We study the performance of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) to understand the market imperfections giving rise to these vehicles and their corresponding economic costs. CLO equity tranches earn positive abnormal returns from the risk-adjusted price differential between leveraged loans and CLO debt tranches. Debt tranches offer higher returns than similarly rated corporate bonds, making them attractive to banks and insurers that face risk-based capital requirements. Temporal variation in equity performance highlights the resilience of CLOs to market volatility due to their closed-end structure, long-term funding, and embedded options to reinvest principal proceeds.
Experimental double-auction commodity markets are known to exhibit robust convergence to competitive equilibria under stable or cyclical supply and demand conditions, but little is known about their performance in truly random environments. We provide a comprehensive study of double auctions in a stochastic setting where the equilibrium prices, trading volumes and gains from trade are highly variable across periods, and with commodity traders who may buy or sell their goods depending on market conditions and their individual outcomes. We find that performance in this stochastic environment is sensitive to underlying market conditions. Efficiency is higher and convergence to the competitive equilibrium stronger when the potential gains from trade are high and when the equilibrium spans a wide range of quantities, implying a large number of marginal trades. Speculative re-trading is prevalent, especially among those who have little to gain under equilibrium pricing. Those with the largest expected gains typically earn far less than predicted, while those with little or no predicted earnings gain modestly from speculation, leading to some redistribution of gains from high to low expected earners. Excessive trading volumes are associated with negative efficiencies in markets with low gains from trade, but not in the high-gains markets, where zero-sum trading and re-trading appear to enforce efficiency and near-equilibrium pricing. Buyers earn more relative to their competitive equilibrium benchmark than sellers do. Introducing trader specialization leads to fewer trading errors and higher market efficiency, but it does not eliminate zero-sum trading and re-trading.
The effect that climate change will have on water resource sustainability is gaining international interest, particularly in regions where stocks are strained due to changing climate and increasing populations. Past studies focus mainly on how water availability will be affected by climate change, with little attention paid to how consumer behavior is likely to react. How a changing climate affects water demand could be equally or more important to management solutions as its influence on water supply. In this paper, we analyze the relationship between residential water use and climate on the Hawaiian island of O‘ahu, and apply a variety of climate projections to estimate end-of-century water use. The island is serviced by only one water utility yet has a wide range of consumers and microclimates, which makes it an ideal location for studying these relationships. We find that climate is strongly associated with residential water use in a manner that is likely causal. If the association is causal, our mean estimates imply that residential demand may increase up to 36% island-wide by the end of the century, holding all else the same, depending on the climate model projection. Mean estimates, however, mask a large degree of uncertainty largely due to the wide range of projected climate outcomes. Strategies for offsetting the projected increase in demand are also considered, along with the study’s place in broader literature examining watershed management and consumer welfare.
In a recent working paper, "An application of causal forest in corporate finance: How does financing affect investment?" Gulen, Jens, and Page, April 23 2020, (GJP) challenge the analysis and several conclusions of our paper, "How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants," 2008, (CR). Specifically, GJP claim that our main results are not robust to a more recent machine learning estimation technique called "causal forest," and that covenant violations only affect investment in a small number of distressed firms. Here we show that these, and other claims made by GJP concerning our study, are incorrect. GJP's results are internally inconsistent, inconsistent with other published studies, and unreproducible. We also provide new evidence using the latest econometric techniques, including that suggested by GJP, and more recent data, all of which show the robustness of our original findings.
We show that variation in short-term nominal interest rates produces an endogenous response in the design of and commitment to corporate loan contracts. Interest rates are negatively related to the cash flow rights and positively related to the control rights granted to creditors. An implication of this contractual response is a sharp increase in the ex post renegotiation of contracts originated in low interest rate environments, as well as a muted effect of interest rate variation on the cost of debt capital. Our findings illustrate how the design of financial contracts in practice reflects a multi-dimensional tradeoff among contract features that aligns incentives and apportions risk among the contracting parties in a state-contingent manner.
We build novel welfare-based price indices for major household appliances that leverage changes in same-model prices and how consumers substitute between exiting, continuing and new models. We then evaluate how minimum energy efficiency requirements and changing criteria for Energy Star™ labels affected these indices in the U.S. between 2001 and 2011, a period of time when some appliances experienced standard changes while others did not. We find that prices declined while quality and consumer welfare increased, especially when standards become more stringent. We also find that much of the price index decline can be attributed to standards-induced innovation, or cannibalism, not to inter-manufacturer competition. Our results also add to a growing body of evidence that the Consumer Price Index exaggerates inflation due to inadequate account of quality and substitution to new goods.
Using data spanning the 20th century, we show that most accounting-based return anomalies are spurious. When examined out-of-sample by moving either backward or forward in time, anomalies' average returns decrease, and volatilities and correlations with other anomalies increase. The data-snooping problem is so severe that even the true asset pricing model is expected to be rejected when tested using in-sample data. Our results suggest that asset pricing models should be tested using out-of-sample data or, when not feasible, by whether a model is able to explain half of the in-sample alpha.
On a levelized-cost basis, solar and wind power generation are now competitive with fossil fuels. But supply of these renewable resources is variable and intermittent, unlike traditional power plants. As a result, the cost of using flat retail pricing instead of dynamic, marginal-cost pricing—long advocated by economists—will grow. We evaluate the potential gains from dynamic pricing in high-renewable systems using a novel model of power supply and demand in Hawai’i. The model breaks new ground in integrating investment in generation and storage capacity with chronological operation of the system, including an account of reserves, a demand system with different interhour elasticities for different uses, and substitution between power and other goods and services. The model is open source and fully adaptable to other settings. Consistent with earlier studies, we find that dynamic pricing provides little social benefit in fossil-fuel-dominated power systems, only 2.6 to 4.6 percent of baseline annual expenditure. But dynamic pricing leads to a much greater social benefit of 8.5 to 23.4 percent in a 100 percent renewable power system with otherwise similar assumptions. High renewable systems, including 100 percent renewable, are remarkably affordable. The welfare maximizing (unconstrained) generation portfolio under the utility’s projected 2045 technology and pessimistic interhour demand flexibility uses 79 percent renewable energy, without even accounting for pollution externalities. If overall demand for electricity is more elastic than our baseline (0.1), renewable energy is even cheaper and variable pricing can improve welfare by as much as 47 percent of baseline expenditure.
In a study published recently in the Journal of Financial Economics, the authors of this article documented a substantial increase in the use of debt financing by U.S. companies over the past century. From 1920 until the mid‐1940s, the aggregate leverage of unregulated U.S. companies was low and stable, with the average debt‐to‐capital ratio staying within the narrow range of 10% to 15%. But during the next 25 years, the use of debt by U.S. companies more than doubled, rising to 35% of total capital. And since 1970, aggregate leverage has remained above 35%, peaking at 47% in 1992. Moreover, this pattern has been observed in companies of all sizes and operating in all unregulated sectors.Changes in the characteristics of U.S. public companies during this period provide little help in explaining the increase in corporate leverage. For example, the displacement of tangible by intangible assets in many sectors of the U.S. economy during the past 50 years would have led most economists to predict, holding all other things equal, a reduction rather than an increase in aggregate corporate leverage. Instead, according to the authors' findings, the main contributors to the increases in U.S. corporate leverage since the 1940s have been external changes, including increases in corporate income tax rates, the development of financial markets and intermediaries, and the reduction in government borrowing in the decades following World War II. The authors' analysis also identifies these last two changes—the development of financial markets, including the rise of institutional investors and shareholder activism, and the post‐War reduction in government debt—as having played the biggest roles in the leveraging of corporate America.
The conference was held on Dec 14-15, 2015 co-organized by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and East-West Center (EWC) in Honolulu. Participants from China, Japan, Korea and the United States discussed the economic future of the major North Pacific countries and the importance of economic cooperation among them. Major topics in each session were (1) Trade (2) Perspectives and (3) Finance. The first topic, Trade, related to the China'a trade strategy, China's Belt-Road Initiative, Korea's Eurasia Initiative, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). The second topic, Macroeconomic Perspectives, aimed to tackle global or regional economic problems through the understanding of the macreconomic policies of the emerging market economies, uncertainty in the economic conditions of the United States, China's New Economic Norms, and the struggle of the East Asian International Order. The third topic, Finance, aimed to provide an analytical perspective over currency convertibility, unconventional monetary policies, and prospect of cooperation between Belt-Road Initiative and TPP in the global economic governance. The conference concluded with the major findings and policy implications from the earlier sessions, particularily, monetary policy response in emerging economies and the importance of strengthing the North Pacific cooperation were discussed.
If agricultural subsidies are largely capitalized into farmland values through their effect on rental rates, then expanding support for agriculture may not benefit farmers who rent the land they farm. Existing evidence on the incidence of subsidies on cash rental rates is mixed. Identification is obscured by unobserved or imprecisely measured factors that tend to be correlated with subsidies, especially land quality and time-varying factors like commodity prices and adverse weather events. A problem that has received less attention is the fact that subsidies and land quality on rented land may differ from owned land. Since most farms possess both rented and owned acreage, farm-level measures of subsidies, land values, and rental rates may bias estimated incidence. Using a new, field-level data set that, for the first time, precisely links subsidies to land parcels, we show that this bias is considerable: where farm-level estimates suggest an incidence of 42-49 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar, field-level estimates from the same farms indicate that landlords capture just 20-28 cents. The size of the farm and the duration of the rental arrangement have substantial effects. Incidence falls by 5-15 cents when doubling total operated acres, and the incidence falls by 0.1-0.8 cents with each additional year of the rental arrangement. Low incidence of subsidies on rents combined with the farm-size and duration effects suggest that farmers renting land have monopsony power.
We provide evidence on the covenant structure of corporate loan agreements. Building on the work of Jensen and Meckling [1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Captial Structure, Journal of the Financial Economics 3, 305–360], Myers [1977, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 5, 145–147] and Smith and Warner [1979, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, Journal of Financial Economics 7(2), 117–161]. We summarize and test the implications for what we refer to as the Agency Theory of Covenants (ATC), using a large sample of privately placed corporate debt. Our results are consistent with many of the implications of the ATC, including a negative relation between the promised yield on corporate debt and the presence of covenants. We also find that borrower and lender characteristics, as well as macroeconomic factors, determine covenant structure. Loans are more likely to include protective covenants when the borrower is small, has high growth opportunities or is highly levered. Loans made by investment banks and syndicated loans are also more likely to include protective covenants, as are loans made during recessionary periods or when credit spreads are large. Finally, we show that consistent with the ATC, firms that elect to issue private rather than public debt are smaller, have greater growth opportunities, less long-term debt, fewer tangible assets, more volatile cash flows and include more covenants in their debt agreements. An important byproduct of our analysis is to demonstrate empirically that covenant structure and the yield on corporate debt are determined simultaneously.
Optimal crop choice and fertilizer applications depend on the stochastic dynamics of commodity prices, fertilizer prices, and the agronomic effects of rotation versus monoculture. The efficient decision rule accounts for real option values associated with maintaining land disposition in an environment with highly uncertain future prices and irreversible past planting decisions. We parameterize a baseline model for a representative acre in Iowa and compare the model's predictions and profits to relatively naive, shorter-horizon decision rules, and a field managed with optimal fertilizer applications conditional on corn and soybeans always being rotated. We also examine the effects of a permanently larger premium on corn prices relative to soybean prices, which has been observed in locations near recently established ethanol plants. We then compare the various decision rules to actual crop choices in a panel of over 6500 Iowa plots during 1979-2007. As compared to less forward-looking objectives, we find the agronomic benefits of rotations coupled with real option values can lead to a more inelastic response of planting decisions to both transitory and permanent price changes. Always rotating, regardless of prices, is close to optimal, but so are shorter-horizon objectives. One implication is that reduced corn monoculture and fertilizer application rates might be implemented with modest incentive payments of $4 per acre or less.
Using a novel dataset of accounting and market information that spans most publicly traded nonfinancial firms over the last century, we show that U.S. federal government debt issuance significantly affects corporate financial policies and balance sheets through its impact on investors' portfolio allocations and the relative pricing of different assets. Government debt is strongly negatively correlated with corporate debt and investment, but strongly positively correlated with corporate liquidity. These relations are more pronounced in larger, less risky firms whose debt is a closer substitute for Treasuries. Indeed, we find a strong negative relation between the BAA-AAA yield spread and government debt, highlighting the greater sensitivity of more highly rated credit to variation in the supply of Treasuries. The channel through which this effect operates is investors' portfolio decisions: domestic intermediaries actively substitute between lending to the federal government and the nonfinancial corporate sector. The relations between government debt and corporate policies, as well as the substitution between government and corporate debt by intermediaries, are stronger after 1970 when foreign demand increased competition for Treasury securities. In concert, our results suggest that large, financially healthy corporations act as liquidity providers by supplying relatively safe securities to investors when alternatives are in short supply, and that this financial strategy influences firms' capital structures and investment policies.