The aim of this conceptual paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the front-end phase of large public projects, which is complex and non-linear. The point of departure relates to a number of paradoxes found along the way of the front-end. A processual approach is taken to follow the front-end over time. Considering a number of example vignettes, four paradoxes and subsequent trade-offs are discussed which affect the strategic decisions that need to be made. These are found to fit largely within four generic sub-processes identified in the front-end. Inspired from the paradox theory, we conceptualise paradoxes and trade-offs under the dynamic equilibrium model adapted for temporary organising such as large public projects. Main aim of this paper is to consider how decision-making can be improved, and managerial strategies developed that permit the acceptance of paradoxes and their resolution in a virtuous cycle leading to long term success.

There are valuable lessons to be learnt from success as well as failure – in many cases, lessons that are quite obvious and relevant. Generally speaking, the purpose of evaluation is threefold, that is, it contributes to efficient control, management and learning. Experience indicates that today, most evaluation activities occur during the implementation phase or just after its conclusion, with options designated interim evaluation and final evaluation, respectively. An evaluation involves an assessment employing specific evaluation criteria and measures against standards or expected values, such as knowledge and proficiency relative to learning goals or effects relative to strategic plans. The chapter presents some findings and recommendations based on experiences from the 29 evaluations conducted so far. In most of the cases, the evaluators concluded that the projects were successful in more than one aspect, especially in operational terms. Different methods of data collection and analysis are needed for different evaluation criteria.

This paper summarizes the results of a comprehensive systematic literature survey on the front-end of a project, commissioned by the Project Management Institute. The dedicated literature on the front-end is sparse: although the front-end has been shown to be critical to the strategic success of the project, this phase of the lifecycle is not well understood. This paper presents the literature on the concept of the front-end, and defines a temporarily ordered structure of generic processes that form the ‘front-end’ and how these fit together as a coherent whole. These start from the preliminaries to the initiative, then the project purpose (for various stakeholders), the initial analysis and scenario analysis; the analysis of alternatives and choice of project concept; assessment of the project, finishing with setting up project execution. It summarises the recent literature at each of these elements in turn, specifically as they relate to the front-end.

This paper summarizes the results of a comprehensive systematic literature survey on the front-end of a project, commissioned by the Project Management Institute. The dedicated literature on the front-end is sparse: although the front-end has been shown to be critical to the strategic success of the project, this phase of the lifecycle is not well understood. This paper presents the literature on the concept of the front-end, and defines a temporarily ordered structure of generic processes that form the 'front-end' and how these fit together as a coherent whole. These start from the preliminaries to the initiative, then the project purpose (for various stakeholders), the initial analysis and scenario analysis; the analysis of alternatives and choice of project concept; assessment of the project, finishing with setting up project execution. It summarises the recent literature at each of these elements in turn, specifically as they relate to the front-end.

SammendragÅ feile er i seg selv hverken positivt eller ønskelig, men kan være nyttig i en større sammenheng. En viktig sammenheng er læring. Det er en kjent sak at vi lærer mer av våre feil enn av våre suksesser.

Abstract Ex-post evaluation is starting to be recognized in the Algerian different government institutions (e.g., ministries); and evaluation is becoming part of any program or project for two main reasons, justify the legitimacy of the programs and projects, and collect lessons learned for the next similar programs and projects. On the other hand, academicians believe that programs and projects can be improved by conducting proper evaluations and extracting lessons learned. Program/Project evaluation is comprehensive evaluation, which mainly applies to ex-post evaluation. This paper will look closer at an ex-post evaluation of an Algerian highway megaproject based on PESTOL model, this evaluation is already conducted in the period of 2014 – 2016. Considering ex-post evaluation of projects has many purposes and among them is linked to learning and knowledge sharing and transfer. In this regard, the paper describes very briefly the approach used to the post project evaluation. In addition, link it to learning and to other types of evaluations – i.e., ex-ante, monitoring, midterm, terminal evaluations, and using system-thinking approach, and proposes a framework for learning in projects by evaluations. This paper is based on qualitative case study approach.

This chapter discusses the Norwegian governance regime for public megaprojects and the lessons learned. Governance regimes for major public investment projects comprise the processes and systems which the financing party must implement to ensure a successful investment. Such regimes typically include a regulatory framework, compliance with agreed objectives, and sound management and resolution of issues that may arise. The challenges in securing quality at entry include identification of a conceptual solution that is economically viable and relevant with respect to the needs and often conflicting priorities in society, avoiding underestimating costs, overestimating utility and making unrealistic and inconsistent assumptions, and securing essential planning data and adequate contract regimes. The Norwegian regime involves external quality assurance of key decision documents, and has given the government greater control over the total cost of its investment project portfolio. It also ensures that decisions regarding the choice of conceptual solution are based on a broad assessment of overall needs and goals, as well as alternative ways of achieving these goals.

This article compares the Norwegian scheme for quality assurance of major public projects with similar project governance schemes in five other OECD countries.1 All schemes have been introduced since the turn of the millennium and seem to be fairly consistent with recommendations from the project management literature. There are also a number of differences between the six schemes, for example, with regard to parties and roles, comprehensiveness, flexibility, organization, and whether portfolio management is covered. It is too early to make conclusions about their relative effects, but the evidence thus far indicates that there is much to learn across countries.

This paper provides an account of how systems engineering principles are applied by the Norwegian government to improve up-front planning and decision-making of large public investment projects, as well as the effect of these efforts after 15 years of operations. It suggests that the results are promising, both in securing budgetary compliance, but also to ensure conceptual solutions that are economically viable in a life-time perspective.

This paper looks beyond more traditional evaluation activities to focus primarily on evaluation up front. It suggests that the early appraisal of an investment case or a project should apply essentially the same evaluation criteria that will be used in ex post evaluation, and thus increase the likelihood of a successful project outcome. However, the initial plan might be altered as result of subsequent analysis, assessment, negotiation, positioning, and the exercise of power. The last part of this paper presents an empirical study of 23 projects, which examines the complexity of processes that occur in the idea- and decision phases.

ISSN: 0803-9763 (papirversjon) ISSN: 0804-5585 (nettversjon) ISBN: 978-82-93253-53-2 (papirversjon) ISBN: 978-82-93253-54-9 (nettversjon) The Concept research program aims to develop know-how to help make more efficient use of resources and improve the effect of major public investments. The Program is designed to follow up on the largest public projects over a period of several years, and help improve design and quality assurance of future public projects before they are formally approved.

The importance of the front-end decision-making phase in securing projects long-term success is being increasingly recognized. This area is underrepresented in the literature, but there are several key themes that run throughout, identifying key issues or difficulties during this stage. Clearly, a key to successful projects lies in the choice of concept. This paper presents some findings from the work of the Concept research programme on front-end management and governance of major public investment projects in Norway. It is based on studies that explore strengths and weaknesses in the processes of analysis and decision-making during the early phase before the final choice of conceptual solution is made, and the extent to which projects under study are (or are likely to be) relevant and effective in relation to needs and priorities in society. It concludes that there are frequent deficiencies in these processes, and that the potential for improvements is huge.

SammendragKostnader som løper løpsk er et stort demokratisk problem. Man investerer i noe som ser mye billigere ut enn det faktisk er. Dette binder opp store ressurser på tiltak som vi egentlig ikke ville bruke så mye penger på.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to adopt an in-depth perspective on cost estimation, from the development of the initial idea until the budget is agreed, to obtain new insights into issues of underestimation at the front-end. Design/methodology/approach – The study uses a small sample of projects with exceptional increases in cost estimates during the front-end phase. The authors analyzed the magnitude of cost increases and possible reasons for them. Findings – The paper concludes that underestimation in the front-end phase was significant in the sample and poses a serious problem in that suboptimal projects are approved. The causes of underestimation include underestimating risk, overestimating opportunities, inadequate estimation methods and skills, reliance on weak information, and strategic/deliberate scope creep and division of projects. Research limitations/implications – The study builds on a small sample, and hence further studies should be undertaken to verify whether the findings are generalizable. Practical implications – The sample shows that the projects with the most unrealistic early estimates have disputable relevance. The paper suggests a number of recommendations that might help to counter the problem of unrealistic early cost estimates, which in turn, might allow suboptimal projects to be funded. Originality/value – The underestimation of costs at the front-end is grossly neglected in the literature compared with whether costs comply with the budget. While cost overruns are an indication of failure in terms of the project’s tactical performance, the contention is that the up-front underestimation of costs might result in an inferior project being selected and thus affect the strategic performance of the project.

SammendragDet viktigste argumentet mot evalueringer er at de fleste av dem gjøres på et altfor sent tidspunkt. Dersom man ønsker å styre, kontrollere eller lære av evaluering, må evaluering skje både før og etter prosjektets levetid.

Governance regimes for major investment projects comprise the processes and systems that need to be in place on behalf of the financing party to ensure successful investments. This would typically include a regulatory framework to ensure adequate quality at entry, compliance with agreed objectives, management and resolution of issues that may arise during the project, etc., and standards for quality review of key governance documents. The challenges are abundant: How to ensure projects' viability and relevance up-front; how to avoid hidden agendas during planning, underestimation of costs and overestimation of utility, unrealistic and inconsistent assumptions; how to secure essential planning data, adequate contract regimes, etc. This paper discusses measures in terms of governance regimes that might improve success in public investment projects. Success is defined at two levels; 1) operational (eciency and cost control), and 2) strategic (eectiveness and viability) . As a special case, we present the Norwegian project governance regime applicable to major public projects, which has existed since year 2000. It comprises two quality assurance exercises in the front-end phase, aimed to ensure an adequate basis for the political go/no go decisions, but with no involvement during project implementation. The experience we have so far is positive and shows that the regime most likely leads to more successful projects at both levels.