SUMMARY On May 11, 2016 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a request for comment on Proposed Auditing Standard—The Auditor's Report on an Audit of Financial Statements when the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards, a reproposal of its August 2013 proposed auditor reporting standard. The reproposal retains the pass/fail model of the existing auditor's report while seeking to enhance the form and content of the report. The reproposal solicited public comment on the following significant changes to the existing auditor's report: (1) add a description of “critical audit matters” that provides audit-specific information about especially challenging, subjective, or complex aspects of the audit as they relate to the relevant financial statement accounts and disclosures, (2) add a statement about auditor independence and the phrase “whether due to error or fraud” when describing the auditor's responsibilities to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatements, (3) add a statement related to auditor tenure, and (4) standardize the form of the auditor's report, requiring the opinion be the first section of the auditor's report and requiring section titles to guide the reader. The comment period ended on August 15, 2016. This commentary summarizes the participating committee members' views on the alternatives presented in the request for comment. Data Availability: The concept release, proposed and reproposed rules, and supplemental information are available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket034.aspx

SUMMARY On June 30, 2015 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a supplemental request for comment on its 2013 reproposal to require auditors to disclose in the auditor's report the name of the engagement partner and information about certain other participants in the audit. The supplemental request solicited public comments on an alternative to disclosure of this information in the auditor's report, namely that audit firms report (1) the name of the engagement partner, and (2) the names, locations, and extent of participation of other audit participants in a new form (Form AP) to be filed with the PCAOB within 30 days of the date the auditor's report is first included in a document filed with the SEC. The comment period ended on August 31, 2015. This commentary summarizes the participating committee members' views on the alternatives presented in the supplemental request for comment. Data Availability: The exposure drafts of the proposed and reproposed rules, the supplemental request for comment, and related information are available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket029.aspx

SUMMARY Recently, the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) solicited public comments on its Staff Consultation Paper Auditing Accounting Estimates and Fair Value Measurements. This commentary summarizes the contributors' views on the various questions asked in the PCAOB Staff Consultation Paper. Our comments submitted to the PCAOB appear below. Data Availability: The invitation to comment (which invited comments through November 4, 2014), with links to the consultation paper, is available at: http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Pages/SCP _ Accounting _ Estimates _ Fair_Value.aspx

Audit fee negotiations conclude with the signing of an engagement letter, typically the first quarter of the year under audit. Yet investors do not learn the audit fee paid until disclosed in the following year's definitive proxy statement. We conjecture that negotiated audit fees impound auditors' consequential private, client-specific knowledge about "bad news'' events investors will learn eventually. We demonstrate that a proxy for the year-to-year change in the negotiated audit fee has an economically meaningful positive association with proxies for public realizations of "bad news'' events that occur during the roughly 12-month period between the negotiation of the audit fee and the disclosure of the audit fee paid. Our results suggest that negotiated audit fees contain information meaningful to investors and that if disclosed proximate to the signing of the engagement letter instead of the following year, information asymmetry between managers and investors would be reduced.

SUMMARYOn December 4, 2013 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) solicited public comments on its reproposed amendments to its standards that would improve the transparency of public company audits. The amendments would require (1) disclosure in the auditor's report of the name of the engagement partner, and (2) disclosure in the auditor's report of the names, locations, and extent of participation of other independent public accounting firms that took part in the audit and the locations and extent of participation of other persons not employed by the auditor that took part in the audit. The comment period initially ended on February 3, 2014, but was subsequently extended to March 17, 2014. This commentary summarizes the contributors' views on these amendments.Data Availability: The exposure drafts of the proposed and reproposed rules and related information are available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket029.aspx

We investigate the influence of local preference policies on auditor selection in the municipal audit market. A local preference occurs when local firms are favored in audit procurement over non-local firms for reasons unrelated to the audit itself. We construct four auction models of the competitive bidding process differentiated by possible objectives of the municipality: cost minimization versus surplus maximization and with or without a local preference policy. Which model is most descriptive is ultimately an empirical question. We generate predictions that allow for empirical identification and find evidence of local preference. We use the identified model to analyze theoretically the unobservable net audit-related effect of a municipality adopting a local preference policy. We show that a local preference policy can benefit even a municipality guided solely by audit-related concerns by encouraging price concessions from non-local auditors.

Abstract. We examine the empirical relationship between auditors' resource allocations and selected engagement characteristics. Our measure of resources is hours of grades of labor (partner, manager, etc.) “charged” to audit activities (planning, internal control evaluation, etc.). Engagement characteristics examined are client size, industry affiliation, client complexity, risk, auditor provision of management advisory services to the auditee, and degree of control reliance. The data were obtained from publicly available sources and a survey developed and administered by an international public accounting firm.We find the cross‐sectional variation in the labor charged to various audit activities can be explained by engagement characteristics found to be important in prior studies on audit fees, total labor inputs, and the mix of labor inputs. Measures of client size, industry, complexity, risk, and services provided are associated with changes in the allocation of labor among audit activities. We find no substitution of internal control review/testing for substantive testing on reliance audits. Task assignments vary by rank. Measures of client size, complexity, risk, and services provided are associated with activity‐specific changes in the labor mix.

We report on an experiment in which experienced auditors (1) determine whether to allow a client to adopt an aggressive reporting method when the auditors have an incentive to do so, and (2) justify aggressive reporting by their interpretations of financial accounting standards. In the experiment, the appropriate reporting method depends upon whether an amount can be "reasonably estimated" as that term is used in an applicable accounting standard. The accounting standard relevant to determining the appropriate reporting method was manipulated between subjects (thus varying whether judging that an amount can be reasonably estimated would justify an aggressive or conservative method), as was engagement risk. The results indicate that the auditors responded to moderate engagement risk by permitting the aggressive reporting method and justified their choice with aggressive interpretations of accounting standards. When faced with high engagement risk, the auditors responded by requiring conservative reporting and justified their choice with conservative interpretations of accounting standards.

Abstract. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 5 requires accrual of contingent losses which are deemed probable. This disclosure criterion is intended to be applied uniformly across a variety of contexts. We performed an experiment which examined whether audit managers' interpretations of the SFAS No. 5 probability expressions are influenced by one contextual feature, event base rate. Counter to the intention of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), interpretations of the expression probable were positively associated with event base rate.Résumé. Le SFAS no 5 exige l'imputation à l'exercice des pertes éventuelles qui sont jugées «probables». La règle ainsi établie veut que ce critère de présentation d'information soit appliqué uniformément dans des contextes très divers. Les auteurs procèdent à une expérience dans le cadre de laquelle ils examinent si la façon dont les responsables de mission interprètent la gamme de probabilités, au sens du SFAS no 5, est influencée par une caractéristique contextuelle, la fréquence relative de l'événement. Contrairement au résultat visé par le FASB, les interprétations du terme «probable» sont en relation positive avec la fréquence relative de l'événement.

This paper investigates whether replacing a standard that employs a vague, verbal disclosure threshold with a standard that employs a more stringent, numerical threshold mitigates the aggressiveness of reporting decisions. Two experiments were performed in a tax setting. The results indicate that (1) when a verbal standard is in place, tax practitioners use the latitude inherent in a verbal standard to support aggressive reporting decisions, and (2) when a numerical standard is in place, tax practitioners use instead the latitude available in assessing evidential support to justify an aggressive reporting decision. This shift in incentive effect is pronounced enough to render reporting decisions made under the numerical standard as aggressive as reporting decisions made under the verbal standard. These results indicate that replacing verbal thresholds with numerical thresholds may not diminish the aggressiveness of reporting decisions.

The purpose of the study is to examine the nature of competition in the audit service market, emphasizing the motives and consequences of auditor switching. We examine empirically the role of engagement profitability on client retention and the consequence of auditor switching on auditor labor utilization. We find (1) the likelihood of client retention increases with engagement profitability, (2) auditees, over time, should expect to pay roughly the same audit fee and be subject to the same mix of auditor labor resources when switching among Big 6 firms, and (3) auditees, over time, should expect to pay a lower audit fee and be subject to a very different mix of auditor labor when switching from a Big 6 firm to a non-Big 6 firm. The emerging view is an audit service market characterized by multiple service levels, with audit firms managing their client portfolios with profitability in mind.