This study investigates Rokkan's research programme in the light of the differences between case- and variables-based methodologies. Three phases of the research process are distinguished. Studying the way Rokkan actually proceeded in the research within his Europe project, we find that he follows the protocols of case-methodologies such as grounded theory. In the second phase of the research process, however, he constructs variables-based models as tools for his macro-historical comparisons. To get to variables from the sensitizing concepts coded in the first phase, Rokkan defines his variables as close to cases as possible: variables as nominal level typologies, types as variable values. He thus faces two interrelated dilemmas. First, a philosophy of science dissonance: he legitimates his research only with reference to a variable-methodology, while his research is thoroughly case based. Second, a paradox of double coding: using variable-based models in the second phase, the status of the knowledge available in the first phase memos is degraded. Rokkan cannot decide between the two main solutions to these dilemmas: The first solution is to discard his heterogeneous data, instead working only with homogeneous data that opens up to more consistently variables-oriented research. The second solution is to replace the notion of variables/variable values with typology/types, thereby returning to cases, pursuing comparative case reconstructions in the third phase of research. The study concludes in favour of the second solution.

In light of the growing importance of finance ministries and the financial dimension in policy-making, opening up the “black box” of fiscal bureaucracies is more warranted than ever. Our paper addresses the following research question: What kinds of roles can be assumed by fiscal bureaucrats in fiscal policy-making and budgeting? We propose four dichotomies that can be employed for examining the roles played by fiscal bureaucracies: 1) developers vs guardians; 2) initiators vs followers; 3) mediators vs insulators; 4) modellers vs estimators. In developing these dimensions, we juxtaposed the insights from various streams of institutionalist research and also on literature on public budgeting and public policy with the themes that emerged from the interviews we conducted in four different countries: Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and Norway. We find that fiscal bureaucracies in Estonia and Latvia tend to be closer to the guardian-insulator-estimator ends of the continuums, whereas the officials in Sweden and especially Norway lean towards the developer-mediator-modeller end of the scale. The division between the initiator vs follower roles is less clear-cut.

The Sociological Imagination was an unfortunate choice of title. To Mills, SI was not about sociology as a discipline, it was about a ‘style of work’ that he found also in the other social sciences and in history. Mills challenged the discipline of sociology. His attacks on Lazarsfeld- type abstracted empiricism and Parsonian grand theory countered the two major attempts to define the identity of sociology as a thoroughly ‘scientific’ discipline in the 1940s and 1950s. Mills wanted to defend social science against this trend towards disciplinary closure, sensing that his own discipline played a leading role: Should these two styles of work – abstracted empiricism and grand theory – come to enjoy an intellectual ‘duopoly’, or even become the predominant styles of work, they would constitute a grievous threat to the intellectual promise of social science and as well to the political promise of the role of reason in human affairs – as that role has been classically conceived in the civilization of the Western societies. (pp. 131f.) There are two promises here, and we shall call them programmes. On the one hand, Mills links the sociological imagination to an ‘intellectual promise’ internal to the academic sphere of higher education and research. On the other hand, he links it to an external ‘promise’ related to Western civilization. Mills would suggest the internal programme to any aspiring social scientists as an account – contrasted to abstracted empiricism/grand theory – of how research may best be carried out:

During the 1950-70s Norway had relatively low GDP per capita compared to the OECD average and even more so compared to Denmark and Sweden. During the 1970s there was a significant catch-up in incomes and from the early 1990s a ‘take-off’ in relative income. Norway is currently ranked among the countries with the highest GDP per capita in the world and is at the top according to UNDP’s human development indicator. We argue that this development is related to the growth of the Norwegian petroleum sector, although many studies of economic growth conclude that countries abundant in natural resources are not blessed but cursed by gifts of nature. How has Norway avoided so many of the possible problems that follow in the wake of a natural resource-based development? Nowadays the standard answer to this question is ‘good institutions’ and ‘clever policies’. In this paper we detail the institutions and policies that may explain the peculiar development success of Norway. There are lessons here that can contribute to policy learning, but only on the provision that the specificities of the ‘learning’ country are understood.

This is the only comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the political economy of the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). Five studies have been written within a project, and are based on thorough discussions on a common framework within which the distinct features of the economic policies of each separate country are analysed in a comparative perspective. The studies are accompanied by an extensive comparative discussion - written collectively by the members of the project team - that locates the Nordic model(s) within the wider map of capitalist varieties in the contemporary Western world. This book emphasizes the variety of experiences within the Nordic realm, from the dramatic collapse of Iceland's economy as the financial bubble burst in 2008 to the full-employment oil-economy of Norway that proved virtually unaffected by the financial instabilities of 2008. It also identifies certain common transformations (particularly linked to the politics of immigration and integration, the persistent role of the unions, and new opportunities created by national systems of innovation).

Norway is a small nation state on the northernmost coastline of Western Europe, integrated in the Western world economy. For centuries Norway's integration in the world economy had been based on exports of raw materials such as fish and timber, as well as shipping services. In the early 20th century, furnace-based metals (made possible by cheap hydropower) were added to this export basket. Just as the world economy entered an increasingly unstable phase in 1970s, another natural resource was discovered in Norway: petroleum – that is, oil and natural gas from the North Sea. This chapter analyses the challenges and possibilities inherent in the Norwegian strategy of developing an oil economy in a world economic situation influenced by new and stronger forms of international integration through the four decades between 1970 and 2010.

During the 1950-70s Norway had relatively low GDP per capita compared to the OECD average and even more so compared to Denmark and Sweden. During the 1970s there was a significant catch-up in incomes and from the early 1990s a .take-off. in relative income. Norway is currently ranked among the countries with the highest GDP per capita in the world and is at the top according to UNDP.s human development indicator. We argue that this development is related to the growth of the Norwegian petroleum sector, although many studies of economic growth conclude that countries abundant in natural resources are not blessed but cursed by gifts of nature. How has Norway avoided so many of the possible problems that follow in the wake of a natural resource-based development? Nowadays the standard answer to this question is .good institutions. and .clever policies.. In this paper we detail the institutions and policies that may explain the peculiar development success of Norway. There are lessons here that can contribute to policy learning, but only on the provision that the specificities of the .learning. country are understood.

During the 1950-70s Norway had relatively low GDP per capita compared to the OECD average and even more so compared to Denmark and Sweden. During the 1970s there was a significant catch-up in incomes and from the early 1990s a 'take-off' in relative income. Norway is currently ranked among the countries with the highest GDP per capita in the world and is at the top according to UNDP's human development indicator. We argue that this development is related to the growth of the Norwegian petroleum sector, although many studies of economic growth conclude that countries abundant in natural resources are not blessed but cursed by gifts of nature. How has Norway avoided so many of the possible problems that follow in the wake of a natural resource-based development? Nowadays the standard answer to this question is 'good institutions' and 'clever policies'. In this paper we detail the institutions and policies that may explain the peculiar development success of Norway. There are lessons here that can contribute to policy learning, but only on the provision that the specificities of the 'learning' country are understood.

Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital is one of the most important books written on capitalism. Historically and theoretically! How can such a statement be made on Carlota Perez' first and (so far) only book? How can a slim volume of about 180 pages be mentioned together with works such as the 2,350 page Das Kapital by Marx, Schumpeter's 1,400 pages of Business Cycles or Å;kerman's 930 pages of Ekonomisk Teori?

Choosing Varieties of Capitalism as the title of their 2001 edited volume, Peter Hall and David Soskice monopolized a label that was much too broad for the project they were actually reporting. Their project was in line with a style of research, which may be called “bringing yet another factor back in”. That term stems from another pioneering edited volume emerging – like Hall and Soskice's volume – from the Harvard circuit: Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol's (1985) Bringing the State Back In. Following that volume, a number of other factors were “brought back in”: classes, geopolitics, finance and so on.