Abstract This article investigates the impact of open banking on the dynamics of fintech firms. Using a unique data set of Spanish fintech firms from 2014 to 2022, we exploit differential exposure to Europe’s open banking regulation between payment-focused fintech firms and other fintech firms. Following the regulation, payment-service fintechs exhibit improved performance and a restructuring of their funding, characterized by reduced reliance on long-term bank debt and increased use of market-based equity. These firms also increase liquidity, reduce labor intensity, raise labor costs, and enhance productivity. These findings provide novel firm-level evidence on the effects of data-sharing regulation in financial markets.
Abstract This article examines how place-based tax incentives impact local private investments and entrepreneurship by studying the U.S. Opportunity Zone program targeting economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. Using a difference-in-differences approach across census tracts, I find that while the policy increases investment deals in treated areas by 10.5%, it leads to a 1.8% decline in business formation, particularly in the non-tradable sector where firms compete locally. Opportunity Zone investors prefer older, established firms, which in turn discourages business formation. Furthermore, the decline in entrepreneurship is associated with a 1.7% reduction in local employment and decreased market competition, suggesting negative real economic impact.
Abstract Using the distance between two Senators’ desks to capture the proclivity to share information, we find that when two Senators sit closer together in the Senate Chamber, they are more likely to trade stocks in the same industry and earn larger returns, especially when they belong to the same political party. This association varies with Senators’ information sources and power and the scrutiny they face. We perform multiple identification tests to support our inference that Senators share private trading information gleaned from their positions in Congress. Moreover, we provide the first evidence on the career benefits associated with sharing information.
Expected returns on market volatility, which can be obtained from VIX futures prices in closed form using standard models, positively predict subsequent realized volatility returns. Volatility returns are negative on average. Following increases in volatility, expected volatility returns and subsequent realized volatility returns become more negative. Because realized volatility returns are negatively correlated with index returns, expected volatility returns also negatively predict S&P 500 index returns, but these results are less significant. The results are robust to a wide range of variations in the empirical setup and to small-sample biases.
Exploiting an exogenous increase in public awareness of banks' lending to the gun industry, this article documents significant deposit outflows from gun lenders. These outflows are stronger in Democratic-leaning markets and for Republican-leaning lenders. In contrast, anti-gun lenders experience limited and insignificant outflows, consistent with policy alignment with depositor values. Outflows tighten funding constraints, prompting gun lenders to reduce deposit spreads and branches in Democratic-leaning markets. While large gun lenders remain resilient, small gun lenders significantly reduce their CRA loan volumes. The findings highlight political value misalignment as a driver of depositor behavior and its real effects on bank operations.
In contrast to the "lazy prices" phenomenon in the stock market, more 10-K textual changes lead to larger increases in volatility smirks-consistent with options traders buying more out-of-the-money put options based on negative information disclosed in textual changes. Moreover, the lazy-prices effect is mainly driven by stocks with tradable options, suggesting that limits to arbitrage lead to a delayed response of stock prices. Finally, the return predictability of textual changes is stronger for stocks with larger option volatility smirk changes. Sophisticated options traders, therefore, demonstrate superior skills at extracting relevant information from public filings.
We conduct the first comprehensive study of blockchain currencies-stablecoins pegged to fiat currencies and traded on decentralized exchanges (DEXs). Using transaction-level data linked to wallet characteristics, we show that prices in these markets are generally efficient, though constrained by blockchain frictions such as gas fees and Ether volatility. DEX rates closely track traditional currency markets through arbitrage and informed trading. Traders with substantial market share and access to primary markets exert greater price impact, reflecting informational advantages. While blockchain markets may improve access for customers excluded from traditional venues, their scalability depends on addressing frictions inherent to decentralized trading.
Using a calibrated, collective life-cycle portfolio choice model for a dual-income couple, we show that an increase in the ability to share risk within the household due to a mean-preserving spread in the partners' coefficients of relative risk aversion leads to a substantial increase in financial risk-taking. Importantly, we show that risk sharing has a larger economic impact on portfolio choice than risk diversification. While unitary models usually do not fully replicate the optimal portfolio choice of collective models, we propose approximations that work reasonably well for moderate background risk. We provide strong empirical support for our key findings.
Using the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, we examine the effect of the credibility of mandatory disclosure by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on market feedback. We find an increase in investment-price sensitivity for firms affected by the act, and the increase is enhanced when managers have greater incentives to glean information from prices-when firms are exposed to multiple dimensions of uncertainty, have higher growth options, face more competition, have less informed managers, or have higher accounting fraud risk. Our findings suggest that the greater credibility of CRA mandatory disclosure improves managerial learning from stock prices.
We study whether information design influences consumer behavior in a randomized field experiment with users of an online account aggregation app. Participants received a personalized index representing their net worth as a lifetime monthly cash flow. The presentation of this index varied across treatments in its framing and the salience of its display. Consumers exposed to a consumption-oriented frame and a salient comparison of the index with their past spending reduced discretionary spending. These findings show that minor variations in information presentation can significantly affect financial behavior, highlighting the power of design in promoting saving and informing policy and regulation.
We examine how Confucian culture operates as an informal institution by fostering relational contracts that substitute for formal legal frameworks in shaping corporate behavior. Using data on historical Confucian academies near firms' headquarters in China, we find that greater cultural exposure is associated with higher investment in stakeholder relationships-measured by social contribution, stakeholder protection, courtesy expenses, patenting, and trade credit. These effects persist after controlling for human capital and alternative cultural influences, and weaken in regions with stronger formal institutions. Our findings highlight the enduring role of culture in supporting trust-based governance when formal contracting is limited.
Past research has documented a substantial finance wage premium. We examine whether this premium reflects differences in lifetime career opportunities. Using resume data, we reconstruct career trajectories in finance and nonfinance sectors and build synthetic measures of career attractiveness that account for compensation levels, growth, and risk. We find that asset management and investment banking provide a sizable risk-adjusted career premium relative to banking, insurance, and other sectors. This premium has declined across cohorts, particularly relative to high tech. Labor-market entry patterns respond to these premia: potential entrants treat finance and high-tech careers as substitutes when choosing where to start.
We argue that firms' ability to disinvest real assets helps rationalize the negative distress premiums in stocks, bonds, and, as we show, loans and firm assets. Using a real options model in which shareholders and debtholders share disinvestment proceeds, the model suggests that the stock (debt) distress premium becomes more negative with the proceeds paid out to that class, and that both premiums can be negative when debtholders receive most of the proceeds. Using hard-asset disinvestment-ability proxies, the stock (bond or loan) distress premium becomes less (more) negative with those proxies, possibly suggesting that shareholders benefit more strongly from nonsecured-asset disinvestments.
While the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) mandates board risk committees for large banks, we argue that such committees do not benefit all banks. Banks forced by the DFA to adopt a board risk committee do not experience a reduction in risk following adoption. In contrast, banks that voluntarily established risk committees before the DFA exhibit lower risk, especially when these committees possess greater risk expertise. Using unique interview data, we find that board risk committees serve as active monitors rather than merely rubber-stamping management proposals. However, regulatory-mandated tasks limit their monitoring role.
