The share of U.S. dollar assets in the official foreign exchange reserve portfolios of central banks is sometimes taken as an indicator of dollar status. We show that the observed decline in the aggregate share of U.S. dollar assets does not stem from a systematic shift in currency preferences away from holding dollar assets. Instead, a small group of countries with large foreign exchange reserve balances drive the dollar share decline observed in aggregate statistics. This arises either due to countries conducting monetary policy vis-à-vis the euro or due to preference shifts away from dollars. Regression analysis shows that interest rate differentials between traditional and nontraditional reserve currencies can tilt portfolio composition, particularly in relation to the scale of investment tranches within overall central bank portfolios. Geopolitical distance from the United States and financial sanctions are associated with lower U.S. dollar shares, especially if the primary foreign currency liquidity needs of the central bank are already satisfied.

The period after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was characterized by a considerable risk migration within global liquidity flows, away from cross-border bank lending towards international bond issuance. We show that the post-GFC shifts in the risk sensitivities of global liquidity flows are related to the tightness of the balance sheet (capital and leverage) constraints faced by international (bank and non-bank) lenders and to the migration of borrowers across funding sources. We document that the risk sensitivity of global liquidity flows is higher when funding is provided by financial intermediaries that are facing greater balance sheet constraints. We also provide evidence that the post-GFC migration of borrowers from cross-border loans to international debt securities was associated with a decline in the risk sensitivity of global liquidity flows to EME borrowers.

The dollar’s share of global official foreign exchange reserves fell from 64 percent in 2015 to 56 percent in 2025. This downward trajectory is sometimes read as evidence that the dollar’s role in international financial markets is eroding. However, aggregate statistics obscure the composition of changes occurring at the country level. In this post, we show that the aggregate decline is not a systematic global shift away from dollar assets. Rather, the aggregate decline reflects the actions of a handful of large reserve holders, changing either their currency preferences or the size of their reserve portfolio. From the perspective of the cross section of countries holding dollar assets, the dollar’s status in official portfolios is largely intact.

Global factors, like monetary policy rates from advanced economies and risk conditions, drive fluctuations in volumes of international capital flows and put pressure on exchange rates. The components of international capital flows that are described as global liquidity—consisting of cross-border bank lending and financing of issuance of international debt securities—have sensitivities to risk conditions that have evolved considerably over time. This risk sensitivity has been driven, in part, by the composition and business models of the financial institutions involved in funding. In this post, we ask whether these same features have led to changes in the pressures on currency values as risk conditions evolve. Using the Goldberg and Krogstrup (2023) Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) country indices, we show that the features of financial institutions in the source countries for international capital do influence how destination countries experience currency pressures when risk conditions change. Better shock-absorbing capacity in financial institutions moderates the pressures toward depreciation of currencies during adverse global risk events.

Global liquidity refers to the volumes of financial flows—largely intermediated through global banks and non-bank financial institutions—that can move at relatively high frequencies across borders. The amplitude of responses to global conditions like risk sentiment, discussed in the context of the global financial cycle, depends on the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the institutions providing funding flows. Evidence from across empirical approaches and using granular data provides policy-relevant lessons. International spillovers of monetary policy and risk sentiment through global liquidity evolve in response to regulation, the characteristics of financial institutions, and actions of official institutions around liquidity provision. Strong prudential policies in the home countries of global banks and official facilities reduce funding strains during stress events. Country-specific policy challenges, summarized by the monetary and financial trilemmas, are partially alleviated. However, risk migration across types of financial intermediaries underscores the importance of advancing regulatory agendas related to non-bank financial institutions.

On May 20 and 21, 2024, the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York jointly hosted the Third Annual International Roles of the U.S. Dollar Conference. The conference brought together researchers, practitioners, and policymakers to understand how changes in the global economic and financial landscape may affect the central role of the dollar.

Global liquidity flows are largely channeled through banks and nonbank financial institutions. The common drivers of global liquidity flows include monetary policy in advanced economies and risk conditions. At the same time, the sensitivities of liquidity flows to changes in these drivers differ across institutions and have been evolving over time. Microprudential regulation of banks plays a role, influencing leverage and capitalization, changing sensitivities to shocks, and also driving risk migration from banks to nonbank financial institutions. Risk sensitivities and flightiness of global liquidity are now strongest in more leveraged nonbank financial institutions, raising challenges in stress episodes. Current policy initiatives target linkages across different types of financial institutions and associated risks. Meanwhile, significant gaps remain. This paper concludes by discussing policy options for addressing systemic risk in banks and nonbanks.

The U.S. dollar plays a central role in the global economy. In addition to being the most widely used currency in foreign exchange transactions, it represents the largest share in official reserves, international debt securities and loans, cross-border payments, and trade invoicing.

Financial sanctions, alongside economic sanctions, are components of the toolkit used by governments as part of international diplomacy. The use of sanctions, especially financial, has increased over the last 70 years. Financial sanctions have been particularly important whenever the goals of the sanctioning countries were related to democracy and human rights. Financial sanctions restrict entities—countries, businesses, or even individuals—from purchasing or selling financial assets, or from accessing custodial or other financial services. They can be imposed on a sanctioned entity’s ability to access the infrastructures that are in place to execute international payments, irrespective of whether such payments underpin financial or real activity. This article explains how financial sanctions can be designed to limit access to the international payment system and, in particular, the SWIFT network, and provides some recent examples.

This paper uses U.S. loan-level credit register data and the 2018–2019 Trade War to test for the effects of international trade uncertainty on domestic credit supply. We exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ ex-ante exposure to trade uncertainty and find that an increase in trade uncertainty is associated with a contraction in bank lending to all firms irrespective of the uncertainty that the firms face. This baseline result holds for lending at the intensive and extensive margins. We document two channels underlying the estimated credit supply effect: a wait-and-see channel by which exposed banks assess their borrowers as riskier and reduce the maturity of their loans, and a financial frictions channel by which exposed banks facing relatively higher balance sheet constraints contract lending more. The decline in credit supply has real effects: firms that borrow from more exposed banks experience lower debt growth and investment rates. These effects are stronger for firms that are more reliant on bank finance.

The risk sensitivity of international capital flow pressures is explored using a new Exchange Market Pressure index that combines pressures observed in exchange rate adjustments with model-based estimates of incipient pressures that are masked by foreign exchange interventions and policy rate adjustments. The sensitivity of capital flow pressures to risk sentiment evolves over time, varies significantly across countries, and differs between normal times and extreme stress events. Across countries, risk sensitivities and safe haven status are associated with self-fulfilling exchange rate expectations and carry trade funding currencies. In contrast, current indicators of a safe macroeconomic profile are only weakly associated with safe haven status.

Bank holding companies (BHCs) can be complex organizations, conducting multiple lines of business through many distinct legal entities and across a range of geographies. While such complexity raises the the costs of bank resolution when organizations fail, the effect of complexity on BHCs' broader risk profiles is less well understood. Business, organizational, and geographic complexity can engender explicit trade-offs between the agency problems that increase risk and the diversification, liquidity management, and synergy improvements that reduce risk. The outcomes of such trade-offs may depend on bank governance arrangements. We test these conjectures using data on large U.S. BHCs for the 1996-2018 period. Organizational complexity and geographic scope tend to provide diversification gains and reduce idiosyncratic and liquidity risks while also increasing BHCs' exposure to systematic and systemic risks. Regulatory changes focused on organizational complexity have significantly reduced this type of complexity, leading to a decrease in systemic risk and an increase in liquidity risk among BHCs. While bank governance structures have, in some cases, significantly affected the buildup of BHC complexity, better governance arrangements have not moderated the effects of complexity on risk outcomes.

The U.S. dollar has played a preeminent role in the global economy since the second World War. It is used as a reserve currency and the currency of denomination for a large fraction of global trade and financial transactions.

Complexity of banks can have important ramifications for the performance and the risks of the banking system. Financial sector reforms that were implemented in the past decade have thus aimed to reduce and to better manage the risk implications of bank complexity. Yet, surprisingly little is known about changes in complexity across countries, its drivers, and its effects. The International Banking Research Network (IBRN) used data and analytical advances to generate rich cross-country insights on the complexity and riskiness of banking organizations. The initiative has yielded four key findings. First, the largest banks in countries tend to be the more complex ones. Even controlling for size, there is substantial diversity across banking organizations in terms of complexity choices. Second, over the past decade, banking organizations have tended to reduce complexity by limiting the number of affiliates in domestic and foreign locations. Generally, however, complexity patterns are fairly persistent. Third, regulatory changes can alter both banking organization complexity and the associated risk profiles. Fourth, the link between complexity and risks involves trade-offs: diversification benefits and reductions in liquidity risk may weigh against agency problems, monitoring costs, and systemic risk contributions arising from higher complexity.

Building on the facility design and application experience from the period of the global financial crisis, in March 2020 the Federal Reserve eased the terms on its standing swap lines in collaboration with other central banks, reactivated temporary swap agreements, and then introduced the new Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) repo facility. While these facilities share similarities, they are different in their operations, breadth of counterparties and potential span of effects. This article provides key details on these facilities and evidence that the central bank swap lines and FIMA repo facility can reduce strains in global dollar funding markets and U.S. Treasury markets during extreme stress events.

While policymakers around the world have aggressively and swiftly reacted to the common negative economic shock from COVID-19, the timing and forms of policy responses in the economic recovery stage may be more geographically differentiated. The range in policy responses, along with variations in the financial health of banks, likely will affect the flow of international credit through global banks. In this post, we ask whether, based on historical precedent, global banks are likely to provide additional support to the economic recovery in the locations they serve.

In March 2020, the Federal Reserve eased the terms on its standing swap lines in collaboration with other central banks, reactivated temporary swap agreements, and then introduced the new Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) Repo Facility. We provide new evidence on how the central bank swap lines and FIMA Repo Facility can reduce strains in global dollar funding markets and U.S. Treasury markets during extreme stress events. These facilities are found to reduce strains in dollar funding markets as measured by foreign exchange swap basis spreads or covered interest parity deviations, as well as the sensitivity of these strains to risk sentiment deterioration. Cross-border flows through banks for excess liquidity support purposes are reduced in the near term and the risk sensitivity of equity and bond fund flows declines. However, access to these facilities leaves longer-term patterns of cross-border liquidity and capital flows broadly unchanged. While official sector liquidity hoarding and “dash for cash” activity are expected to be lower with access to these facilities, initial evidence does not show differential changes in foreign exchange reserve holdings by central banks in relation to liquidity access.

Banks are key for the transmission of many monetary, fiscal and regulatory measures that have been taken to dampen the economic consequences of the Covid-19 crisis. This article reviews evidence on the international spillovers of macroprudential policies, focusing on the transmission through bank credit flows and how this varies depending on the characteristics of banking organisations. While authorities reacted to the common negative economic shock with fairly symmetric policy responses, asymmetric speeds of recovery across countries and sectors may imply asymmetric normalisation of policy. At that stage, long-standing questions about the international spillovers of monetary policy, fiscal policy and macroprudential measures, and the case for coordinating such measures, will take on renewed relevance. Global banks can generate positive spillovers and support the recovery in the locations they serve. Some features of global banks, such as their capitalisation and credit provision to borrowers, require particular attention during the economic recovery phase. Cross-country coordination arguments may find support if international spillovers weaken the ability of countries to recover from the Covid-19 crisis.

After the global financial crisis, regulatory changes were implemented to support financial stability, with some changes directly addressing capital and liquidity in bank holding companies (BHCs) and others targeting BHC size and complexity. Although the overall size of the largest U.S. BHCs has not decreased since the crisis, the organizational complexity of these same organizations has declined, with less notable changes being observed in their range of businesses and geographic scope (Goldberg and Meehl, forthcoming). In this post, we explore how different types of BHC risks—risks that can influence the probability that a BHC is stressed, as well as the chance of systemic implications—have changed over time. The results are mixed: Levels of most BHC risks tend to be higher than in the years immediately preceding the crisis, but are markedly lower than the levels seen during and immediately following the crisis.