Fragen wir uns zu Beginn, warum sich Strafrechtswissenschaftler und Strafrichter in Deutschland erst jetzt intensiver für Urteilsfehler zu interessieren beginnen, über die in der Psychologie bereits seit den 70er Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts intensiv geforscht wird. Für den deutschsprachigen Raum sind uns zumindest nur wenige rechtswissenschaftlich ausgerichtete Tagungen bekannt, die sich speziell mit dieser Thematik auseinandergesetzt haben. Eine Ausnahme bildet wohl die im Mai 2004 an der FU Berlin stattgefundene 94. Dahlem Konferenz zum Thema »Heuristics and the Law« (Gigerenzer & Engel 2006), die sich aber nicht gezielt auf das Strafrecht bezog. Ein Grund für das relativ spät aufkommende Interesse von Juristen an psychologischen Erkenntnissen könnte sein, dass die grosse Anzahl an Publikationen, die sich thematisch mit Urteilsfehlern auseinandersetzt, nach den vielen Jahren kaum noch übersehen werden kann. Ein zweiter Grund könnte aber auch sein, dass in der Psychologie sowohl aus theoretischer wie empirischer Sicht zunehmend speziell auf strafrichterliche Entscheidungen Bezug genommen wird. Der vielleicht wichtigste Grund wird aber sein, dass Juristen spätestens aufgrund der Erkenntnisse des in den USA angesiedelten »Innocence Project« (Drizin & Leo 2004) das Problem von Fehlurteilen im Strafrecht nicht mehr ignorieren können. In der Sozialpsychologie gab es bereits in den 60er Jahren wichtige Erkenntnisse über Fehler, die Personen bei der Beurteilung ihrer eigenen

People report suggested misinformation about a previously witnessed event for manifold reasons, such as social pressure, lack of memory of the original aspect, or a firm belief to remember the misinformation from the witnessed event. In our experiments (N=429), which follow Loftus's paradigm, we tried to disentangle the reasons for reporting a central and a peripheral piece of misinformation in a recognition task by examining (a) the impact a warning about possible misinformation has on the error rate, and (b) whether once reported misinformation was actually attributed to the witnessed event in a later source-monitoring (SM) task. Overall, a misinformation effect was found for both items. The warning strongly reduced the misinformation effect, but only for the central item. In contrast, reports of the peripheral misinformation were correctly attributed to the misinformation source or, at least, ascribed to guesswork much more often than the central ones. As a consequence, after the SM task, the initially higher error rate for the peripheral item was even lower than that of the central item. Results convincingly show that the reasons for reporting misinformation, and correspondingly also the potential to avoid them in legal settings, depend on the centrality of the misinformation.

Distrust should automatically activate a the opposite. Thus, according to Schul, Mayo and Burnstein (2004), subjects detect antonyms of adjectives faster when confronted with untrustworthy rather than trustworthy faces. We conducted four experiments within their paradigm to test whether the response latency of detecting antonyms remains stable. We introduced the following changes: the paradigm was applied with and without an induction phase, faces were culturally adapted, the stimuli were presented according more to priming rules, and the canonicity of antonyms was controlled. Results show that the response latency of detecting antonyms is difficult to predict. Even if faces are culturally adapted and priming rules are applied more strictly, response latency depends on whether the induction phase is applied and on the canonicity of antonyms rather than on the trustworthiness of faces. In general, this paradigm seems not to be appropriate to test thinking the opposite under distrust.

We examined whether distrust (vs. neutral condition) triggers non-routine, analytical reasoning processes and improves the accuracy of deception detection. We conducted two experiments to investigate the influence of distrust on analytical thinking. In the first experiment, participants had to determine whether the reports are true or falsified. The results show that distrust improves the accuracy of detecting lies without reducing truth accuracy. Qualitative analyses of participants’ reported reasons of their veracity judgments suggest that participants under distrust rely especially on the logical consistency of arguments. In the second experiment, we tested the assumption that distrust enhances analytical reasoning more straightforward. We applied the paradigm of belief bias and expected that participants under distrust (vs. neutral condition) would rely more on logic than on plausibility in their judgment of the validity of a conclusion. The results of the second experiment strongly support the assumption that distrust triggers and fosters analytical reasoning. (150 words)

The present study investigated how ease of imagery influences source monitoring accuracy. Two experiments were conducted in order to examine how ease of imagery influences the probability of source confusions of perceived and imagined completions of natural symmetric shapes. The stimuli consisted of binary pictures of natural objects, namely symmetric pictures of birds, butterflies, insects, and leaves. The ease of imagery (indicating the similarity of the sources) and the discriminability (indicating the similarity of the items) of each stimulus were estimated in a pretest and included as predictors of the memory performance for these stimuli. It was found that confusion of the sources becomes more likely when the imagery process was relatively easy. However, if the different processes of source monitoring—item memory, source memory and guessing biases—are disentangled, both experiments support the assumption that the effect of decreased source memory for easily imagined stimuli is due to decision processes and misinformation at retrieval rather than encoding processes and memory retention. The data were modeled with a Bayesian hierarchical implementation of the one high threshold source monitoring model.

It is widely known that people utter an untruth from time to time. Our ability to detect and recognize deception and lies and, in the next step, to respond appropriately is not very far-reaching. We were interested in finding out if distrust triggers non-routine, analytical thought processes and therefore improves the detection of lies without dismissing the truth. We conducted two experiments to investigate the influence of an unconscious form of distrust on our thought processes. In the first experiment, participants had to determine whether a report is truthful or false. The aim of this second experiment was to investigate if this enhanced ability to detect a falsified report correctly is based on analytical thinking taking place. To examine our assumptions, we applied the paradigm of belief bias. The results of the second experiments strongly point out the fact that an unconscious form of distrust triggers and fosters analytical thinking.

Die vorliegende Studie untersuchte via online-Befragung den Zusammenhang zwischen Ex-Partner-Belästigung und Trennungskontext, Bindungsstil sowie Commitment. Es wurde erwartet, dass jene Männer, die von ihrer Ex-Partnerin verlassen worden sind, eher zu Belästigungsverhalten gegenüber dieser tendieren als jene, die die Beziehung selber beendet haben. Des Weiteren wurde ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen Belästigungsverhalten und ängstlicher Bindung erwartet. Schliesslich wurde erstmalig eine positive Beziehung zwischen Belästigungsverhalten und Commitment gegenüber der Beziehung postuliert. Für die Analysen wurden die Daten einer für die Universität Bern repräsentativen Stichprobe von männlichen Studenten und Doktoranden (N = 140) untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass insbesondere Commitment ein guter Prädiktor für Ex-Partner-Belästigung ist und dass der verlassene Partner zu mehr solchen stalkingähnlichen Verhaltensweisen neigt als der, der den Partner verlassen hat. Ebenfalls konnte eine Beziehung zwischen ängstlicher Bindung und Ex-Partner-Belästigung gefunden werden.

The present study investigated the correlation between post-relationship harassment, break-up context, attachment and commitment. Therefore an online questionnaire was used. Participants (N = 140) were men, being a representative sample of students at the University of Bern. It was assumed that male breakup sufferers were more likely to engage in unwanted pursuit behavior than relationship dissolvers. A positive relationship between unwanted pursuit behavior and anxious attachment was anticipated. For the first time the level of commitment was assumed to be directly proportional to unwanted pursuit behavior. Results show that breakup sufferers are more likely than relationship dissolvers to engage in stalking-like behavior. Commitment in particular is a significant predictor of unwanted pursuit behavior. A positive relationship between unwanted pursuit behavior and anxious attachment was found as well.

Introduction. Erroneous answers in studies on the misinformation effect (ME) can be reduced in different ways. In some studies, ME was reduced by SM questions, warnings, or a low credibility of the source of post-event information (PEI). Results are inconsistent, however. Of course, a participant can deliberately decide to refrain from reporting a critical item only when the difference between the original event and the PEI is distinguishable in principle. We were interested in the question to what extent the influence of erroneous information on a central aspect of the original event can be reduced by different means applied singly or in combination. Method. With a 2 (credibility; high vs. low) x 2 (warning; present vs. absent) between subjects design and an additional control group that received neither misinformation nor a warning (N = 116), we examined the above-mentioned factors’ influence on the ME. Participants viewed a short video of a robbery. The critical item suggested in the PEI was that the victim was given a kick by the perpetrator (which he was actually not). The memory test consisted of a two-forced-choice recognition test followed by a SM test. Results. To our surprise, neither a main effect of erroneous PEI nor a main effect of credibility was found. The error rates for the critical item in the control group (50%) as well as in the high (65%) and low (52%) credibility condition without warning did not significantly differ. A warning about possible misleading information in the PEI significantly reduced the influence of misinformation in both credibility conditions by 32-37%. Using a SM question significantly reduced the error rate too, but only in the high credibility no warning condition. Conclusion and Future Research. Our results show that, contrary to a warning or the use of a SM question, low source credibility did not reduce the ME. The most striking finding was, however, the absence of a main effect of erroneous PEI. Due to the high error rate in the control group, we suspect that the wrong answers might have been caused either by the response format (recognition test) or by autosuggestion possibly promoted by the high schema-consistency of the critical item. First results of a post-study in which we used open-ended questions before the recognition test support the former assumption. Results of a replication of this study using open-ended questions prior to the recognition test will be available by June.

The present research focuses on the question of whether even a preliminary decision causes a confirmation bias in order to maintain the status quo and examines individual differences in consistency between the preliminary and final decision and biased information processing. Dispositional Need for Closure (NFC, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994 ) was expected to predict revision or maintenance of the preliminary decision (decision consistency) after additional information on the issue was searched for and evaluated. Participants higher on dispositional NFC were less likely to change their preliminary decision than participants lower on dispositional NFC. Furthermore, the effect of NFC on decision consistency was fully mediated by biased information evaluation following the preliminary decision.

Aggressive behavior can be classified in hostile and instrumental aggressions (anderson & bushman, 2002). this classification is mostly synonymously used with reactive and proactive aggression, whereas the differences between hostile and instrumental aggression lie on three dimensions, the primary goal, amount of anger and planning and calculation(bushman & anderson, 2001). although there are rating instruments and experimental paradigms to measure hostile aggression, there is no instrument to measure instrumental aggression. the following study will present an account to measure instrumental aggression with an experimental laboratory paradigm. the instrument was firstly tested on two samples of normal young adolescents (n1 = 100; amage. = 19.14; n2 = 60; amage. = 21.46). the first study revealed a strong correlation with a laboratory aggression paradigm measuring hostile aggression, but no correlations with self-reported aggression in the buss and perry questionnaire. these results were replicated in a second study, revealing an additional correlation with aggressive but not adaptive assertiveness. secondly the instrument was part of the evaluation of the reasoning and rehabilitation program rr rangeage = 15-17) is compared to a no treatment control group (n=24; rangeage = 17-19) preand post- treatment. further aggressive behavior was surveyed and experimentally measured. hostile rumination, aggressive and adaptive assertiveness, emotional and social competence were included in the measurement to estimate construct validity.

Support among US citizens for severe interrogation has been recognized as drawing upon utilitarian as well as on retributive motivation (Carlsmith & Sood, 2009). Two studies were conducted to expand on these findings in a Swiss sample. In Study 1, participants rated the severity of different interrogation techniques, which were scaled to provide an alternative measure of interrogation severity. In Study 2, retributive motivation was manipulated by varying the terrorist past of a male suspect, and utilitarian motivation was manipulated by varying the probability that the suspect could provide valuable information. Additionally, we manipulated the suspect's group membership. The results of the vignette study suggest that the number and severity of recommended interrogation techniques is mainly influenced by whether the suspect might provide valuable information. Whether the suspect had a terrorist past was an additional influence that, however, was primarily attributable to the suspect's group membership: If the suspect belonged to the ingroup, participants' harsher interrogation recommendations were affected by that person's past, whereas recommendations were not significantly influenced by a terrorist past if the suspect was an outgroup member.