Anticipated emotions are the feelings one expects if a hypothetical future event were to occur, whereas anticipatory emotions are those one experiences right now while imagining the event.There has been little direct comparison of these two forms of future-oriented emotion, and authors have typically focused on positive emotions (e.g., pleasure).Besides, their sensitivity to depressive symptoms-which may help to explain motivational problems in depression-has only recently been investigated (e.g., Anderson et al., 2023;Gamble et al., 2021).The present study (conducted September-November 2022) used innovative picture-and-text vignettes depicting everyday positive and negative future events, to which participants rated their anticipated and anticipatory responses on separate dimensions of valence (i.e., how positive or negative) and arousal (i.e., emotional intensity).Based on prior literature, anticipatory emotions were expected to be correlated with, yet weaker than, anticipated emotions, reflecting a conceptualization of anticipatory emotions as a "foretaste" of the affective response one expects in the future.We also predicted that high depressive symptoms would coincide with diminished emotion ratings overall and specifically for anticipatory emotions (tightly coupled with event expectations; Carrera et al., 2012).Results largely supported these preregistered predictions, yet anticipatory emotions (positive and negative) were only weaker in more highly depressed participants.Depressive symptoms may therefore affect how one currently feels about future possibilities without altering one's expectations of how such events would actually feel.Implications and future research objectives arising from this are discussed.

Previous research demonstrating that positive episodic simulation enhances future expectancies has relied on explicit expectancy measures. The current study investigated the effects of episodic simulation on implicit expectancies. Using the Future Thinking Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (FT-IRAP), participants made true/false decisions to indicate whether or not they expected positive/negative outcomes after adopting orientations consistent or inconsistent with an optimistic disposition. The outcome measure, DIRAP, was based on response time differences between consistent and inconsistent blocks. Participants then engaged in either positive simulation training, in which they imagined positive future events, or a neutral visualisation task before repeating the FT-IRAP twice following 10-minute intervals. Positive simulation training increased DIRAP scores for don't-expect-negative trials-boosting participants' readiness to affirm that negative events were unlikely to happen to them. Although findings did not generalise across all trial types, they show potential for positive simulation training to enhance implicit future expectancies.

Several theories of belief processing assume that processing another's false belief requires overcoming an egocentric bias toward one's current knowledge. The current evidence in support of this claim, however, is limited. In order to investigate the presence of egocentric bias in adult belief processing, computer mouse tracking was used across three experiments to measure attraction toward response options reflecting one's current knowledge while reporting a false belief. Participants viewed scenarios in which an agent either had a true belief or a false belief about the location of a set of keys. Participants used a mouse to answer reality questions "where are the keys currently hidden?" and belief questions "where does she think the keys are?" Mouse-tracking measures indexing attraction toward response options during decision making were measured, along with time taken to make a response and accuracy. Experiment 1 found no evidence, in any measures, that participants showed a bias toward their own knowledge when reporting another's false belief. Experiment 2 investigated whether differences in event timings between true belief and false belief scenarios in Experiment 1 masked an egocentric bias. Experiment 3 investigated whether the lack of egocentric bias could be explained by participants prioritizing encoding the other's beliefs. Neither follow-up experiment found evidence supporting the presence of an egocentric bias. Overall, contrary to many theories of belief processing, our results suggest that adults are readily able to process other people's beliefs without having to overcome a default bias toward their own knowledge. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Depression is associated with difficulties in goal pursuit which could be related to deficits in emotional anticipation regarding goal success. Therefore, the reported study investigated emotional anticipation for personal goals and whether this differs as a function of depressive symptoms. After listing approach and avoidance goals, 263 participants made predictions about these goals (e.g. likelihood of achievement and controllability) and rated the vividness and perspective with which they envisaged goal achievement. They also provided ratings of either anticipated (predicted emotions that would accompany goal success) or anticipatory (in-the-moment emotions when imagining goal success) positive emotions. Higher levels of depressive symptomatology were associated with pessimistic predictions about goal achievement, coupled with reduced vividness and greater adoption of observer perspective when envisaging achievement. Furthermore, those experiencing higher levels of depressive symptoms evidenced biases in both anticipated and anticipatory positive emotions associated with goal success. They believed that goal achievement would bring them lower levels of positive emotion and also reported less in-the-moment happiness, satisfaction, and pleasure when thinking about achieving their goals. Irrespective of depressive symptom level, anticipated emotions were generally stronger than anticipatory emotions. These findings have implications both for research on future-oriented emotions (anticipated and anticipatory) and for the development of therapeutic techniques to aid depression.

Autistic and non-autistic adults completed a visual perspective taking (VPT) task, reporting an object’s location from an actor’s perspective, or their own. On half the trials the actor looked at and reached for the object, and on half did not. Accuracy and reaction time were measured. In Experiment 1, both groups (N = 34, mean age = 24 years) responded slower when reporting the actor’s perspective, with no group differences in this effect. Experiment 2 included “other” VPT trials only. Both groups (N = 30, mean age = 25 years) showed sensitivity to the actor’s behaviour, more accurately reporting his perspective when he acted upon the object. No group differences were observed. In contrast to developmental studies, these experiments suggest similar VPT abilities in autistic and non-autistic adults.

The ability to represent approximate numerical magnitudes is often referred to as the approximate number system (ANS) and has regularly been proposed as foundational to mathematics achievement. However, some argue that the relation between ANS acuity and mathematics achievement ceases to exist when controlling for domain-general cognitive abilities. The current debate in the literature on whether ANS acuity remains a predictor to mathematics after strict control is applied leads to the need to simultaneously investigate domain-specific and domain-general foundational abilities in different ages. 174 Children took part in two computerised ANS tasks, two executive function tasks, a verbal skills task, two intelligence subscales, and a mathematics achievement task (i.e. global, formal, and informal mathematics achievement). Results demonstrated that, when controlling for intelligence and visuospatial memory, the relation between ANS acuity and mathematics achievement ceased to exist, and that ANS acuity might only play a predictive role in early informal mathematics.

Previous research shows that the development of response inhibition and drawing skill are linked. The current research investigated whether this association reflects a more fundamental link between response inhibition and motor control. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds ( n  = 100) were tested on measures of inhibition, fine motor control, and drawing skill. Data revealed an association between inhibition and fine motor control, which was responsible for most of the association observed with drawing skill. Experiment 2 ( n  = 100) provided evidence that, unlike fine motor control, gross motor control and inhibition were not associated (after controlling for IQ). Alternative explanations for the link between inhibition and fine motor control are outlined, including a consideration of how these cognitive processes may interact during development.

Fast mapping is often used to refer to children’s remarkable ability to learn the meanings of new words with minimal exposure and in ambiguous contexts. It is one thing to claim that children are capable of learning words this way; it is another to claim that this ability relies on a specific fast-mapping neurocognitive mechanism that is critical for early word learning. Yet that claim has recently been made in adult memory research and used as a theoretical justification for research into an adult fast-mapping mechanism. In this review, we explain why the existence of such a mechanism in children is not supported by developmental research and explore the implications for adult fast-mapping data and research.

Previous research shows that the development of response inhibition and drawing skill are linked. The current research investigated whether this association reflects a more fundamental link between response inhibition and motor control. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds (n = 100) were tested on measures of inhibition, fine motor control, and drawing skill. Data revealed an association between inhibition and fine motor control, which was responsible for most of the association observed with drawing skill. Experiment 2 (n = 100) provided evidence that, unlike fine motor control, gross motor control and inhibition were not associated (after controlling for IQ). Alternative explanations for the link between inhibition and fine motor control are outlined, including a consideration of how these cognitive processes may interact during development.

Cooper Greve, and Henson (this issue) caution restraint before accepting that a fast mapping (FM) process exists in adults. We welcome this, but would also add that the original rationale for studying FM in adults is not currently supported by developmental research. Despite the claims of several adult FM researchers, there is little evidence from developmental word learning research for a special hippocampus-independent FM process critical for children's word learning.

Only one previous developmental study of Stroop task performance (Schiller, 1966) has controlled for differences in processing speed that exist both within and between age groups. Therefore, the question of whether the early developmental change in the magnitude of Stroop interference actually persists after controlling for processing speed needs further investigation; work that is further motivated by the possibility that any remaining differences would be caused by process(es) other than processing speed. Analysis of data from two experiments revealed that, even after controlling for processing speed using z-transformed reaction times, early developmental change persists such that the magnitude of overall Stroop interference is larger in 3rd- and 5th graders as compared to 1st graders. This pattern indicates that the magnitude of overall Stroop interference peaks after 2 or 3 years of reading practice (Schadler & Thissen, 1981). Furthermore, this peak is shown to be due to distinct components of Stroop interference (resulting from specific conflicts) progressively falling into place. Experiment 2 revealed that the change in the magnitude of Stroop interference specifically results from joint contributions of task, semantic and response conflicts in 3rd- and 5th graders as compared to a sole contribution of task conflict in 1st graders. The specific developmental trajectories of different conflicts presented in the present work provide unique evidence for multiple loci of Stroop interference in the processing stream (respectively task, semantic and response conflict) as opposed to a single (i.e. response) locus predicted by historically - favored response competition accounts.

BACKGROUND:Alcohol Use Disorder (AUD) is associated with problems with processing complex social scenarios. Little is known about the relationship between distinct AUD-related factors (e.g., years of problematic drinking), aspects of cognitive function and dysfunction in individuals diagnosed with AUD, and the relative impact these may have on social cognition.AIMS:To explore differences in social cognition between a group of participants diagnosed with AUD and controls, using a clinical measure, the Mini Social and Emotional Assessment (mini-SEA). The mini-SEA was used to evaluate social and emotional understanding through a facial emotional recognition task and by utilising a series of social scenes some of which contain a faux pas (social error).METHODS:Eighty-five participants (individuals with AUD and controls) completed demographic questions and a general cognitive and social cognitive test battery over three consecutive days.RESULTS:Between group analyses revealed that the participants with AUD performed less well on the faux pas test, and differences were also revealed in the emotional facial recognition task. Years of problematic alcohol consumption was the strongest predictor of poor ToM reasoning.CONCLUSION:These results suggest a strong link between AUD chronicity and social cognition, though the direction of this relationship needs further elucidation. This may be of clinical relevance to abstinence and relapse management, as basic social cognition skills and ability to maintain interpersonal relationships are likely to be crucial to recovery.

BACKGROUND:Understanding the world from another's perspective is an important and potentially automatic human process which is crucial for efficient social interactions. However, while deficits have repeatedly been described for various interpersonal abilities in alcohol-dependence (AD), only one previous study has investigated perspective taking in this pathology.AIM:The current study aimed to explore further how AD affects visual-spatial perspective taking (VSPT) by examining the effect of positive emotional stimuli on VSPT in both an AD and non-AD sample.METHODS:Reaction times (RT) for simple spatial judgments were measured. Participants made these judgments from their perspective, but judgments were either congruent or incongruent with the perspective of another agent. The emotion conveyed by that agent (happy or neutral) was manipulated across trials.RESULTS:Compared to baseline, both AD and non-AD groups displayed delayed RTs for spatial judgments when these were incongruent with the perspective of a happy agent (the expected VSPT RT cost, indicating automatic VSPT). The AD, but not the non-AD group, further displayed a VSPT RT cost when the agent expressed a neutral emotion.CONCLUSION:There was no evidence that AD compromised automatic VSPT. However, as in previous research, AD was associated with differences in the processing of emotional stimuli. Future research should explore which 'real-world' settings are likely to trigger social confusion and misunderstanding.

Previous research suggests depressed individuals have difficulties with future directed cognitions. For instance, compared with non-depressed individuals, they predict positive events are less likely to occur. Recent work suggests that episodic simulation of positive futures may represent a useful strategy for improving prospective predictions. The current studies investigated positive future episodic simulation as a method of modifying predictions regarding the likelihood of occurrence, perceived control, and importance of positive and negative future events. Experiment 1 compared positive episodic simulation to a neutral visualization task in a non-clinical sample. Predictions regarding future events were rated more positively after the use of positive episodic simulation but not as a result of neutral visualization. Experiment 2 extended these findings to show that future episodic simulation can be used to modify predictions, for both positive and negative events, in individuals experiencing significant levels of dysphoric mood and depressive symptoms. Taken together, these findings suggest that training in positive episodic future simulation can improve future outlook and may represent a useful tool within cognitive therapeutic techniques.

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally utilitarian' pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane etal., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter-intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter-intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter-intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.

To become skilled artifact users, children must learn the actions and functions associated with artifacts. We investigated preschoolers' ability to fast map an action, function and name associated with a novel artifact, and retain the new mapping long term following brief incidental exposure to the artifact being used. In Experiment 1, 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 144) were tested 1 week after two exposures to a novel action, function, and name. Participants performed well on comprehension tests of all three kinds of information. In Experiment 2, 3-year-olds (N = 100) were exposed to these three kinds of information only once. Retention of the action-artifact link was above chance levels, whereas retention of function and the name was not. Finally, in Experiment 3, 4 year-olds (N = 128) performed well on an action production task 1 week after brief exposure. In contrast, their performance on a name production task immediately after exposure was poor. Our data suggest that preschoolers can retain function information about a novel artifact from minimal exposure, similar to their ability to learn an artifact name. Crucially, their ability to remember action-artifact mappings is markedly better than their ability to remember functions and names. Crown Copyright (C) 2017 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Language and action naturally occur together in the form of cospeech gestures, and there is now convincing evidence that listeners display a strong tendency to integrate semantic information from both domains during comprehension. A contentious question, however, has been which brain areas are causally involved in this integration process. In previous neuroimaging studies, left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) have emerged as candidate areas; however, it is currently not clear whether these areas are causally or merely epiphenomenally involved in gesture-speech integration. In the present series of experiments, we directly tested for a potential critical role of IFG and pMTG by observing the effect of disrupting activity in these areas using transcranial magnetic stimulation in a mixed gender sample of healthy human volunteers. The outcome measure was performance on a Stroop-like gesture task (Kelly et al., 2010a), which provides a behavioral index of gesture-speech integration. Our results provide clear evidence that disrupting activity in IFG and pMTG selectively impairs gesture-speech integration, suggesting that both areas are causally involved in the process. These findings are consistent with the idea that these areas play a joint role in gesture-speech integration, with IFG regulating strategic semantic access via top-down signals acting upon temporal storage areas.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Previous neuroimaging studies suggest an involvement of inferior frontal gyrus and posterior middle temporal gyrus in gesture-speech integration, but findings have been mixed and due to methodological constraints did not allow inferences of causality. By adopting a virtual lesion approach involving transcranial magnetic stimulation, the present study provides clear evidence that both areas are causally involved in combining semantic information arising from gesture and speech. These findings support the view that, rather than being separate entities, gesture and speech are part of an integrated multimodal language system, with inferior frontal gyrus and posterior middle temporal gyrus serving as critical nodes of the cortical network underpinning this system.

Effective pragmatic comprehension of language is critical for successful communication and interaction, but this ability is routinely impaired following Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) (1,2). Individual studies have investigated the cognitive domains associated with impaired pragmatic comprehension, but there remains little understanding of the relative importance of these domains in contributing to pragmatic comprehension impairment following TBI. This paper presents a systematic meta-analytic review of the observed correlations between pragmatic comprehension and cognitive processes following TBI. Five meta-analyses were computed, which quantified the relationship between pragmatic comprehension and five key cognitive constructs (declarative memory; working memory; attention; executive functions; social cognition). Significant moderate-to-strong correlations were found between all cognitive measures and pragmatic comprehension, where declarative memory was the strongest correlate. Thus, our findings indicate that pragmatic comprehension in TBI is associated with an array of domain general cognitive processes, and as such deficits in these cognitive domains may underlie pragmatic comprehension difficulties following TBI. The clinical implications of these findings are discussed.

We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. The challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for their systematic nature. There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to be. There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn from Maxi-type false belief tests. We provide novel responses to several examples showing that Simulation Theory can answer these challenges.

There is an ongoing debate over the extent to which language development shares common processing mechanisms with other domains of learning. It is well-established that toddlers will systematically extend object labels to similarly shaped category exemplars (e.g., Markman and Hutchinson, 1984; Landau et al., 1988). However, previous research is inconclusive as to whether young children will similarly extend factual information about an object to other category members. We explicitly contrast facts varying in category relevance, and test for extension using two different tasks. Three- to four-year-olds (N = 61) were provided with one of three types of information about a single novel object: a category-relevant fact ('it's from a place called Modi'), a category-irrelevant fact ('my uncle gave it to me'), or an object label ('it's called a Modi'). At test, children provided with the object name or category-relevant fact were significantly more likely to display systematic category extension than children who learnt the category-irrelevant fact. Our findings contribute to a growing body of evidence that the mechanisms responsible for word learning may be domain-general in nature.