The global economic lockdown implemented to contain the COVID-19 virus has caused the most severe economic downturn in Canada since the Great Depression in the 1930s. However, while production plummeted, the overall income of Canadians fell much less because of the federal government’s aggressive debt-financed policy response. Most of the current discussion around the additional debt focusses on its sustainability -- whether the debt can be rolled over indefinitely without requiring tax increases or spending cuts to finance the interest expense. The economic cost of the debt gets much less attention in the policy discussions. The implicit assumption appears to be that very low interest rates mean that the debt can be rolled over indefinitely without imposing any economic costs – the Canadian economy is dynamically inefficient. However, calculation of the net cash flow from investment by the corporate sector indicates that the Canadian economy was dynamically efficient over the 30 year period ending in 2019. Rolling over the lockdown-related debt would therefore have an economic cost. The income loss arising from the recession can only be deferred, not eliminated, by issuing debt. Since the benefits of the economic stabilization policies accrue to persons alive today, the lockdown-induced increase in debt should be retired before the next generation starts working and paying taxes. A second fairness issue explored in the paper is how the recession-induced output loss should be shared among the current generation.

In this article, John Lester describes the federal tax expenditures database developed as part of the Finances of the Nation data portal. He also uses the database to analyze trends in federal tax expenditures over a 21-year period ending in 2019 and to identify the beneficiaries and the activities supported by these measures.

Business investment in research and development (Ru0026D) makes a key contribution to rising living standards. Firms undertaking the Ru0026D can reduce production costs and introduce new products that provide benefits to consumers that are not fully captured in selling prices. Further, it is very difficult for Ru0026D-performing firms to prevent some of the knowledge created from leaking out or spilling over to other firms. Since firms do not take these positive spillover benefits into consideration when making investment decisions, most governments subsidize business investment in Ru0026D with the expectation that economic performance will improve as a result. Our study confirms the existence of substantial spillover benefits from Ru0026D performed in Canada, so government support for Ru0026D is justified. However, we do not find any empirical evidence to support the current policy of subsidizing Ru0026D at a higher rate when it is performed by small firms than when it is performed by large firms. We also find much lower private rate of return on Ru0026D performed by small firms than by large firms. Subsidies appear to be playing a key role in this result

Business investment in research and development (R&D) makes a key contribution to rising living standards. Firms undertaking the R&D can reduce production costs and introduce new products that provide benefits to consumers that are not fully captured in selling prices. Further, it is very difficult for R&D-performing firms to prevent some of the knowledge created from leaking out or spilling over to other firms. Since firms do not take these positive spillover benefits into consideration when making investment decisions, most governments subsidize business investment in R&D with the expectation that economic performance will improve as a result. Our study confirms the existence of substantial spillover benefits from R&D performed in Canada, so government support for R&D is justified. However, we do not find any empirical evidence to support the current policy of subsidizing R&D at a higher rate when it is performed by small firms than when it is performed by large firms. We also find much lower private rate of return on R&D performed by small firms than by large firms. Subsidies appear to be playing a key role in this result

Business investment in research and development (R&D) is widely recognized as providing benefits to the broader economy that exceed the benefits to the firms that perform the R&D. As a result of this externality or spillover, most governments provide support for R&D in order to encourage more of it. In 2017, 29 of the 35 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provided tax incentives for spending on R&D. That’s up slightly since 2014, when we last prepared an international comparison of tax assistance for R&D. On the other hand, average support levels edged down from 2014 to 2017. In addition to these expenditure-based measures, 15 OECD countries provide preferential tax treatment for the income generated by commercializing R&D and other innovative activities. These income-based measures are often described as patent boxes, since they first applied to income realized from patented products and processes. In most cases, the qualifying patents did not have to be based on R&D performed in the country offering the incentive, so patent boxes were criticized for creating an incentive to shift taxable income without encouraging additional R&D. Recently, however, most countries have accepted the OECD recommendation that both the R&D and the income from its commercialization must be located in the same jurisdiction before an income-based incentive can be provided. With this linkage, income-based incentives can be a useful policy tool, particularly for large firms. Income- and expenditure-based incentives are likely to have similar impacts on the amount of R&D undertaken by large firms, but income-based measures have the advantage of providing a greater incentive to commercialize R&D in the implementing jurisdiction. They also blunt the incentive to shift the taxable income generated by commercializing R&D to lower-tax jurisdictions. However, smaller firms, who are more likely to be cashflow constrained, will respond less strongly to income-based measures since the subsidy is available with a delay. Further, small firms have limited opportunities to shift taxable income across international borders. Should the federal government implement an income-based tax incentive for R&D performed by large firms? A key consideration is what happens to tax revenue on income from commercialization of R&D. If a lower tax rate results in higher revenue as a result of tax base shifting effects, income-based measures have a clear advantage over their expenditure-based counterparts. Some competing jurisdictions have very low corporate income tax rates, so feasible reductions in federal tax rates may not generate tax base shifting effects large enough to make the policy a success. More information on how multi-national enterprises shift intellectual-property income out of Canada is required before proceeding with income-based tax incentives for R&D.

Business subsidies in Canada: the “winner” is Alberta; the loser is the taxpayer The federal government and the four largest provinces in Canada spend about $29 billion a year on business subsidies, delivered through program spending, the tax system, government business enterprises and direct investments by government. These subsidies represent almost half of the corporate income tax revenue collected by the five jurisdictions. Surprisingly, given its reputation as a bastion of free enterprise, Alberta is the most prolific subsidizer. In the 2014-15 fiscal year, per person subsidies were $640 in Alberta, about $100 ahead of the next most generous jurisdiction, Québec. Alberta has probably added to its “lead” through measures introduced in the October 2015 Fiscal Update and the 2016 budget. Alberta also stands out by having the least transparent public reporting of business subsidies. What motivates governments to subsidize business? Abstracting from cynical efforts to win votes, business subsidies have two broad objectives: to improve economic performance and to achieve a social objective by supporting specific firms, industries or regions. On average in the five jurisdictions, the split between the two categories is about 70-30 in favour of economic development measures. Assessing value for money from programs with a social objective is subjective, but measures intended to improve economic performance should be assessed on their ability to raise real income. Business subsidies can only raise real income if markets fail to allocate labour and capital to their best uses. The classic case is R&D. When a firm undertakes R&D, some of the knowledge created inevitably spills over to the benefit other firms. Firms are focused on their own benefits and costs when deciding how much to spend on R&D, not the benefits received by other firms, so society has an interest in encouraging additional R&D. While markets generally do a good job allocating capital to its most productive uses, governments express concern about the ability of small firms to access external financing. Just over half of business subsidies are intended to address these two issues. Governments also provide subsidies in order to create what are often described as “good jobs,” meaning employment in high-wage, high-productivity industries. There is ample evidence that wages differ by sector even after differences in worker skills and working conditions are taken into account. That opens up the possibility that subsidizing high-wage jobs will make us better off. Almost 10 per cent of government subsidies are pursuing “industrial policy” objectives. But real income won't necessarily go up, even in these circumstances. Benefit-cost analyses of key programs suggest that, at best, only a third of subsidies intended to raise real income achieve their objective. The main reason these subsidies are unsuccessful is that they have to be funded, either by raising taxes or cutting program spending, both of which harm economic performance. And avoiding the pitfall of excessive subsidization can be challenging. For example, small firms performing R&D get about 43% of their funding from governments, which is substantially beyond an effective level. Industrial policy measures are particularly tricky to get right. Governments have to identify sectors and firms that pay a premium for a given set of skills and working conditions, determine the subsidy that generates a social benefit net of the costs of providing assistance and avoid transferring income from low to high-wage taxpayers. With so much money at play, business subsidies should be reported more transparently and managed more effectively. For greater transparency, governments should prepare a comprehensive annual report on business subsidies delivered through program spending, the tax system and through the activities of government business enterprises. The report would describe the programs, state their objectives and report funding levels. When discussing program objectives, the report should set out in general terms the expected benefits and costs of government intervention and discuss who benefits from the measure and who is expected to pay for it. Making a commitment to set out the expected benefits and costs of all new business subsidies as they are introduced might prevent the worst offenders from being implemented in the first place.

In this chapter, I set out an approach for evaluating or assessing tax expenditures as part of an expenditure management system. I also make some recommendations on how tax expenditures should be included in one-off spending-control initiatives, and I discuss the merits of selected Canadian measures. Finally, this chapter provides a perspective on the evolution of Canadian tax expenditures over time.

Small business has a well-deserved reputation as the driver of job growth and as a key contributor to innovation. In the 12 years ending in 2013, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) accounted for about 90% of private sector job growth in Canada. What is less well-recognized, however, is that a small fraction of SMEs account for most of the job growth and innovation. As a result, governments have offered broad-based support for small businesses, rather than focusing on high-impact entrepreneurs. This approach is wasteful: firms that do not grow or innovate receive most of the benefits. Further, this approach can harm economic performance by promoting the expansion of smaller, lessefficient firms at the expense of larger ones. The federal government elected in 2015 is focussing new initiatives on innovative and growth-oriented businesses. Legislated reductions in the small business tax rate were reversed and targeted support for innovative SMEs was increased. While the change in direction is welcome, almost 85% of the $7 billion yearly funding for small business continues to provide broad-based support. The largest program is the special low rate of tax for small businesses, implemented to improve access to financing for capacity-expanding investment. This measure is harming economic performance because the cost of shifting capital and labour from large to smaller, less-efficient businesses outweighs the benefit from improving access to capital. Large subsidies for small business financing are also provided by the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC). With access to cheap government funding, the BDC is profitable, but evaluated using a more realistic cost of financing, the bank operates at a substantial loss. This loss exceeds the benefit from improving access to capital, particularly for the bank’s direct-lending program. While there is a solid argument for supporting R&D, subsidies provided to small firms are so generous that they are harming economic performance. The federal government provides a 35% tax credit for R&D performed by small firms. Provincial tax credits raise the subsidy rate to about 42%. And those firms receiving support from the federal Industrial Research Assistance Program can have almost 60% of their project costs paid by the government. By way of contrast, large firms performing R&D receive subsidies from federal and provincial tax credits amounting to under a quarter of their costs, an intervention which improves economic performance. Canada has had what could be described as a small business policy – broad-based support for all small businesses. The newish federal government is moving to an entrepreneurship policy: new initiatives emphasize support for the high-impact firms and individuals that make an outsized contribution to Canada’s innovation and prosperity. Making the transition to the new framework will require overhauling legacy small business policies to free up resources for new initiatives and to secure fiscal savings. Three changes would pay big dividends: • Eliminate the small-business corporate income tax deduction. • Reduce the enhanced R&D tax credit rate to the same level as the regular credit. • Replace the BDC’s direct loan program with a loan guarantee program.

Special supports for small businesses are a hallmark of both federal and provincial tax policy. There are two major federal programs: the Small Business Deduction (SBD), which provides small business a special lower income tax rate, and the enhanced Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) investment tax credit. The purpose of these programs is to improve overall economic performance by mitigating inefficiencies in the market. However, since receiving benefits is conditional on staying small, these programs could act as a barrier to growth. This Commentary makes use of newly available tax data for individual firms to investigate the effect of the tax wall firms face as they grow. We find that the SR&ED thresholds are set high enough that their impact on investment decisions is negligible. Similarly, while the SBD thresholds affect more firms, that program has only a minor impact on investment by small firms. Nevertheless, such supports for small business have a social cost. The largest cost arises from the fact that the government must recoup forgone tax revenue by cutting spending or imposing higher taxes elsewhere. If the alternative to the SBD is a lower general corporate income tax rate, the net impact of the SBD will be an expansion of the small business sector at the expense of large businesses. Since small firms are less productive than large firms, overall economic performance would suffer as a result of the SBD. A more effective way of spurring economic growth is to reduce corporate income tax rates for all firms rather than providing preferential tax rates for small businesses.

This study seeks to assess recent evidence on funding cost differentials among US Bank Holding Companies (BHCs), to better inform the debate about the future of financial reform in the US. Specifically, we measure differences in market spreads observed from 2009-2013 for senior unsecured bonds issued by US BHCs.

Business spending on research and development (R&D) is generally recognized as a private activity providing broader economic benefits that justify government support. But subsidizing R&D has costs as well as benefits, and governments need to exercise judgement to ensure that subsidies are set at a level that results in a net economic benefit for society as a whole, not just for the recipients of the assistance. A key finding of the international comparison undertaken in this paper is that Canada and nine other of the 36 countries in the comparison group are providing R&D subsidies that are likely too high to generate a net economic benefit. Subsidy rates in this group of countries range from 25 to 45 per cent. The risk of excessive subsidization is confined to small firms in Canada, which receive a subsidy of almost 41 per cent through the tax system. Canada’s subsidy rate for small firms is the third highest, behind Chile and France. Other countries providing subsidy rates close to 40 per cent are Spain and India. This paper also assesses several design features of tax assistance measures, including enhanced benefits for small and young firms, refundability of benefits and incentives based on increases in R&D spending above a base level. While the best policy for R&D subsidies may be a uniform rate for all businesses regardless of age or size, the case for favouring young firms is somewhat stronger than for favouring all small firms. Focusing on young firms avoids providing benefits to small firms that are not growth-oriented; but, it is difficult to design a program that can be completely restricted to young firms since entrepreneurs would have an incentive to create new firms to avoid losing higher benefits. Even with this “leakage”, however, an age-dependent incentive could be more cost-effective than size-dependent enhanced benefits. There is a particularly strong case for providing refundability to young firms, which are unlikely to have taxable income while the first round of R&D is undertaken While refundability for large firms has the advantage of increasing the effective subsidy rate on R&D to its target level, it runs the risk of revenue losses as multinational firms have less incentive to ‘book’ taxable income in Canada. A reasonable compromise would be to adjust the value of unused credits and deductions to maintain their present value. International comparisons of tax assistance for R&D typically highlight country rankings and express satisfaction with the most generous regimes. This paper draws attention to the possibility of providing too much of a good thing, a warning that governments in Canada should keep in mind when preparing next year’s budgets.

The knowledge created by private spending on research and development (R&D) generates benefits for society as well as for the firm performing the research, so there is a strong case for government intervention to encourage R&D. But intervening in the market has costs, and these costs may exceed the benefits derived from the additional R&D. This article describes an approach for assessing the net economic benefit arising from R&D support programs and presents results for two federal programs: the scientific research and experimental development (SR & ED) tax credit and the industrial research assistance program (IRAP).The benefit-cost approach used in this article calculates the impact of R&D subsidies on real income taking into consideration the benefit created by knowledge spillovers from the induced R&D, the cost of financing the subsidies with taxes that unavoidably harm economic performance, the cost of shifting resources from their market-determined uses, and administration and compliance costs. The SR & ED credit has two components: a regular 20 percent credit and an enhanced 35 percent refundable credit for smaller Canadian-controlled firms. The regular credit generates a net economic benefit, but the enhanced credit fails a benefit-cost test, owing to higher compliance costs and a higher subsidy rate. IRAP also fails a benefit-cost test, despite the assumption that IRAP-funded R&D generates higher spillovers than R&D funded by the tax credit, owing to the high cost of administering and complying with the program.The policy recommendations flowing from the analysis in this article are that the enhanced SR & ED tax credit should be aligned with an unchanged regular credit rate and that the IRAP model of providing firms with a substantial amount of one-on-one advice and imposing relatively burdensome reporting requirements should be revisited in order to reduce costs. The 2012 federal budget took a different approach: the regular credit rate was reduced to 15 percent, and IRAP funding was doubled without any changes to the program's structure. In contrast to the policy recommendations made in this article, these changes will reduce the net benefit from both the SR & ED tax credit and IRAP. In particular, without any changes to program structure, the additional IRAP funding will substantially increase the net loss from the program.

The federal and provincial governments spend almost half a billion dollars a year providing tax incentives to encourage the production of films, videos and television programs in Canada by foreign firms. Although the subsidies are successful in achieving their stated objective of increasing employment in the film industry, the increase comes at the expense of activity in other sectors. This study uses a benefit-cost framework to demonstrate that Canadians are poorer, not richer, as a result of the film tax credits. It would serve the economic interest of Canadians for the federal and provincial governments to phase out support for foreign location shooting with appropriate transitional assistance for the workers affected. While elimination by all governments would provide the largest benefits, any jurisdiction taking unilateral action would realize a net benefit.

The federal government implemented a new expenditure management system in 2007. Under the new system, departments are required to review programs on a four-year cycle to determine if they are aligned with federal responsibilities and priorities, if they are efficiently delivered and if they are providing value for money, or effective. Based on the results from these strategic reviews, which are expected to be supported by formal evaluations that provide the evidence base for decisions, departments are expected to identify five per cent of their direct program spending that could be reallocated to other priorities, including deficit reduction. This system has much to recommend it, but to realize the full potential of the new system two fundamental changes should be made. First, spending programs delivered through the tax system should be integrated into the expenditure management system. Integration implies that departments would be given responsibility for both tax and spending initiatives that are relevant to their mandates, and that tax-based expenditures would be subject to the government’s evaluation policy and be included in strategic reviews. Second, while departments should continue to have responsibility for evaluating program efficiency, evaluations of both tax- and spending-program effectiveness should be undertaken by an independent entity such as the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Effectiveness evaluations should be carried out using a variant of the benefit-cost framework that is now applied to government regulatory initiatives. In order for the reformed system to work, more resources will need to be allocated to developing the performance data needed to undertake effectiveness evaluations and to perform the evaluations. These changes go well beyond a recent recommendation by a House of Commons committee to include tax expenditures in departmental reports to Parliament, along with planned program spending. The government rejected the recommendation, arguing that the change would undermine the finance minister’s authority over the tax system. Reform cannot proceed unless the finance minister relinquishes his power, exercised jointly with the prime minister, to introduce, modify, or eliminate tax measures related to the mandate of a program minister without the consent of the minister.

The federal budget contains some sensible changes to the SR&ED investment tax credit, but the decision to reduce support for large firms to provide additional support for small firms is a step in the wrong direction. The Jenkins Panel* expressed concern about excessive subsidization of small and medium-sized firms and recommended cutting back on the enhanced SR&ED credit in order to finance more targeted support for these firms. Following that advice would have improved the social return on support for R&D; in contrast, the budget measures marginally reduce the benefits to society from subsidizing R&D. The budget also announced $400 million in additional funding for risk capital. Returns in the venture capital industry are very low and the additional funding is unlikely to be successfully deployed until returns improve. There is abundant evidence that the tax credit for investment in Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations is crowding out private investment and contributing to low rates of return; eliminating the credit is therefore an essential first step in restoring the financial health of the venture capital industry.

The federal budget contains some sensible changes to the SRE in contrast, the budget measures marginally reduce the benefits to society from subsidizing RD eliminating the credit is therefore an essential first step in restoring the financial health of the venture capital industry.

Patients and their care givers have created an impressive array of online health resources. Can healthcare professionals tap into them? In 1994, as a part of an initiative by the department of neurology of the Massachusetts General Hospital to develop promising new ways of using information technology, we began to study how patients with neurological concerns were using online health resources. To our surprise, we found that thousands of patients and their care givers had already created an impressive variety of online health resources. The online support groups, each devoted to a single neurological condition, were especially intriguing. The opportunities that these electronic groups offered for meeting members' needs were more convenient, powerful, and complex than anything we had seen in face to face support groups. For example, patients attending medical centres around the world could compare the treatments their clinicians had recommended. Participants found it easy to send complex medical information (medical journal articles, research reports, etc) to other patients, complete with links to yet other sources. But the groups we observed were scattered and uncoordinated. And although groups existed for most of the common neurological concerns, patients with uncommon conditions had no way of finding one another. We decided that our team of e-health researchers might be able to help—by providing better “homes” for existing support groups, and by encouraging the formation of needed groups. So in March 1995 the hospital's neurology service instituted a family of online groups called the Brain Talk Communities (http://www.braintalk.org/) to support e-patients with neurological concerns. Most medical professionals who have set out to develop online resources for patients have created applications and content in a “top down” manner, directed by health professionals. Within such systems, end users (patients, their care givers, and their family members) usually have little or no input or …

Epilepsy Patients and users of an online educational and communication resource were polled about their information needs over time. Subjects appear to prefer to communicate with their specialist digitally rather than talk on the telephone or have a face-to-face visit. The longer the patients have access to the resource, the less likely they are to plan to make a face-to-face doctors office visit for information needs.