Alternating between different talkers during listening typically incurs a cognitive processing cost. How these processing costs manifest, and potentially differ, in a multi-accent setting remains to be examined. Across two experiments, we investigate (1) whether talker and accent switching costs are driven by engagement of a recalibration mechanism, and (2) whether global listening context affects the magnitude of talker and accent switching costs. The results of our first experiment indicate that switching between speakers of the same second language (L2) accent (e.g., between two Mandarin-accented speakers of English) was less cognitively challenging than switching between speakers of different L2 accents (e.g., between a Mandarin-accented speaker and a Turkish-accented speaker of English). This outcome suggests that the perceptual distance (i.e., the holistic estimate of spectral and temporal differences in acoustic signals) between two speakers’ productions determines the size of associated switching costs, such that recalibration is less cognitively demanding for speakers with the same L2 accent. In our second experiment, we examine whether a more challenging block-wide listening context results in a global upregulation of cognitive resources, and, subsequently, reduces the cognitive resources required to (a) process L2 accent and (b) resolve local talker and accent changes. Here, the overall cognitive demands of processing L2 accent were reduced, as predicted, but talker and accent switching costs were not. We conclude that talker and accent switching are supported by a recalibration mechanism and that global upregulation of cognitive resources may reduce L2 accent processing costs but not local switching costs.

The correlates of mind wandering are well studied in younger adult samples. However, little is known about the correlates of mind wandering among older adults. The current study took a comprehensive approach to investigating age-related differences in the correlates of mind wandering. Participants (N = 150 younger and N = 150 older adults) completed a series of attention tasks. During some of these tasks, participants were periodically probed to report on their mind wandering experiences. Additionally, participants completed several questionnaires capturing theoretically relevant constructs such as motivation, affect, and dispositional factors. We used confirmatory factor analysis to assess correlations between our predictors and mind wandering at the construct level. We found that some factors (e.g., task-based motivation) were significantly correlated in both age groups, while other factors were significant correlates in one age group but not the other. Despite these apparent differences, many of the correlations did not statistically differ across the groups. We did find, however, that the association between behavioral attention lapses and mind wandering was significantly stronger in younger adults compared to older adults. A secondary aim of the current study was to replicate and extend prior work examining the mediating factors in the age-mind wandering relationship. Consistent with prior findings, we showed that motivational and affective factors only partially mediated the relationship between age and mind wandering. Our findings can help inform and refine theories of mind wandering by showing that key predictors of mind wandering are largely consistent across younger and older adults.

Jacoby and colleagues demonstrated that control processes can adapt at the level of individual stimuli, giving rise to the item-specific proportion congruence (ISPC) effect, whereby items that frequently appear as incongruent produce a smaller Stroop effect. Prior research has focused exclusively on informational conflict (competition between word meaning and ink color), leaving open whether item-specific control mechanisms also affect task conflict (competition between the task sets of word reading and color naming). Across two experiments, we addressed this question. In Experiment 1, using an ISPC manipulation, we replicated the classic reduction of informational conflict for mostly incongruent items but found no evidence of item-specific control of task conflict. In Experiment 2, we introduced a novel item-specific proportion wordness (ISPW) manipulation to vary the likelihood of task conflict at the item level, by presenting items mostly with neutral words or neutral nonwords. Results revealed robust item-specific effects on task conflict and informational conflict, with reductions in both types of conflict for items that were mostly neutral words. These findings clarify the scope of item-specific control: while manipulations of reactive informational control selectively influence informational conflict, manipulations of reactive task control can regulate not only task conflict but additionally informational conflict. Our results refine and extend Jacoby et al.’s original insight, providing initial evidence for item-specific control of word reading, and demonstrating the operation of item-specific control at multiple levels of conflict via an ISPW manipulation that modulated the likelihood of word reading.

Strategic monitoring is the heightening of monitoring in relevant contexts where prospective memory (PM) targets are expected and the relaxation of monitoring in irrelevant contexts. There is ample evidence for strategic monitoring, but most studies instructed participants about relevant contexts (e.g., PM targets will appear in words but not in nonwords). In Experiments 1 and 2, we examined whether strategic monitoring emerges without such instructions when participants must learn that words are the PM-relevant context. Participants monitored more in words than in nonwords, demonstrating experience-guided strategic monitoring. However, this pattern emerged even before the first PM target, suggesting a word-monitoring bias. In Experiment 3, the PM-relevant context was shifted to nonwords so that evidence for experience-guided strategic monitoring could not be attributed to a word-monitoring bias. Participants monitored equally in words and nonwords. Collectively, Experiments 1-3 revealed no clear evidence of experience-guided strategic monitoring independent of a word-monitoring bias. Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 3 except that participants were directly instructed that PM targets would occur in nonwords. There was only short-lived evidence of instructed strategic monitoring. Our findings cast doubt on the possibility that strategic monitoring can arise through experience (i.e., via the learning of associations between contextual cues and PM relevance), suggesting that strategic monitoring may require instructions. Additionally, we found a previously undocumented word-monitoring bias. Understanding this bias is important for instructed and experience-guided paradigms, as it can mimic strategic monitoring when words are the relevant context or obscure evidence of strategic monitoring when nonwords are the relevant context. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

Despite the intuition that attention can be willfully heightened on demand in response to warnings that alert people to impending distraction (e.g., “Pay attention!”), the empirical evidence for this notion from studies employing congruency pre-cues is surprisingly weak, posing a challenge to some theoretical accounts. Here, we examine this puzzle of profitless pre-cues via the first systematic review of the literature on pre-cues in conflict tasks (e.g., the Stroop task)—a classic instance of proactive cognitive control. We first outline important conceptual and methodological considerations to delineate the process of greatest theoretical and practical importance, namely, the volitional attenuation of distraction when the precise target and distractor features are not known in advance. This is followed by a comprehensive literature review, revealing limited evidence for the effective use of pre-cues to attenuate distraction in conflict tasks (and we note a similar status in adjacent fields, like task switching and visual search). To elucidate this puzzle, we synthesize key findings alongside design parameters employed across studies to develop a novel theoretical framework, called TEPID. TEPID proposes a two-phase model that highlights the interactivity of a small set of task-related factors (preparation time, cue type, response modality, and task type) and person-related factors (motivation and ability) which we believe to be crucial for determining whether pre-cues are exploited to proactively modulate control. From this synthesis, several recommendations and predictions are derived to position the field for future investigations of proactive control using pre-cueing manipulations, as well as their translation to real-life applications.

Congruency precues rarely produce benefits on incongruent trials in four-choice conflict tasks, raising questions about people's ability to heighten cognitive control on demand. The motivational hypothesis posits that benefits may be elusive because people are insufficiently motivated to engage effortful control in response to precues signaling an incongruent trial. We conducted three preregistered experiments using performance incentives to systematically test the motivational hypothesis in a condition where incongruent trial precue benefits previously were not found, namely, when preparation time was short. We observed precue benefits for reward and, surprisingly, no-reward trials in Experiment 1 (within-block incentive manipulation) and Experiment 2 (between-block incentive manipulation), suggesting a possible carryover effect of motivation. When incentives were manipulated between subjects (Experiment 3), a precue benefit was selective to the reward group. Although this pattern lends support to the motivational hypothesis, in all experiments, the difference in precue benefits between reward and no-reward conditions was nonsignificant. Collectively, the findings suggest that the effects of motivation on precue benefits are not robust, at least when preparation time is short. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

Prospective memory (PM) is often supported by monitoring the environment for a PM target that signals it is the appropriate time to perform the intention, a process that is attentionally demanding and therefore induces a cost to the ongoing task. Consequently, monitoring is employed strategically by heightening monitoring in contexts where PM targets are likely to occur, and relaxing monitoring in other contexts. In a seminal paper, Guynn (2003) proposed a dual-process model to explain the mechanisms of strategic monitoring, positing that strategic monitoring is supported by two processes: retrieval mode and target checking. The dual-process model has since been a fundamental contributor within the PM domain, playing a critical role in both theoretical and empirical progress. Although the dual-process model has undoubtedly left its mark, Guynn's (2003) original findings have not yet been replicated. Moreover, there has been no test of whether these results are replicable in a more traditional PM paradigm. In Experiment 1, we conceptually replicated Guynn's (2003) findings in support of the dual-process model of strategic monitoring after adjusting her design slightly to provide a more complete characterization of the influence of strategic monitoring on ongoing task costs. Experiment 2 aimed to conceptually replicate the evidence for the dual-process model in a traditional ongoing task within the PM literature, a lexical decision task. Although we found little support for the dual-process model in lexical decision task performance, the pattern of results raises the possibility that task characteristics may affect engagement of retrieval mode and target checking. Ultimately, this study provides the first replication of Guynn (2003) and highlights the need for further investigation of the dual-process model in other PM paradigms.

Decades of research has aimed to distinguish cognitive control from bottom-up learning and memory processes. Despite early consensus that both mechanisms contribute to key phenomena, debates persist. We argue that battles such as these reach a point of diminishing returns, consuming substantial time, effort and resources without further advancing theoretical understanding. Decades of research has aimed to distinguish cognitive control from bottom-up learning and memory processes. Despite early consensus that both mechanisms contribute to key phenomena, debates persist. We argue that battles like these reach a point of diminishing returns, consuming substantial time, effort, and resources without further advancing theoretical understanding.

Evidence that individuals proactively adjust cognitive control in response to pre-cues signaling upcoming distraction has been surprisingly sparse, raising questions about the limits of volitional control. The present study tested whether this pattern reflects genuine constraints in proactive control engagement or methodological limitations of standard pre-cueing designs. Across two pre-registered experiments, we examined the role of cueing order (i.e., whether participants started with informative or uninformative pre-cue blocks) in the commonly used between-block approach and evaluated a within-block alternative in which informative and uninformative pre-cues were randomly intermixed. In Experiment 1, the standard approach of collapsing cueing order conditions yielded null pre-cue benefits for the between-block comparison, mirroring what is often observed in literature. However, when considering cueing order, benefits emerged when informative cues were encountered first (cued-first group) but not when they appeared later (uncued-first group). In contrast, the within-block comparison produced reliable pre-cue benefits regardless of cueing order. Experiment 2 replicated the within-block pre-cue benefit using a fully intermixed design without the cueing order manipulation. Together, these findings indicate that sparse evidence for pre-cue benefits may partly reflect design-related constraints rather than limits in proactive control. Why pre-cue benefits depend on cueing order remains an open question, but the present findings reveal that the intermixed cueing design offers a more sensitive and reliable method for detecting cue-based control adjustments—with important implications for prominent theories of cognitive control.

Cognitive control enables adaptive behavior by flexibly adjusting information processing to meet changing environmental demands. While extensive research has examined the costs of switching between different tasks, it remains unclear whether switching between different control states (relaxed and focused) within a single task carries intrinsic costs. We hypothesized that internally switching between control states while performing a single task incurs a subjective effort cost and, therefore, that people avoid such demands. Additionally, we examined the tradeoff between this cost and an established demand source—interference. We conducted a series of experiments using the Demand Selection Task, where participants chose between different options that yielded lists of Stroop trials. Participants consistently avoided options with high demands for internal state switching (Experiment 1, N = 64) or interference (Experiment 2, N = 86). Regarding the potential tradeoff, Experiment 3 (N = 120) tested whether internal state-switching demands modulate interference costs when both are present, but did not provide evidence for this modulation. However, due to constraints imposed by the structure of the Stroop task, simultaneous manipulation of switching and interference was only possible with relatively weak manipulations for both. To address this, we developed a novel parametric flanker task (Experiment 4, N = 50) that enables strong simultaneous manipulation of both demands. With these stronger manipulations, both switching and interference costs influenced selections, revealing trade-offs between these competing demands (Experiment 5, N = 130). Our findings refine models of control regulation, highlighting that not only exerting but also adjusting control carries intrinsic costs.

People learn associations between attentional demands (e.g., conflict likelihood) and predictive cues and then reactively retrieve relatively relaxed or focused control settings upon reoccurrence of a predictive cue, which is referred to as learning-guided control. A key theoretical question concerns whether learning-guided control transfers to novel situations in which the cues are no longer predictive of attentional demands. Using a picture-word Stroop task, we examined whether learning-guided control settings acquired when responding with one response modality (i.e., manual keypress) were evidenced when subsequent transfer items required a different response modality (i.e., vocal response). For training items, an item-specific proportion congruence manipulation was employed such that some predictive cues (pictures) were mostly congruent, and others were mostly incongruent. Transfer items were visibly identical to training items, but critically, all cues were 50% congruent. In Experiment 1 in which training occurred prior to a separate transfer phase, we did not observe transfer. In Experiment 2, we intermixed manual modality training items and vocal modality transfer items within blocks throughout the experiment. In this case, transfer was observed. These novel findings demonstrate that learning-guided control settings can generalize from one response modality to another under select conditions. We discuss the roles of modality-specific processes and boundaries between training items and transfer items in modulating transfer, and implications for automaticity.

Age-related differences in mind wandering are robust. However, previous work examining such differences rarely considered the specific content of participants' mind wandering. We sought to replicate prior work showing that older adults' reduced frequency of mind wandering is specific to negative and neutral thoughts, and extend this work by examining the role of perceived stress in this pattern. We also tested if older and younger adults differed in the meta-awareness of their emotionally valenced mind wandering. Older and younger adults completed a sustained attention task with periodic thought probes and were instructed to self-catch any instances of mind wandering they had during the task. Consistent with prior work, older adults reported less mind wandering overall. Critically, using thought probes, we replicated the specific pattern of an age-related reduction in negative and neutral mind-wandering reports, but similar rates of positive mind-wandering between age groups. Further, the age-related difference in negative mind wandering was still evident after accounting for participants' level of perceived stress. There were also age-related differences in participants' self-caught mind wandering. While older adults had fewer self-caught episodes overall, the age difference was largest for neutral reports and smallest for negative reports. Age-related differences in the processing of, and preference for, certain emotional information appear to be evident in participants' off-task thinking. Our findings highlight that age-related differences in mind wandering might not be consistent across different contents and that future work should consider mind-wandering content, such as emotional valence, when testing for age-related differences.

People learn to associate external (predictive) cues (e.g., pictures; colors) with the attentional demands (e.g., the likelihood of conflict) that tend to accompany these cues. Such learning supports item-specific control, the reactive triggering of control settings associated with predictive cues (e.g., high level of focus triggered by a cue predicting high attentional demands). Item-specific control is assumed to operate with a degree of automaticity that allows for efficient processing even in the presence of competing demands. In three experiments, we investigated whether the unpredictable appearance of another salient stimulus (external distractor) presented along with the predictive cue would interfere with the triggering of item-specific control settings. The first two blocks of each experiment (i.e., acquisition phase) allowed participants to learn associations between different pictures and their likelihood of conflict in a picture-word Stroop task without external distraction. In the last two blocks (i.e., test phase), we introduced a random visual distractor (Experiments 1 and 2) or a combined visual and auditory distractor (i.e., multisensory; Experiment 3), with Experiment 2 additionally manipulating the timing of the distractor onset. Overall, the item-specific proportion congruence effect remained intact in both distractor-present and distractor-absent trials in all experiments, suggesting that item-specific control is robust to the presence of external distraction. We consider the theoretical implications of the results, with a focus on the automaticity of item-specific control and future investigations of potential boundary conditions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

We provide a comprehensive investigation of proactive and reactive control during Stroop task performance with younger, middle-aged, and older adults, to test predictions of the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework. A novel color-word vocal response paradigm was utilized with separate baseline, proactive, and reactive conditions, which differed in list-level and item-specific proportion congruencies, along with matched and randomly alternating color naming and word reading blocks. When compared to baseline, the proactive condition indexes processes that actively maintain goal-relevant information during contexts in which distraction is expected, while the reactive condition indexes dynamic adjustment processes engaged when items associated with high cognitive control demands are unpredictably encountered. Using a large sample (N = 327) and targeted analyses measuring primary and secondary behavioral markers of proactive and reactive control, the findings strongly indicate that while younger adults demonstrate robust engagement of proactive control mechanisms, proactive control effects were absent in older adults, and diminished in middle-aged adults, suggesting a lifespan related pattern of change. In contrast, the results highlight the selectivity of the proactive pattern, as indices of reactive control did not exhibit age-related change, nor were there any effects of proportion congruency in matched word reading blocks. Together, the findings provide strong confirmation of the DMC framework, in suggesting a tight linkage between proactive control capacity and the dynamic neurocognitive processes that change across the adult lifespan.

Learning-guided reactive control is the flexible biasing of attention that is triggered by external cues, such that more focused control settings are retrieved and executed in response to cues predicting higher attentional demands. We investigated whether race/ethnicity is harnessed as a cue to guide control using a social Stroop task in which participants named the race/ethnicity of a face (e.g., Asian) while ignoring a superimposed word that was congruent (e.g., Asian) or incongruent (e.g., White). In the first four experiments, we manipulated item-specific proportion congruence. Faces of some races/ethnicities (e.g., Asian, Black) were mostly congruent, and faces of others (e.g., White, Latina) were mostly incongruent. We observed the item-specific proportion congruence effect showing a smaller Stroop effect for mostly incongruent faces. Critically, we found transfer of the effect to faces of each race/ethnicity that were 50% congruent, indicating control at the more abstract, category level (i.e., more focused control setting retrieved and executed for racial/ethnic categories associated with higher attentional demands). Individuating faces did not disrupt category-level control but recategorisation of the faces into racially/ethnically diverse teams did, as indicated by the lack of transfer. In a final experiment, we associated proportion congruence (attentional demands) with the conjunction of two social categories (race/ethnicity and gender) and found novel evidence of conjunctive learning-guided control. The findings demonstrate that race/ethnicity (and conjunctions with gender) cues control adjustments, people transfer learned control settings to other members of race/ethnicity categories, and recategorisation creates an important boundary condition for transfer.

PURPOSE:People reliably relax cognitive control in response to pre-cues signaling a low likelihood of distraction (e.g., mostly congruent lists). However, there is limited evidence that people heighten control when pre-cued that distraction is likely (e.g., mostly incongruent lists). One possible explanation for this asymmetry pertains to floor effects in mostly incongruent lists, where interference is minimal even without pre-cues. Hence, we examined whether individuals would heighten control in mostly congruent lists-where control is typically relaxed-when given pre-cues and novel instructions emphasizing the difficulty posed by infrequent but disruptive incongruent trials. METHOD:In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants performed a color-word Stroop task with mostly congruent and mostly incongruent lists and encountered informative or uninformative pre-cues before each list. Instructions highlighted the difficulty of performing well in mostly congruent lists (1a) or mostly incongruent lists (1b). In Experiment 2, we additionally tested whether forming implementation intentions would enhance pre-cue use and facilitate on-demand control. RESULTS:Comparisons across Experiments 1a and 1b provided modest evidence that participants heightened control in response to pre-cues in mostly congruent lists. Experiment 2 found no additional benefit from implementation intentions. CONCLUSION:These findings suggest that perhaps individuals can heighten control on demand when distraction is infrequent but nonetheless disruptive, which may be critical given the potential to be caught off-guard in such conditions. However, other factors beyond list composition seem to contribute to the limited evidence of an on-demand heightening of control.

People learn and retrieve cognitive control settings (e.g., attentional focus) associated with stimulus and contextual features. It has been theorized that control adjustments occur at the item level (e.g., for a specific picture) and the category level (i.e., for the overarching category represented by the picture), but evidence is lacking for the former. We aimed to determine whether control can truly operate at the item level. In Experiments 1-3, we manipulated item-specific proportion congruencies in a picture-word Stroop task while holding category-specific proportion congruencies constant at 50% congruent. One item in each animal category (e.g., Dog 1, Fish 1) was mostly congruent (MC) and one item (e.g., Dog 2, Fish 2) was mostly incongruent (MI). Item-level control (i.e., larger Stroop effect for MC items compared to MI items) was observed in Experiment 1, but neither Experiment 2 nor 3 replicated this finding. Experiments 4a and 4b used MC and MI categories, with each comprising both MC and MI items, allowing us to potentially index both levels of control. However, the findings indicated that control operated only at the category level and not the item level. Using novel stimuli, Experiment 5 showed Stroop effects differed between items that shared a response but were visually/conceptually dissimilar. This finding suggests that applying item-level control may be difficult when items within a category are visually/conceptually similar (as in Experiments 1-4). Collectively, our findings provided little evidence for item-level control; instead, the findings suggest control primarily operates at the category level in the picture-word Stroop task. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Mind wandering is a common everyday phenomenon, and previous research has shown that people may mind wander strategically, suggesting a sensitivity to more versus less opportune times to let our minds wander. In the current study, we aimed to replicate the evidence for strategic mind wandering and address a novel question: Who are those individuals who are more apt to strategically mind wander? Following Seli et al. Psychological Science, 29, 1247–1256, (2018a), Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147, 431-443, participants (N = 269) completed a mind-wandering clock task with periodic thought probes to assess mind wandering and cognitive (working memory capacity [WMC] and fluid intelligence [Gf]) and dispositional (trait spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering and prospective memory ability/strategy use) individual differences measures. The results demonstrated that strategic mind wandering occurred in the mind wandering clock task, replicating previous work. Critically, only individual differences in WMC predicted the strategic modulation of mind wandering. Strategic mind wandering was more pronounced in individuals with higher WMC, such that these individuals showed a larger shift away from mind wandering in the moments before demands of the clock task were highest. This suggests people who are better at actively maintaining goal-relevant information are more strategic in decisions to mind wander. These findings highlight that mind wandering is not necessarily a failure of control, but something that people can control, especially those that are high in WMC.

Previous research has demonstrated robust age-related differences in the Stroop effect. Such differences are often attributed to deficits in cognitive control processes, such as goal maintenance ability. Previous research in younger adults has reliably demonstrated that the magnitude of the Stroop effect, particularly for those lower in working memory capacity, can be reduced by providing periodic goal reminders. The present study tested if this benefit of goal reminders extends to another group with reduced goal maintenance ability, older adults. Younger (N = 80) and older (N = 78) adults completed a vocal color-word Stroop task in which most trials were congruent, a condition which induces goal neglect and exacerbates Stroop effects. Critically, half of the participants in each age group were stopped every 24 trials to vocalize either a goal-reminder statement ("The goal is to name the color, not the word") or a nongoal statement ("This is part of my psychology study"). The key finding was that the goal reminders benefitted older adults as evidenced by a reduced Stroop effect in reaction time for the goal condition compared with the nongoal condition. This pattern was not observed for younger adults. Error rate analyses suggested that the benefits of goal reminders were short-lived, with errors primarily reduced in the first half of the run (e.g., 12 trials) following goal reminders. We suggest that goal reminders can be a useful intervention to momentarily improve cognitive control in older adults. We discuss the implications of this finding for theories of cognitive control that implicate reductions in goal maintenance at the center of age-related cognitive decline. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Monitoring the environment for prospective memory (PM) targets can be attentionally demanding, such as searching for a pharmacy to pick up medication while driving in traffic. It is therefore optimal to increase monitoring in contexts when the probability of encountering a PM target is high (e.g., business plaza) and decrease monitoring in contexts when the probability is low (e.g., residential area), referred to as strategic monitoring. In some instances, though, identifying whether the context is appropriate for monitoring can be attentionally demanding. For example, when contextual information varies unpredictably, it may be easier to continuously monitor rather than dynamically increase and decrease monitoring on a moment-by-moment basis. The current study extends previous research by showing that participants strategically monitor when the ongoing task automatically orients attention to contextual information (i.e., focal context cues), regardless of the difficulty of checking for PM targets (Experiment 1). In contrast, when ongoing task processing does not orient attention to contextual information (i.e., nonfocal context cues), participants only strategically monitor when the demands of target checking are high (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that the decision to utilize context to adjust monitoring is driven by a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the perceived efforts of context identification relative to the expected benefit of not having to check for PM targets on half of the trials. When the perceived effort of identifying context on each trial is outweighed by the benefit of reducing target checking on a subset of trials, strategic monitoring occurs.