The illegal ivory trade is the main driver of elephant poaching in Africa. In recent years, China—long regarded as the main destination of illegal ivory trade—has undertaken a series of policy interventions to curtail ivory imports, such as the closure of ivory carving enterprises. In this article we explore the impact of these recent interventions on the price of ivory and poaching and the wider drivers connected to the illegal trade, such as China's macro-economic performance. The research demonstrates that the price of illegal ivory in China has dropped significantly, mainly due to measures taken under China's "Ecological Civilization" (EC) programme and ivory trade ban to curb demand and supply. The number of illegal ivory seizures decreased over time but remains active, with a high proportion of seizures categorized as minor infringements (ivory pieces under 2.4 kg) often imported by tourists as souvenirs. We also find that the price of ivory is recovering in other destinations such as Vietnam, and it is becoming clear that all countries should make more political commitments on the existing basis to elephant conservation and curtailing illegal ivory trade.
The widespread dissemination of information related to wildlife utilization in new online media and traditional media undoubtedly impacts societal conservation concepts and attitudes, thus triggering public discussions on the relationship between conservation and utilization. A study on how public attitudes and concepts are affected by the related information on wildlife utilization is helpful to implement the scientific wildlife conservation and management strategies, and to propose targeted measures to optimize the information environment. We designed the questionnaire to investigate the public's awareness and agreement with related information on wildlife utilization so as to measure how information with different dissemination channels, source types, and content orientation influenced the public's concept of wildlife conservation and utilization. The questionnaire was distributed in seven major geographical regions throughout China. Out of a total of 1645 questionnaires that were collected, 1294 questionnaires were valid, with an effective rate of 78.7%. Results show that respondents had the greatest awareness of information on preventing unsustainable and illegal utilization, and the lowest awareness of information on promoting unsustainable utilization, and that awareness of information that against utilization was higher than that of information which supported sustainable utilization. At the same time, respondents showed the greatest agreement for information on preventing unsustainable utilization and the lowest agreement for information on promoting unsustainable utilization; also, their agreement with information that against utilization was higher than that for information which supported sustainable use. Respondents had a high level of awareness of information on wildlife related to COVID-19 provided by experts. Gender, age, the level of development of the city in which they live, education, vegetarianism, and religious beliefs all affected respondents' agreement with related information on wildlife utilization. This research suggests that the publicity and education of scientific conservation methods should be emphasized in the future conservation education. In addition, scholars in the field of wildlife research should assume the role of 'influencer' and give full play to the scientific guidance of public opinion.
The size, logistical and political constraints of China has made it difficult to research the black-market in ivory. In situ investigations of retailers have been infrequent, with limited coverage. Some of the results are problematic. This motivated the trial of a different survey technique in 2014 in Beijing and Fuzhou. The trial employed local Chinese to identify search costs for illegal ivory in different market segments, using legal ivory as the benchmark. It was hypothesised that high-quality pieces would be much harder to find in the illegal market. Illegal factories lack access to the skilled carvers for these pieces, the registration-card system is hard to overcome, and the legal factories put most of their output into those segments. The results tentatively support this hypothesis. They were corroborated by interviews with law-enforcement which confirmed illegal sellers preferred the low-end of the market. The legal-market in these cities appears to have pushed the illegal market down to the bottom-end. Additionally, the use of search costs as a metric of illegal activity is a useful method for investigating ivory-markets like China.
It has been alleged or suspected that the legal ivory factories in China launder poached ivory to make carvings. In this research the throughput of tusks across all 37 factories is analysed. The period covers the first allocation of tusks by the Chinese State Forest Administration in July 2009 up to January 2014. The number of factories is fixed, the number of carvers is stable and ivory carving is time-intensive. Diversion of carver-effort to use illegal ivory must come at the expense of legal output. If laundering is occurring it should have an appreciable effect on the rate at which legal tusks are consumed as carvings. The throughput of 1293 tusks is analysed with two modelling approaches. These were a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) and a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach. Tusk throughput is affected by the size of the tusk and the experience of the carver. Factories also report tusks used up in production in batches. The models show that this reporting effect is partly explained by the Chinese retail spending cycle. No significant deviation in tusk throughput is detected. This implies that the legal factory system is largely clean of illegal ivory. The results also provide indirect evidence that the illegal ivory entering China is destined largely for a speculative market in raw ivory or for an autonomous illegal factory network.
Since CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) ratification 40 years ago, trade bans have emerged as a principle conservation tool for endangered species. While trade bans have been successful in helping to stabilize populations of certain species, evidence for others suggests that such bans are proving less effective. Looking at three species, the author identifies and explores a conflux of forces that, in the context of a trade ban, may result in an increase of illegal trade, further threatening a species already at risk. These forces include 1) inelastic demand and high profit potential, 2) long history of trade, both legal and illegal, coupled with strong cultural affiliation, 3) ambiguous property rights, 4) negative economic incentives for conservation due to human-animal conflict, and 5) inadequate enforcement. Termed a “Perfect Storm”, these forces combine to accelerate the demise of the species. In essence, a trade ban hands a monopoly on commerce to the black market. It is even possible that the trade ban protects the illegal market against competition, suggesting that other conservation tactics warrant consideration. The author concludes that legal, regulated trade needs to be fully investigated using fields of science that have evolved during CITES lifetime to determine if it is a viable tactic for conservation when such conditions exist.