Contrary to what some postmodern theorists think, digitalization does not destroy the rationality of the Gutenberg age nor does it create a new world of images without logical structure; rather, it broadens the media spectrum of communicative acts. Nothing about it is virtual. However, this means that the same rules apply to communication on the Internet as to communication in general. In the philosophy of language, there is agreement that successful communicative practice can only be achieved if those involved in communication adhere to certain constitutive rules, such as those of truthfulness, trust, and reliability. At times, the anonymity of internet communication, the absence of the face-to-face situation and the possibility of communicating under aliases promotes manipulative and exploitative practices which violate these rules.

Is it possible to create an ethical programming of computers? Utilitarianism seems to be a good candidate for such programming. After all, utilitarian ethics are based on an optimizing calculus and the assumption that it is possible to evaluate the consequences of action in a coherent way. This can be summarized precisely in mathematical terms: First, determine a value function that judges all consequences of action according to the extent to which they realize which values, then calculate the expected value of the different decision options given probabilities, and finally choose the one whose expected value is highest. The software engineer using this principle would therefore only have to use two setscrews in order to cause “intelligent” systems to make rational decisions. But does this really ensure that software systems always “make” the right ethical choices? In this chapter we show that consequentialist ethics collides with, among other things, a fundamental principle of any civil and humane society, we call the principle of non-comparability.

The danger in dealing with artificial intelligence is that simulation is confused with realization. This already leads us to use an inappropriate vocabulary, according to which software systems have “perceptions” and “make decisions.” For example, when the navigation system commands “Turn right,” we attribute an intention to the system, namely, to make us turn right. But as things stand, that is, at the current state of digital technologies, this would be a mystification. Software systems do not will, feel, think, decide. Humans however do. It is them who are not determined by mechanical processes. Thanks to their capacity for insight as well as their ability to have feelings, they can determine their actions themselves, and they do this by deciding to act in this way and not in another. This is what discerns us from robots.

There is much to be said for declaring access to the Internet as a human right today and even more so in the future. The basic principle of all human rights is immutable: no one may be existentially damaged in their self-respect. This is the core of human dignity, as it has found systematic expression, for example, in the ethics of Immanuel Kant or currently in Avishai Margalit’s. When a growing number of people have internet access, exclusion from internet access can become a human rights violation. That time does not seem to be far away. A completely different question is whether or not the Internet as a communication medium is conducive to the realization of human rights in political practice. Even though the Internet can trigger unexpected positive changes, its negative effects must not be neglected.

According to the empirical data so far, the productivity effects from digitalization are modest and not comparable with earlier technological revolutions. They were evident in the early phase of the introduction of PCs and browsers (1994–2004) but fell to a conspicuously low level after the turn of the century, which continues to this day. This could change however if there was to be new phase of industrially oriented digitalization. If this were to happen and the growth rates, at least in the mature economies, were not sufficient to prevent a significant shrinkage of the volume of work, then the new leeway should be used for an expansion of lifelong learning, a more flexible change between family and gainful employment, for sabbaticals and more time sovereignty.

A person acts out of strength of will if she punctually does what she has realized to be structurally rational. Weakness of will is displayed in structurally irrational punctual optimization. Strength of will is a prerequisite for responsible action.