The article provides experimental evidence of the effect of candidate-citizen town-hall meetings on voters’ political behavior. The intervention took place prior to the March 2011 elections in Benin and involved 150 randomly selected villages. In the treatment group, candidates held town-hall meetings where voters deliberated over their electoral platforms. The control group was exposed to the standard campaign—that is, one-way communication of the candidate’s platform by himself or his local broker. We find that town-hall meetings led to a more informed citizenry and higher electoral participation, which diverged little along socioeconomic lines. We also observe a lower effectiveness of vote-buying attempts where town halls took place. This is consistent with town-hall deliberation promoting what we call more “ethical” voters.

This paper examines racial disparities in economic publishing using bibliometric data from over 200 economic journals. We find notable differences in authorship between White and non-White authors, with Black, Hispanic, and Asian economists significantly underrepresented in comparison to their share of the overall population. While the publication of non-White economists has increased over the last three decades, the average number of Top 5 journal publications by non-White economists is 25 to 50 percent lower than that of White economists in comparable positions. These disparities highlight the need for measures to enhance knowledge diversity within the economics profession.

We show that current levels of democracy in Africa are linked to the nature of its independence movements. Using different measures of political regimes and historical data on anticolonial movements, we find that countries that experienced rural insurgencies tend to have autocratic regimes, while those that faced urban protests tend to have more democratic institutions. The association between the type of independence movement and democracy is statistically significant for the post‐Cold War period and robust to a number of potential confounding factors and sensitivity checks. We provide evidence for causality in this relationship by using an instrumental variables approach and a difference‐in‐differences design with fixed effects. Furthermore, we adjudicate between two potential mechanisms and find support for a behavioral path dependence hypothesis. Urban protests enabled participants to develop norms of peaceful political behavior, which provided cultural bases for liberal democracy. In contrast, armed rebellions generated behavioral patterns that perpetuated political exclusion and the use of violence as a form of political dissent.

Technological progress is widely recognized as a fundamental driver of economic development and structural transformation. Nevertheless, substantial variations in productivity persist both within and across countries. While the literature on misallocation has made important progress, we still have a limited understanding of the extent to which these misallocations are driven by political factors and the actions (or inactions) of governments. This paper reviews the literature on various political distortions, including state capture, patronage, and firm-political connections, and their impacts on economic outcomes. The review emphasizes empirical research, especially in low- and middle-income countries, highlighting the need for coherent theoretical frameworks and policy interventions to address political distortions. The paper also provides suggestions for future research, aiming to advance our understanding of the complex interplay between political dynamics and structural transformation.

Municipal Elections in Mexico Researchers: Alberto Chong Ana De La O Dean Karlan Leonard Wantchekon Sector(s): Political Economy and Governance J-PAL office: J-PAL Latin America and the Caribbean, J-PAL North America Fieldwork: Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) Location: Jalisco, Morelos, and Tabasco, Mexico Sample: 2,360 voting precincts Target group: Voters Outcome of interest: Electoral participation Transparency and accountability Corruption and Leakages Intervention type: Information AEA RCT registration number: AEARCTR-0001973 Data: Download data (545 KB) Research Papers: Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experi... Partner organization(s): Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Vote-buying-or the pre-electoral distribution of private goods in exchange for support at the ballot box-is often blamed for the poor economic performance of many developing countries. By pressuring individuals to vote against their own interest, vote-buying may undermine accountability and the imple-mentation of sound development policies. Yet, these effects depend on it leading to electoral outcomes that would not have occurred otherwise. In this paper we use survey data from 17 sub-Saharan African elections between 2000 and 2005 and 20 Latin American elections between 2005 and 2010 to show that, despite its widespread prevalence, vote-buying has a limited electoral impact on average: in only 11 of 37 elections are gifts-for-votes practices correlated with higher turnout; yet, in only very few elections could have these gifts translated into visible electoral advantages for a particular party. This contrasts with common perceptions about the effectiveness of electoral handouts and the quality of the elections in these regions. (c) 2022 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

This study aims to assess the effects of risk management tools on the agricultural performance of rural producers benefiting from the joint support of the Senegalese state and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) through the co-financed project PADAER. Data collection covers two regions in Senegal: Kolda and Tambacounda. The sample comprises 1167 farmers, including 379 beneficiaries of the index-based insurance facilitated by PADAER (Programme d’Appui au Développement Agricole et à l’Entreprenariat Rural). The quasi-experimental method known as the propensity score matching method was used to determine the impact of subscribing to index-based insurance on the farmer’s production, agricultural investments, and annual income. Although the results of the estimates show that the project has not yet had any effect on production, without the intervention of this project, farmers would have recorded a loss of about USD 115 (FCFA 57,600). Not only did the index-based insurance for the harvest facilitated by the PADAER allow the beneficiary to cover this loss and realize a gain estimated at USD 25 (FCFA 12,749), but the added value of this paper is that it measures the effects of agricultural index-based insurance in Africa using real-world statistical data.

This chapter uses a novel database on contractual arrangements between politicians, political brokers, and businessmen in Benin to investigate the way the nature of these arrangements depends on the level of political competition. We find that firms provide financial support to local and national politicians in exchange for policy concessions, direct budget support of firms, 'favourable' procurement auctions (bid-rigging), and various forms of state capture. In addition, while bid-rigging features constantly in politician–firm contracts, increased electoral uncertainty is associated with less demand for policy concessions and stronger preference for direct forms of state capture, that is, the appointment of firms' agents or cronies to key government positions. In other words, electoral uncertainty could simultaneously contribute to democratic consolidation through political turnover, and to worse forms of corruption through state capture by business elites.

This paper studies when and why firms prefer more direct forms of state capture (i.e., directly capturing tenured state officials who implement policy, as bureaucrats) to more indirect ones (i.e., using intermediaries, such as elected officials, to influence bureaucrats). First, we propose a principal-agent model under political uncertainty. Firms can induce market distortions by making transfers to incumbents, but such incumbents may be displaced in an election. Direct capture acts as an insurance for the firm, guaranteeing that its paid for distortions are kept in place even when the incumbent loses. We then show that policies thought to decrease state capture, such as improved bureaucrat selection, can have little to no effect once substitution towards indirect control is accounted for. We test the model's predictions using a novel database on contractual arrangements between politicians, political brokers and businessmen in Benin. As proposed by the theory, we find that an increase in political uncertainty is associated with an increase in direct forms of capture. We conclude that electoral competition is not a sufficient mechanism to curb firms' control of government when they can switch forms of state capture.

This study examines how the political interruptions in Nigeria between 1970 to about 2003 altered policies, institutional norms, governance structures, and attitudes in the education sector. Particular attention is given from 1973 to 2003, a period after the civil war, when the Federal Government became fully involved in managing primary and secondary schools (taking over schools from missions and private owners) up to 2003 when the first successful democratic transition took place. Further disruptions to the country’s democracy have been experienced since then, and have continued to inform the political economy of education sector development.

Abstract Understanding the primary causes of human prosperity is one of the most important endeavors for social scientists. Much research in the twentieth century followed a neo-classical approach that emphasized important factors such as physical capital, human capital, and technological change, but was nonetheless devoid of historical and political context. In recent decades there has been a resurgence of political and historically embedded explanations of economic development, which have greatly expanded upon the works of early political economists such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx. This chapter provides an overview of this recent research on geography, institutions, and human capital, along with their interactions, as drivers of long-term economic development. The chapter then moves beyond these paradigms to argue that many historical political economists have largely overlooked explanations focused on state capacity and state-led development. A better understanding of the state should help scholars identify paths to break away from the low-growth equilibrium of less-developed countries.

We review research on the history of education policy in colonial sub-Saharan Africa and among the African Diaspora in the United States and Brazil through a political economy lens. While the supply of education was severely constricted in all of these cases, demand for education remained strong. Thus, even as authoritarian states have attempted to restrict educational supply for social control, the strength of the demand—and the accompanying pedagogical, organizational, and political innovations—illustrates the power of education to empower marginalized communities. Through reviewing work in economics, history, and political science, we highlight the transformative effects of formal education in Black communities as well as the centrality of Black people in demanding access to higher education and innovating new political ideas and pedagogies that saw education as a force for liberation. Governments and citizens must continue to work to correct the inherited distortions in the supply of education in Black communities in Africa as well as in the diaspora.

This article studies the role of political distortions in driving economic growth and development in Africa. We first discuss how existing theories based on long-run structural factors (e.g., pre-colonial and colonial institutions, or ethnic diversity) may not capture new data patterns in the region, including changes to political regimes, growth patterns, and their variation across regions with similar historical experiences. We then argue that a framework focused on political distortions (i.e., how political incentives impact resource allocation and economic outcomes) may have multiple benefits: it encapsulates many distortions observed in practice, including patronage, variations in contract enforcement and the role of political connections in firm outcomes; it unifies results in Africa and elsewhere; and it leaves a wide scope for policy analysis. We conclude by overviewing reforms that may curb such distortions, including changes to campaign financing rules, bureaucratic reform, free trade agreements, and technology.

In a randomized experiment in cooperation with two national parties competing in a congressional election in the Philippines, we estimate the causal effect on voting behavior of a town-hall style campaign in which candidates discuss their campaign platform with small groups of citizens. Keeping the parties' platform fixed, we find that town-hall meetings have a positive effect on parties' vote shares compared to the status quo, in which voters play a passive role. Consistent with the parties' advocacy for underprivileged groups, we observe heterogeneous effects by income, education, and gender. Deliberative campaigns increase voters' awareness on the issues parties campaign on, affecting the vote of the direct beneficiaries of the parties' platform.

Philippines Researchers: Leonard Wantchekon Thomas Fujiwara Daniel Rubenson Cecilia Pe Lero Gabriel López-Moctezuma Sector(s): Political Economy and Governance, Gender J-PAL office: J-PAL Southeast Asia Location: The Philippines Sample: 711 voters in 39 electoral units Target group: Voters Outcome of interest: Electoral participation Elected Official Performance Voter behavior Gender attitudes and norms Intervention type: Community participation Data: dataverse.harvard.edu Partner organization(s): Umalab Ka, Akbayan, Citizens' Action Party, The Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice

Africa is rising, but IB scholars have largely failed to take notice. We argue that this is a missed opportunity. Not only is Africa a dynamic and distinctive region, but its rise presents a number of puzzles for international business (IB) research, with phenomena that seem to challenge fundamental assumptions underlying IB theories. In order to unravel these puzzles and better explain business dynamics on the continent, we contend that there is a need for IB theorizing to place greater emphasis on the role of people, to balance IB's traditional emphasis on institutions, location-specific assets, and other macro-level attributes. We explore how this conceptual shift presents new avenues for inquiry into issues that are of importance for IB but have received limited attention to date. Such issues include entrepreneurial human capital, social networks, institutional co-evolution, and the informal economy. As such, we argue that, while extant theories in IB inform explanations and predictions regarding business activity across the continent, Africa's diverse and distinctive characteristics offer the potential to serve as a context for testing and developing generalizable, cutting-edge IB theory.

About 2 billion children were affected by school closures globally at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. This has led to documented learning losses while children were out of school, and an especially precarious future academic path for pupils in developing countries where learning and continued enrolment remain important issues. There is an urgent need to understand the extent of these learning and enrolment losses, and possible policy options to get children back on track. This paper studies the extent of learning losses and recovery in Africa's most populous country, Nigeria, and provides some evidence that a full recovery is possible. Using data from a random sample of schools, we find significant learning losses of about .6 standard deviations in English and Math. However, a program designed to slow down the curriculum and cover what was missed during school closures led to a rebound within 2 months, and a recovery of all learning losses. Students who were a part of the program do not lag behind one year later and remain in school.