A hundred days out from the election a number of issues are buzzing: housing, immigration, water, climate change, electricity bills, and the perennials, economic growth, incomes and taxes and law and order. Based on previous contests, some of these will become the raw material of the political debates while others will fade to the background.

This book chapter analyses how globalisation has changed and continues to change the nature of trade policy, and consequently affects the ways in which international trade policy interacts with domestic policies to shape the structure of domestic regulation. The chapter compares and contrasts the structure and negotiating methods of different types of trade agreements and alliances and looks at the circumstances where one type of agreement may favour New Zealand over another. The chapter proposes that the multilateral (or many party) agreement is the preferred one because New Zealand has a better chance of coordinating interests with like-minded countries. Conversely, agreements where New Zealand interests either are given no say, or where they are not accommodated because the “top-down” dictated terms are too strong, are not considered the best economic strategy. Agreements which are often, although not always, more of a “bottom-up” integration process tend to work better to improve the overall New Zealand position. Whatever the form of the agreement, the pros and cons need to be carefully considered, particularly where the terms of the agreement may become multilateralised. The chapter uses patent law and particularly the demands of the United States, in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, to illustrate the potential difficulties of such top-down agreements. The chapter relies on detailed research not only about trade agreements, but also about how New Zealand no longer has patent term extension and why the current demands of patent term extension represent an economic loss for New Zealand. The question discussed is that when there is such a loss, what the gain is. As well as the TPP, the chapter looks at what is known as ASEAN 6 negotiations and the durability of that potential arrangement.

New Zealand struggles to grow its economy partially due to its small size and remote location. There is little that can be done to change location, but the size can be increased over time. It is feasible to adopt a population policy with the aim of the population reaching 15 million in the next 50 years – an annual growth rate of 2.5% per annum. This would bring the size and density of the population to levels closer to more prosperous European countries. Fifteen million – two and a half times current projections – is a good target, too, as it allows for several large cities, fostering competition within New Zealand.

Disclaimer While every effort has been made to ensure the information in this publication is accurate, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry does not accept any responsibility or liability for error or fact omission, interpretation or opinion which may be present, nor for the consequences of any decisions based on this information. Any view or opinions expressed to not necessarily represent the official view of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The information in this report and any accompanying documentation is accurate to the best of the knowledge and belief of the Consultant acting on behalf of MAF Policy. While the Consultant has exercised all reasonable skill and care in the preparation of information in this report, neither the Consultant nor MAF Policy accept any liability in contract, tort or otherwise for any loss, damage, injury, or expense, whether direct, indirect or consequential, arising out of the provision of information in this report. This information may be copied and distributed to others without limitation, provided that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the authors are acknowledged. Under no circumstances may a charge be made for this information without the express permission of the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge the support and funding provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. We thank Phil Journeaux, Grant McFadden and Alan Walker for their helpful and perceptive comments throughout the project. Chrys Horn and Garth Harmsworth provided comments on Part II of this report. The help of all those people who participated in the sustainable development extension workshop as part of this project is greatly appreciated. (NZIER) for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) reviewed a possible role for government in sustainable development extension. The report is in two parts. Part I; by NZIER, covers the case for government intervention. Part II, of this report covers current theory and practice, and suggests ways to integrate and coordinate sustainable development information and extension. Objectives 1. Explain if and why government should intervene in sustainable development extension. • Identify the special characteristics of rural industries from a sustainability point of view. • Identify why government intervention via extension is appropriate to maintain/improve rural sustainability, including a review of the public good component of sustainable development. 2. To identify new skills, roles, players, and capacities needed for the provision and integration of sustainable development information. • Discuss the …

In these comments on Kawamoto's paper, made during the first session of the conference on “Challenges of Globalization,” Dr. John Yeabsley of the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research draws on the experience of New Zealand to highlight some salient features of regulatory reform. He points out that the process can take a long time to complete, that the costs are complex, and that people find it hard to adjust to the idea of constant change. Dr. Yeabsley emphasizes that a redistribution of the important products of the economy and society—jobs, incomes, wealth, and prestige—is inevitable, and is a necessary part of the process, although the consequent social costs can be high and seem unfair. Intervention to mitigate the risks and social concern should not, however, be allowed to compromise the reforms.

Various writers have developed models dealing with the problems facing a political party about to choose its election platform. 1 This Note shows, by means of a simple model, the importance that parties ought, in making this choice, to assign to a particular class of voters. This class consists of a subgroup of the usual ‘floating voters’ (i.e. those who change their vote from election to election). The subgroup consists of those among the floating voters whose votes may be influenced by their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the programs the parties adopt. Such voters may be designated ‘swing voters’. Whether or not such voters exist it is not the purpose of this Note to argue. Certainly political parties - in the importance they attach to their election manifestos and to the promises they contain - behave as though they believe they exist.

The existence of procedures to amend constitutions, which are expected at their writing to last for many years, means that amendments that are accepted may not harmonise with the intent of the rest of the constitution. This dynamic inconsistency can be guarded against by asking the constitution to be approved by the method of amendment. Nations whose approval methods differ widely from the amending procedure may find their constitutions suffer from dynamic inconsistency and may be unstable.