This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation into people's evaluations of choice problems that are strategically equivalent, but differ in respect of their temporal framings. We elicit individual valuations for three strategically equivalent choice problems, which differ in terms of their framing and the timing of the decision. This allows us to begin to understand how people view dynamic decision problems and how they tackle them. This research is complementary to earlier experimental work of others, which suggests that the temporal frame of a dynamic decision problem may well influence the decisions that are taken. We show that the framing affects also some people's evaluation of the problem. We combine these findings with the earlier findings to relate the two issues: the evaluations and the decisions. This helps us get some insight into the thought processes of dynamically inconsistent people.

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation into whether people solve dynamic decision problems using the strategy method or the method of backward induction. Of course, if people have Expected Utility preferences these methods yield the same plans. Our experimental results suggest that whilst people may have Expected Utility preferences (in terms of their evaluation of static decision problems) their approach to dynamic decision problems implies that they are not indifferent to the timing of their decision-making. Indeed they seem to prefer not to commit themselves to future decisions, even though strategically nothing of consequence hangs on the pre- commitment decision. This suggests that the temporal framing of a decision problem is crucial to its resolution. This has important implications for a whole host of economic dynamic decision problems.

Timing-independence implies that individuals are indifferent between a sequential choice problem and a planned choice problem which are strategically equivalent except for the timing of resolution of the uncertainty. This paper reports an experiment in which we investigate whether the timing of resolution of the uncertainty affects individual preferences. We elicit individual preferences for three strategically equivalent decisions problems. The experimental results suggest that timing-independence is an inappropriate assumption of individual preferences. The paper discusses possible implications of such findings.