The growing prevalence of animal feeding operations (AFOs) in the United States raises concerns among the public and regulators about their impact on local environmental quality. By linking historical regulatory records of AFOs in Iowa to downstream surface water pollution monitors, this paper studies the effects of the 2003 Clean Water Act regulations that targeted water pollution from the largest hog AFOs. The regulation decreased ammonia concentrations downstream of large hog AFOs by 6–8 percentage points. We find limited to no evidence of improvement for dissolved oxygen and phosphorus concentrations. Pollution reductions are largest during heavy precipitation months, consistent with the regulations reducing on‐site spills and nutrient runoff from local fields. However, we find that pollution increased downstream from mid‐sized hog AFOs, which were exempt from the updated regulations. Given the growth in the number of mid‐sized facilities relative to large AFOs, we estimate that the regulation had little discernible impact on overall water quality.
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel coordinated an air attack on Iran. Market reactions were swift and reflected uncertainty over fuel and fertilizer movements in the Strait of Hormuz. In the weeks to follow, oil and fertilizer prices rose by nearly 50%. Predictions of corn prices for the year, likewise rose reflecting the potential cost increases. In this study, we attempt to quantify the potential economic impact while acknowledging the uncertainty over day-to-day changes in the war itself. Using USDA and futures price estimates from prior to and after the war, we incorporate these impacts into an equilibrium trade model and then use its outputs to generate economic impacts in an input-output model. Findings include: • US corn growers stand to lose $6 billion in revenues and $4 billion in additional costs for an approximate $6 billion loss in profits (producer surplus) and an additional $3 billion loss to workers in the US corn production industry. • Additional losses to the US economy along the corn supply chain amount to about $5 billion in lost revenue and an added $3 billion in lost sales related to general spending in the rest of the economy. • The total loss in sales related to the US corn supply chain amounts to about $13 billion, of which about $10 billion is a loss to US gross domestic product. • Losses to the state of Iowa would be approximately 15-20 percent of these losses based on Iowa's share of the US corn market.
The political economy literature related to agricultural policy provides a number of conjectures corresponding to farm size, but provides no theoretical model of the political utility of small farms. Framed in the context of regulation, we demonstrate how large farms may use small farms to influence their regulatory burden. Producing in the presence of externalities, farms can be regulated to eliminate the damage. We compare a socially optimal regulation with the choice that would be taken by a large farm if it could influence the regulatory decision using the small farm as political cover. Compared to the socially optimal choice, there are cases where the large farm would choose regulation and reduced competition while in others would choose to fight the regulation to save its smaller rival. If the externality and the regulatory burden are very large, the large farm prefers more competition if that leads to less regulation. In this case, lobbying to “save small farms” is in the best interest of the large farm.
We measured brain activity using a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm and conducted a whole-brain analysis while healthy adult Democrats and Republicans made non-hypothetical food choices. While the food purchase decisions were not significantly different, we found that brain activation during decision-making differs according to the participant's party affiliation. Models of partisanship based on left insula, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, superior frontal gyrus, or premotor/supplementary motor area activations achieve better than expected accuracy. Understanding the differential function of neural systems that lead to indistinguishable choices may provide leverage in explaining the broader mechanisms of partisanship.
The USA has significant potential to produce energy from anaerobic digesters (AD) due to the size of its agricultural sector. The use of ADs reduces greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from manure management. The financial benefits to farmers come from the on-farm use, or off-farm sales, of biogas and its end products, namely renewable natural gas (RNG) or electricity. Current energy prices and policies in the USA are insufficient to trigger large-scale construction of ADs; however, payments to avoid GHG emissions and sequester carbon could become sufficiently high to prompt investment. This analysis quantifies the economic incentives necessary for the construction of ADs for swine producers and can easily be expanded to include other feedstocks. Various end-use pathways to produce RNG and electricity are considered to account for location, herd size, and other parameters to deliver a comprehensive analysis for the USA. The analysis and results are composed of a generic part to illustrate the effects of carbon payment on profitability in general as well as a specific analysis for states representing 83.6% of the US hog inventory. Our results indicate that carbon payments would be a stronger determinant than energy prices in farm-level decisions to install ADs, but that energy prices would be influential in determining the optimal biogas end use. The potential need for long-term contracts - both for energy and carbon payments - to reduce investment uncertainty and increase investment in ADs is also discussed.
The credibility of agricultural carbon credits will play a critical role in the determination of payments received by farmers through voluntary carbon markets. This article analyzes the major challenges from both the demand and supply sides to voluntary agricultural carbon credit programs and serves as a resource to researchers, producers, policymakers, and other stakeholders who seek a comprehensive analysis of the challenges that still face this market despite recent positive developments in global agreements.
Abstract The upheaval wrought on the U.S. beef industry by the global COVID-19 pandemic carried with it several lessons that might help improve resiliency should there be a reoccurrence. First, the futures market for fed cattle fell well before cash prices, which sent a signal to market cattle early, and those who did so benefited. Second, the decline in futures anticipated the closure of slaughter plants and provided an opportunity to purchase and store beef primals in anticipation of future scarcity. Third, the beef industry has ways of slowing or stopping the pipeline of animals destined for feed yards and can “store” these animals in background feeding facilities or on pasture or rangeland. Producers who waited to sell feeder cattle benefited from higher feeder cattle prices once the processing facilities reopened. Fourth, cow slaughter plants responded to the pandemic and subsequent scarcity of labor much better than large fed-cattle plants. Cow plants are not as sophisticated and complex as fed-cattle plants. This relative simplicity may help explain the superior performance of these plants during the crisis. Sixth, the academic work on the value of building smaller plants as a response against concentration provides mixed results—these plants require more labor per animal and can be even more susceptible to labor scarcity. Seventh, the observed increase in boxed beef prices, even as fed cattle prices fell, demonstrates the risk-mitigating impact of producer ownership of downstream activities in the value chain.
The Growing Climate Solutions Act of 2021 has wide bipartisan and industry support and yet has had little discussion in either the popular press or academic discussion of carbon markets. Although seemingly straightforward, the bill creates the necessary steps toward establishing an agricultural carbon market and may in hindsight be viewed as an essential step in such a market's viability.
In this study, we estimate the COVID-19 outbreak\u0027s revenue impacts on some of Iowa\u0027s largest agricultural industries. We estimate overall annual damage of roughly $788 million for corn, $213 million for soybean, over $2.5 billion for ethanol, $658 million for fed cattle, $34 million for calves and feeder cattle, and $2.1 billion for hogs. As more data become available and as the pandemic evolves, these estimates will certainly change, but for now they represent our best assessment of the impact on these industries.
This paper examines how comparative advantages of major beef exporters changed following the 2003 bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak, which significantly disrupted the U.S. beef trade until approximately 2007. Using longitudinal data on beef export values and constructed revealed comparative advantage measures, we show that while some measures of the long-run impacts of BSE on U.S. beef export competitiveness have returned to pre-2003 levels, the U.S.'s comparative advantage has not. We also examine a hypothetical scenario of no BSE event in 2003 and predict that in the absence of the BSE outbreak, the U.S. beef sector would have been increasingly more competitive by 2017 than it actually was. Long-term trade competitiveness may not simply return to normal even after a short-term disruption.
This paper examines how comparative advantages of major beef exporters changed following the 2003 bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak, which significantly disrupted the U.S. beef trade until approximately 2007. Using longitudinal data on beef export values and constructed revealed comparative advantage measures, we show that while some measures of the long-run impacts of BSE on U.S. beef export competitiveness have returned to pre-2003 levels, the U.S.’s comparative advantage has not. We also examine a hypothetical scenario of no BSE event in 2003 and predict that in the absence of the BSE outbreak, the U.S. beef sector would have been increasingly more competitive by 2017 than it actually was. Long-term trade competitiveness may not simply return to normal even after a short-term disruption.
In this study, we estimate the COVID-19 outbreak's revenue impacts on some of Iowa's largest agricultural industries. We estimate overall annual damage of roughly $788 million for corn, $213 million for soybean, over $2.5 billion for ethanol, $658 million for fed cattle, $34 million for calves and feeder cattle, and $2.1 billion for hogs. As more data become available and as the pandemic evolves, these estimates will certainly change, but for now they represent our best assessment of the impact on these industries.
In this study, we estimate the COVID-19 outbreak's revenue impacts on some of Iowa's largest agricultural industries. We estimate overall annual damage of roughly $788 million for corn, $213 million for soybean, over $2.5 billion for ethanol, $658 million for fed cattle, $34 million for calves and feeder cattle, and $2.1 billion for hogs. As more data become available and as the pandemic evolves, these estimates will certainly change, but for now they represent our best assessment of the impact on these industries.
The United States livestock industry has experienced dramatic structural changes over the past three decades. Among the most concerning trend to the public and regulators is the growing prevalence of concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs). This paper studies the effects of the 2003 Clean Water Act regulations on water pollution associated with hog CAFOs in Iowa. We compile a novel dataset that includes regulatory records of hog operations and pollution readings from monitoring sites, and links all hog operations to monitoring sites along the same river in Iowa. We find that the regulations have led to a 3 to 6 percentage points decrease in ammonia concentration since 2003, and such effect is stronger during heavy precipitation seasons than lower precipitation seasons.
Some producers, policy makers, and researchers claim that packers influence cash prices through contracts tied to futures prices. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical study on the price effects of contract-pricing terms linked to futures price and the related formula pricing terms linked to a cash price. We show that contract-pricing terms tied to a cattle futures price can theoretically be used to reduce the cash price. Furthermore, the model demonstrates that such tied-to-a-futures-price contract-pricing clauses and the related tied-to-a-cash-price formula pricing clauses can be substitutable tools for packers to depress the cash cattle price. Nevertheless, although empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model they show that while such manipulations may occur, their market power impact appears quite small.