Abstract This chapter considers a view of the intentional horizons of spatial perception which make the subject’s actions central. More specifically, it considers a view—strongly associated with Alva Noë and enactivism—that posits a constitutive connection between action and spatial perception, whereby spatial perception is constituted by the exercise of a range of sensorimotor skills. I call views which posit a constitutive connection between sensorimotor knowledge concerning how the perspectival appearance of an object ‘changes as you move’ and spatial perception, Sensorimotor Knowledge views (SMK views for short). The chapter discusses different iterations of the view, and provides an ability-based gloss on its central notion of an ‘implicit grasp’ of sensorimotor correlations. Two main objections are discussed.

Abstract This book tackles a long-standing puzzle concerning visual experiences: humans enjoy visual experiences as of complete three-dimensional entities despite being limited to seeing the side or sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective. How are these phenomenological facts to be reconciled? This study aims to solve this puzzle, and in so doing make sense of a foundational form of spatial perception, through a correct understanding of the role that a ‘sense of the possible’ plays in perception. Visual experiences include an implicit element which ‘refers beyond’ what is explicitly given of the object to parts of it which are currently occluded or out of view, thus making up for our perspectivally limited viewpoint such as to provide us with an experience as of a complete thing. More than any other philosopher Edmund Husserl should be credited with putting this puzzle and the issues surrounding it at the centre stage of an understanding of visual experience. Indeed he has a distinctive term for the component of intentional experiences that ‘refer beyond’, namely an experience’s intentional horizon. Following an initial reconstruction of the notion of an intentional horizon, the majority of the book is given over to a systematic exploration of the character and role of intentional horizons in visual experiences as of three-dimensional objects, such that it seeks to answer just what is required to see such objects as being complete three-dimensional things. In doing so, the book critically evaluates a range of proposals, and then proposes its own original Modal-Ability view.

Episodic recollection often involves some kind of awareness of the sensory features or properties of what is remembered. Episodically recollecting that sunset last summer on the Greek island of Ios, involves some kind of awareness of how it looked, that is its deep blood-red colour. This is suggestive that for those episodic recollections that possess this sensory phenomenology, it is not a mere accompaniment, that is something those types of experiences could do without and maintain their identity as precisely those types of experiences. Rather their sensory phenomenology is constitutive of there being the type of experiences they are. If such thoughts are along the right lines, then getting clearer about the character of the sensory phenomenology of episodic recollection is essential to better understanding these types of memory experiences. We can frame the pertinent question as follows: in what does the sensory dimension of episodic recollection consist. My goal here is to detail the problems with the existing imagistic-representationalist and Relationalist accounts of the sensory dimension of episodic recollection and develop a positive alternative, the Sensory Absence View. The guiding idea of my positive proposal will be that episodic recollection involves a positive phenomenology of sensory absence, whereby we represent, from our current temporal perspective, the lack or absence of a sensory perception of the relevant object and its properties, such that what is remembered is absent-qua-past, as I will put it.

Abstract In the first of two chapters dedicated to Modal-Ability view, this chapter articulates the view. While the view is introduced as a distinctive and original proposal, it draws on key ideas discussed across the study, such as ability awareness, the visual background, and the visual potential of objects. The central claim of the view is that the intentional horizons of spatial perception consist in a specific kind of indeterminate ability awareness indexed to spatial possibilities. More specifically, what is anticipated is the possibility that the perceiving subject could come to occupy, or could envisage occupying, some yet-to-be-determined point of view on the object. The view is also contrasted with some similar proposals in contemporary philosophy of perception.

Abstract In the second chapter concerned with the Modal-Ability view, the task of defending the view against a range of pressing objections is taken up. In doing so, further significant aspects of it are drawn out. More specifically, it is argued that visual experience as of three-dimensional form per se is the most fundamental level at which an account of the intentional horizons of spatial perception should be pitched, rather than in terms of shape constancy. The chapter also covers questions concerning perceptual familiarity, perceptual surprise, and a cognitive complexity worry with the Modal-Ability view. The result is a more developed articulation of the commitments of the view.

Abstract This chapter applies the Master Argument for Horizonal Intentionality to spatial perception, that is our visual experiences as of three-dimensional objects. It details what the ‘objective sense’ of spatial perception amounts to and how the explicit component falls short of that sense. This involves a detailed discussion of what the explicit component of spatial perception consists in. The chapter also includes detailed discussion of various issues at the intersection of contemporary philosophy of perception and phenomenology. It closes by connecting the discussion to the 'underdetermination problem' in perceptual psychology.

Abstract This chapter provides the reader with two things that are helpful in orientating them for what is to come across the study. In the first instance it provides a substantive reconstruction of the notion of an intentional horizon. Secondly, it offers theoretical background, motivation, and defence for the approach to the study of perceptual experience that is taken in the book, namely one that can be called phenomenological. It also introduces the reader to the Master Argument for Horizonal Intentionality. Finally, it provides remarks on the very idea of ‘intentional analysis’, and defends the phenomenological approach against some recent criticisms.

Abstract This chapter discusses the view that the intentional horizons of spatial perception should be understood in terms of visualized alternative perspectives. As such the visual experience of an object as a complete three-dimensional entity would consist in a visual component and a visualized component, that is some form of imagistic representation of the occluded sides of the object. The inadequacy of what is given of the object by way of the explicit component of spatial perception would be ‘made up for’ by the relevant visualizations. I call this the Visualizing-Horizons view. Despite being an interesting proposal it is subject to several objections which creates significant problems for the view.

Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant pains. It argues that the intentional structure of paradigmatic unpleasant pain is as follows: unpleasant pains essentially involve a proprietary intentional mode-what I call affective-interoception-and a distinctive kind of evaluatively qualified sensory content. The resulting view is Affective-Evaluativism.

How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or presently unseen back-sides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be sense-perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object that they currently are—I call this the horizonality of visual experience. Existing accounts of these horizonal references are unsatisfactory. In providing a satisfactory account, this paper argues that the content and structure of the visual experience of complete three-dimensional objects is as follows: the object is presented as being perceptible from yet-to-be-determined alternative points of view. As part of the content of visual experience, this motivates non-propositional attitudes of anticipation. Explicating this proposal is the central positive aim of this paper.

This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along the lines of, judgements, perceptions, or other mental states.

In The Imaginary Jean-Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience - I call this the exclusion claim. This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre's exclusion claim. First, it frames the claim in terms of cross-modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to simultaneously attend to what one is imagining and what one is perceiving. However, this leaves it open that a subject can simultaneously imagine and perceive on the condition that either the perceived or imagined objects are not attended to. While this is a philosophically plausible position it fails to do justice to Sartre's intended position, which suggests a more radical exclusion between perception and imagination. In light of this section 3 develops a supplementary argument to remove one of the possible configurations of attention that the ban on divided attention leaves in place by arguing that the objects of imagining must be attended to, which follows from Sartre's characterisation of imagination as spontaneous. The resulting exclusion is as follows: attentive perception excludes imagination (and vice versa), given that the latter is necessarily attentive, but attentive imagination can co-occur with non-attentive or background perception (in this sense the exclusion is asymmetric in a way that Sartre fails to recognise). In concluding I detail how from this exclusion we get an important consequence - which Sartre wants the exclusion claim to have - namely that it rules out an imagination-based solution to the problem of perceptual presence.

European Journal of PhilosophyVolume 31, Issue 2 p. 534-538 BOOK REVIEW On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by Berislav Marušić. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. ISBN: 0198851162, £55.00 (Hardcover) Dr. Jonathan Mitchell, Corresponding Author Dr. Jonathan Mitchell [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-7008-4655 Department of Philosophy, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Correspondence Dr. Jonathan Mitchell, Department of philosophy, Cardiff University, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU, UK. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Dr. Jonathan Mitchell, Corresponding Author Dr. Jonathan Mitchell [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-7008-4655 Department of Philosophy, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Correspondence Dr. Jonathan Mitchell, Department of philosophy, Cardiff University, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU, UK. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 25 April 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12858Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat REFERENCES Husserl, E. (1977). In D. Cairns (Ed.), (trans.) Cartesian mediations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Mitchell, J. (2021). Emotions as feelings towards value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Müller, J. M. (2019). The world-directness of emotional feeling: On affect and intentionality. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Volume31, Issue2June 2023Pages 534-538 ReferencesRelatedInformation

A key claim of classical phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a distinctive kind of implicit intentionality, which accompanies the relevant explicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is purportedly co-constitutive of the object-presenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences. This implicit intentionality is often framed by Husserl and other classical phenomenologists in terms of horizonal intentionality or intentional horizons. Its most interesting form is labelled the 'inner horizon'. My aim in this paper is to consider whether a case can be made for thinking that affective-evaluative experiences, predominately conscious emotions, exhibit a form of implicit intentionality in terms of an inner horizon. I suggest that one plausible way of motivating this idea is by reference to the normative phenomenology of the relevant experiences, in which particular objects' values are presented as either an ideal 'ought to be' or an ideal 'ought not to be'.

In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action-properties are presented-namely, those in which objects in our perceptual surroundings or environment 'demand' that certain actions be carried out, as experienced mandates (EMs). The critical part of the paper argues that a complex contents view, which builds all of the distinctiveness of such experiences into their perceptual content, is unsatisfactory. As an alternative, I argue that EMs involve bodily potentiation, which is best understood in terms of felt action readiness. I then outline a hybrid account, which combines content-based features of EMs with action-readiness.

Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captured in terms of what that experience represents, that is in terms of properties of its intentional object. This paper attempts to get clearer on the phenomenal contribution of conscious attention. In doing so it considers and sets aside two prominent impure intentionalist accounts, namely the Phenomenal Structure view of Sebastien Watzl, and the Demonstrative Awareness view of Wayne Wu. As an alternative I outline a Modification view, which draws on ideas in Husserlian phenomenology. On this view, we should think of the phenomenal contribution of conscious attention in terms of attentive modifications of what I call a ‘pre-attentive phenomenal field’. I develop this view and highlight its benefits over alternatives.

According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The fact that a plausible account of the non-intentional awareness which experience putatively has of itself cannot be framed with reference to such forms of awareness is grounds for scepticism concerning the cogency of non-intentional experiential presence.

A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions, whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object-because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects-nonetheless need not differ qua emotion-type. This leads to the same-emotional attitude, different content claim: It is possible to have the same emotional attitude toward a range of (different) contents, as provided by different cognitive bases. This paper argues that this claim is mistaken. By appealing to the specific case of imagination, the same emotional-attitude, different content claim is challenged. Drawing on phenomenological observations made by Jean-Paul Sartre, supplemented with independently plausible considerations, I argue that we should recognize a distinct class of emotion types, which I call affective imaginings. Affective imaginings contrast with emotional experiences whose cognitive bases are sense-perceptual experiences (affective perceptions). The contrast turns on the way the different contents across these cases modify the attitudinal character of the emotional experience, motivating the positing of two irreducible classes of emotional experiences.

Recent work on pain focuses on the question “what makes pains unpleasant.” Second-order desire views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to Second-order desire views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the Second-order desire view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion is that until there is a convincing explanation of how Second-order desire views can handle masochistic psychology, theorists should look elsewhere for an account of pains unpleasantness.

This paper first demonstrates that recognition of the diversity of ways that emotional responses modulate ongoing attention generates what I call the puzzle of emotional attention , which turns on the fact that distinct emotions (e.g., fear, happiness, disgust, admiration etc.) have different attentional profiles. The puzzle concerns why this is the case, such that a solution consists in explaining why distinct emotions have the distinct attentional profiles they do. It then provides an account of the functional roles of different emotions, as tied to their evaluative themes, which explains and further elucidates the distinctive attentional profiles of different emotions, so solving the puzzle of emotional attention. Following that, it outlines how such attentional profiles are reflected in the character of emotional experience and its attentional phenomenology. The resulting picture is a more detailed account of the connections between emotion and attention than is currently on offer in the philosophical literature.