Background The extent to which vaccinated persons who become infected with SARS-CoV-2 contribute to transmission is unclear. During a SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant outbreak among incarcerated persons with high vaccination rates in a federal prison, we assessed markers of viral shedding in vaccinated and unvaccinated persons. Methods Consenting incarcerated persons with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection provided mid-turbinate nasal specimens daily for 10 consecutive days and reported symptom data via questionnaire. Real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), viral whole genome sequencing, and viral culture was performed on these nasal specimens. Duration of RT-PCR positivity and viral culture positivity was assessed using survival analysis. Results A total of 978 specimens were provided by 95 participants, of whom 78 (82%) were fully vaccinated and 17 (18%) were not fully vaccinated. No significant differences were detected in duration of RT-PCR positivity among fully vaccinated participants (median: 13 days) versus those not fully vaccinated (median: 13 days; p=0.50), or in duration of culture positivity (medians: 5 days and 5 days; p=0.29). Among fully vaccinated participants, overall duration of culture positivity was shorter among Moderna vaccine recipients versus Pfizer (p=0.048) or Janssen (p=0.003) vaccine recipients. Conclusions As this field continues to develop, clinicians and public health practitioners should consider vaccinated persons who become infected with SARS-CoV-2 to be no less infectious than unvaccinated persons. These findings are critically important, especially in congregate settings where viral transmission can lead to large outbreaks.

In April 2017, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) participated in the Gotham Shield Exercise, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and in collaboration with other federal agencies to test the federal, state and local government's ability to respond to an improvised nuclear device (IND). With active engagement from CDC leadership, 266 scientific and support staff from across the agency participated in the Gotham Shield exercise. The scenario involved a 10-kiloton detonation near the Lincoln Tunnel in New Jersey. This nuclear detonation scenario provided CDC with the opportunity to test some of the all-hazards tools the agency uses during response to other national or international emergencies, such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and mapping tools, and apply these tools to a nuclear emergency. Geospatial analysis associated with real time data can provide near real time information for individuals and entities associated with response and recovery activities. This type of analysis can provide timely data in regard to maps and information used to properly place staging areas for Community Reception Centers (CRC), mass care locations, and other medical care and countermeasure related services. Maps showing locations of power loss, such as locations of lost or inoperable main electrical grid and substations, combined with real time data on where power is available provides valuable information for first responders and emergency managers as well as responders engaged in communicating critical public messages to affected populations in these areas. By using real-time information, response officials can direct the response, allocate scarce resources, aid in coordination efforts, and provide a more efficient means of providing critical public health and medical services. The results of the exercise highlight the importance of using geospatial analysis for response planning and effect mitigation before, during, and after a public health event of this magnitude, and the value they represent in informed decision making.

Laboratory and epidemiologic data are vital to identify a novel influenza A virus and inform the public health response, whether it be to a localized outbreak or pandemic. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) developed the Pandemic Influenza Readiness Assessment (PIRA) to evaluate the state of the nation's preparedness for the next influenza pandemic. Representatives from all 62 Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) awardee jurisdictions were requested to complete the web-based questionnaire in July 2015. The PIRA consists of 7 modules covering key components of pandemic preparedness; this article summarizes results from the laboratory and epidemiology modules. Many of the jurisdictions reported they had the capacity to fulfill most of the laboratory and epidemiology tasks, including the ability to differentiate novel influenza A viruses from seasonal influenza viruses and electronically transfer laboratory, surveillance, and case investigation data. Pandemic preparedness includes transfer of electronic death records and conducting surveillance for influenza-associated mortality in adults. Although most jurisdictions self-reported that they had the epidemiologic and laboratory capabilities that were assessed, additional planning and technical assistance are needed to ensure all states and territories have and maintain all critical capacities. The results from this PIRA can inform how CDC and federal partners focus future training and outreach.

We report a fatal case of Lassa fever diagnosed in the United States in a Liberian traveler. We describe infection control protocols and public health response. One contact at high risk became symptomatic, but her samples tested negative for Lassa virus; no secondary cases occurred among health care, family, and community contacts.

Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratories help protect populations from biological and chemical public health threats. We examined the role of LRN biological laboratories in enhancing capacity to detect and respond to public health infectious disease emergencies in South Korea. The model for responding to infectious disease emergencies leverages standardized laboratory testing procedures, a repository of standardized testing reagents, laboratory testing cooperation among hospital sentinel laboratories and reference laboratories, and maintenance of a trained workforce through traditional and on-demand training. Cooperation among all network stakeholders helps ensure that laboratory response is an integrated part of the national response. The added laboratory testing capacity provided by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention LRN assets helps protect persons who reside in South Korea, US military personnel and civilians in South Korea, and those who reside in the continental United States.

The 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa highlighted the need to maintain organized laboratory systems or networks that can be effectively reorganized to implement new diagnostic strategies and laboratory services in response to large-scale events. Although previous Ebola outbreaks enabled establishment of critical laboratory practice safeguards and diagnostic procedures, this Ebola outbreak in West Africa highlighted the need for planning and preparedness activities that are better adapted to emerging pathogens or to pathogens that have attracted little commercial interest. The crisis underscored the need for better mechanisms to streamline development and evaluation of new diagnostic assays, transfer of material and specimens between countries and organizations, and improved processes for rapidly deploying health workers with specific laboratory expertise. The challenges and events of the outbreak forced laboratorians to examine not only the comprehensive capacities of existing national laboratory systems to recognize and respond to events, but also their sustainability over time and the mechanisms that need to be pre-established to ensure effective response. Critical to this assessment was the recognition of how response activities (i.e., infrastructure support, logistics, and workforce supplementation) can be used or repurposed to support the strengthening of national laboratory systems during the postevent transition to capacity building and recovery. This report compares CDC's domestic and international laboratory response engagements and lessons learned that can improve future responses in support of the International Health Regulations and Global Health Security Agenda initiatives.The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).

The 2014–2015 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic is the largest in history and represents the first time Ebola has been diagnosed in the United States. On July 9, 2014, CDC activated its Emergency Operations Center and established an Ebola clinical consultation service to assist U.S. state and local public health officials and health care providers with the evaluation of suspected cases. CDC reviewed all 89 inquiries received by the consultation service during July 9, 2014– January 4, 2015, about children (persons aged ≤18 years). Most (56 [63%]) children had no identifiable epidemiologic risk factors for Ebola; among the 33 (37%) who did have an epidemiologic risk factor, in every case this was travel from an Ebola-affected country. Thirty-two of these children met criteria for a person under investigation (PUI) because of clinical signs or symptoms. Fifteen PUIs had blood samples tested for Ebola virus RNA by reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction; all tested negative. Febrile children who have recently traveled from an Ebola-affected country can be expected to have other common diagnoses, such as malaria and influenza, and in the absence of epidemiologic risk factors for Ebola, the likelihood of Ebola is extremely low. Delaying evaluation and treatment for these other more common illnesses might lead to poorer clinical outcomes. Additionally, many health care providers expressed concerns about whether and how parents should be allowed in the isolation room. While maintaining an appropriate level of vigilance for Ebola, public health officials and health care providers should ensure that pediatric PUIs receive timely triage, diagnosis, and treatment of other more common illnesses, and care reflecting best practices in supporting children’s psychosocial needs.

There have been periodic electronic news media reports of potential bioterrorism-related incidents involving unknown substances (often referred to as white powder) since the 2001 intentional dissemination of Bacillus anthracis through the U.S. Postal System. This study reviewed the number of unknown white powder incidents reported online by the electronic news media and compared them with unknown white powder incidents reported to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during a 2-year period from June 1, 2009 and May 31, 2011. Results identified 297 electronic news media reports, 538 CDC reports, and 384 FBI reports of unknown white powder. This study showed different unknown white powder incidents captured by each of the three sources. However, the authors could not determine the public health implications of this discordance.

Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) cases continue to be reported from the Middle East. Evaluation and testing of patients under investigation (PUIs) for MERS are recommended. In 2013-2014, two imported cases were detected among 490 US PUIs. Continued awareness is needed for early case detection and implementation of infection control measures.

A new human coronavirus (CoV), subsequently named Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)-CoV, was first reported in Saudi Arabia in September 2012. In response, we developed two real-time reverse transcription-PCR (rRT-PCR) assays targeting the MERS-CoV nucleocapsid (N) gene and evaluated these assays as a panel with a previously published assay targeting the region upstream of the MERS-CoV envelope gene (upE) for the detection and confirmation of MERS-CoV infection. All assays detected ≤10 copies/reaction of quantified RNA transcripts, with a linear dynamic range of 8 log units and 1.3 × 10(-3) 50% tissue culture infective doses (TCID50)/ml of cultured MERS-CoV per reaction. All assays performed comparably with respiratory, serum, and stool specimens spiked with cultured virus. No false-positive amplifications were obtained with other human coronaviruses or common respiratory viral pathogens or with 336 diverse clinical specimens from non-MERS-CoV cases; specimens from two confirmed MERS-CoV cases were positive with all assay signatures. In June 2012, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration authorized emergency use of the rRT-PCR assay panel as an in vitro diagnostic test for MERS-CoV. A kit consisting of the three assay signatures and a positive control was assembled and distributed to public health laboratories in the United States and internationally to support MERS-CoV surveillance and public health responses.

Since early 2014, there have been more than 6,000 reported deaths from Ebola virus disease (Ebola), mostly in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. On July 9, 2014, CDC activated its Emergency Operations Center for the Ebola outbreak response and formalized the consultation service it had been providing to assist state and local public health officials and health care providers evaluate persons in the United States thought to be at risk for Ebola. During July 9-November 15, CDC responded to clinical inquiries from public health officials and health care providers from 49 states and the District of Columbia regarding 650 persons thought to be at risk. Among these, 118 (18%) had initial signs or symptoms consistent with Ebola and epidemiologic risk factors placing them at risk for infection, thereby meeting the definition of persons under investigation (PUIs). Testing was not always performed for PUIs because alternative diagnoses were made or symptoms resolved. In total, 61 (9%) persons were tested for Ebola virus, and four, all of whom met PUI criteria, had laboratory-confirmed Ebola. Overall, 490 (75%) inquiries concerned persons who had neither traveled to an Ebola-affected country nor had contact with an Ebola patient. Appropriate medical evaluation and treatment for other conditions were noted in some instances to have been delayed while a person was undergoing evaluation for Ebola. Evaluating and managing persons who might have Ebola is one component of the overall approach to domestic surveillance, the goal of which is to rapidly identify and isolate Ebola patients so that they receive appropriate medical care and secondary transmission is prevented. Health care providers should remain vigilant and consult their local and state health departments and CDC when assessing ill travelers from Ebola-affected countries. Most of these persons do not have Ebola; prompt diagnostic assessments, laboratory testing, and provision of appropriate care for other conditions are essential for appropriate patient care and reflect hospital preparedness.

Nipah virus (NiV) is a highly pathogenic paramyxovirus that causes fatal encephalitis in humans. The initial outbreak of NiV infection occurred in Malaysia and Singapore in 1998-1999; relatively small, sporadic outbreaks among humans have occurred in Bangladesh since 2001. We characterized the complete genomic sequences of identical NiV isolates from 2 patients in 2008 and partial genomic sequences of throat swab samples from 3 patients in 2010, all from Bangladesh. All sequences from patients in Bangladesh comprised a distinct genetic group. However, the detection of 3 genetically distinct sequences from patients in the districts of Faridpur and Gopalganj indicated multiple co-circulating lineages in a localized region over a short time (January-March 2010). Sequence comparisons between the open reading frames of all available NiV genes led us to propose a standardized protocol for genotyping NiV; this protcol provides a simple and accurate way to classify current and future NiV sequences.

INTRODUCTION We investigated a cluster of patients with encephalitis in the Manikgonj and Rajbari Districts of Bangladesh in February 2008 to determine the etiology and risk factors for disease. METHODS We classified persons as confirmed Nipah cases by the presence of immunoglobulin M antibodies against Nipah virus (NiV), or by the presence of NiV RNA or by isolation of NiV from cerebrospinal fluid or throat swabs who had onset of symptoms between February 6 and March 10, 2008. We classified persons as probable cases if they reported fever with convulsions or altered mental status, who resided in the outbreak areas during that period, and who died before serum samples were collected. For the case-control study, we compared both confirmed and probable Nipah case-patients to controls, who were free from illness during the reference period. We used motion-sensor-infrared cameras to observe bat's contact of date palm sap. RESULTS We identified four confirmed and six probable case-patients, nine (90%) of whom died. The median age of the cases was 10 years; eight were males. The outbreak occurred simultaneously in two communities that were 44 km apart and separated by a river. Drinking raw date palm sap 2-12 days before illness onset was the only risk factor most strongly associated with the illness (adjusted odds ratio 25, 95% confidence intervals 3.3-∞, p<0.001). Case-patients reported no history of physical contact with bats, though community members often reported seeing bats. Infrared camera photographs showed that Pteropus bats frequently visited date palm trees in those communities where sap was collected for human consumption. CONCLUSION This is the second Nipah outbreak in Bangladesh where date palm sap has been implicated as the vehicle of transmission. Fresh date palm sap should not be drunk, unless effective steps have been taken to prevent bat access to the sap during collection.

ABSTRACT Although high measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccination coverage has been successful in dramatically reducing mumps disease in the United States, mumps (re)infections occasionally occur in individuals who have been either previously vaccinated or naturally infected. Standard diagnostics that detect virus or virus-specific antibody are dependable for confirming primary mumps infection in immunologically naïve persons, but these methods perform inconsistently for individuals with prior immune exposure. We hypothesized that detection of activated mumps-specific antibody-secreting B cells (ASCs) by enzyme-linked immunospot (ELISPOT) assay could be used as a more reliable diagnostic. To test this, a time course of virus-specific ASC responses was measured by ELISPOT assay following MMR vaccination of 16 previously vaccinated or naturally exposed adult volunteers. Mumps-specific ASCs were detectable in 68% of these individuals at some point during the first 3 weeks following revaccination. In addition, mumps-specific ASCs were detected in 7/7 previously vaccinated individuals who recently had been infected as part of a confirmed mumps outbreak. These data suggest that ELISPOT detection of mumps-specific ASCs has the potential for use as an alternative method of diagnosis when suspect cases cannot be confirmed by detection of IgM or virus. In addition, it was determined that mumps-specific memory B cells are detected at a much lower frequency than measles- or rubella-specific cells, suggesting that mumps infection may not generate robust B-cell memory.

Molecular characterization of measles viruses is a valuable tool for measuring the effectiveness of measles control and elimination programmes. WHO recommends that virological surveillance be conducted during all phases of measles control to document circulation of indigenous strains and trace future importation. This report describes the genetic characterization of wild type measles viruses from Tamil Nadu, India isolated between January 2005 and January 2006. In the study, 304 suspected measles cases (292 from 56 outbreaks and 12 sporadic cases) were investigated. Blood samples were collected from suspected measles outbreaks and 11 suspected sporadic cases and tested for the presence of measles and rubella specific IgM. Based on serological results, 53 outbreaks were confirmed as measles, 2 as a combination of measles and rubella, and 1 negative for both. Eight sporadic cases were confirmed as measles and one as rubella. Throat swab and urine samples were collected for virus isolation and 28 isolates were obtained. Sequencing and analysis showed that 3 isolates belonged to genotype D4 and 25 to genotype D8. Comparison of the genotype D8 sequences from Tamil Nadu with previously reported genotype D8 sequences from India and abroad showed six distinct clusters with Tamil Nadu strains forming two clusters. This study has established baseline molecular data and is the first report that describes genetic diversity of circulating measles strains in Tamil Nadu, a state in India. D8 has multiple lineages and this has been linked with importation of measles into the USA and UK.

BACKGROUND:Despite elimination of endemic measles in the United States (US), outbreaks associated with imported measles continue to occur. In 2007, the initiation of a multistate measles outbreak was associated with an imported case occurring in a participant at an international youth sporting event held in Pennsylvania.METHODS:Case finding and contact tracing were conducted. Control measures included isolating ill persons and administering postexposure prophylaxis to exposed persons without documented measles immunity. Laboratory evaluation of suspected cases and contacts included measles serologic testing, viral culture, detection of viral RNA by reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction, and viral genotyping.RESULTS:The index case occurred in a child from Japan aged 12 years. Contact tracing among 1250 persons in 8 states identified 7 measles cases; 5 (71%) cases occurred among persons without documented measles vaccination. Epidemiologic and laboratory investigation supported a single chain of transmission, linking the outbreak to contemporaneous measles virus genotype D5 transmission in Japan. Of the 471 event participants, 193 (41%) lacked documentation of presumed measles immunity, 94 (49%) of 193 were US-resident adults, 19 (10%) were non-US-resident adults (aged >18 years), and 80 (41%) were non-US-resident children.DISCUSSION:Measles outbreaks associated with imported disease are likely to continue in the US. Participants in international events, international travelers, and persons with routine exposure to such travelers might be at greater risk of measles. To reduce the impact of imported cases, high measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine coverage rates should be maintained throughout the US, and support should continue for global measles control and elimination.