The European Union’s (EU) fishing fleet has struggled with overcapacity, which has led to overexploitation of fish stocks. Since the 2013 Common Fishery Policy (CFP) last reform, efforts to promote sustainable fisheries have resulted in healthier fish stocks and a reduction in fleet size. While EU fleets now comply with capacity limits, challenges remain, threatening sustainability and the fishing sector’s viability. Despite improvements since the reform, economic disparities and imbalances in fish resources persist. By collating expert knowledge and data analyses, this study examines if facing future challenges, such as energy transition and attracting young fishers, may require extra capacity to accommodate more efficient or alternative engines for greener fuels, and improve working conditions, in the context where country-specific capacity ceilings limiting the fishing capacity are not reached. However, current policies may limit short-term profitability of the current active fleet. At the same time, the EU fleet policy should ensure that fleet renewal, modernization, and profitability improvements, which may require additional capacity or not, alongside improved efficiency over time, do not result in an improved ability to catch fish that would exacerbate fleet imbalances, create overcapacity, or put more pressure on exploited stocks. Our findings indicate that the current EU fleet imbalance will likely worsen whenever capacity is reused, or extra capacity is granted without controlling for the ability to catch fish, and without monitoring for the right metrics beside fleet or vessels kW and GT. It appears optimistic to assume that reactivating unused fishing capacity or granting extra fishing capacity will not be used to catch even more fish. The findings aim to inform recommendations for improvement and to find applicable solutions within the EU framework, while addressing ongoing challenges in EU fisheries without compromising the fleet’s capacity to catch fish in ways that do not contribute to overcapacity and imbalance. It appears advisable that fishing capacity would best be managed at the fleet level, not reduced per individual vessel, to ensure balance with fisheries opportunities, support the energy transition, and safeguard socioeconomic resilience under the CFP.

The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), established in 1983, is the European Union’s policy for sustainable management of European fishing fleets and conservation of fish stocks. In 2002, the CFP was reformed with the objective of improving its legitimacy towards fisheries management. This involved the introduction of ‘Regionalisation’, establishing Advisory Councils (ACs) for each European sea basin. Regionalisation advanced in 2013 by setting up Member States Groups (MSGs), facilitating more tailor-made management proposals at decentralised levels. We examine whether these reforms have reached their objectives of improving the CFP’s legitimacy and effectiveness, using the concepts of input and throughput legitimacy. Results from interviews, an online survey and focus groups show that Regionalisation is considered necessary and has fulfilled most expectations (to a certain extent). European and national policy-makers were more positive than ACs. Regionalisation increased legitimacy of the CFP by giving diverse stakeholders direct access to the policy-making process. Yet, in practice stakeholders (unevenly) struggle with different aspects of participation, and clarity about the extent to which AC advice is taken on board is lacking. Improving these aspects of input and throughput legitimacy are therefore required to arrive at a truly legitimate fisheries policy. The ACs and MSGs developed under Regionalisation provide structured procedures of cooperation and dialogue. ACs have demonstrated to be crucial boundary organisations where consensus is built and mediated, information is shared, capacity is built, and knowledge is co-produced. This is crucial considering increasingly wicked problems associated with the blue economy agenda and climate change.

In a context of global changes, a foresight study is helpful to look into the future, anticipate possible scenarios and take appropriate decisions to face emerging risks for food and feed safety. Considering that an increased use of the ocean is expected for the next decades, it is essential to explore its possible impact on the safety of food and feed from the oceans. A scoping study was carried out to analyse drivers of change that may impact/promote the future uses of the ocean and its resources. From bibliographic search, different ocean uses were identified: coastal and open-sea mining, marine aquaculture, sea transport and trade, energy production and related infrastructures, fisheries, ocean crops, saline farming, desalination, extraction of bioresources, marine protected areas and conservation of the ocean. Through the information gathered in the scoping study and the input of several experts, three key ocean uses were prioritised to proceed to a participatory foresight exercise: (i) coastal and open-sea mining; (ii) marine aquaculture; and (iii) sea transport and trade. The foresight exercise produced three possible scenarios for 2050 for each prioritised use of the ocean. On the basis of these scenarios, possible implications and potential emerging issues for the safety of food and feed from the oceans were identified and characterised through bibliographic data. This document also provides a description of the methodology followed in the scoping study and in the foresight exercise, and recommendations that could help EFSA to prepare to the challenges posed by the future exploitation of ocean resources.

To effectively future-proof the management of the European Union fishing fleets we have explored a suite of case studies encompassing the northeast and tropical Atlantic, the Mediterranean, Baltic and Black Seas. This study shows that European Union (EU) fisheries are likely resilient to climate-driven short-term stresses, but may be negatively impacted by long-term trends in climate change. However, fisheries’ long-term stock resilience can be improved (and therefore be more resilient to increasing changes in climate) by adopting robust and adaptive fisheries management, provided such measures are based on sound scientific advice which includes uncertainty. Such management requires regular updates of biological reference points. Such updates will delineate safe biological limits for exploitation, providing both high long-term yields with reduced risk of stock collapse when affected by short-term stresses, and enhanced compliance with advice to avoid higher than intended fishing mortality. However, high resilience of the exploited ecosystem does not necessarily lead to the resilience of the economy of EU fisheries from suffering shocks associated with reduced yields, neither to a reduced carbon footprint if fuel use increases from lower stock abundances. Fuel consumption is impacted by stock development, but also by changes in vessel and gear technologies, as well as fishing techniques. In this respect, energy-efficient fishing technologies already exist within the EU, though implementing them would require improving the uptake of innovations and demonstrating to stakeholders the potential for both reduced fuel costs and increased catch rates. A transition towards reducing fuel consumption and costs would need to be supported by the setup of EU regulatory instruments. Overall, to effectively manage EU fisheries within a changing climate, flexible, adaptive, well-informed and well-enforced management is needed, with incentives provided for innovations and ocean literacy to cope with the changing conditions, while also reducing the dependency of the capture fishing industry on fossil fuels. To support such management, we provide 10 lessons to characterize ‘win-win’ fishing strategies for the European Union, which develop leverages in which fishing effort deployed corresponds to Maximum Sustainable Yield targets and Common Fisheries Policy minimal effects objectives. In these strategies, higher catch is obtained in the long run, less fuel is spent to attain the catch, and the fisheries have a higher resistance and resilience to shock and long-term factors to face climate-induced stresses.

The aim of this research is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the degree of participation and influence of Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF) across the European Union Atlantic Area putting forward a set of good practices and recommendations for policymakers, Non-Governmental Organisations and SSF representatives. The actual margin for enhancing the degree of influence of SSF on decision-making processes is still large. Moving towards community-based management models from the current hierarchical models is compulsory. A set of measures have been adopted in Western Waters following participatory processes, introducing self-management and co-management tools at the local and regional levels. This research goes beyond the governance model addressing issues such as the increase of influence when the final decision-makers promote a certain devolution of power to the local/regional levels carried out in parallel with reinforcing the capacity of the SSF representatives to exercise such power.

This study compares the details and performance of fisheries management between the EU and a selection of other countries worldwide: Iceland, New Zealand, and Australia, which are considered in many respects to be among the most advanced in the world in fisheries management. Fisheries management in the EU, Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand has developed following different paths, despite being based on similar instruments and principles. Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand have been at the forefront of developing management practices such as stakeholder involvement, legally binding management targets (Australia, New Zealand), individual transferable quotas, and discard bans (Iceland, New Zealand). The EU has since the beginning of the 21st century taken significant steps to better involve stakeholders and establish quantitative targets through management plans, and a landing obligation is gradually being implemented from 2015 onward. The management of domestic fisheries resources in Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland has, overall, performed better than in the EU, in terms of conservation and economic efficiency. It should, however, be stressed that, compared to Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland, (i) initial over-capacity was more of an issue in the EU when management measures became legally binding and also that (ii) EU has been progressive in developing common enforcement standards, on stocks shared by sovereign nations. The situation of EU fisheries has substantially improved over the period 2004–2013 in the northeast Atlantic, with fishery status getting close to that in the other jurisdictions, but the lack of recovery for Mediterranean fish stocks remains a concern.

A survey of past and existing management measures applied to different fisheries in European Western Waters is analyzed as a typology of co-management between governments and stakeholders. Faced with increasing constraints on accessing fish stocks, management measures have evolved toward fishing rights individualization, limited access and various other specific measures. Restrictions on access have changed fishermen's behaviour in several significant ways. A comparative analysis, based on qualitative data collected through interviews and focus groups, is developed for fisheries from the following European countries: France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom. Past and existing individual harvesting rights in the four countries are reviewed and compared.

Fisheries policy is increasingly influenced by civil society organizations. The newest example of this is the formulation of the landing obligation, a regulation that should reduce the contested practice of discarding unwanted fish. In this paper the implementation process of the landing obligation in four European countries is compared. From this comparison it becomes clear that fishers are working on diminishing discards. However it also shows that for the legitimacy, and the effectiveness of policy it is not only vital to increase the influence of civil society actors, but also the participation of resource users. Their views, knowledge, and cooperation are vital for a successful implementation of the regulation. Otherwise, resistance become too high, and regulation becomes more symbolic than a tool for change.

There is a need for effective mechanisms to be in place in order to allocate fishing possibilities. This seems crucial so that distributional concerns regarding this issue are properly addressed. This paper aims at providing insights into the allocation of fishing possibilities from Basque fisheries. We put forward this case in terms of its outcomes to the incentives deployed by the allocation system. The institutional substratum plays a key role in the outcomes of the system. In fact, the fishermen's traditional collective approach predominates even though the management system tends towards individual rights allocation and promotion of rights transferability. This is particularly notable in the case of inshore Basque fisheries.

The list of past and existing management measures applied to different fisheries developed in European Western waters is analysed from a typology of co-management between government and stakeholders. Faced with increasing constraints on accessing fish stocks, management measures have evolved toward individualisation of fishing rights, limited access and other specific management measures. Restrictions on fish stocks access have changed fishermen behaviour in several major ways. A comparative methodology, based on qualitative data collected through interviews and focus groups, is developed for fisheries commercially exploited by fishing fleets from different European countries: France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom. Past and existing individual authorisations experienced in the four countries are reviewed and compared.

The objective of fisheries management is the sustainable exploitation of the fish resources over the extent of their spatial distribution. Along with the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) objectives, the socio-economic viability of the fisheries exploiting the resource is also to be achieved. To reach these aims, managers need to define the management units they are going to work with. For the purpose of GEPETO project, we define a management unit (MU) as the set of fishing fleets exploiting a common pool of fish resources with strong spatial overlapping and sharing of habitats, which make them being typically fished together. In other words, a MU is the set of fishing fleets exploiting a common fish community over their spatial distribution. MUs have to be defined by the fish community, by the spatial range of distribution of the fish community, and by the set of fishing fleets sharing the exploitation of the fish community

For several decades it has been acknowledged that there is an urgent need for new approaches to fisheries management, embracing conservation and environmental considerations. The voluntary Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement provide the formal basis for the Precautionary Approach to fisheries management. Some tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organisations such as the WCPFC and IATTC make explicit mention of these codes in their conventions, whilst others, whose conventions do not explicitly address the Precautionary Approach, are searching for ways in which to take these codes into consideration. In practical terms, the scientific obligations to Precautionary Approaches are to determine the status of the stock(s) relative to limit and target reference points, to predict outcomes of management alternatives for reaching the targets and avoiding the limits, and to characterise the uncertainty in both cases. A convenient framework to conduct management evaluations is through the use of harvest control rules, for which managers agree on specific management actions under their control which are evoked according to levels of stock status relative to predefined reference points. These pre-agreed management actions are then simulated for a range of scenarios. This paper presents the ways in which tuna RFMOs are currently incorporating the precautionary approach in their fisheries management as well as suggestions for possible best practice.

Overcapacity is a major threat to the sustainability of tuna resources. Diverse actions are being carried out by tuna RFMOs to counteract this problem. This paper reviews and analyses both the historical development of fishing capacity management in tuna RFMOs and their state of the art practices. Despite the fact, that thus far, management measures have not yielded the expected results for capacity reduction, they provide a good basis for improved management of capacity at regional and global levels.

The Peruvian anchoveta fishery began in the early 1950s and has become one of the most important fisheries in the world in terms of landings and fishmeal production. Fisheries management in Peru has evolved from regulated open access to recently introduced individual vessel quota management. This paper aims to examine the evolution of fishing capacity management and identify the management actions that have determined the current levels of fishing overcapacity. A lack of a solid policy to stop fishing capacity accumulation together with management susceptibility to industry pressure are likely the main causes of the historical levels of overcapacity, which has recently encouraged a drastic change in the management system.

The New Zealand’s Quota Management System (QMS) is one of the first individual transferable quota systems (ITQs) and the most referred example of implementation of right-based management in fisheries. In New Zealand various groundbreaking measures on fisheries management have been introduced. New Zealand does not share resources with neighbouring countries. All fisheries are under the full jurisdiction of the government and thus no external factors have affected the QMS system since its introduction. In addition, the government’s aim of achieving economic efficiency has determined that government intervention is low. The QMS has evolved being strongly market-based although the government changed the design of the QMS in its early stages due to stock collapses and Maori claims. The QMS has allowed the introduction of mechanisms implemented to reduce management costs, that are now entirely borne by the industry and tools aiming at providing flexibility to the system such as the deemed value instrument and the annual catch entitlement (ACE). Participation is another of the major improvements of the QMS. Indeed the management process is consulted to a wide variety of stakeholders who actively participate in input giving even in scientific matters. Although the system aims at reducing government intervention, drastic decisions of fishing closures are still being taken by the government. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate New Zealand’s QMS system in terms of biological robustness, cost-effectiveness of management, economic efficiency, and social robustness. The chapter is based on two sources of information: desk studies and a field study trip.

Social robustness is a neglected but crucial component of fisheries management. We present a conceptual framework for evaluating social robustness and we apply it to the analysis of four case studies. We understand social robustness to be a combination of two factors that allow a management regime to adapt to a broad range of potential ecological, economic and political situations: acceptance by stakeholders, reflected in how they perceive and respond to management, and capacity for institutional learning, the process in which institutions change in reaction to internal or external socio-economic or ecological pressures. We apply five hypotheses about social robustness to four European case studies of innovations in fisheries management in the Baltic Sea, the Faroe Islands, the North Sea and the Western Shelf. The innovations represent a range of systems that incorporate both rights-based management, including transferable effort allocations, and participatory governance. The overall conclusions are that the innovations of the Faroe Islands and the North Sea are socially robust with relatively high degrees of stakeholder acceptance and the ability, in many situations, to institutionally learn. In the Basque fisheries, innovations seem to be socially robust with high institutional learning, but low in stakeholders’ acceptance. The Baltic innovations seem to be less socially robust compared to the other cases.