This paper considers equilibrium trade in a real estate market. When search is directed, buyers have private independent values, and sellers compete on asking prices, stock-flow matching characterises equilibrium outcomes. Consistent with the data, equilibrium not only generates large and variable price spikes for new listing sales; unsuccessful sellers lower their asking prices over time; and there is equilibrium asking price dispersion. Bidding war data demonstrate that the match surplus is substantial: a lower bound equals 3.3% of house price, whereas ballpark examples suggest match surplus is around 10%.

This article identifies an equilibrium theory of wage formation and endogenous quit turnover in a labour market with on-the-job search, where risk averse workers accumulate human capital through learning-by-doing and lose skills while unemployed. Optimal contracting implies the wage paid increases with experience and tenure. Indirect inference using German data determines the deep parameters of the model. The estimated model not only reproduces the large and persistent fall in wages and earnings following job loss, a new structural decomposition finds foregone human capital accumulation (while unemployed) is the worker’s major cost of job loss.

Because the data show that market tightness is not orthogonal to unemployment, this paper identifies the many empirical difficulties caused by adopting the free entry of vacancies assumption in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) framework. Relaxing the free entry assumption and using Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) finds the vacancy creation process is less than infinitely elastic. Because a recession-leading job separation shock then causes vacancies to fall as unemployment increases, the ad hoc restriction to zero job separation shocks (to generate Beveridge curve dynamics) becomes redundant. In contrast to standard arguments, the calibrated model finds the job separation process drives unemployment volatility over the cycle. (JEL E24, E32, J24, J63, J64)

This paper considers a dynamic, non-steady state environment in which wage dispersion exists and evolves in response to shocks. Workers do not observe firm productivity and firms do not commit to future wages, but there is on-the-job search for higher paying jobs. The model allows for firm turnover (new start-up firms are created, some existing firms die) and firm specific productivity shocks. In a separating equilibrium, more productive firms signal their type by paying strictly higher wages in every state of the market. Consequently, workers always quit to firms paying a higher wage and so move efficiently from less to more productive firms. As a further implication of the cost structure assumed, endogenous firm size growth is consistent with Gibrat's law. The paper provides a complete characterization and establishes existence and uniqueness of the separating (non-steady state) equilibrium in the limiting case of equally productive firms. The existence of equilibrium with any finite number of firm types is also established. Finally, the model provides a coherent explanation of Danish manufacturing data on firm wage and labor productivity dispersion as well as the cross firm relationship between them.

The focus of this chapter is to consider new developments in the search and matching literature where wages, quit turnover and unemployment are endogenously determined in economies with aggregate shocks. The aim of the discussion is not only to highlight possible market failures but also to explain how on-the-job search and employee turnover fundamentally affect our understanding of fluctuations in aggregate employment.

The objective of this paper is to study why some workers are paid more than others. To do so we construct and quantitatively assess an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search, general human capital accumulation and two sided heterogeneity. In the model workers differ in abilities and firms differ in their productivities. The model generates a simple (log) wage variance decomposition that is used to measure the importance of firm and worker productivity differentials, frictional wage dispersion and workers' sorting dynamics. We calibrate the model using a sample of young workers from the UK. We show that heterogeneity among firms generates great deal of wage inequality. Among low skilled workers job ladder effects are small, most of the impact of experience on wages is due to learning-by-doing. High skilled workers are much more mobile. Job ladder effects have sizeable impact.

The purpose of the paper is to study and quantify the possible importance of on-the-job for the fluctuations in the job finding rate within an alternative market equilibrium framework to that of the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model recently introduced by Coles and Mortensen (2013). In the process we show that the Coles–Mortensen model can easily explain the magnitudes of worker flow fluctuation reported by Shimer (2005) for the 50 year post WWII period in the U.S. as well as the observed real wage rigidity.

This paper considers a dynamic, non-steady state environment in which wage dispersion exists and evolves in response to shocks. Workers do not observe firm productivity and firms do not commit to future wages, but there is on-the-job search for higher paying jobs. The model allows for firm turnover (new start-up firms are created, some existing firms die) and firm specific productivity shocks. In a separating equilibrium, more productive firms signal their type by paying strictly higher wages in every state of the market. Consequently, workers always quit to firms paying a higher wage and so move efficiently from less to more productive firms. As a further implication of the cost structure assumed, endogenous firm size growth is consistent with Gibrat's law. The paper provides a complete characterization and establishes existence and uniqueness of the separating (non-steady state) equilibrium in the limiting case of equally productive firms. The existence of equilibrium with any finite number of firm types is also established. Finally, the model provides a coherent explanation of Danish manufacturing data on firm wage and labor productivity dispersion as well as the cross firm relationship between them. Melvyn G. Coles Department of Economics University of Essex Colchester CO435Q ENGLAND mcole@essex.ac.uk Dale T. Mortensen Department of Economics Northwestern University 2003 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208-2600 and NBER d-mortensen@northwestern.edu

A rich but tractable variant of the Burdett-Mortensen model of wage setting behavior is formulated and a dynamic market equilibrium solution to the model is defined and characterized. In the model, firms cannot commit to wage contracts. Instead, the Markov perfect equilibrium to the wage setting game, characterized by Coles (2001), is assumed. In addition, firm recruiting decisions, firm entry and exit, and transitory firm productivity shocks are incorporated into the model. Given that the cost of recruiting workers is proportional to firm employment, we establish the existence of an equilibrium solution to the model in which wages are not contingent on firm size but more productive employers always pay higher wages. Although the state space, the distribution of workers over firms, is large in the general case, it reduces to a scalar that can be interpreted as the unemployment rate in the special case of homogenous firms. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique. As the dimension of the state space is equal to the number of firms types in general, an (approximate) equilibrium is computable.

We explore how gender bias in career opportunities affects matching in a marriage market with search frictions and where an individual's fitness decays with age. We document a "being left on the shelf" effect where young singles, who find the marriage market rapidly thins with age, rush into early partnership. Singles with stronger career opportunities, however, have a greater option value to defer marriage. More equal career opportunities for women (captured by greater schooling and better occupations) potentially explain the recent emergence of toyboy unions, in which the woman is at least 5 years older than her partner.

This paper considers new business start-up activity within a stochastic equilibrium model of unemployment. The resulting job creation process is both natural and tractable, and generates equilibrium unemployment and vacancy dynamics which match the volatility and persistence observed in the data. The insight is that the standard Diamond/Mortensen/Pissarides matching framework works beautifully once the free entry of vacancies assumption is replaced by a model of business start-up activity. The approach is particularly important as it is demonstrated that a large part of net job creation in the U.S. economy can be attributed to new business start-ups.

We analyse an equilibrium labour market with on-the-job search and experience effects (where workers learn-by-doing). The analysis yields a standard Mincer wage equation with worker fixed effects and endogenously determined firm fixed effects. It shows that learning-by-doing increases equilibrium wage dispersion consistent with the data. Equilibrium sorting - where over time more experienced workers also tend to find and quit to better paid employment - has a significant impact on wage inequality. As the model yields a cross section distribution of wages paid with the 'right' structure (the density of wages paid is single peaked with a 'fat' Pareto right tail) and yields the 'right' time profile of worker wage outcomes (the initial 10 years of a worker's career are characterised by several job changes and rapid wage growth) it yields a new, coherent statistical structure for future applied work.

Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partnerships. We explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labor supply decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities - one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt. These generate different investment incentives and therefore have a real impact on the market economy. While marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency, romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency, since more high ability individuals participate in the labour market. The analysis offers the possibility of explaining cross-country differences in educational investments and labor force participation based on matching regimes.

This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk-averse workers, both employed and unemployed, search for better paid job opportunities. Different firms typically offer different contracts. Workers accumulate general human capital through learning-by-doing. With on-the-job search, a worker’s wage evolves endogenously over time through experience effects, tenure effects and quits to better paid employment. This equilibrium approach suggests how to identify econometrically between experience and tenure effects on worker wages.

This paper investigates equilibria where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk averse workers search for new job opportunities whether employed or unemployed. We generalize previous work by assuming firms have different productivities. Equilibrium implies more productive firms always offer more desirable contracts. Thus workers never quit from more productive firms for less productive firms. Nevertheless turnover is inefficient as employees with long tenures at low productivity firms may reject outside job offers from more productive firms. A worker who quits to a more productive firm may accept a wage cut. Such wage cuts are compensated by faster “promotion” rates to higher wage levels in the future. We also generalize previous arguments by showing equilibria exist where the distribution of offers contains interior mass points and find equilibrium wage/tenure contracts need not be smooth.

Stock–flow job matching implies that there are two types of job seekers—those on the short side of their occupations who can easily find work, and those on the long side who expect extended unemployment spells. Using matching data and information on completed and uncompleted unemployment spells for England and Wales, this paper uses the stock–flow matching hypothesis to identify the fraction (incidence) of laid off workers who find themselves on the long side of the market and, conditional on being on the long side, their expected unemployment duration. The average incidence is around one-half and increases significantly in recessions. The expected duration is also strongly countercyclical—peaking at 15 months in the 1990–1992 recession and falling to a more modest 9 months by January 1999. Cross-section estimates also identify a North–South divide and a large city effect—the unemployed in large cities and in the North experience longer spells.