The capacity to change with experience infuses our perceptions, thoughts, and actions in and about the past, present, and future. The cognitive system supporting this capacity for change can be exquisitely responsive to external events and yet can influence how those external events affect us. This interplay between the external and internal has been a major theme of my lab group's research. We proposed that the fundamental ambiguity of subjective experience requires ongoing reality monitoring processes for evaluating its veridicality and proposed a source monitoring framework for exploring the encoding, activation, and evaluation of information. We further proposed a functional architecture, a multiple-entry modular memory system, that characterizes component subprocesses of cognition that give rise to remembering and other subjective phenomena (e.g., knowledge, beliefs, emotion, consciousness, self). I first discuss these approaches and some issues they address and then describe some educational and professional experiences that provided opportunities to investigate this fascinating epistemological puzzle.

Face attractiveness can influence memory for previously seen faces. This effect has been shown to differ for young and older perceivers. Two parallel studies examined the moderation of both the age of the face and the age of the perceiver on the relationship between facial attractiveness and face memory. Study 1 comprised 29 young and 31 older participants; Study 2 comprised 25 young and 24 older participants. In both studies, participants completed an incidental face encoding and a surprise old/new recognition test with young and older faces that varied in face attractiveness. Face attractiveness affected memory for young but not older faces. In addition, young but not older perceivers showed a linear effect of facial attractiveness on memory for young faces, while both young and older perceivers showed a quadratic effect on memory for young faces. These findings extend previous work by demonstrating that the effect of facial attractiveness on face memory is a function of both the age of the perceiver and the age of the face. Factors that could account for such moderations of face and perceiver age on the associations between face attractiveness and face memory are discussed (e.g. age differences in social goals and face similarity/distinctiveness).

Previously, we demonstrated that in young adults, briefly thinking of (i.e., refreshing) a just-seen word impairs immediate (100-ms delay) perceptual processing of the word, relative to words seen but not refreshed. We suggested that such reflective-induced inhibition biases attention toward new information. Here, we investigated whether reduced accessibility of refreshed targets dissipates with a longer delay and whether older adults would show a smaller and/or delayed effect compared with young adults. Young adult and older adult participants saw 2 words, followed by a cue to refresh one of these words. After either a 100-ms or 500-ms delay, participants read a word that was the refreshed word (refreshed probe), the nonrefreshed word (nonrefreshed probe), or a new word (novel probe). Young adults were slower to read refreshed probes than nonrefreshed probes at the 100-ms, but not the 500-ms, delay. Conversely, older adults were slower to read refreshed probes than nonrefreshed probes at the 500-ms, but not the 100-ms, delay. The delayed slowing of responses to refreshed probes was primarily observed in older-old adults (75+ years). A delay in suppressing the target of refreshing may disrupt the fluidity with which attention can be shifted to a new target. Importantly, a long-term memory benefit of refreshing was observed for both ages and delays. These results suggest that a full characterization of age-related memory deficits should consider the time course of effects and how specific component cognitive processes affect both working and long-term memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

In this fMRI study, participants watched the same short video several times in separate scan runs. We used a novel cognitive task design that afforded direct, time-locked comparisons between perception and imagery-based memory recall for the same information, in contrast to other studies of audiovisual episodic memory recall in which the memory probe took place after the movie, and at a different pace. In some runs of our paradigm, participants saw and heard the full movie (audio + video, A+V); in other runs, they saw only the video and were instructed to imagine the audio from memory (0+V); and in still other runs, they heard only the audio and were instructed to imagine the video from memory (A+0). Using the DeLINEATE toolbox (http://delineate.it), we trained subject-specific deep-learning models based on a sensory cortex (visual + auditory) region of interest to discriminate whether two fMRI volumes from different runs represented the same point in time, or two different points in time. The model performed easily above chance at this task. Although classification was, as expected, best when comparing one full-movie (A+V) run to another, and video-only runs (0+V) tended to classify better than audio-only (A+0) runs, performance was high between all run-type pairs. Critically, this included comparisons between 0+V and A+0 runs, which shared no common sensory information. In fact, classification was higher on data drawn from one 0+V and one A+0 run than on data drawn from two different A+0 runs. We believe this technique provides a powerful new way to assess reinstatement of brain activity patterns in sensory regions during recall of complex, naturalistic information.

A Multiple-Entry, Modular memory (MEM) system is a process oriented approach; the primary descriptive units are cognitive actions. MEM specifies a set of actions that, working together in various combinations, have memorial consequences. The subsystems in MEM perform different functions or solve different problems they also allow more than one type of problem to be worked on more or less simultaneously. MEM offers a more fine-grained division of learning and memory than do the top-down/bottom-up and conceptually-driven/data-driven distinctions and consequently may prove more analytically useful. The language of MEM provides a means of clarifying problems with some alternative general frameworks—such as those proposing distinctions between episodic and semantic memory, between procedural and declarative memory, and between conceptual processing and data-driven processing. The terms top-down or conceptually-driven cover processing ranging across MEM’s perceptual and reflective subsystems. MEM provides a framework for understanding a wide range of mnemonic phenomena.

Using the self as a reference point at encoding produces a memory advantage over other types of encoding activities. Even simply co-presenting a target item with self-relevant versus other-relevant information can produce an "incidental" self-memory advantage in the absence of any explicit task demand to evaluate the item's self-relevancy. In the present study, we asked whether an incidental self-memory advantage results from (a) the mere co-presentation of a target item with self-relevant information at encoding or (b) relational processing between a target item and self-relevant information at encoding. During incidental encoding, words were presented in two different colors either above or below a name (the participant's own or another person's). Participants judged either the location of each word in relation to the name ("Is the word above or below the name?") or the color of each word to which the name had no relevance ("Is the word in red or green?"). In a subsequent memory test, we found a self-memory advantage for both items and their associated source features in the location judgment task but not in the color judgment task. Our findings show that a memory advantage for a target item presented with self-relevant versus other-relevant information is more likely when a task agenda places, via relational processing demands, the self-relevant/other-relevant information in the focus of attention along with the target item. Potential processes that mediate this attention-dependent effect are discussed.

This study assessed children's preference, giving, and memory to investigate the impact of social information over time. We compared 5- and 6-year-olds' (N = 144) immediate or delayed responses to an individual who does or does not share their toy preference (similar vs. dissimilar) or an individual who treats others kindly or poorly (nice vs. mean). Immediately, children all preferred the similar or nice characters but gave more stickers to the similar character. This strong initial effect of similarity was not evident after 1 week; children's preference, giving, and memory reflected a greater long-term impact of niceness than similarity. These findings highlight the importance of using multiple features and measures to elucidate children's evolving views about others.

Reality monitoring processes are necessary for discriminating between internally generated information and information that originated in the outside world. They help us to identify our thoughts, feelings, and imaginations, and to distinguish them from events we may have experienced or have been told about by someone else. Reality monitoring errors range from confusions between real and imagined experiences, that are byproducts of normal cognition, to symptoms of mental illness such as hallucinations. Recent advances support an emerging neurocognitive characterization of reality monitoring that provides insights into its underlying operating principles and neural mechanisms, the differing ways in which impairment may occur in health and disease, and the potential for rehabilitation strategies to be devised that might help those who experience clinically significant reality monitoring disruption.

Decades of research suggest that encoding information with respect to the self improves memory (self-reference effect, SRE) for items (item SRE). The current study focused on how processing information in reference to the self affects source memory for whether an item was self-referentially processed (a source SRE). Participants self-referentially or non-self-referentially encoded words (Experiment 1) or pictures (Experiment 2) that varied in valence (positive, negative, neutral). Relative to non-self-referential processing, self-referential processing enhanced item recognition for all stimulus types (an item SRE), but it only enhanced source memory for positive words (a source SRE). In fact, source memory for negative and neutral pictures was worse for items processed self-referentially than non-self-referentially. Together, the results suggest that item SRE and source SRE (e.g., remembering an item was encoded self-referentially) are not necessarily the same across stimulus types (e.g., words, pictures; positive, negative). While an item SRE may depend on the overall likelihood the item generates any association, the enhancing effects of self-referential processing on source memory for self-referential encoding may depend on how embedded a stimulus becomes in one’s self-schema, and that depends, in part, on the stimulus’ valence and format. Self-relevance ratings during encoding provide converging evidence for this interpretation.

A central question for cognitive neuroscience is how feature-combinations that give rise to episodic/source memories are encoded in the brain. Although there is much evidence that the hippocampus (HIP) is involved in feature binding, and some evidence that other brain regions are as well, there is relatively little evidence about the nature of the resulting representations in different brain regions. We used multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to investigate how feature combinations might be represented, contrasting two possibilities, feature-based versus holistic. Participants viewed stimuli that were composed of three source features - a person (face or body), a scene (indoor or outdoor), and an object (bike or luggage) - which were combined to make eight unique stimulus identities. We reasoned that regions that can classify the eight identities (a multiclass classification) but not the individual features (a binary classification) likely have a holistic representation of each identity. In contrast, regions that can classify the eight identities and can classify each feature are likely to contain feature-based representations of these identities. To further probe the extent of feature-based or holistic classification in each region, we developed and validated a novel approach that directly compares binary and multiclass classification. We found clear evidence for holistic representation in the parahippocampal cortex (PHC), consistent with theories that posit that pattern-separation-like binding mechanisms are not unique to the HIP. Further clarifying the mechanisms of feature binding should benefit from systematic comparisons of multi-feature representations and whether they vary with task, type of stimulus, and/or experience.

Achieving a mechanistic explanation of brain function requires understanding causal relationships among regions. A relatively new technique to assess effective connectivity in fMRI data is Dynamic Causal Modeling (DCM). As DCM is more frequently used, it becomes increasingly important to further validate the technique and understand its limitations. With DCM, Bayesian Model Selection (BMS) is used to select the most likely causal model. We conducted simulations to test the degree to which BMS is robust to two types of challenges when applied to DCMs, those inherent to data ( Category 1 ) and those inherent to model space ( Category 2 ). Category 1 challenges tested properties of the data (low signal-to-noise, different response magnitudes and shapes across regions) that could either blur the distinction between models or potentially bias model selection. These challenges are impossible or difficult to measure and control in real data, so investigating their effect upon BMS through simulation is critical. Category 2 challenges tested properties of model space that create subsets of confusable models. Our results suggest that given data that conform to the prior assumptions of DCM, BMS is robust to challenges from Category 1 . However, in the face of Category 2 challenges (when a more homogenous model space was tested) the false positive rate rose above an acceptable level. We show that such errors are neither trivial nor easily avoided with existing approaches. However, we argue that it is possible to detect Category 2 challenges, and avoid inappropriate interpretations by conducting simulations prior to applying DCM.DCM: Dynamic Causal ModelingBMS: Bayesian Model SelectionfMRI: functional magnetic resonance imagingBOLD: blood oxygen level dependentFMC: Family Model ComparisonHRF: hemodynamic response functionROI: region of interestSNR: signal to noise ratioR1: region 1R2: region 2U1: input 1

When children's self-interests are at odds with their moral considerations, what do they do? In the current study of 5- and 6-year-olds (N=160), we asked (a) whether children would select the offering of a do-gooder over a neutral individual at a personal cost, (b) whether they would reject the offering of a wrongdoer over a neutral individual at a personal cost, and (c) whether these two types of decisions involve comparable levels of conflict. In the absence of material considerations, children preferred a nice character to a neutral one, but this preference was easily overcome for material gain; children accepted a larger offering from a neutral source over a smaller offering from a nice source. In contrast, children's aversion to negative characters was largely unaffected by the same material consideration; they rejected a larger offering from a mean source in favor of a smaller offering from a neutral source. In addition, children's response times indicated that deciding whether or not to "sell out" to a wrongdoer for personal gain engenders conflict but that deciding whether to take a lesser gain from a do-gooder does not. These findings indicate that children weigh both their own material interests and others' social behaviors when selecting social partners and, importantly, that an aversion to wrongdoers is a more powerful influence on these choices than an attraction to do-gooders.

Reality monitoring refers to processes involved in distinguishing internally generated information from information presented in the external world, an activity thought to be based, in part, on assessment of activated features such as the amount and type of cognitive operations and perceptual content. Impairment in reality monitoring has been implicated in symptoms of mental illness and associated more widely with the occurrence of anomalous perceptions as well as false memories and beliefs. In the present experiment, the cognitive mechanisms of reality monitoring were probed in healthy individuals using a task that investigated the effects of stimulus modality (auditory vs visual) and the type of action undertaken during encoding (thought vs speech) on subsequent source memory. There was reduced source accuracy for auditory stimuli compared with visual, and when encoding was accompanied by thought as opposed to speech, and a greater rate of externalization than internalization errors that was stable across factors. Interpreted within the source monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), the results are consistent with the greater prevalence of clinically observed auditory than visual reality discrimination failures. The significance of these findings is discussed in light of theories of hallucinations, delusions and confabulation.

Episodic memory is characterized by remembering events as unique combinations of features. Even when some features of events overlap, we are later often able to discriminate among them. Here we ask whether hippocampally mediated reactivation of an earlier event when a similar one occurs supports subsequent memory that two similar but not identical events occurred (mnemonic discrimination). In two experiments, participants viewed objects (Experiment 1) or scenes (Experiment 2) during functional MRI (fMRI). After scanning, participants had to remember whether repeated items had been identical or similar. In Experiment 2, representational similarity between the 1st and 2nd presentation predicted participants' ability to remember that the presentations were different, suggesting that the first item was reactivated while viewing the second. A similar but weaker result was found in Experiment 1 that did not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Furthermore, both experiments yielded evidence that the hippocampus was involved in reactivation; hippocampal pattern similarity (and, in Experiment 2, hippocampal activity during the 2nd presentation) correlated with pattern similarity in several regions of visual cortex. These results provide the first fMRI evidence that hippocampally mediated reactivation contributes to the later memory that two similar, but different events occurred. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Background Antidepressant treatment efficacy is low, but might be improved by matching patients to interventions. At present, clinicians have no empirically validated mechanisms to assess whether a patient with depression will respond to a specific antidepressant. We aimed to develop an algorithm to assess whether patients will achieve symptomatic remission from a 12-week course of citalopram.Methods We used patient-reported data from patients with depression (n=4041, with 1949 completers) from level 1 of the Sequenced Treatment Alternatives to Relieve Depression (STAR*D; ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT00021528) to identify variables that were most predictive of treatment outcome, and used these variables to train a machine-learning model to predict clinical remission. We externally validated the model in the escitalopram treatment group (n=151) of an independent clinical trial (Combining Medications to Enhance Depression Outcomes [COMED]; ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT00590863).Findings We identified 25 variables that were most predictive of treatment outcome from 164 patient-reportable variables, and used these to train the model. The model was internally cross-validated, and predicted outcomes in the STAR*D cohort with accuracy significantly above chance (64.6% [SD 3.2]; p<0.0001). The model was externally validated in the escitalopram treatment group (N=151) of COMED (accuracy 59.6%, p=0.043). The model also performed signifi cantly above chance in a combined escitalopram-buproprion treatment group in COMED (n=134; accuracy 59.7%, p=0.023), but not in a combined venlafaxine-mirtazapine group (n=140; accuracy 51.4%, p=0.53), suggesting specifi city of the model to underlying mechanisms.Interpretation Building statistical models by mining existing clinical trial data can enable prospective identifi cation of patients who are likely to respond to a specific antidepressant.

The Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition (SARMAC) was founded in 1994 with a major purpose "to enhance collaboration and co-operation between basic and applied researchers in memory and cognition." Cognitive neuroscience presents opportunities to help actualize the SARMAC vision. The current translational zeitgeist promoted by the National Institutes of Mental Health can be seen as a call for behavioral cognitive psychologists and researchers in cognitive and clinical neuroscience to collaborate to build cumulative knowledge that will advance understanding and treatment of mental disorders. I describe some examples of connections among cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical neuroscience that are informative from my perspective as a basic researcher in cognitive psychology, and that address (but do not yet answer) some fundamental questions of clinical significance. I also note some challenges of balancing between the goals of understanding and prediction.

A Ten-Year Follow-Up of a Study of Memory for the Attack of September 11, 2001: Flashbulb Memories and Memories for Flashbulb Events William Hirst, Elizabeth A. Phelps, Robert Meksin, Chandan J. Vaidya, Marcia K. Johnson, Karen J. Mitchell, Randy L. Buckner, Andrew E. Budson, John D. E. Gabrieli, Cindy Lustig, Mara Mather, Kevin N. Ochsner, Daniel Schacter, Jon S. Simons, Keith B. Lyle, Alexandru F. Cuc, and Andreas Olsson Online First Publication, March 9, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000055

Although children's initial perceptions and judgments about sociomoral situations are being actively explored, little is known about what children remember about them. In four experiments testing over 400 children, we investigated children's memories for small acts of giving and taking. When asked to recall their own giving and taking, children were relatively accurate following a number of delays. In contrast, when asked to recall a child's giving or taking, children exaggerated the child's taking after a 1-day or 1-week delay. Notably, this pattern of misremembering occurred only when children recalled the actions of a child but not an adult. We consider the idea that children spontaneously engage in social comparison, which colors their memories of the social world.