Economic experiments related to biodiversity conservation policies provide valuable insights into how individuals respond to specific policy designs. However, they provide limited guidance on how to design cost-effective conservation policies at the landscape level. Ecological-economic models - integrating ecological dynamics with economic decision-making in optimization procedures - are well-suited to this purpose. Yet they nearly always assume purely profit-maximizing behaviour, overlooking deviations from this behaviour observed in practice. Our methodological aim is to combine these two approaches by incorporating behavioural data from a charitable-giving based laboratory experiment with student participants into an established decision-support software based on an ecological-economic model. We empirically explore how pro-environmental motives might influence participation in agri-environment schemes (AES) through decision support software applied to meadow bird conservation. Adjusting the modelling procedure to reflect intrinsic motives, we compare outcomes with those generated under standard profit-maximization assumption. The results indicate that while behavioural motives can increase participation, their overall impact on cost-effective AES design recommendations remain modest.

We experimentally investigate the effect of the incentives provided by different allocations of liability in the case of (semi)autonomous devices which are a source of risk of accident. Considering three key agents, an AI provider (scientist), a producer, and a consumer, we look at the effect of different liability-sharing rules on the decision-making of each type of agent. We show that assigning liability to the scientist and to the producer is effective in reducing their misbehavior. We also find that assigning liability to the consumer increases her incentive to control the risk of accident in the case of semi-autonomous devices. However, the absence of consumer control (fully autonomous device), coupled with the assignment of liability, decreases the consumer's propensity to buy the good in the first place. We complete our study with a social welfare analysis which highlights the importance of assigning liability to the producer so that the consumer can have greater confidence in the technology, especially in the case of fully autonomous devices.

In this paper, we present estimates of the effect of different care settings on health and well- being outcomes. We use data from the French CARE Survey, which interviews individuals aged 60 and above, to assess the differential effect of living at home or in a nursing home on mortality, morbidity and well-being indicators. In addition, we differentiate the effect between for-profit and non-profit nursing homes. To do so, we apply a propensity score matching approach that controls for selection on observables by matching people living at home with those living in nursing homes. Our results are threefold. First, we observe a positive effect of being in a nursing home on health outcomes but a negative effect on other well-being indicators such as happiness and nervousness. Second, the ownership status of the nursing home matters and the positive effect is stronger for non-profit and public nursing homes. Third, residents in for-profit nursing homes appear to to be worse off than those in nonprofit institutions. These findings raise important questions for the future organization and the funding of long-term care.

Over the years, the Belgian social security system has undergone substantial reform with a prime focus on increasing older worker labor force participation. The paper explores the effect of past reforms on inequality in old age. We distinguish two separate effects: The mechanical effect considers the change in inequality and expected benefit levels due to the reforms for a fixed retirement age distribution. The behavioral effect accounts for the endogenous change caused by changes in the incentives to work. Our results show that mechanically, reforms have led to losses in expected benefits for all but the lowest income quintile. Behavioral changes had a positive but orders of magnitude smaller effect. Overall, inequality decreased as a result of reforms.

The phenomenon of grandparents assuming the role of caretakers for their grandchildren is substantial and on the rise; a trend partially attributed to mothers’ increased participation in the workforce. While altruism is commonly assumed to be the primary driver behind such caregiving, we examine an additional motivation: the expectation among grandparents that they will receive care from their offspring in the event of their own incapacity. This study investigates this hypothesis from theoretical and empirical perspectives. Initially, we construct a theoretical framework, delineating a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium model wherein the grandparent first commits to caring for the grandchild, followed by anticipation of receiving care from their adult child in disability scenarios. Subsequently, we empirically test the feasibility of this model by analysing data sourced from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. Our results confirm that elderly parents who cared for their grandchildren received more support from their children in the case of a loss of autonomy.

Declining labor force participation of older men throughout the 20th century and recent increases in participation have generated substantial interest in understanding the effect of public pensions on retirement. The National Bureau of Economic Research's International Social Security (ISS) Project, a long-term collaboration among researchers in a dozen developed countries, has explored this and related questions. The project employs a harmonized approach to conduct within-country analyses that are combined for meaningful cross-country comparisons. The key lesson is that the choices of policy makers affect the incentive to work at older ages and these incentives have important effects on retirement behavior.

Cet article a pour objectif, dans le cadre d’une expérience en classe sur le dilemme du voyageur, de montrer l’impact comportemental de la connaissance commune de la valeur des bagages égarés. Cette valeur agit comme un point focal qui canalise le comportement des étudiants dans le rôle des voyageurs. Nous commentons son impact sur le raisonnement des étudiants et sur la structure du jeu. Puis nous construisons un nouveau jeu qui modèle cet impact et nous en analysons l’équilibre de Nash. Classification JEL : C72.

Given that poor individuals face worse survival conditions than non-poor individuals, one can expect that a steeper income/mortality gradient leads, through stronger income-based selection, to a lower poverty rate at the old age (i.e. the “missing poor” hypothesis). This paper uses U.S. state-level data on poverty at age 65+ and life expectancy by income levels to provide an empirical test of the missing poor hypothesis. Using air pollution as an instrument for mortality differentials, we show that instrument changes in mortality differentials have a negative and statistically significant effect on old-age proverty: A 1 % increase in the mortality differential implies a 9 % decrease in the 65+ headcount poverty rate. Using those regression results, we compute hypothetical old-age poverty rates while neutralizing the impact of the income/mortality gradient, and show that correcting for heterogeneity in income-based selection effects modifies the comparison of old-age poverty prevalence across states.

This paper investigates the effect of introducing a European unemployment insurance scheme (EMU-UI) on the labour supply and income distribution in the Eurozone countries. We simulate various reform scenarios based on structural estimation of the labour supply and using the European tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD. The results show that the labour supply response to the introduction of an EMU-UI differs substantially across countries and depends on the design of the EMU-UI. We find that a flat EMU-UI scheme implies a strong work disincentive but reduces poverty. On the contrary, a fully contribution-related EMU-UI system limits much more the distortions on the labour market in most countries but has limited effects on poverty and inequality. An EMU-UI with a common replacement rate, articulated with floor and ceiling amounts, would allow for upward convergence as it would strongly reduce poverty and inequality in several countries while not inducing substantial labour supply reduction.

This paper presents a classroom experiment on the Traveler's Dilemma in order to show the impact of the common knowledge of the value of the luggage. This value becomes a focal point that canalizes the behavior of the students. This leads us to commenting on the impact of such focal points both on the reasoning of the players and on the structure of the game. We construct a new game which models this impact and we study its Nash equilibrium.

In Belgium, a series of social security reforms have been implemented over the years with the overarching goal of increasing the labor force participation through better work incentives. Using individual-level administrative data, the paper studies the impact of those incentive-based reforms on observed changes in older workers’ employment patterns. We investigate how social security incentives and particularly their changes over time can explain the retirement decision. We calculate indicators of benefit entitlement and derive retirement incentive measures. Using micro-estimation techniques, we find that more generous retirement provision contribute to earlier retirement. Counterfactual reform simulations show strongly incentivizing effects at lower ages and more mixed results at higher ages – particularly for men.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

How does the mother’s labour supply affect the household’s demand for childcare? And thus are formal and informal childcare substitutable? In this paper, we address these two questions using micro-data for 14 European countries observed over the period between 2010 and 2017. Relying on a Control Function Approach to account for the endogeneity between childcare and the mothers’ labour supply, we identify different factors affecting the demand for formal and informal childcare. The results show that the mother’s labour supply is a key element in understanding the demand for childcare and suggest that the more the mother participates in the labour market, the higher the household’s demand for childcare services. Moreover, our results support the substitutability hypothesis between formal and informal childcare. Policymakers aiming to promote mothers’ employment should increase the availability of formal childcare services, as this will increase labour supply by mothers and reduce the use of informal care arrangements.

We investigate whether and how an individual giving decision is affected in risky environments in which the recipient’s wealth is random. We demonstrate that, under risk neutrality, the donation of dictators with a purely ex post view of fairness should, in general, be affected by the riskiness of the recipient’s payoff, while dictators with a purely ex ante view should not be. Furthermore, we observe that some influential inequality aversion preferences functions yield opposite predictions when we consider ex post view of fairness. Hence, we report on dictator games laboratory experiments in which the recipient’s wealth is exposed to an actuarially neutral and additive background risk. Our experimental data show no statistically significant impact of the recipient’s risk exposure on dictators’ giving decisions. This result appears robust to both the experimental design (within subjects or between subjects) and the origin of the recipient’s risk exposure (chosen by the recipient or imposed on the recipient). Although we cannot sharply validate or invalidate alternative fairness theories, the whole pattern of our experimental data can be simply explained by assuming ex ante view of fairness and risk neutrality.

We experimentally investigate the impact of information disclosure on managing common harms that are caused jointly by a group of liable agents. Subjects interact in a public bad setting and must choose ex ante how much to contribute in order to reduce the probability of causing a common damage. If a damage occurs, subjects bear a part of the loss according to the liability-sharing rule in force. We consider two existing rules: a per capita rule and a proportional rule. Our aim is to analyze the relative impact of information disclosure under each rule. We show that information disclosure increases contributions only under a per capita rule. This result challenges the classical results regarding the positive effects of information disclosure, since we show that this impact may depend upon the legal context. We also show that while a proportional rule leads to higher contributions than a per capita one, the positive effect of disclosure on a per capita rule makes it as efficient as a proportional rule without information disclosure.

Tests of labor supply models often rely on wages. However, wage variation alone generally cannot disentangle the classical time separable model and its extensions: reference dependent preferences (income targeting) and time nonseparable preferences (disutility spillovers; timing -specific preferences). We set up a novel laboratory experiment in which individuals choose their working time. We vary, independently, wages, historical income paths, and cumulative past work. We also vary the timing of experimental sessions. Statistical tests and stochastic revealed preference methods cannot reject the classical model in favor of income targeting or disutility spillovers, but the data suggest that labor supply varies by time-of-the-day.

The current health crisis has particularly affected the elderly population. Nursing homes have unfortunately experienced a relatively large number of deaths. On the basis of this observation and working with European data (from SHARE), we want to check whether nursing homes were lending themselves to excess mortality even before the pandemic. Controlling for a number of important characteristics of the elderly population in and outside nursing homes, we conjecture that the difference in mortality between those two samples is to be attributed to the way nursing homes are designed and organized. Using matching methods, we observe excess mortality in Sweden, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Czech Republic and Estonia but not in the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, France, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain. This raises the question of the organization and management of these nursing homes, but also of their design and financing.

Under income-differentiated mortality, poverty measures suffer from a selection bias: they do not count the missing poor (i.e., persons who would have been counted as poor provided they did not die prematurely). The Pre-Industrial period being characterized by an evolutionary advantage (i.e., a higher number of surviving children per household) of the non-poor over the poor, one may expect that the missing poor bias is substantial during that period. This paper quantifies the missing poor bias in Pre-Industrial societies, by computing the hypothetical headcount poverty rates that would have prevailed provided the non-poor did not benefit from an evolutionary advantage over the poor. Using data on Pre-Industrial England and France, we show that the sign and size of the missing poor bias are sensitive to the degree of downward social mobility.

Through a series of experiments, this paper tests the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows us to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to four treatments of the same game in which we successively introduce a persuasion message, commitment devices, and communication between subjects. Our results suggest that these non-monetary procedures significantly increase cooperation and reduce the decay of contributions across periods.