We analyze the flow of money between mutual fund categories, finding strong evidence of seasonality in investor risk aversion. Aggregate investor flow data reveal an investor preference for safe mutual funds in autumn and risky funds in spring. During September alone, outflows from equity funds average $13 billion, controlling for previously documented flow determinants (e.g., capital-gains overhang). This movement of large amounts of money between fund categories is correlated with seasonality in investor risk aversion, consistent with investors preferring safer (riskier) investments in autumn (spring). We find consistent evidence in Canada and also in Australia, where seasons are offset by 6 months.

It is commonly believed that women are more likely to seek advice than men; for example, on aspects of health or asking for directions when lost. This paper investigates whether women's relatively greater propensity for advice seeking extends to important business decisions, specifically those involving corporate takeovers. Consistent with the evidence from other contexts, we show that the presence of female directors on target boards is positively and significantly associated with target boards seeking advice from top-ranked financial advisors. In contrast, we do not observe any significant association between the presence of female directors on bidder boards and their engagement of top-ranked financial advisors. We argue that the presence of a gender effect for target boards but not for bidder boards is consistent with less overconfident female versus male directors on bidder boards initiating fewer bids, higher litigation risk facing target boards for accepting too little, and the different type of advice sought by bidders and target firms.

It is commonly believed that women are more likely to seek advice than men; for example, on aspects of health or asking for directions when lost. This paper investigates whether women’s relatively greater propensity for advice seeking extends to important business decisions, specifically those involving corporate takeovers. Consistent with the evidence from other contexts, we show that the presence of female directors on target boards is positively and significantly associated with target boards seeking advice from top-ranked financial advisors. In contrast, we do not observe any significant association between the presence of female directors on bidder boards and their engagement of topranked financial advisors. We argue that the presence of a gender effect for target boards but not for bidder boards is consistent with less overconfident female versus male directors on bidder boards initiating fewer bids, higher litigation risk facing target boards for accepting too little, and the different type of advice sought by bidders and target firms.

We document an annual cycle in U.S. Treasuries, with variation in mean monthly returns of over 80 basis points from peak to trough. This seasonal Treasury return pattern does not arise due to macroeconomic seasonalities, seasonal variation in risk, cross- hedging between equity and Treasury markets, conventional measures of investor sentiment, the weather, seasonalities in the Treasury market auction schedule, seasonalities in the Treasury debt supply, seasonalities in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cycle, or peculiarities of the sample period considered. Rather, it is correlated with a proxy for variation in risk aversion linked to seasonal mood changes. Such a model can explain more than sixty percent of the average seasonal variation in monthly Treasury returns. The White (2000) reality test suggests this is not data snooping.

We investigate an asset pricing model with preferences cycling between high risk aversion and low EIS in fall/winter and the reverse in spring/summer. Calibrating to consumption data and allowing plausible preference parameter values, we produce returns that match observed equity and Treasury returns across the seasons: risky returns are higher and risk-free returns are lower or stable in fall/winter, and they reverse in spring/summer. Further, risky returns vary more than risk-free returns. A novel finding is that both EIS and risk aversion must vary seasonally to match observed returns. Further, the degree of necessary seasonal change in EIS is small.

Does director gender influence CEO empire building? Does it affect the bid premium paid for target firms? Less overconfident female directors less overestimate merger gains. As a result, firms with female directors are less likely to make acquisitions and if they do, pay lower bid premia. Using acquisition bids by S&P 1500 companies during 1997–2009 we find that each additional female director is associated with 7.6% fewer bids, and each additional female director on a bidder board reduces the bid premium paid by 15.4%. Our findings support the notion that female directors help create shareholder value through their influence on acquisition decisions. We also discuss other possible interpretations of our findings.

In a 2011 reply to our 2010 comment in this journal, Berument and Dogen maintained their challenge to the existence of the negative daylight-saving effect in stock returns reported by Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi in 2000. Unfortunately, in their reply, Berument and Dogen ignored all of the points raised in the comment, failing even to cite the Kamstra, et al. comment. Berument and Dogen continued to use inappropriate estimation techniques, over-parameterized models, and low-power tests and perhaps most surprisingly even failed to replicate results they themselves reported in their previous paper, written by Berument, Dogen, and Onar in 2010. The findings reported by Berument and Dogen, as well as by Berument, Dogen, and Onar, are neither well-supported nor well-reasoned. We maintain our original objections to their analysis, highlight new serious empirical and theoretical problems, and emphasize that there remains statistically significant evidence of an economically large negative daylight-saving effect in U.S. stock returns. The issues raised in this rebuttal extend beyond the daylight-saving effect itself, touching on methodological points that arise more generally when deciding how to model financial returns data.

International commodity market arbitrage is generally based on moving the commodity between countries to exploit price differences, making allowance for exchange rates. This form of arbitrage is clearly impossible for services and immobile objects such as real estate. However, there is the possibility of another form of arbitrage when the buyer can move to the product in order to enjoy what it offers. Such a situation is possible in the international market for recreational properties such as exclusive mountain ski resorts and oceanfront estates. By constructing repeat sales indices for several such markets, we show that prices of internationally traded properties differ from prices of local properties in terms of the impact of exchange rates. Rising values of a country's currency dampen local currency prices of internationally-traded properties relative to domestic properties, and vice versa. We also find that relative prices of similar international properties in different countries vary with exchange rates. Overall, we show there is a significant long-term equilibrium relationship between relative prices and exchange rates.

In questioning Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi’s (2003) finding of an economically and statistically significant seasonal affective disorder (SAD) effect, Kelly and Meschke (2010) make errors of commission and omission. They misrepresent their empirical results, claiming that the SAD effect arises due to a “mechanically induced” effect that is non-existent, labeling the SAD effect a “turn-of-year” effect (when in fact their models and ours separately control for turn-of-year effects), and ignoring coefficient-estimate patterns that strongly support the SAD effect. Our analysis of their data shows, even using their low-power statistical tests, there is significant international evidence supporting the SAD effect. Employing modern, panel/time-series statistical methods strengthens the case dramatically. Additionally, Kelly and Meschke represent the finance, psychology, and medical literatures in misleading ways, describing some findings as opposite to those reported by the researchers themselves, and choosing selective quotes that could easily lead readers to a distorted understanding of these findings.

This paper finds that the number of CEOs born in June and July is disproportionately small relative to the number of CEOs born in other months. Our evidence is consistent with the “relative-age effect” due to school admissions grouping together children with age differences up to one year, with children born in June and July disadvantaged throughout life by being younger than their classmates born in other months. Our results suggest that the relative-age effect has a long-lasting influence on career success.

International commodity market arbitrage and its corollary, the law of one price, are generally based on moving the commodity between markets to exploit price differences, making allowance for prevailing exchange rates. This form of arbitrage is clearly impossible for services and immobile objects such as real estate. However, there is the possibility of another form of arbitrage when the buyer can move to the object instead of the object moving to the buyer. Such a situation is possible for the market for international real estate such as recreational properties in exclusive mountain ski resorts and oceanfront estates. By constructing repeat sales indices for several such markets, we find that the price dynamics of international properties differs from local properties in terms of the impact of exchange rates. We show there is a significant long-term equilibrium relationship between the levels of relative prices and exchange rates. Rising values of a country's currency dampen local currency prices of internationally-traded properties relative to domestic properties, and vice versa. Lastly, we provide direct evidence in support of the law of one price for the case of international real estate.

Technology today permits all payments to be made electronically. As a result, the economy can easily function without currency and coins. This paper shows the consequences of eliminating these media of exchange. A cost-benefit analysis of elimination of coins and currency shows that all levels of government gain from such an action. Even the issuers of coins and currency will gain from their elimination despite the loss of seigniorage. Benefits accrue from shrinkage of the underground economy and the reduction of crime, especially involving illicit drugs. Calculations are based on three levels of government in Canada, federal, provincial, and municipal.

In a recent article in this journal, Berument, Dogan, and Onar (2010) challenged the existence of the previously documented daylight-saving effect. Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi's original finding (2000) was that average stock market returns on Mondays following time changes are economically and statistically significantly lower than typical Monday returns. Kamstra, et al. hypothesized that the effect may arise due to heightened anxiety or risk aversion on the part of market participants after they experience a 1-hr. disruption in their sleep habits, in accordance with prior findings in the psychology literature linking sleep desynchronosis with anxiety. Berument, et al. replicated the original findings using ordinary least squares estimation, but when they modeled the mean of returns using a method prone to producing biased estimates, they obtained puzzling results. The analysis here, based on standard, unbiased modeling techniques, shows that the daylight-saving effect remains intact in the U.S.

Adjustment of behavior to maintain risk, known as risk homeostasis, has previously been studied in a variety of psychological, health, social and economic contexts. This paper examines the evidence for risk homeostasis in corporate financial decisions involving mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We first show that when bidder corporations’ risks decline relative to non-bidding peer firms prior to M&As, relative risk levels subsequently return to original levels. We argue this pattern is consistent with risk homeostasis whereby bidder companies have a target risk — that of their peers — and use M&As to regain this desired risk level after risk has declined. On the other hand, M&As are not used to reduce risk after it has increased. We develop a simple model of risk homeostasis in an acquisitions context, and find empirical support for our predictions: when a bidder’s relative risk declines, the greater the risk of a target, the smaller is the investment in that target; and for a target firm smaller than the bidder, the larger the correlation between the target and the bidder returns, the smaller is investment in that target.

Young male CEOs appear to be combative: they are 4% more likely to be acquisitive and, having initiated an acquisition, they are over 20% more likely to withdraw an offer. Furthermore, a young target male CEO is 2% more likely to force a bidder to resort to a tender offer. We argue that this combative nature is a result of testosterone levels that are higher in young males. Testosterone, a hormone associated with male dominance seeking, has been shown to influence prospects for a cooperative outcome of the ultimatum game. Specifically, high-testosterone responders tend to reject low offers even though this is against their interest. It has been argued that this is consistent with a low offer being seen as dominance seeking. The acts of attempting or resisting an acquisition can be viewed as striving to achieve dominance. We argue that the evidence reported in this paper is consistent with the presence of a significant hormone effect in mergers and acquisitions.