With the research achievements in both theory and practice domain,more and more new challenges for power system operation and planning have been aroused in the electricity industry restructuring process. Some hot topics about these new problems are analyzed in this paper,which is the first part of a series of two. The history of electricity market is firstly reviewed. The interactive process between the power system optimization theory and the microeconomics theory is discussed. Then the advantages of some foreign electricity markets, such as North-Europe, United Kingdom and PJM etc,are summarized. Especially the SMD(Standard Market Design) framework is focused in the analysis. Finally some suggestions on the market design work are proposed based on the western successful experiences and the realities of China.

备用辅助服务是电力系统的重要特征之一 ,关系到电力系统的安全运行与可靠性。在电力市场环境下 ,备用辅助服务的市场组织、指标量化和费用结算等研究课题一直令人关注。文中对各类备用辅助服务市场的组织模式、备用市场与电量市场进行协调等相关问题进行了研究 ,总结了电量市场与备用市场的交易决策方法 ,并提出了发电侧电力市场中备用市场运行模式的建议

衡量各发电商的市场力与投机行为 ,研究市场的电价变化 ,是电力市场的深层次问题。在总结传统市场力理论的基础上 ,基于厂商所面对的需求曲线 ,提出了反映机组市场力的市场电价可控区的新概念 ,建立了从市场电价角度衡量各厂商市场力大小的指标———市场价格可控指数。在此基础上 ,提出了衡量市场力程度的综合指数和衡量厂商滥用市场力行为的指标。这些指标能较全面地反映市场力变化的动态信息 ,使得对市场控制力的监管更科学化和具有可操作性 ,有利于采取针对性和预知性措施以抑制市场力的垄断行为。

合约市场是电力市场的重要组成部分 ,它通过中长期合约交易降低发电商的市场风险 ,保证电力系统长期安全平稳运营。文中紧密结合我国现状 ,充分考虑各发电公司由于历史原因造成的在市场上竞争能力的差异 ,提出了分组竞价的概念和交易机制 ,在最大限度上保证各发电公司的公正和公平性。提出了分组竞价的合约市场交易模型和算法 ,可以同时考虑上升、下降及混合型报价曲线。算例分析表明 ,这种分组竞价机制能保证交易的经济性和公平性 ,将对电力市场的稳定运营提供有力的保障

Through analyzing the difficulties of current deregulation of Chinese power industry, this paper proposes a novel model in which electricity market is gradually established and it has been testified that such model is available for the current situation of China. In this model, at the beginning of restructuring power industry, generators are divided into two alternative group, some of them are inside market, the left outside market. Generators inside market will participate in generation competition, while those outside market maintain cost-based operation mode with contracts. The load demand will be distributed to each group in term of their integrated generating price. The lower price of the group, the more load demand will be obtained. This model can coordinate the cost-difference conflict between old and new power plants, make load demand elastic relatively to its price in the case single buyer trading model, valorize electricity trading price avoiding the price risk of restructuring power industry and make it marketable in very short period of time, and gradually lead generators join in market by means of market mechanism. The mathematical model corresponding to the new model proposed by this paper is established and the decoupled algorithm is also presented. Both the market model and the solution algorithm have already been put into the real application.

In order to organize automatic generation control (AGC) market in the deregulated environment in China, three new AGC market models with AGC and operating constraints taken into consideration to avoid negative price of downward AGC regulation. The first model minimizes the total cost of the AGC market and the energy market. The second model meets the generation requirements and AGC schedule embeding justness and clearity. The third model provides economic incentives to stimulate enough units to participate in the AGC market. Based on their relations to the dayahead energy market, these three models are applicable to different reformation periods and different operating conditions in deregulating power systems. Some problems related to these models, such as opportunity costs and uplift of AGC units, are also discussed.

 Two different principles that can be used to determine the final electricity purchase price are discriminatory bidding price and uniform marginal price. Mathematical models for these two mechanisms in a competitive market were used to quantitatively analyze the characteristics of the methods. If electricity sellers are paid a discriminatory price, the final purchase price to each seller differs when their bidding price curves are different, though the total payment is less than that with the uniformprice mechanism. The uniformprice settlement rules provide fairness in the energy trading and provide market participants with information concerning the real cost of electricity generation.

借鉴了常规的合约市场、日前市场交易机制 ,在目前部分省区组织的“水火置换”的基础上 ,提出了发电权交易的思想 ,即发电企业进行双边交易 ,转让或购入发电权 ,从而实现一定程度上的自调度 ,对系统的安全、经济运行有重要的辅助作用。经纪人模式是双边交易的主要组织模式。文中首先从数学和经济学角度剖析了经纪人模式组织普通双边交易的机理 ,进而研究了由此组织发电权交易的过程和方法 ,并建立了考虑交易成本的经纪人模型。最后提出了发电权交易的两种方式 ,即不考虑交易成本的简易模式和考虑交易成本的全效用模式 ,并举例分析了各自的交易结果。研究表明 ,发电权交易是一种新颖而有效的交易 ,可以在电力市场实践中发挥积极的作用

在电力市场环境下 ,发电商的策略性投标行为关系到电价风险、市场稳定、市场力滥用行为及发电商自身利润等诸多问题。文中在对发电机组成本 /需求的微观经济分析基础上 ,建立了机组面对需求曲线的公式及求解方法 ,提出了机组市场价格控制区的新概念。基于经济学中企业经营决策的最大利润原理 ,阐述了“边际发电成本等于边际发电收入”的机组最优竞价准则 ,提出了拥有不同市场力的发电商最优竞价策略及算法

探讨了如何在发电侧电力市场中考虑水电优化运行问题 ,建立了综合考虑水电机组运行约束条件 （出力约束、电量约束和振动区约束 ）的数学模型 ,并提出了解决该优化问题的新方法。该方法已经在实际中得到应用。计算结果表明所提出的模型和方法是有效的 ,为在竞价上网中考虑水电的运行模式提出了新的思路和方法。

In a competitive electricity market, the power suppliers develop bidding strategies in order to maximize their own profits. The competition among participants is modeled as a non-cooperative game with incomplete information. This paper presents an optimization model of the bidding problem and formulates a novel approach with the application of game theory and probability theory. By introducing the concept of virtual rival, the method can efficiently deal with the problem of multi-person gaming and incomplete information, which remains very difficult problems in the game theory. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates the determination of Nash equilibrium when all participants try to maximize their profit in the same manner and in a complete information environment. Numerical results show the efficiency of the proposed approach.

电力市场的安全经济运行需要交易中心对市场进行及时而合理的调节。文中提出了市场分析与评估的概念 ,初步建立了相应的模型和软件系统。所建立的数学模型考虑了市场成员竞争行为和市场运行规则等 ,求解结果可以及时揭示系统供需平衡状况和安全隐患。市场分析与评估系统采集相关信息 ,并在模拟市场运行的基础上评估 ,得到未来的供需关系、网络充裕度和运行经济性等信息。这些信息不仅可以指导发电公司的竞争行为 ,减少生产的盲目性 ,还能辅助交易调度人员的决策安排 ,保证市场的正常运行

系统边际电价作为电力市场最终的交易价格 ,对电力交易有着重要的影响。国内外现有电力市场中 ,为了保证市场交易的公平性 ,通常将电价申报曲线强制定义为单调上升型 ,造成申报电价与电力生产成本相背离。文中提出一种新的边际电价确定方案以及相应的电力竞争模式 ,能够处理包括下降型在内的各种形状的电价曲线。在保证电力交易结果的合理性的前提下 ,新的电价体系可以在任何电价情况下获得一个随负荷增长单调增加的系统边际电价 ,避免了传统边际电价定义体系中无法在保证竞争公平性的前提下处理下降型报价的缺点。

The energy generated by the unit for electricity market depends on its competition ability,which is decided by its technical and economic parameters,and system load.Based on the engineering practice,the common index of competition ability for generator unit is analyzed.The non constrained price index is given,which reflects both sides of trade,and based on it,a new fair and rational index system for generator unit competition is proposed.It can be used for improving the unit commitment algorithm of short term purchase scheduling,manual trading plan and real time dispatch.The calculation example shows that the proposed comprehensive index can fairly evaluate the competition ability of generator unit and provide a better initial solution for trading plan optimization,resulting in a higher calculation speed and accuracy.