In 2011, the department charged with monitoring compliance with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) initiated a new website that functions as a virtual wall of shame: it publishes reports by NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) accusing states of noncompliance with ECHR judgments. This paper analyzes all the reports posted in the first four years of the website's existence. It shows that NGOs focus their attention on severe violations and legally significant issues. It also shows that NGOs invest more resources in monitoring high-reputation states than in monitoring low-reputation states. These findings suggest that opening the arena of reputational sanctions to diverse NGOs may help to make states' reputations more accurate and useful. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ............................................................................................. 2 I. The ECHR and its Enforcement Mechanism ....................................... 4 A. The ECHR ..................................................................................... 4 B. The Committee of Ministers .......................................................... 6 C. Rule 9.2 Procedure ......................................................................... 7 II. Are NGOs Focusing on the Trivial or The Important? ....................... 8 A. The Severity of the Violation ....................................................... 10 1. the violated right ...................................................................... 10 2. just satisfaction ......................................................................... 12 B. The Legal Importance of the Case ............................................... 13 1. HUDOC categorization ............................................................ 13 2. the size of the panel .................................................................. 14 3. judicial dialogue ....................................................................... 14 4. other proxies for salience ......................................................... 15 C. Conclusions on the Focus of NGO Attention............................... 16 III. Are High-Reputation States More Vulnerable than Low-Reputation States? ................................................................................................... 16 A. Measuring States' Reputation ....................................................... 17 B. The Connection between State Reputation and NGO Applications .......................................................................................................... 19 C. Alternative Explanations for the Focus of NGOs on HighReputation States .............................................................................. 22 1. willingness to reply to NGO reports ........................................ 22 2. willingness to cooperate with the Committee of Ministers ...... 23 3. willingness to comply with judgments ..................................... 24  Associate Professor of International and Public Law (tenured), University of Copenhagen Faculty of Law affiliated with iCourts. PhD, LLM, LLB, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law. I thank Karen J. Alter, Patrick Barry, Or Bassok, Eyal Benvenisti, Lisa Bernstein, Avinoam Cohen, Yoav Dothan, Olga Frishman, Rotem Giladi, Tom Ginsburg, Francoise Hampson, Laurence R. Helfer, Saggi Katz, Michal Lavi, Christopher McCrudden, Ioannis Panagis, and Uri Regev for many instructive conversations and comments. I thank participants in the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law Seminar, the Midwestern Law and Economics Association 2014 Annual Meeting, the University of Chicago Legal Scholarship Workshop, the Northwestern University Legal Scholarship Workshop, the iCourts Research Seminar, the Spanish Law and Economics Association 2015 Annual Meeting, and the German Law and Economics Association 2015 Annual Meeting. This research is funded by the Danish National Research Foundation Grant no. DNRF105 and conducted under the auspices of iCourts, the Danish National Research Foundation’s Centre of Excellence for International Courts. NON-LEGAL SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 Non-Legal Sanctions in International Law [ 4. NGO past involvement ............................................................. 25 5. a concentration of severe and important violations in highreputation states ............................................................................ 26 D. Conclusions about the Focus of NGOs on High-Reputation States .......................................................................................................... 28 IV. The Nature of Reputation ................................................................ 28 A. Imperfect Information Makes Every Deed Count ........................ 29 B. Opening the Shaming Community to Prevent Echo .................... 31 V. What Do NGOs Really Want? ......................................................... 35 A. Separating NGOs According to Size ........................................... 35 B. The Incentives of NGOs .............................................................. 36 VI. Conclusion ...................................................................................... 39