Psychological measures are commonly reduced to aggregate scores, such as questionnaire totals, accuracy scores, or human-annotated measures. Although useful, these scores may hide information about the configuration of participants’ responses. The present study took mentalization (i.e., the ability to infer others’ mental states) as a working example to investigate how this domain can be characterized through vector-based response representations in addition to classical scoring. One hundred and sixty-four university participants completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), and the Triangles task. For each task, we constructed participant-by-participant distance matrices based on classical scores and on vector representations: IRI item-response profiles, RMET response-choice patterns, and sentence embeddings of open-ended Triangles ToM descriptions. Classical score correlations showed limited convergence across tasks, with only RMET accuracy and Triangles score showing a small positive association. Representational similarity analyses showed that vector-based representations reliably converged with classical score distances within each task, although the associations were modest. Cross-task analyses further indicated that score-based and vector-based representations produced partly different prediction patterns. Overall, these findings suggest that classical mentalization measures organize individual differences differently depending on whether responses are represented as aggregate scores or full response configurations, with implications for how psychologists conceptualize and validate social-cognitive assessment. Keywords: mentalization; representational similarity analysis; individual differences.

Early temperament has been shown to have a profound impact on various life outcomes including academic performance, however, the nature of the relationship between temperamental dimensions and learning abilities is still unclear. The aim of this meta-analysis and review is to investigate the empirical findings on the associations between temperament and learning using an integrative model. The 72 studies yielded 594 effect sizes (N = 27,568; age = 9 months to 16 years; 49.53

Attempts to describe the early acquisition of metaphor skills led to inconsistent results. We address this issue by examining developmental trajectories across metaphor types and along the literal–figurative and physical–mental dimensions. To this end, we implemented the Physical and Mental Metaphors task in a multiple-choice format (with literal, unrelated, figurative physical, and figurative mental interpretation options) and administered it to 176 typically developing children aged 4-6, alongside linguistic, cognitive, and Theory of Mind tests. We observed a curvilinear trend, with age 6 marking a significant improvement in physical, but not mental, metaphors, driven by a drop in literal interpretations. For mental metaphors, children at this age still prefer physical interpretations. Vocabulary supported physical metaphors, while Theory of Mind aided mental metaphor comprehension. Results highlight that overcoming literal and physical preferences are two important stages in metaphor development, interacting with verbal and socio-cognitive factors.

This longitudinal study investigates theory of mind (ToM) development in middle childhood and its demographic and linguistic predictors. In this study, 194 Italian primary school children (Mage = 9.4 years; 47% girls; 28% with one or both Italian parents) were assessed four times over 2 years using a multi-modal ToM battery. Results confirmed longitudinal measurement invariance of the ToM battery. Latent growth modeling showed ToM growth from Time 1 to Time 3, followed by a plateau. Analyses revealed significant inter-individual variability at Time 1 but no variance in the rate of development. Higher verbal ability and having siblings predicted higher initial ToM, while non-native speakers began lower but showed greater gains. Findings extend existing accounts on ToM development.

Word recognition is a complex cognitive process that has been often investigated via lexical decision task (LDT). LDT can indeed provide insight into how individuals access and process linguistic information, and how (and if) specific word- and/or individual-level characteristics affect participants' behavior. Here, we aimed to provide a systematic investigation of the interaction between individual-level reading skills and word-level factors (e.g., frequency, length). Participants were asked to perform a LDT and complete neuropsychological tests assessing their reading-related skills. By using completely data-driven approaches, participants' performance in the LDT was predicted by word- and individual-level predictors, and the best-fitting model was selected. The best-fitting model dropped all the interactions among deeper-level predictors (e.g., density of the semantic neighborhood) and reading-related skills. The interactions involving word length or word frequency indicated that more expert readers are less sensitive to this kind of factors. These results underscore the importance of considering both lexical properties and individual reading proficiency when investigating the cognitive mechanisms underlying word recognition.

Understanding how Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, develops and differs across individuals requires robust and easily applicable measures. Tasks involving open ended verbal responses such as the Triangles Task offer valid indicators of ToM, but their manual scoring is time-consuming and demands substantial training. In this study, we test the validity and reliability of TrAIngles, an automatic scoring software for the Triangles Task developed through fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs). TrAIngles was trained on a dataset of N ~ 11,000 responses collected from 581 Italian-speaking participants aged between 8 and 81 years. LLM-based ToM scores showed high accuracy and reliability metrics (Cohen’s kappa, ICC, Krippendorff’s alpha, Spearman’s rho) comparable to human ratings and consistently exceeding commonly accepted thresholds for inter-rater agreement (i.e., > .80). Performance remained robust across age groups (children, adolescents, young adults, adults, and older adults). Our findings demonstrate that reliable and valid ToM indexes can be obtained from the Triangles Task using this new automated scoring system based on LLMs. TrAIngles thus provides an innovative tool for lifespan ToM assessments relying on open-ended responses, highlighting the potential of training automated scoring systems on archival, human-rated datasets. TrAIngles is openly available for use both as code and via a user-friendly graphical interface.

Traditionally, spatial perspective-taking (sPT) has been investigated as an ability to take the perspective of others when explicitly instructed to do so. However, more recent findings suggest that, even in the absence of explicit instruction, people sometimes take the visual perspective of others when observing a visual scene, that is, they engage in spontaneous sPT. To explain why, research has so far focused on features of the visual scene. Here, we focus on the observer. By developing a novel task, the Do You See What I See (DYSWIS) task, across 4 studies (N = 603; age range: 18-36 years), we find that some people are systematically more likely than others to choose the perspective of others across conditions and when tested 2 weeks apart. These individual differences in spontaneous sPT correlate with the ability to take the perspective of others when explicitly instructed to do so and with self-reported empathy in 3 out of 4 studies, while they are not associated with mental rotation or non-verbal reasoning abilities. These associations are stable across different visual scenes, even if some features of the scenes, such as the presence of humans or their implied movement, substantially enhance spontaneous sPT. Taken together, this work demonstrates that people systematically differ in their spontaneous tendency to take the visual perspective of others, highlighting the importance of investigating sPT not only as an ability, but also as a disposition or choice.

PhD candidates face elevated risks of anxiety, depression, and burnout. Yet, mental health in doctoral education remains under-addressed and insufficiently supported by systematic data and interventions. In response, the Italian Ministry of University and Research launched PRO-BEN, a nationwide initiative aimed at investigating and promoting undergraduate and graduate student wellbeing. Within this framework, the “Health Mode On” project engages 10 universities and conservatories across Italy, targeting nearly 12,000 students, with a specific focus on doctoral candidates. As part of the assessment component, a survey adapted from the World Mental Health International College Student (WMH-ICS) initiative was expanded through a Delphi-informed process to include lifestyle-related domains. A pilot study conducted in July 2025 at the University of Pavia involved 352 PhD students (36.3% response rate). Preliminary findings showed a 12-month prevalence of 18.5% for mood disorders and 25.0% for anxiety disorders, highlighting a substantial burden of mental health conditions. By integrating epidemiological assessment with evidence-led interventions, training, and institutional engagement, the project aims to provide a scalable framework to support doctoral wellbeing.

As people age, declines in mentalizing, the ability to attribute mental states to others, have been frequently reported. More than a decade ago, Henry et al. (2013) conducted a foundational meta-analysis on age-related mentalizing differences, reporting consistent declines in older adults regardless of task features. Since then, the literature has expanded substantially, extending their conclusions while also revealing inconsistencies that highlight the complexity of age-related mentalizing differences. Considering this, we conducted an updated meta-analysis to reassess these differences and examine whether task-related characteristics moderate the effects, directly building on the work of Henry et al. The analysis included 73 studies and tested various (and novel) moderators such as task domain (cognitive, affective, mixed), modality (verbal, visual-static, visual-dynamic), task type (e.g., interpretation of actions, shared world knowledge), ecological validity, and respondent perspective (first-, second-, or third-person). Results confirmed and extended previous findings, showing that older adults exhibit significant declines in mentalizing compared to younger adults (g = 0.78), and that these deficits are specific to mentalizing rather than general cognitive performance. However, only one moderator significantly influenced the effect and should be interpreted cautiously, given the small number of contributing effect sizes, suggesting a general age-related decline in mentalizing rather than effects driven by specific task characteristics. Notably, most tasks relied on third-person perspectives and lacked ecological validity, highlighting the need for more ecologically valid, interactive, and second-person paradigms. Such approaches may help clarify whether tasks that are more engaging, socially meaningful, and reflective of real-world interactions could positively affect older adults' mentalizing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

Metaphor is a powerful tool of verbal reasoning that helps individuals understand complex phenomena and plays a central role in climate change communication. However, children’s still-developing metaphor comprehension abilities may limit the effectiveness of figurative environmental messages. To address this issue, we extended the MetaCom training by developing MetaCom-Green, a novel intervention combining metaphor training with climate change education. Each session revolved around a metaphor describing an environmental phenomenon (e.g., The ocean is a soup or Animals are eating bites of fire). A group of fourth graders were assigned either to MetaCom-Green or to a control condition receiving an equivalent, metaphor-free environmental program. Pre-training assessments indicated that the two groups were comparable on linguistic, socio-cognitive, and most environmental measures. Post-training, children in the MetaCom-Green group showed greater improvements not only in metaphor comprehension, but also in climate change knowledge. Moreover, they developed richer conceptualizations of climate change phenomena and showed changes in environmental attitudes, with greater hope, lower despair about the future, and more pro-environmental behavior. These findings suggest that metaphor constitutes a powerful “learning-by-thinking” tool, fostering reasoning, conceptual reframing, and possibly embodied experiences that may enhance children’s engagement with environmental challenges.

Background: RIDInet-Reading Trainer 2 (RT-2) is a web-platform for the remote treatment of developmental dyslexia (DD) which has been shown to improve reading performance. However, no previous studies have investigated stability in reading improvement after RT-2 training and the influence of a previous diagnosis of developmental language disorder (DLD) and of participants’ age on stability. Objectives: In a sample of 52 Italian-speaking children with DD who participated in a 3-month home-based treatment with RT-2, we aimed (1) to assess the stability in reading improvement after RT-2 training at a 3-month follow-up and the potential moderating role of DLD and age; and (2) to evaluate the impact of RT-2 training in reading comprehension. Results: By implementing linear mixed model analysis, our findings confirmed reading improvement after RT-2 training in word and text reading in DD. Moreover, we observed an overall stability in single-word and text reading speed performances after three months, regardless of the diagnosis of DLD and the age of the participants. Conversely, accuracy showed an overall stability for single-word reading, while it was significantly stable only in the younger participants in text reading. The improvement was educationally relevant as it impacted reading comprehension. Conclusions: The current study supports the use of remotely delivered DD interventions among school-aged children.

Children’s theory of mind (ToM) is critical for academic success, yet its associations with reading comprehension and mathematics remain unclear. This pre-registered meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 53 studies, including 12,347 participants aged 2.5 – 17 years. Results revealed a significant overall association between ToM and academic achievement (r = .32), which: (i) did not differ across domains (i.e., reading, mathematics, general achievement); (ii) was independent of verbal ability, non-verbal ability, executive function, and socioeconomic status; and (iii) appeared bidirectional. These longitudinal findings should be interpreted with caution, as they are largely based on zero-order associations without baseline controls. Sample (i.e., age, gender and country) and task characteristics (i.e., level of mentalizing, ToM stimulus type, mental state category, response type, and sensitivity to individual differences) did not moderate the relation between ToM and academic achievement, although weaker effects emerged in European samples. Our results demonstrate a consistent association between ToM and academic achievement underscoring the potential contribution of social–cognitive understanding to children’s academic development. Future research should clarify the mechanisms underlying this association, its domain specificity, and the direction of causal influence.

This poster presents the preliminary results of the TrustInAging project aimed at promoting healthy aging. An application was designed that comprehensively addresses prevention interventions for elderly people. The app addresses the motor, cognitive, social and nutritional areas. The app will be validated in a pilot study by elderly people living alone or in assisted residences.

We present the outcome of a decade-long research programme targeting the relationship between individual differences in metaphor skills and Theory of Mind (ToM), based on the use of the Physical and Mental Metaphors (PMM) task alongside the Strange Stories task in neurotypical children throughout middle childhood. A meta-analysis conducted on our published and unpublished articles, including 500 children aged 8-12 years, showed that metaphor and ToM are significantly associated, even when controlling for vocabulary. This association peaks around the age of 9 years and fades away with increasing age. A critical review of our longitudinal and training studies evidenced that it is especially metaphor understanding that benefits ToM, rather than vice versa. Overall, the results of our research programme confirm the inherent mindreading component of pragmatic operations as postulated by post-Gricean pragmatics, highlighting also that ToM involvement in metaphor varies dynamically depending on age and possibly other factors such as the type of metaphor. Furthermore, we argue that pragmatics should not be seen as ancillary to ToM but rather as a driving factor for socio-cognitive development. We conclude that integrating experimental pragmatics and insights from developmental psychology, such as the attention to individual differences, brings new opportunities for metaphor research.This article is part of the theme issue 'At the heart of human communication: new views on the complex relationship between pragmatics and Theory of Mind'.

While some aspects of pragmatic competence are known to decline with age, for metaphor skills the evidence is inconclusive, possibly due to heterogeneity in the assessment tools. Furthermore, the previous literature on age-related changes in pragmatic skills has rarely considered the role of Theory of Mind (ToM), which is described as one of the main factors affecting metaphor across theoretical and experimental studies in children and clinical populations. This study aimed at elucidating age-related differences in metaphor understanding and the interplay between metaphor skills and ToM in middle-aged and older adults with a fine-grained approach. Participants (n = 201, age range 54-93) completed tasks assessing ToM and metaphor understanding. On the one side, we used the Physical and Mental Metaphors task, to distinguish between different types of metaphor (physical, such as "Lifeguards are lizards," meaning that they lie in the sun, vs. mental, such as "Adolescents are pendulums," meaning that they are emotionally unstable) and different aspects of metaphor understanding, namely, accuracy in finding a link between topic and vehicle versus type of interpretation (from physical to psychological). On the other side, we analyzed two aspects of ToM skills: the accuracy in mental state understanding and the intentionality, defined as the degree of mental state attribution, assessed with the Strange Stories and the Animated Social Triangles task, respectively. Structural equation models indicated a decline in metaphor skills with advancing age. Furthermore, we found that ToM is involved in metaphor understanding in a specific fashion. While higher ToM accuracy explained better metaphor accuracy, higher ToM intentionality explained better performance in the interpretation of mental, but not physical, metaphors. These findings suggest that age-related differences in pragmatics extend to metaphor skills and that ToM plays a role in metaphor comprehension in older age, with a division of labor where the ability to understand what others think is key to spotting a metaphorical link, but the greater tendency to attribute mental states is what specifically helps when it comes to grasping the psychological nuances of a metaphor.

As people age, declines in social cognition and more specifically Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, have been frequently reported. More than a decade ago, Henry et al. (2013) conducted a foundational meta-analysis on age-related ToM differences, reporting consistent declines in older adults regardless of task features. Since then, the literature has expanded substantially, extending their conclusions while also revealing inconsistencies that highlight the complexity of age-related ToM differences. Considering this, we conducted an updated meta-analysis to reassess these differences and examine whether task-related characteristics moderate the effects, directly building on the work of Henry et al. The analysis included 69 studies and tested various (and novel) moderators such as task domain (cognitive, affective, mixed), modality (verbal, visual-static, visual-dynamic), task type (e.g., False Belief, Eyes Task, Faux Pas), ecological validity, and respondent perspective (first-, second-, third-person). Results confirmed and extended previous findings, highlighting persistent age-related ToM deficits. However, none of the examined moderators significantly influenced this effect, suggesting that the decline reflects a general difficulty with ToM in older adults rather than one driven by specific task characteristics. Notably, most tasks relied on third-person perspectives and lacked ecological validity, highlighting the need for more ecologically valid, interactive, and second-person paradigms. Such approaches may help clarify whether tasks that are more engaging, socially meaningful, and reflective of real-world interactions could positively affect older adults’ ToM performance.

Persuasion is a complex communicative process aiming at influencing others’ beliefs or behaviors. Imbuing everyday communication, persuasion is a crucial skill for children to successfully manage social interactions. While theoretically persuasion has been linked with the mastery of figurative language and with pragmatics more broadly, there is a scarcity of empirical evidence exploring the relationship between persuasion and metaphor skills. Here we tackle this issue in early childhood by examining whether individual differences in metaphor skills are related to those in persuasion. 175 children (age 4-6 years) were assessed for persuasive abilities alongside metaphor comprehension and production, in addition to vocabulary and working memory skills as control variables. Results showed an improvement in persuasive skills at 5 years of age. Across ages, children preferred to use positive persuasive strategies (i.e., offering rewards) over negative ones (i.e., punishments), while psychological strategies relying on mitigation and modeling were rarely used. Regardless of the type of strategy, persuasion correlated positively with vocabulary skills. Interestingly, greater use of psychological persuasive strategies was associated with better metaphor production skills (being conversely hampered by working memory), while no effect of metaphor comprehension was found. Overall, these findings suggest that some aspects of metaphor skills, within the broader set of pragmatic competencies, might be a driving factor in achieving a high-level persuasive style. Such aspects possibly deal with the functions of metaphors to favor flexible conceptualization and social use of language.

A puzzling issue in cognitive science is whether human communication is mainly a matter of decoding words or a matter of understanding other people's mental states. This issue becomes especially intriguing when we consider that verbal communication is often non-literal, with language being just a cue to infer intended meaning, as in the case of irony and metaphors. Pragmatics is the cognitive ability dealing with understanding a speaker's intended messages in the context of use, and its relationship with the ability to read other people's minds, i.e. Theory of Mind (ToM), has been a largely debated topic in the past twenty years across a number of research domains investigating human communication. This theme issue offers fresh evidence on this debate from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives (including linguistics, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience), methodological approaches (both experimental and theoretical) and populations (typical and atypical children and adults, as well as artificial networks). It covers a variety of pragmatic phenomena, both expressive and receptive, such as metaphor, irony, reference, implicature, storytelling and question asking. In this Introduction, we go back to the definition of pragmatics and ToM, highlight their nuanced nature and sketch the scenario in which the debate over their relationship arose. After summarizing the different articles, we highlight the flexible-at times unstable-nature of the relationship between pragmatics and ToM as it emerges from this collection, which offers the most mature and up-to-date view of the sociocognitive roots of human communication.This article is part of theme issue 'At the heart of human communication: new views on the complex relationship between pragmatics and Theory of Mind'.

Narcolepsy type 1 is a neurological disorder typically emerging in childhood or adolescence, characterised by excessive daytime sleepiness, cataplexy and rapid eye movement sleep-related symptoms. Beyond its core features, increasing evidence suggests an impact on socio-cognitive development, including difficulties in understanding others' mental states. In this study, we aimed to clarify whether such impairments extend to more basic emotional processes. We expanded previous work on Theory of Mind by including an analysis of facial emotion recognition and comparing children with narcolepsy type 1 to a newly recruited group of typically developing peers. Twenty-two children with narcolepsy type 1 and twenty-two age- and sex-matched controls completed standardised tasks assessing Theory of Mind and facial emotion recognition. Results confirmed a significant impairment in Theory of Mind among children with narcolepsy compared to controls. In contrast, no differences emerged in facial emotion recognition, suggesting a selective disruption in higher-order socio-cognitive processes. Additionally, greater daytime sleepiness was associated with poorer Theory of Mind performance, but not with emotion recognition accuracy. These results indicate a specific vulnerability in social understanding during the development of type 1 narcolepsy, probably aggravated by narcoleptic symptoms. However, facial emotion recognition is not affected in these patients, suggesting the involvement of different networks. Early identification of these difficulties and targeted interventions may be crucial to support peer relationships and long-term psychosocial outcomes in affected children.

Narcolepsy type 1 is a central disorder of hypersomnolence characterized by excessive daytime sleepiness, cataplexy and other rapid eye movement sleep-related manifestations. Neurophysiological studies suggest that narcolepsy type 1 patients may experience impairment in emotional processing due to structural and functional changes in limbic structures and associated areas. However, the only study exploring narcolepsy behavioural responses found no impairment in the ability to recognize emotions, possibly due to compensatory mechanisms. The present study was designed to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the behavioural impairment related to emotional processing focusing on an advanced socio-cognitive skill, namely Theory of Mind, in paediatric narcolepsy type 1 patients. Twenty-two narcolepsy type 1 children and adolescents (six female; age range: 8.0-13.5) and 22 healthy controls matched for age and sex (six female; age range: 8.9-13.0) underwent a neuropsychological evaluation to assess socio-economic status, verbal abilities, working memory, social anxiety and Theory of Mind via a verbal task (i.e. Strange Stories task) and a visual task (i.e. Silent Films). Narcolepsy type 1 patients were also evaluated for disease severity. Patients exhibited impairment in Theory of Mind skills, as assessed both through both verbal (controls median = 8; patients median = 5; P = 0.009) and visual tasks (controls median = 8; patients median = 6; P = 0.003), compared to healthy controls. Correlation analyses showed that verbal and visual Theory of Mind was negatively related to narcolepsy severity (ρ = -0.45, P = 0.035 and ρ = -0.52, P = 0.012), and daytime sleepiness (ρ = -0.48, P = 0.025 and ρ = -0.45, P = 0.038). Our study shows a selective impairment in the Theory of Mind domain in children and adolescents with narcolepsy type 1. In addition, our results highlight a link between symptom severity and Theory of Mind, suggesting that lower Theory of Mind levels are associated with higher symptom severity. Further, longitudinal studies are needed to disentangle the direction of this relation and to disambiguate if narcolepsy severity impaired children's Theory of Mind or if Theory of Mind skills modulate the severity of narcolepsy symptoms by providing a greater ability to avoid cataplexy.