Exploiting the "quiet period" before European Central Bank (ECB) announcements, this paper studies ECB-related content on X/Twitter to better understand how investors acquire information about upcoming monetary policy decisions in the absence of central bank signals. We first document that attention is endogenous, as tweet traffic positively correlates with the magnitude of subsequent monetary policy surprises. Second, when there is large disagreement about the economic outlook, more tweet traffic is associated with an improved accuracy of market expectations already during the quiet period, thereby leading to smaller monetary policy surprises. This suggests that information exchange can improve expectation formation.

Trust in the central bank is an essential ingredient for a successful conduct of monetary policy. However, for many central banks trust has recently declined, for instance in the wake of the post-pandemic inflation surge, due to large errors in central banks’ inflation forecasts, or given problems when exiting from forward guidance. The rapid, substantial, and persistent erosion of trust makes it clear that trust needs to be earned continuously. This paper reviews why trust is important, what determines it and how central banks can enhance it. It also argues that it is important for central banks to improve the measurement and monitoring of trust. It ends by highlighting some future challenges for maintaining trust.

We revisit the debate on the effectiveness of central bank communication on exchange rates, contrasting a skeptical view, which holds that communication neither moves exchange rates nor influences them in the desired direction, with an optimistic view that it does. Using nearly 100 official ECB statements on exchange rates made during its monetary policy press conferences since 2002, we show that the ECB tends to mention the exchange rate when the real effective exchange rate deviates from its equilibrium value, whereas journalists’ questions are mainly responsive to the nominal exchange rate. Studying the effects of these mentions, our findings by and large support the skeptical view: after controlling for monetary policy shocks, exchange rate communication has limited immediate effects on the euro exchange rate, which fade quickly. Effectiveness is particularly limited when interest rates are at their effective lower bound.

Using a novel database of media-reported anonymous leaks about monetary policy in the euro area, we conduct the first systematic empirical analysis of these confidential information disclosures originating from central banks. Our database reveals that Eurosystem leaks are frequent - in particular relative to leaks from other major central banks. We provide evidence that many Eurosystem leaks are likely not accidents, but placed strategically by insiders. Exploiting high-frequency financial market reactions to leaks, we find that they have large effects on markets relative to standard monetary surprises, often exceeding the impact of attributed statements by policy-makers. Yet, mainly reflecting minority opinions, leaks do not usually lock in decision-making. Post-meeting leaks regularly reveal information about dissent on the committee, changing market perceptions about the strength of the policy signal. Post-meeting leaks thereby reverse some of the initial market effect of official policy announcements.

Federal Reserve Bank presidents experience years with and without the right to vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee because of a mechanical voting rights rotation scheme. In years when presidents vote, their speeches move financial markets less than in years when they do not vote. We argue that this vote discount mirrors the way voting status affects presidents' speech behavior. Speeches given by a president in years with the right to vote are more influenced by regional conditions that national markets care less about, and as a result, markets such as the U.S. Treasury market react less to those speeches.

Enhancing central bank credibility among the general public is a challenging task, not least because it is difficult to reach out to this group: even the revision of the ECB’s inflation target in 2021 went largely unnoticed by consumers. However, randomised information treatments conducted in a representative consumer survey in the six largest euro area countries reveal that communicating information about the target can enhance the perceived probability that price stability will be maintained in the medium-term. Especially if some explanation about the role of monetary policy is provided, credibility can be boosted also among the less financially literate, and the credibility gains are noticeable even in periods when inflation has increased.

This paper studies the effect of monetary policy on inflation along the income distribution in the euro area and shows that monetary policy has differential effects. In response to monetary tightenings, high-income households engage in more intense product substitution and trade down in the product and store space relative to low-income households, such that their inflation responds relatively more. This channel stands in contrast to the effect arising from different consumption bundles, which imply that the inflation experienced by high-income households responds less to monetary policy. The paper also reveals substantial cross-country heterogeneity, with the product substitution channel being more pronounced in countries where price differences between possible substitutes are larger.

Central banks are increasingly reaching out to the general public to motivate and explain their monetary policy actions. One major aim of this outreach is to guide inflation expectations; another is to ensure accountability and create trust. This article surveys a rapidly-growing literature on central bank communication with the public. We first discuss why and how such communication is more challenging than communicating with expert audiences. Then we survey the empirical evidence on the extent to which this new outreach does in fact affect inflation expectations and trust. On balance, we see some promise in the potential to inform the public better, but many challenges along the way.

A survey on monetary policy communication among former members of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) reveals that enhancing credibility and trust is viewed as the most important objective of communication. Respondents judge communication with financial markets and experts as adequate, but see room for improvement in communicating with the public. The central bank objective is seen as the most important topic. Several respondents perceived the ECB's inflation aim of "below, but close to, 2%" that was in place at the time as ambiguous and in need of clarification. Overall, there is broad consensus on various communication issues.

Leaks of confidential information emanating from public institutions have been the focus of a long-standing line of research. Yet, their determinants as well as their potential impact on public views and on policy effectiveness remain elusive. To address this gap, we study leaks from central banks because their effects are instantaneously reflected in financial markets. Based on a novel database of anonymous monetary policy leaks in the euro area as reported by newswires, we provide evidence that many of these leaks are likely placed by individual insiders with minority opinions. While we find that leaks have large effects on markets and weaken official policy announcements, our results also suggest that leaks do not lock in decision-makers, and that attributed communication can mitigate some of their effects.

Using French matched administrative-survey data, we quantify the distributional effects of monetary policy on labor income and decompose the extensive and intensive margins of these effects. We find that the effects of ECB monetary policy shocks on labor income are U-shaped along the labor income distribution. These effects are driven by the extensive margin (transitions out or to unemployment) at the bottom of the distribution and by the intensive margin (labor income changes for individuals continuously employed) at the top. We document that sectoral heterogeneity, especially related to the labor force composition, is crucial in explaining these heterogeneous effects.

Digitalisation has fundamentally changed the global economy and will continue to do so. This paper draws on economic research to identify some of its key implications for labour markets, inequality, e-commerce and the financial system. Beyond its potential to boost productivity and living standards, digitalisation: i) does not necessarily replace jobs on aggregate but changes their content; ii) tends to raise income and wealth inequality; iii) has ambiguous effects on competition; and iv) might change how the retail and financial sectors respond to monetary policy. Developing adequate (re-)training opportunities and providing a labour market, regulatory, and innovation environment which encourages the creation of “good jobs” is essential to improve productivity and equity while avoiding a polarisation of labour markets. E-commerce and fintech will likely lead to a faster transmission of monetary policy. The rise of fintech brings about new risks for regulatory arbitrage and has ramifications for financial stability.

We show that the announcement of the ECB's Strategy Review and the revision of its inflation target in summer 2021 went largely unnoticed by the wider public. Although it is hard to reach out to this group, we find evidence that communicating key elements of the strategy can enhance the perceived credibility that price stability will be maintained in the medium-term. Randomised information treatments reveal that providing additional explanations about monetary policy's stabilising role has the strongest positive impact on credibility, boosting credibility also among the less financially literate and generating more persistent credibility gains, even after inflation increased.

Central banks have intensified their communication with non-experts – an endeavour which some have argued is bound to fail. This paper studies English and German Twitter traffic about the ECB to understand whether its communication is received by non-experts and how it affects their views. It shows that Twitter traffic is responsive to ECB communication, also for non-experts. For several ECB communication events, Twitter constitutes primarily a channel to relay information: tweets become more factual and the views expressed more moderate and homogeneous. Other communication events, such as former President Draghi’s “Whatever it takes” statement, trigger persistent traffic and a divergence in views. Also, ECB-related tweets are more likely to get retweeted or liked if they express stronger or more subjective views. Thus, Twitter also serves as a platform for controversial discussions. The findings suggest that central banks manage to reach non-experts, i.e. their communication is not a road to nowhere.

This paper tests whether fluctuations in investors' attention affect stock return comovement with national and global markets, and which stocks are most affected. We measure fluctuations in investor attention using 59 high-profile soccer matches played during stock market trading hours at the three editions of the FIFA World Cup between 2010 and 2018. Using intraday data for more than 750 firms in 19 countries, we find that distracted investors shift attention away from firm-specific and from global news. When movements in global stock markets are large, the pricing of global news reverts back to normal, but firm-specific news keep being priced less, leading to increased comovement of stock returns with the national stock market. This increase is economically large, and particularly strong for those stocks that typically comove little with the national market, thereby leading to a convergence in betas across stocks.

Whether Federal Reserve Bank presidents have the right to vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: also nonvoting presidents attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. Does voting status change behavior? We find that the data go against the hypothesis that without the voting right, presidents use their public speeches and their meeting interventions to compensate for the loss of formal influence; rather, they support the hypothesis that the voting right makes presidents more involved. We also find that speeches move financial markets less in years that presidents vote. We argue that these discounts are consistent with their communication behavior.

The ECB’s price stability mandate has been defined by the Treaty. But the Treaty has not spelled out what price stability precisely means. To make the mandate operational, the Governing Council has provided a quantitative definition in 1998 and a clarification in 2003. The landscape has changed notably compared to the time the strategy review was originally designed. At the time, the main concern of the Governing Council was to anchor inflation at low levels in face of the inflationary history of the previous decades. Over the last decade economic conditions have changed dramatically: the persistent low-inflation environment has created the concrete risk of de-anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations. Addressing low inflation is different from addressing high inflation. The ability of the ECB (and central banks globally) to provide the necessary accommodation to maintain price stability has been tested by the lower bound on nominal interest rates in the context of the secular decline in the equilibrium real interest rate. Against this backdrop, this report analyses: the ECB’s performance as measured against its formulation of price stability; whether it is possible to identify a preferred level of steady-state inflation on the basis of optimality considerations; advantages and disadvantages of formulating the objective in terms of a focal point or a range, or having both; whether the medium-term orientation of the ECB’s policy can serve as a mechanism to cater for other considerations; how to strengthen, in the presence of the lower bound, the ECB’s leverage on private-sector expectations for inflation and the ECB’s future policy actions so that expectations can act as ‘automatic stabilisers’ and work alongside the central bank.

This paper examines the importance of central bank communication in ensuring the effectiveness of monetary policy and in underpinning the credibility, accountability and legitimacy of independent central banks. It documents how communication has become a monetary policy tool in itself; one example of this being forward guidance, given its impact on inflation expectations, economic behaviour and inflation. The paper explains why and how consistent, clear and effective communication to expert and non-expert audiences is essential in an environment of an ever-increasing need by central banks to reach these audiences. Central banks must also meet the demand for more understandable information about policies and tools, while at the same time overcoming the challenge posed by the wider public’s rational inattention. Since the European Central Bank was established, the communications landscape has changed dramatically and continues to evolve. This paper outlines how better communication, including greater engagement with the wider public, could help boost people’s understanding of and trust in the Eurosystem.

Monetary and macroprudential policy makers trade off financial stability and economic efficiency. This paper builds a model in which banks supply liquidity services through deposits and use them to fund loans and safe bond holdings. Expansive monetary policy can increase loan repayments but also provides liquidity to non-banks, which shifts deposit demand downward and lowers the liquidity premium of deposits. Optimally coordinated policies reveal two key complementarities over financial cycles. First, during normal times additional risk-weight add-ons for bonds are complementary to additional capital buffers. Second, during crisis times relative monetary policy tightening is complementary to releasing capital buffers.