language differ in a situation of asymmetric bilingualism. Using large variations in language composition in Canadian cities from the 2001 and 2006 Censuses, we show that the differences in the knowledge of English by immigrant allophones (i.e., the immigrants with a mother tongue other than English and French) in English-majority cities are mainly due to sorting across cities. Instead, in French-majority cities, learning plays an important role in explaining differences in knowledge of French. In addition, the presence of large anglophone minorities deters much more the assimilation into French than the presence of francophone minorities deters the assimilation into English. Finally, we find that language distance plays a much more important role in explaining assimilation into French, and that assimilation into French is much more sensitive to individual characteristics than assimilation into English. Some of these asymmetric assimilation patterns extend to anglophone and francophone immigrants, but no evidence of learning is found in this case.

Using a large administrative French panel data set for 1976-2007, we examine how low- educated immigration affects the wages, employment, occupations and locations of blue-collar native workers. The natives in the sample are initially in occupations heterogeneous in the presence of immigrants, which might reflect a different degree of competition with low-educated immigrants. We first show that larger immigration inflows into locations are accompanied by larger outflows of negatively selected natives from these locations. At the same time, larger immigrant inflows into occupations come with larger outflows of positively selected natives towards occupations with less routine tasks. While we find no negative impact on employment, there is substantial evidence that immigration lowers the median annual wages of natives. The estimated negative effects are also much larger in cross-section than in estimates controlling for composition effect, which is consistent with the idea that endogenous changes in occupation and location attenuate the impact of immigration on natives’ wages. We also find much larger wage decreases for workers initially in non-tradable sectors and more particularly in the construction sector, which are much less likely to upgrade their occupation or change location in response to immigration inflows.

Combining large (up to 25%) extracts of five French censuses and data from Labor Force Surveys for 1968–1999, we use Borjas' (2003) factor proportions methodology for France and find that a 10 p.p. increase in the immigrant share raises natives' wages by 3.3%, which is in stark contrast with the results in Borjas (2003) for the U.S. The positive impact of immigration on natives' wages and employment is shown to hold also at the regional level. We find evidence that this positive correlation partly comes from the imperfect substitutability of natives and immigrants within education/experience cells. Specifically, (i) the occupational distribution of natives and immigrants within these cells is more dissimilar when there are more immigrants in the cell; (ii) natives tend to perform more abstract tasks when there are more immigrants in the cell; and (iii) an important part of the positive relation between immigration and wages comes from a reallocation of natives to better-paid occupations within the cells. However, we argue that this positive correlation is also likely to be related to the inability of the Borjas (2003) model to perfectly account for the important changes in the wage distribution and the educational level characterizing the French economy in this period.

This paper evaluates the impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes of natives in France over the period 1962-1999. Combining large (up to 25%) extracts from six censuses and data from Labor Force Surveys, we exploit the variation in the immigrant share across education/experience cells and over time to identify the impact of immigration. In the Borjas (2003) specification, we find that a 10% increase in immigration increases native wages by 3%. However, as the number of immigrants and the number of natives are positively and strongly correlated across cells, the immigrant share may not be a good measure of the immigration shock. When the log of natives and the log of immigrants are used as regressors instead, the impact of immigration on natives' wages is still positive but much smaller, and natives wages are negatively related to the number of natives. To understand this asymmetry and the positive impact of immigration on wages, we explore the link between immigration and the occupational distribution of natives within education/experience cells. Our results suggest that immigration leads to the reallocation of natives to better-paid occupations within education/experience cells.

This paper evaluates the impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes of na- tives in France over the period 1962-1999. Combining large (up to 25%) extracts from six censuses and data from Labor Force Surveys, we exploit the variations in the immigrant share across education/experience cells and over time to identify the impact of immigra- tion. In the baseline specification, we find that a 10% increase in immigration increases native wages by 3%. The positive impact of immigration is shown to be robust to different identification strategies and does not seem to come from the differential prevalence of the minimum wage for different groups of workers. We show that a larger number of natives in education/experience cells is generally associated with lower wages for natives, while the number of immigrants in the cell is actually positively correlated with the wages of na- tives. To understand this asymmetry and the positive impact of immigration on wages, we explore the link between immigration and the occupational distribution of natives within education/experience cells. Our results suggest that immigration leads to the reallocation of natives to better-paid occupations within education/experience cells.

A dynamic labor matching economy is presented, in which the unemployed are either entitled to unemployment insurance (UI) or unemployment assistance (UA), and the employees are either eligible for UI or UA upon future separations. Eligibility for UI requires a minimum duration of contributions and UI benefits are then paid for a limited duration. Workers are risk-averse and wages are determined in a bilateral Nash bargain. As eligibility for UI does not automatically follow from employment, the two types of unemployed workers have different threat points, which delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. Most of the variables and parameters of the model are estimated using the French sample of the European Community Household Panel (1994-2000). We show that extending the UI entitlement improves the situation of all groups of workers and slightly lowers unemployment, while raising UI benefits harms the unemployed on assistance and raises unemployment. Easier eligibility for UI also improves the situation of all groups of workers and favours relatively more the least well-off than longer entitlement. The re-entitlement effect in France lowers by 10% the rise in the wage and by 13% the rise in unemployment following a 10% increase in benefit levels.

We consider an economy with two language groups, where only agents who share a language can produce together. Schooling enhances the productivity of students and may modify their language endowment. Under a unilingual system, the language of the politically dominant group is the only language of instruction, and the members of the politically dominated group who attend school shift language. Instead, under a bilingual system, the members of the dominated group who attend school become bilingual. The dominant group chooses the education system, and then individuals decide whether to attend school. While agents do not get utility from speaking their own language, we show that a language conflict of the expected type endogenously arises in the choice between a unilingual and a bilingual system. Democracy (majority rule) always leads to the implementation of the socially optimal education system, while the unilingual system is too often implemented under minority rule. In the presence of productivity spillovers, there may be unanimity for unilingualism, even if this system is assumed to be technologically inferior. The model is consistent with evidence from Finland in 1919 and France in 1863, showing that the choice of bilingualism in education may not be related to the size of language groups.

Presentamos un analisis de seccion cruzada a nivel comarcal para estudiar los determinantes del conocimiento activo oral del catalan de los residentes en Cataluna nacidos fuera de esta comunidad autonoma (los “inmigrantes”). El conocimiento del catalan de los inmigrantes es mayor en las zonas pirenaicas o agricolas, y menor en el area metropolitana de Barcelona. El resto de los determinantes es diferente para diferentes grupos de inmigrantes. En su conjunto, los inmigrantes tienen un mayor conocimiento del catalan en aquellas comarcas en las que el conocimiento del catalan de los nacidos en Cataluna es mayor. Por su parte, el conocimiento del catalan de los inmigrantes nacidos en Espana es mayor en las comarcas en las que constituyen una fraccion pequena de los residentes. Por ultimo, los inmigrantes nacidos fuera de Espana tienen un mayor conocimiento del catalan en las comarcas con mayor voto a partidos nacionalistas catalanes y en las comarcas de menor densidad, asi como cuando su nivel de estudios es mas alto.

We consider a bilingual country with immigration, where only agents who share the same language can produce together. Immigrants cannot communicate with each other nor with natives unless they learn to speak one of the two languages of the country. We model immigrants’ choice of language. With an exogenous language composition of natives, immigrants tend to choose the language of the majority. Endogenising the choice of minority natives to become bilingual does not alter the set of production partners of other minority members but reinforces the incentives of the immigrants to learn the majority language. In order to learn the minority language, immigrants would require a larger subsidy the smaller the minority. Using Canadian language data from the 2001 Census at the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) level, we show that the situations of English and French are asymmetric as (i) the capacity of assimilation of French-speaking majorities is smaller, and (ii) English assimilation is larger in CMAs with larger Francophone minorities. JEL classification: F22, J 15

A labour-matching economy with ex post heterogeneous firms is presented. When bargaining over the wage, firms and workers do not know the level of product demand. Once demand is realized, hours of work are chosen. We show that the existence of a legal workweek may enhance efficiency with respect to laissez-faire: while laissez-faire is good at allocating hours across firms, regulation may be better at reproducing optimal hours. Shortening the legal workweek raises employment and is Pareto-improving if and only if the demand faced by low-demand firms and/or the overtime premium are small enough.

The interplay between unemployment compensation and the duration of contracts is analysed in a matching framework. The unemployed after a permanent job are entitled to a long period of unemployment Insurance (UI). The unemployed after a temporary job are not eligible for UI. The former receive offers for permanent and temporary jobs while the latter find only temporary jobs. The variables of the model are estimated using the European Panel. Then some reforms of the unemployment compensation system and of the temporary contracts' legislation are simulated. More generous insurance or assistance benefits slightly raise the unemployment rate and the social welfare. Increasing the legal duration of temporary contracts or their transformation rate in permanent contracts strongly decreases the rate of unemployment and improves the welfare of all the individuals. L'interaction entre l'indemnisation du chomage et la duree des contrats est analysee dans le cadre d'un modele d'appariement. Les chomeurs apres un emploi en CDI ont droit a une longue periode d'indemnisation par l'assurance. Les chomeurs apres un emploi temporaire sont peu ou pas indemnises. Or les premiers recoivent des offres d'emploi en CDI et CDD, alors que les seconds ne trouvent que des CDD. Les variables du modele sont estimees a partir du Panel europeen, puis des reformes de l'indemnisation du chomage et de la legislation sur les contrats temporaires sont simulees. Des allocations chomage (d'assurance ou d'assistance) plus genereuses accroissent faiblement le taux de chomage et le bien-etre social. Allonger la duree legale des CDD ou accroitre leur taux de transformation en CDI reduit fortement le taux de chomage et ameliore le bienetre de tous.

Abstract The existence and the nature of the effects of immigration on the economic situation of natives is a subject of debate in industrialized ‘host’ countries, particularly in Europe. The idea that the presence or arrival of immigrants may deteriorate the economic prospects of natives is widely spread. From the available empirical literature, the conclusion is, however, far from clear-cut, for the US as well as for Europe. As stressed by Borjas (1994) in his survey, ‘the most important lesson is that the economic impact of immigration will vary by time and by place, and can be either beneficial or harmful’.