Going beyond the origins of cognitive biases, which have been the focus of continued research, the notion of metacognitive myopia refers to the failure to monitor, control, and correct for biased inferences at the metacognitive level. Judgments often follow the given information uncritically, even when it is easy to find out or explicitly explained that information samples are misleading or invalid. The present research is concerned with metacognitive myopia in judgments of change. Participants had to decide whether pairs of binomial samples were drawn from populations with decreasing, equal, or increasing proportions p of a critical feature. Judgments of p changes were strongly affected by changes in absolute sample size n, such that only increases (decreases) in p that came along with increasing (decreasing) n were readily detected. Across 4 experiments these anomalies persisted even though the distinction of p and n was strongly emphasized through outcome feedback and full debriefing (Experiment 1-4), simultaneous presentation (Experiments 2-4), and recoding of experienced samples into descriptive percentages (Experiment 3-4). In Experiment 4, a joint attempt was made by 10 scientists working in 7 different institutions to develop an effective debiasing training, suggesting how multilab-collaboration might improve the quality of science in the early stage of operational research designing. Despite significant improvements in change judgments, debiasing treatments did not eliminate the anomalies. Possible ways of dealing with the metacognitive deficit are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Previous research on advice taking has explained the failure to exploit collective wisdom in terms of the egocentric underweighting of advice provided by independent others. The present research is concerned with an opposite and more radical source of irrational advice taking, namely, the failure to critically assess the validity of advice due to metacognitive myopia. Participants could use the advice of one or two experts when estimating health risks. They read sketches of the study samples that experts had drawn to estimate conditional probabilities (e.g., of HIV-given drug addiction). Whether samples were valid or seriously biased, subsequent judgments were strongly affected by any advice (Experiment 1). Uncritical reliance on any advice persisted when participants were sensitized to the contrast of valid and invalid advice in a repeated measures design (Experiment 2), when participants themselves believed advice not to be valid (Experiment 3), and even after full debriefing about invalid advice (Experiment 4). Lay advice exerted a similar influence as expert advice (Experiment 5). Although these provocative results are independent of numeracy and consensus (Experiment 6), they highlight the impact of metacognitive myopia as an impediment of social rationality.

Abstract. We examined the effect of presenting unknown policy statements on German parties’ election posters. Study 1 showed that participants inferred the quality of a presented policy from knowledge about the respective political party. Study 2 showed that participants’ own political preferences influenced valence estimates: policy statements presented on campaign posters of liked political parties were rated significantly more positive than those presented on posters of disliked political parties. Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 with an additional measure of participants’ need for cognition. Need for cognition scores were unrelated to the valence transfer from political parties to policy evaluation. Study 4 replicated the findings of Studies 2 and 3 with an additional measure of participants’ voting intentions. Voting intentions were a significant predictor for valence transfer. Participants credited both their individually liked and disliked political parties for supporting the two unknown policies. However, the credit attributed to the liked party was significantly higher than to the disliked one. Study 5 replicated the findings of Studies 2, 3, and 4. Additionally, participants evaluated political clubs that were associated with the same policies previously presented on election posters. Here, a second-degree transfer emerged: from party valence to policy evaluation and from policy evaluation to club evaluation. Implications of the presented studies for policy communications and election campaigning are discussed.

We examined the effect of presenting unknown policy statements on German parties' election posters. Study 1 showed that participants inferred the quality of a presented policy from knowledge about the respective political party. Study 2 showed that participants' own political preferences influenced valence estimates: policy statements presented on campaign posters of liked political parties were rated significantly more positive than those presented on posters of disliked political parties. Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 with an additional measure of participants' need for cognition. Need for cognition scores were unrelated to the valence transfer from political parties to policy evaluation. Study 4 replicated the findings of Studies 2 and 3 with an additional measure of participants' voting intentions. Voting intentions were a significant predictor for valence transfer. Participants credited both their individually liked and disliked political parties for supporting the two unknown policies. However, the credit attributed to the liked party was significantly higher than to the disliked one. Study 5 replicated the findings of Studies 2, 3, and 4. Additionally, participants evaluated political clubs that were associated with the same policies previously presented on election posters. Here, a second-degree transfer emerged: from party valence to policy evaluation and from policy evaluation to club evaluation. Implications of the presented studies for policy communications and election campaigning are discussed.

Recent attempts to improve on the quality of psychological research focus on good practices required for statistical significance testing. The scrutiny of theoretical reasoning, though superordinate, is largely neglected, as exemplified here in a common misunderstanding of mediation analysis. Although a test of a mediation model X➔Z➔Y is conditional on the premise that the model applies, alternative mediators Z′, Z″, Z‴ etc. remain untested, and other causal models could underlie the correlation between X, Y, Z, researchers infer from a single significant mediation test that they have identified the true mediator. A literature search of all mediation analyses published in 2015 in Sciencedirect shows that the vast majority of studies neither consider alternative causal models nor alternative mediator candidates. Ignoring that mediation analysis is conditional on the truth of the focal mediation model, they pretend to have demonstrated that Z mediates the influence of X on Y. Recommendations are provided for how to overcome this dissatisfying state of affairs.

This article introduces the Conditional E-mail Response Technique (CERT) as a systematic, hidden observation technique to measure behavioral tendencies. Although CERT derives from older techniques such as lost-letter/lost-e-mail techniques, we show how CERT is unique: each participant receives several e-mails with varying content, allowing the researcher to observe response rates and valence as a function of the manipulated content. Our study investigated discrimination against foreigners in the apartment rental market in Heidelberg (a German university city) by recording lessors’ (non-) responses to 600 e-mails from fake applicants. Each owner (N = 120) received five applications for a one-room apartment via e-mail. Applicants’ ethnic identities were communicated through their names. The results showed a remarkable bias against foreign names compared to German names. The response rates for foreign applicants were almost half that for German applicants (response rates were 78% for German names compared to 44–54% for American, Italian, Russian, and Turkish names). The relative risk of a rejecting response was up to eight times higher for e-mails appearing to come from foreigners. Applicants with foreign names were noticeably more likely to receive either no response or a negative response, that is, to have a negative outcome. There were also differences among the foreign applicant groups. We discuss the implications, ethical considerations, and advantages of CERT compared to other related techniques, as well as possible future uses.

The present article is concerned with a common misunderstanding in the interpretation of statistical mediation analyses. These procedures can be sensibly used to examine the degree to which a third variable (Z) accounts for the influence of an independent (X) on a dependent variable (Y) conditional on the assumption that Z actually is a mediator. However, conversely, a significant mediation analysis result does not prove that Z is a mediator. This obvious but often neglected insight is substantiated in a simulation study. Using different causal models for generating Z (genuine mediator, spurious mediator, correlate of the dependent measure, manipulation check) it is shown that significant mediation tests do not allow researchers to identify unique mediators, or to distinguish between alternative causal models. This basic insight, although well understood by experts in statistics, is persistently ignored in the empirical literature and in the reviewing process of even the most selective journals.