The following provides the author's responses to the four commentaries on Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, written by Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Eleanor Palafox-Harris and Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Miguel N & uacute;& ntilde;ez de Prado Gordillo, and Sofia Jeppsson and Paul Lodge.

Historians of psychiatry conventionally describe its history as a clash between biological and psychological perspectives. Recently, Garson proposed an alternative framework, viewing psychiatry's history as a tension between "madness-as-dysfunction" and "madness-as-strategy." Madness-as-dysfunction interprets mental health issues, like extremely low mood or panic attacks, as symptoms of underlying diseases or disorders. Madness-as-strategy, by contrast, regards these states as functional, adaptive, or purposeful in their own right. This paper examines what this shift in perspective might mean for psychiatric medications. Two possible views are explored: an optimistic one, suggesting drugs might be used so long as they do not undermine the natural function of a condition, and a pessimistic one, arguing that such drug use constitutes a "violence against the self" and should only occur in emergencies. The aim is not to decide between these positions, but rather to map out the range of attitudes toward medications from the standpoint of madness-as-strategy.

I argue that despite the merits of Jefferson's account of a brain disorder, which are many, the notion of function she deploys is unsuitable to the overall goals of that account. In particular, Jefferson accepts Cummins' causal role theory of function and dysfunction. As the causal role view, in its standard elaborations, is wedded to human interests, goals, and values, it cannot serve as a value-neutral anchor for her hybrid "harm-dysfunction" account of disorder. I argue that the selected effects theory, or some comparably value-neutral account, would serve her purposes better.

A basic question of philosophy of psychiatry is "what is madness (mental illness, mental disorder.)?" Contemporary thinkers err by framing the problem as one of defining madness in contrast with sanity. For the Late Modern theorist of madness, the problem was not one of defining madness in contrast with sanity, but in contrast with "idiocy"-the apparent diminution or abolition of one's reasoning power. This altered reading of the problem has an important consequence. For what distinguishes madness from idiocy is not the failure, absence, or lack of reason, but its presence-albeit in a perverse and mutated form. For the Late Modern theorist, madness was always, by its very nature, infused with reason. This "infusion" of madness by reason has two consequences for philosophy of psychiatry today: it reframes the project of defining "mental disorder," and it provides intellectual scaffolding for the emerging movement known as Mad Pride, mad resistance, or mad activism.

Abstract Teleology is the study of purposes and goals. While humans and other intelligent creatures can act on purposes, are there purposes in nature, too? Biologists often explain the development of organisms, the behavior of plants and animals, and the working of body parts and processes, in terms of their ‘purposes’, ‘goals’, or ‘functions’. This gives rise to a philosophical problem: how can we make sense of teleological language in the life sciences? Important philosophical definitions of ‘biological function’ include the selected effects theory, the goal‐contribution theory, and the causal role theory, among others. A related problem is understanding the concept of ‘goal directedness’. Key Concepts Teleology is the study of goals and purposes. Teleological language such as ‘function,’ ‘goal’, and ‘purpose’ is prevalent in the life sciences. Philosophers and scientists disagree about whether teleological language is consistent with modern science and its avoidance of supernatural explanations. Philosophers debate the correct definition of ‘biological function.’ The ‘selected effects theory’ holds that the function of a trait depends on what it was selected for, by natural selection. The ‘goal‐contribution theory’ holds that a function of a trait depends on its contribution to survival or reproduction. The ‘causal role theory’ holds that a trait's function depends on its contribution to some interesting system capacity. It's possible that biologists use ‘function’ in multiple senses. There are philosophical problems surrounding the concept of goal directedness as well.

Mechanisms, in the prominent biological sense of the term, are historical entities. That is, whether something is a mechanism for something depends on its history. Put differently, while your spontaneously generated molecule-for-molecule double has a heart, and its heart pumps blood around its body, its heart does not have a mechanism for pumping, since it does not have the right history. My argument for this claim is that mechanisms have proper functions; proper functions are historical entities; so, mechanisms are historical entities, too. This thesis runs against the mainstream new mechanist way of thinking about mechanisms, where mechanisms are generally thought of in an ahistorical way. After arguing for this thesis, I draw out some consequences for philosophy of science and metaphysics.

What is it for an animal to be female, or male? An emerging consensus among philosophers of biology is that sex is grounded in some manner or another on anisogamy, that is, the ability to produce either large gametes (egg) or small gametes (sperm), though the exact nature of this grounding remains contentious. Here we argue for a new conception of this relation. In our view, one’s sex doesn’t depend on the kind of gamete one is capable of making, but on the kind of gamete one is designed to make, where design is understood in terms of an evolutionary or ontogenetic selection process. Specifically, we argue that what it is to be, say, male, is to have a part or process that has the (proximal or distal) biological function of producing sperm. We outline and defend our view, and sketch some implications for scientific and social problems related to sex.

Philosophers who study the problem of biological function often begin their deliberations by reflecting on the functions of parts of animals, or the behavior of animals. Applying theories of biological function to unconventional or borderline cases can help us to better evaluate and refine those theories. This is the case when we consider whether parts of transposable elements (TEs)—bits of “selfish” DNA that move about within a host genome—have functions of their own, that is, whether the parts of TEs have the function of helping the TE move about within the genome. Here I argue that whether or not the parts of TEs have functions depends crucially on whether collections of TEs form “populations,” by which I mean, here, a group of individuals of the same type that impact one another’s chances of persistence or multiplication, by impacting one another’s access to a shared resource. I think there is suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence that some TEs have functions of their own. Considering the problem of TE functionality, then, has value both for philosophy and for biology.

Today we live in the era of Darwinian medicine. One implication of Darwinian medicine is that some mental disorders might be adaptations, that is, evolved strategies for dealing with ancient and modern environments. For example, it allows us to think of depression as an evolved strategy for dealing with interpersonal conflict, or anxiety disorders as evolved strategies for remaining vigilant to potential threats. Darwinian medicine, then, puts teleology back into psychiatry, and thereby reverses the trend of the DSM franchise to divest psychiatry of teleology. The idea that Darwinism helps to reintroduce teleology into psychiatry forces us to examine how Darwinism and teleology are inseparable, rather than antagonistic. We can see a natural association between the ancient Greek magicians, the exorcists of the Renaissance, the psychoanalysts, and the evolutionary psychologists, in that they all saw madness as wedded to purpose.

For some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: Is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human thought? Revised and updated to take account of new developments in the field, The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction explores these questions and more, using the philosophy of biology to introduce and assess the nature of the mind. Justin Garson addresses the following key topics: moral psychology, altruism, and levels of selection; evolutionary psychology and the adaptationism debate; genes, environment, and the nature–nurture debate; natural selection and mental representation; psychiatric classification and the maladapted mind. This second edition includes three new chapters on race, sex, and human nature as well as new sections on group and kin selection, psychological altruism, and cultural evolution. Including chapter summaries, annotated further readings, a glossary of terms, and examples and case studies throughout, this is an indispensable introduction for those teaching philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of biology. It will also be an excellent resource for those in related fields such as biology.

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 105, Issue 2 p. 490-503 BOOK SYMPOSIUM Response to Neander's Critics Justin Garson, Corresponding Author Justin Garson jgarson@hunter.cuny.edu Hunter College and The Graduate Center, City University of New York Correspondence Justin Garson, Hunter College and The Graduate Center, City University of New York. Email: jgarson@hunter.cuny.eduSearch for more papers by this author Justin Garson, Corresponding Author Justin Garson jgarson@hunter.cuny.edu Hunter College and The Graduate Center, City University of New York Correspondence Justin Garson, Hunter College and The Graduate Center, City University of New York. Email: jgarson@hunter.cuny.eduSearch for more papers by this author First published: 31 December 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12931Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume105, Issue2September 2022Pages 490-503 RelatedInformation

One of the clearest expressions of madness-as-dysfunction is Kant’s youthful essay of 1764, “Essay on the Maladies of the Head.” There, Kant argues that each form of madness represents a defect in a corresponding faculty of reason. Since there are only three faculties of reason (experience, judgment, and reason), there are only three forms of madness, corresponding to the breakdown of each. Kant gives voice to what was to become a basic protocol for nineteenth-century medical psychiatry: to understand madness, we must first survey the faculties of the sound mind, and then identify the forms of madness as so many different ways that those faculties break. It is astonishing, then, that in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View of 1798, Kant rediscovers teleology inside of madness. Some forms of madness are bestowed upon us by the “wisdom of nature” in order to protect reason or motivate ethical behavior.