Assessing public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) can help monitor and improve systems? capacities and capabilities. Yet, measuring preparedness is a complex process and available assessment approaches have numerous limitations. To review gaps and strengths of current assessment tools and methods, a scoping review was conducted based on peer-assessed and grey literature published between 2013 and 2019 describing PHEP assessments. A total of 32 articles were selected, the majority being assessments implemented at national level (44%, N = 14). Assessments were mainly formatted as questionnaires/surveys (41%, N = 13), followed by checklists (25%, N = 8), interviews or group discussions (16%, N = 5), and tools that extracted information directly from data sources (13%, N = 4). The most frequent analytical approach adopted in the reviewed articles was quantitative analysis (N = 16, 50%), followed by qualitative analysis (N = 12, 38%) and mixed methods (N = 3, 9%). In most of the articles the assessment results were reported by listing gaps in preparedness (N = 9, 28%), a preparedness score with defined preparedness levels/margins (N = 6, 19%) or a preparedness score with descriptive figures (N = 6, 19%). The elements of preparedness incorporated in each assessment were also reviewed in this paper, the most common domains being ?Pre-event preparation and governance? and ?Event response management?. Overall, from the reviewed articles, we identified important features and points of improvement that assessment approaches should undertake. These suggestions include the need for assessments to identify and specify appropriate stakeholders to conduct and complete the evaluation; the importance of reaching a consensus on what preparedness standards to measure; and the need for further research on minimising the biases specific to each assessment format.

Background Communities affected by infectious disease outbreaks are increasingly recognised as partners with a significant role to play during public health emergencies. This paper reports on a qualitative case study of the interactions between affected communities and public health institutions prior to, during, and after two emerging tick-borne disease events in 2016: Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever in Spain, and Tick-Borne Encephalitis in the Netherlands. The aim of the paper is to identify pre-existing and emergent synergies between communities and authorities, and to highlight areas where synergies could be facilitated and enhanced in future outbreaks. Methods Documentary material provided background for a set of semi-structured interviews with experts working in both health and relevant non-health official institutions (13 and 21 individuals respectively in Spain and the Netherlands), and focus group discussions with representatives of affected communities (15 and 10 individuals respectively). Data from all sources were combined and analysed thematically, initially independently for each country and then for both countries together. Results Strong synergies were identified in tick surveillance activities in both countries, and the value of pre-existing networks of interest groups for preparedness and response activities was recognised. However, authorities also noted that there were hard-to-reach and potentially vulnerable groups, such as hikers, foreign tourists, and volunteers working in green areas. While the general population received preventive information about the two events, risk communication or other community engagement efforts were not seen as necessary specifically for these sub-groups. Post-event evaluations of community engagement activities during the two events were limited, so lessons learned were not well documented. Conclusions A set of good practices emerged from this study, that could be applied in these and other settings. They included the potential value of conducting stakeholder analyses of community actors with a stake in tick-borne or other zoonotic diseases; of utilising pre-existing stakeholder networks for information dissemination; and of monitoring community perceptions of any public health incident, including through social media. Efforts in the two countries to build on the community engagement activities that are already in place could contribute to better preparedness planning and more efficient and timely responses in future outbreaks.

Objectives Respiratory infectious disease outbreaks pose a threat for loss of life, economic instability and social disruption. We conducted a systematic review of published econometric analyses to assess the direct and indirect costs of infectious respiratory disease outbreaks that occurred between 2003 and 2019.Setting Respiratory infectious disease outbreaks or public health preparedness measures or interventions responding to respiratory outbreaks in OECD countries (excluding South Korea and Japan) so as to assess studies relevant to the European context. The cost-effectiveness of interventions was assessed through a dominance ranking matrix approach. All cost data were adjusted to the 2017 Euro, with interventions compared with the null. We included data from 17 econometric studies.Primary and secondary outcome measures Direct and indirect costs for disease and preparedness and/or response or cost-benefit and cost-utility were measured.Results Overall, the economic burden of infectious respiratory disease outbreaks was found to be significant to healthcare systems and society. Indirect costs were greater than direct costs mainly due to losses of productivity. With regard to non-pharmaceutical strategies, prehospitalisation screening and the use of protective masks were identified as both an effective strategy and cost-saving. Community contact reduction was effective but had ambiguous results for cost saving. School closure was an effective measure, but not cost-saving in the long term. Targeted antiviral prophylaxis was the most cost-saving and effective pharmaceutical intervention.Conclusions Our cost analysis results provide evidence to policymakers on the cost-effectiveness of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies which may be applied to mitigate or respond to infectious respiratory disease outbreaks.

Background This paper describes a participatory methodology that supports investigation of the synergistic collaboration between communities affected by infectious disease outbreak events and relevant official institutions. The core principle underlying the methodology is the recognition that synergistic relationships, characterised by mutual trust and respect, between affected communities and official institutions provide the most effective means of addressing outbreak situations. Methods The methodological approach and lessons learned were derived from four qualitative case studies including (i) two tick-borne disease events (Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever in Spain, 2016, and tick-borne encephalitis in the Netherlands, 2016); and (ii) two outbreaks of acute gastroenteritis (norovirus in Iceland, 2017, and verocytotoxin-producing Escherichia coli [VTEC] in Ireland, 2018). An after-event qualitative case study approach was taken using mixed methods. The studies were conducted in collaboration with the respective national public health authorities in the affected countries by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). The analysis focused on the specific actions undertaken by the participating countries’ public health and other authorities in relation to community engagement, as well as the view from the perspective of affected communities. Results Lessons highlight the critical importance of collaborating with ECDC National Focal Points during preparation and planning and with anthropological experts. Field work for each case study was conducted over one working week, which although limiting the number of individuals and institutions involved, still allowed for rich data collection due to the close collaboration with local authorities. The methodology enabled efficient extraction of synergies between authorities and communities. Implementing the methodology required a reflexivity among fieldworkers that ackowledges that different versions of reality can co-exist in the social domain. The method allowed for potential generalisability across studies. Issues of extra attention included insider-outsider perspectives, politically sensitivity of findings, and how to deal with ethical and language issues. Conclusions The overall objective of the assessment is to identify synergies between institutional decision-making bodies and community actors and networks before, during and after an outbreak response to a given public health emergency. The methodology is generic and could be applied to a range of public health emergencies, zoonotic or otherwise.

This guidance document was developed in the context of EU Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to health, and includes findings and guidance derived from an ECDC project on community preparedness (2016–2019). This comprised of a: • a literature review • case studies on community engagement during tick-borne disease events in Spain (Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever, or CCHF) and the Netherlands (Tick-Borne Encephalitis, or TBE), and on outbreaks of acute gastroenteritis in Ireland (Verocytotoxin-producing Escherichia coli, or VTEC) and Iceland (norovirus) • an expert consultation on community engagement in public health emergency situations. The resulting empirically-derived guidance on community engagement for public health emergency preparedness is intended for public health authorities in EU/EEA Member States. The guidance is meant to provide step-by-step technical support to Member States who are initiating or professionalising their core community engagement capacity. The guidance is organised according to the three core stages of the preparedness cycle: anticipation, response, and recovery.

Recent international communicable disease crises have highlighted the need for countries to assure their preparedness to respond effectively to public health emergencies. The objective of this study was to critically review existing tools to support a country's assessment of its health emergency preparedness. We developed a framework to analyze the expected effectiveness and utility of these tools. Through mixed search strategies, we identified 12 tools with relevance to public health emergencies. There was considerable consensus concerning the critical preparedness system elements to be assessed, although their relative emphasis and means of assessment and measurement varied considerably. Several tools identified appeared to have reporting requirements as their primary aim, rather than primary utility for system self-assessment of the countries and states using the tool. Few tools attempted to give an account of their underlying evidence base. Only some tools were available in a user-friendly electronic modality or included quantitative measures to support the monitoring of system preparedness over time. We conclude there is still a need for improvement in tools available for assessment of country preparedness for public health emergencies, and for applied research to increase identification of system measures that are valid indicators of system response capability.

Background: Infectious disease outbreaks require decision makers to make rapid decisions under time pressure and situations of scientific uncertainty, and yet the role of evidence usage in these contexts is poorly understood. Aims and objectives: To define and contextualise the role of scientific evidence in the governance of infectious disease outbreaks and to identify recommendations for overcoming common barriers to evidence-informed decision making. Methods: A scoping review and an expert workshop to provide additional input into recommendations on enhancing evidence uptake during infectious disease outbreaks taking place in European settings. Findings: Forty-nine records reporting on multiple decision-making processes during infectious disease outbreaks of the past ten years were included in the study. Decision makers prioritise expert advice, epidemiological data and mathematical modelling data for risk characterisation and management, but tend to be challenged by scientific uncertainties, which allow for conflicting interpretations of evidence and for public criticism and contestation of decision-making processes. There are concrete opportunities for optimising evidence usage to improve public health policy and practice through investment in decision-making competencies, relationship building, and promoting transparent decision-making processes. Discussion and conclusions: It is not necessarily a disregard of evidence that puts a strain on decision making in health crises, but rather competing interests and the lack of clear, unambiguous and rapidly available evidence for risk characterisation and effectiveness of response measures. The relationship between science and public health decision making is relatively understudied but is deserving of greater attention, so as to ensure that the pursuit of evidence for decision making does not challenge timely and effective crisis management.

Abstract Background Communities that could be affected by infectious disease outbreaks are increasingly recognised as resources that may be effectively utilized by the authorities during public health emergencies. Methods This case study project, aiming to identify synergies between communities and authorities, was based on qualitative sources of evidence, including document and media review, stakeholder mapping, interviews and FGDs (N = 137). Four countries were selected for inclusion: Spain and the Netherlands on the basis of emerging tick-born disease incidents; Iceland and Ireland on the basis of acute gastroenteritis outbreaks. Results In the Netherlands and Spain strong synergies were identified in tick surveillance activities, and the value of pre-existing networks of interest groups for preparedness and response activities was recognised. The Icelandic norovirus event was unexpected and fast-moving, while VTEC in Ireland is a familiar and slower-burning challenge. As a relatively common disease in Ireland, VTEC-protocols are closely followed, while a generic all-hazards approach was taken in Iceland. There was considerable community support in the responses in both countries., and in Iceland community representatives also actively participated in producing institutional post-event evaluations. Conclusions An over-riding principle emerging from this study is that an informed, at-risk community understands the challenges to adopting effective preventive practices for themselves better than anyone. Additional good practices included the utilisation of pre-existing stakeholder networks for information dissemination; and of monitoring community perceptions of any public health incident, including through social media, in order to identify and manage misperceptions. Efforts to build on the community engagement activities that are already in place in the four countries could contribute to better preparedness planning and more efficient and timely responses in future outbreaks. Key messages Recognise the community as a real partner in outbreak preparedness, response, and recovery. Optimise communications with communities who may be affected by outbreaks.

In 2017, under the supervision of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), a list of competencies and knowledge and skill statements for EU professionals working in Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) systems were identified and integrated into a Competency Model. Building on these efforts, a PHEP competency-based training toolkit was developed, pilot tested and finalized with the goal of providing a standardized training resource for experts involved in response to cross-border threats to health. Led by the ECDC, an international research team drafted a preliminary version of a curriculum consisting of five modules, with a list of targeted competencies, learning objectives, reading and training methods including case studies and simulation exercises. In May 2018, the curriculum was pilot tested in a 3.5-day training course at the University of Bologna, Italy. The participants included 20 representatives from 8 EU Member States. An evaluation strategy, combining both quantitative and qualitative methods, was designed to assess the impact of the training on participants’ applied knowledge and competence. Overall, the participants’ feedback on the pilot course was positive, with scores from 4.0 to 4.8 out of 5 for all the items considered. Several suggestions were made both by the trainers and the trainees to enhance the effectiveness of the learning activities, and the curriculum was integrated into a training toolkit with more exercises, teaching materials and a guide for facilitators. This European Public Health Emergency Preparedness Training Toolkit is the first EU competency-based toolkit intended to help Member States improve their response to public health emergencies through standardized training. Designed for individuals working in strategic positions at the national level, its general approach, modular structure and content are relevant and can be tailored to a wider range of professionals. To improve PHEP in the EU, competency-based curricula and standardized training programs and resources for health professionals are needed. By enhancing the overall public health professionals’ experience and competency, the European PHEP Training Toolkit represents a step towards strengthening preparedness and response systems in the EU.

Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) commenced in April 2009. Robust planning and preparedness are needed to minimize the impact of a pandemic. This study aims to review if key elements of pandemic preparedness are included in national plans of European countries. Key elements were identified before and during the evaluations of the 2009 pandemic and are defined in this study by 42 items. These items are used to score a total of 28 publicly available national pandemic influenza plans. We found that plans published before the 2009 influenza pandemic score lower than plans published after the pandemic. Plans from countries with a small population size score significantly lower compared to national plans from countries with a big population (P <.05). We stress that the review of written plans does not reflect the actual preparedness level, as the level of preparedness entails much more than the existence of a plan. However, we do identify areas of improvement for the written plans, such as including aspects on the recovery and transition phase and several opportunities to improve coordination and communication, including a description of the handover of leadership from health to wider sector management and communication activities during the pre-pandemic phase. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2019;13:582-592)

OBJECTIVE:This literature review aimed to identify the range of methods used in after action reviews (AARs) of public health emergencies and to develop appraisal tools to compare methodological reporting and validity standards. METHODS:A review of biomedical and gray literature identified key approaches from AAR methodological research, real-world AARs, and AAR reporting templates. We developed a 50-item tool to systematically document AAR methodological reporting and a linked 11-item summary tool to document validity. Both tools were used sequentially to appraise the literature included in this study. RESULTS:This review included 24 highly diverse papers, reflecting the lack of a standardized approach. We observed significant divergence between the standards described in AAR and qualitative research literature, and real-world AAR practice. The lack of reporting of basic methods to ensure validity increases doubt about the methodological basis of an individual AAR and the validity of its conclusions. CONCLUSIONS:The main limitations in current AAR methodology and reporting standards may be addressed through our 11 validity-enhancing recommendations. A minimum reporting standard for AARs could help ensure that findings are valid and clear for others to learn from. A registry of AARs, based on a common reporting structure, may further facilitate shared learning. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2019;13:618-625).

In 2017, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) developed a competency model for individuals who work in public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) in European Union (EU) countries. The model serves as the basis for developing competency-based training programmes to support professionals in PHEP efforts at the country level. The competency model describes the knowledge and skills professionals need when working in national-level PHEP, such as preparedness committee members or their equivalents. In order to develop the model, existing competency statements were reviewed, as well as case studies and reports. Fifty-three professionals from the EU and other countries provided feedback to the model by participating in a three-stage consultation process. The model includes 102 competency, 100 knowledge and 158 skill statements. In addition to specifying the appropriate content for training programmes, the proposed common competency model can help to standardise terminology and approaches to PHEP training.

Background: EU Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border health threats provides a legal basis for collaboration between EU Member States, and between international and European level institutions on preparedness, prevention, and mitigation in the event of a public health emergency. The Decision provides a context for the present study, which aims to identify good practices and lessons learned in preparedness and response to Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) (in UK, Greece, and Spain) and poliomyelitis (in Poland and Cyprus). Methods: Based on a documentary review, followed by five week-long country visits involving a total of 61 interviews and group discussions with experts from both the health and non-health sectors, this qualitative case study has investigated six issues related to preparedness and response to MERS and poliomyelitis: national plans and overall preparedness capacity; training and exercises; risk communication; linking policy and implementation; interoperability between the health and non-health sectors; and cross-border collaboration. Results: Preparedness and response plans for MERS and poliomyelitis were in place in the participating countries, with a high level of technical expertise available to implement them. Nevertheless, formal evaluation of the responses to previous public health emergencies have sometimes been limited, so lessons learned may not be reflected in updated plans, thereby risking mistakes being repeated in future. The nature and extent of inter-sectoral collaboration varied according to the sectors involved, with those sectors that have traditionally had good collaboration (e.g. animal health and food safety), as well as those that have a financial incentive for controlling infectious diseases (e.g. agriculture, tourism, and air travel) seen as most likely to have integrated public health preparedness and response plans. Although the formal protocols for inter-sectoral collaboration were not always up to date, good personal relations were reported within the relevant professional networks, which could be brought into play in the event of a public health emergency. Cross-border collaboration was greatly facilitated if the neighbouring country was a fellow EU Member State. Conclusions: Infectious disease outbreaks remain as an ongoing threat. Efforts are required to ensure that core public health capacities for the full range of preparedness and response activities are sustained.

Improving preparedness in the European region requires a clear understanding of what European Union (EU) member states should be able to do, whether acting internally or in cooperation with each other or the EU and other multilateral organizations. We have developed a preparedness logic model that specifies the aims and objectives of public health preparedness, as well as the response capabilities and preparedness capacities needed to achieve them. The capabilities, which describe the ability to effectively use capacities to identify, characterize, and respond to emergencies, are organized into 5 categories. The first 3 categories-(1) assessment; (2) policy development, adaptation, and implementation; and (3) prevention and treatment services in the health sector-represent what the public health system must accomplish to respond effectively. The fourth and fifth categories represent a series of interrelated functions needed to ensure that the system fulfills its assessment, policy development, and prevention and treatment roles: (4) coordination and communication regards information sharing within the public health system, incident management, and leadership, and (5) emergency risk communication focuses on communication with the public. This model provides a framework for identifying what to measure in capacity inventories, exercises, critical incident analyses, and other approaches to assessing public health emergency preparedness, not how to measure them. Focusing on a common set of capacities and capabilities to measure allows for comparisons both over time and between member states, which can enhance learning and sharing results and help identify both strengths and areas for improvement of public health emergency preparedness in the EU.

The threat of serious, cross-border communicable disease outbreaks in Europe poses a significant challenge to public health and emergency preparedness because the relative likelihood of these threats and the pathogens involved are constantly shifting in response to a range of changing disease drivers. To inform strategic planning by enabling effective resource allocation to manage the consequences of communicable disease outbreaks, it is useful to be able to rank and prioritise pathogens. This paper reports on a literature review which identifies and evaluates the range of methods used for risk ranking. Searches were performed across biomedical and grey literature databases, supplemented by reference harvesting and citation tracking. Studies were selected using transparent inclusion criteria and underwent quality appraisal using a bespoke checklist based on the AGREE II criteria. Seventeen studies were included in the review, covering five methodologies. A narrative analysis of the selected studies suggests that no single methodology was superior. However, many of the methods shared common components, around which a 'best-practice' framework was formulated. This approach is intended to help inform decision makers' choice of an appropriate risk-ranking study design.

BackgroundEurope has been identified as a hot spot of infectious disease emergence, and myriad factors affect human and zoonotic pathogens.The societal impact of future disease risks will not only depend on pathogen characteristics, but also on the ability of health systems to anticipate and prepare for emerging risks.The need to identify and prioritise emerging risks has thus emerged as an important area for public health action.European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) launched a risk ranking study to identify emerging pathogens that could pose threats to the health and security of the EU. MethodsThe methodology is based on multicriteria decision analysis.Two stakeholder meetings were used to identify and refine criteria to be used in the ranking system.Seven final criteria were grouped into a risk model consisting of four categories: likelihood of pathogen emergence; magnitude of the impact; current level of health system preparedness/resilience to mitigate threats; and public perception.Expert panels were used for criteria weighting.The final list of criteria and weights was employed by multi-disciplinary panels of experts to score a wide range of infectious diseases.These scores were standardized and analysed, leading to an overall risk ranking. ResultsA novel methodology for the ranking of emerging pathogens was developed.Over 100 experts were invited to participate, representing every EU Member State.The final ranking results (to be available by September, 2015) enables prioritisation of emerging infectious disease threats. ConclusionsIn a rapidly changing world and in situations of incomplete information, sourcing expert knowledge for prioritising public health action may become an increasingly integral component of preparedness planning.Aside from the results of risk ranking studies, the process, which engages multiple disciplines and stakeholders, is an equally and increasingly important component of public health work in the 21st century.

Infectious diseases can constitute public health emergencies of international concern when a pathogen arises, acquires new characteristics, or is deliberately released, leading to the potential for loss of human lives as well as societal disruption. A wide range of risk drivers are now known to lead to and/or exacerbate the emergence and spread of infectious disease, including global trade and travel, the overuse of antibiotics, intensive agriculture, climate change, high population densities, and inadequate infrastructures, such as water treatment facilities. Where multiple risk drivers interact, the potential impact of a disease outbreak is amplified. The varying temporal and geographic frequency with which infectious disease events occur adds yet another layer of complexity to the issue. Mitigating the emergence and spread of infectious disease necessitates mapping and prioritising the interdependencies between public health and other sectors. Conversely, during an international public health emergency, significant disruption occurs not only to healthcare systems but also to a potentially wide range of sectors, including trade, tourism, energy, civil protection, transport, agriculture, and so on. At the same time, dealing with a disease outbreak may require a range of critical sectors for support. There is a need to move beyond narrow models of risk to better account for the interdependencies between health and other sectors so as to be able to better mitigate and respond to the risks posed by emerging infectious disease.

PROBLEMImproving pandemic planning and preparedness is a challenge in Europe, a diverse region whose regional bodies (the Regional Office for Europe of the World Health Organization [WHO], the European Commission and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control) have overlapping roles and responsibilities.APPROACHEuropean pandemic preparedness indicators were used to develop an assessment tool and procedure based on the 2005 global WHO checklist for pandemic preparedness. These were then applied to Member States of WHO's European Region, initially as part of structured national assessments conducted during short visits by external teams.LOCAL SETTINGCountries in WHO's European Region.RELEVANT CHANGESFrom 2005 to 2008, 43 countries underwent a pandemic preparedness assessment that included a short external assessment visit by an expert team. These short visits developed into a longer self-assessment procedure involving an external team but "owned" by the countries, which identified gaps and developed plans for improving preparedness. The assessment tool and procedure became more sophisticated as national and local pandemic preparedness became more complex. The 2009 pandemic revealed new gaps in planning, surveillance communications and immunization.LESSONS LEARNTStructured national self-assessments with support from external teams allow individual countries to identify gaps in their pandemic preparedness plans and enable regional bodies to assess the regional and global resources that such plans require. The 2009 pandemic revealed additional problems with surveillance, pandemic severity estimates, the flexibility of the response, vaccination, involvement of health-care workers and communication. European national plans are being upgraded and global leadership is required to ensure that these plans are uniformly applied across the region.