To meet increasing combatant command demands for forces, the United States Marine Corps deploys task-organized provisional units. Their temporary nature and provisional missions are at odds with the way the Marine Corps normally deploys units. A lack of specific policy to validate and manage resources used by these units causes many problems. To mitigate provisional unit equipping challenges, a multipronged approach is the best course of action.

As conflicts increasingly involve joint operations, joint training becomes more important. Much of it must be simulation-based training (SBT) conducted on systems that allow the services to interoperate. But commercial SBT systems do not always align with military needs, and the services face coordination challenges. The authors of this report examine the gap between joint training needs and current and future resources and offer recommendations.

Army collective SBT uses physically simulated military equipment (PSME) or virtual military equipment (VME) • PSME approaches, such as CCTT and AVCATT, attempt to replicate the physical environment, controls, and sensory cues of an actual tank or aircraft. PSME development, use, and maintenance are expensive, and soldiers’ access to PSME equipment may be limited. • VME uses personal computers and other equipment in ways similar to commercial first-person-shooter games. These have less physical realism but are easier and less expensive to operate, maintain, and upgrade and are more accessible to soldiers, allowing for more practice.

Company leaders in the U.S. Army have long been recognized as overworked, partly because of the number of requirements imposed on them by higher headquarters. This report is intended to help the Army identify ways to reduce and manage the time burdens on Active Component company leaders in garrison by addressing the challenges of reducing time burdens at both organizational and individual worker levels.

The U.S. Army uses various virtual systems to help soldiers learn, practice, and demonstrate proficiency in collective skills. This report examines the fidelity of virtual systems to train U.S. Army platoon- and company-level collective skills and estimates the costs and effectiveness of using simulators with different degrees of fidelity for collective training.

This chapter describes an in-depth analysis of the errors made by novice programmers learning to write programs in a language called SOLO. It then analyzes the underlying causes of these errors, based upon in-depth analyses of session transcripts. The relative importance of different types of error is very hard to assess, particularly across different languages, programmer skill levels, and types of programming environment. The trap philosophy allows the user to enter nearly-correct lines of a program, and then relies on the user-interface to make sense of obvious errors. J. B. H. duBoulay looked in depth at programming errors made by school teachers learning the language LOGO. Naturally, users of interactive computing environments, especially beginners, are destined to make some mistakes. Semantic and conceptual errors can be characterized by the presence of ill-formed plans in a programmer's emerging repertoire of skills.

Three severe and very different storms developed across northern England on 1 July 2015 during a short‐lived hot spell. These events are analysed using a mixture of traditional data sources, as well as the improved UK radar capability and the public crowdsourcing of data, which itself could have a powerful role in future nowcasting. The first storm developed during early afternoon from an area of medium‐level instability, resulting in strong straight‐line winds and localised flash flooding in northeast England. The second storm was rooted to the boundary layer and, from analysis of social media reports, produced a 130km swathe of large hail. Subsequent radar analysis showed this storm to have acquired characteristics of a supercell. Despite the loss of daytime heating, further thunderstorms developed across northwest England later in the evening, albeit rooted to a layer above the boundary layer. However, these storms still produced large hail and frequent lightning, with radar analysis showing the development of a rare elevated supercell.

Abstract : In response to readiness problems in Army reserve component (RC) units mobilized for Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991, Congress passed legislation establishing requirements for RC personnel and training and active component support to RC units. Since then, Army policies and organizations supporting RC training have evolved to meet rotational demands for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they continue to evolve as these operations come to an end and defense budgets decline. This report examines the congressional intent underlying existing law, the Army s recent experience preparing RC units for deployments, and its future plans for RC training requirements and training support. It recommends changes to law and policy needed to support future RC training plans. This research suggests that premobilization training should focus on individual soldier qualifications and collective training at the crew, squad, and platoon levels, particularly for combat units. In addition, the Army should maintain a multicomponent RC training support structure to ensure that training standards do not diverge across components. Furthermore, some provisions of existing legislation no longer reflect the current operating environment, although others remain relevant.

: The Army owns and operates a large fleet of wheeled combat and support vehicles, divided into three categories: heavy, medium, and light tactical vehicles. It also often uses ground mobility capabilities that are not formally identified in any of the categories, such as all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles, as well as some continuing use of pack animals. These vehicles are informally classified as ultra-light tactical mobility (UTM). Most recently, forces in Afghanistan have used several types of UTM, to include ATVs and pack animals. In April 2014 Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) initiated a plan to develop established sets of UTM vehicles for airborne forces. Given the persistent use of UTM currently and throughout the Army's history, a more detailed examination is warranted to determine whether the Army should formally acquire and equip units with such vehicles. This report assesses the unvalidated needs (demands), validated needs (requirements), current ad hoc capabilities, and key considerations for developing and sustaining formal Army UTM fleets. The various potential UTM investments and applications do not provide equal opportunity to improve current and future Army operations. Furthermore, the threats and risks associated with some UTM applications make their use in combat less likely and investments in them harder to justify. This report identifies and assesses various potential methods for Army development of UTM capabilities. The Army should consider likely impact, risks and threats, and emerging technologies when prioritizing the employment methods, or Tactical Activities, described in this report to address with UTM program investments.

The results of the Teach For America (TFA) 2015 National Principal Survey show the context in which TFA corps members work, how principals perceive corps members, and how principals perceive their interactions with TFA.

EQUITY IN COMPETENCY EDUCATION: REALIZING THE POTENTIAL, OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES Equity is both a central goal and fundamental value of competency education. Competency-based approaches are designed to promote equity by preventing students from falling behind or staying behind. Traditional models require all learners to spend the same amount of “seat time” in class and often allow them to advance with a wide range of grades indicating anything from mastery to large gaps in knowledge and skills. However, in competency education systems, students progress at different rates and only by demonstrating mastery of learning objectives aligned with state standards. All students are held to the same high expectations, but instruction is individualized to meet each person’s strengths and challenges.

Competency-based education meets students where they are academically, provides students with opportunities for choice, and awards credit for evidence of learning, not for the time students spend studying a subject. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation asked RAND to evaluate three competency-based education grants in terms of implementation, students' experiences, and student performance.

In 2011, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation extended grants to three organizations involved with competency-based education approaches. RAND examined these organizations' implementation, student experiences, and student outcomes.