The rising of religious intrastate armed conflicts in recent years has a significant impact on the world order. Despite a growing literature on the relationship between religion and conflict we know little about the conditions under which peace processes of religious conflicts may succeed. Studies show that addressing issues of transitional justice during conflicts may promote peace. This study examines the role of transitional justice in peace processes of religious conflicts. Our study uses quantitative analysis utilizing the Transitional Justice in Peace Processes (TJPP) Dataset, which contains innovative information on worldwide peace negotiations between 1989 and 2014. The TJPP dataset identifies six elements of transitional justice: truth commissions, reconciliation processes, reparations programs, restitution and rehabilitation of refugees, amnesties and prisoners' release. Findings demonstrate that peace processes of religious conflicts are more likely to use transitional justice elements, yet these peace efforts are less likely to reach a full peace agreement.

Introduction: In 2018, we reported a case series of 47 patients diagnosed with cancer following several years of exposure to high-intensity whole-body radiofrequency radiation (RFR) using the parameter of percentage fre-quency (PF). Consistent high and statistically significant PFs of hematolymphoid (HL) cancers were found in this group and in four previous reports on RFR-exposed groups in Belgium, Poland and Israel together with increased all-cancers rates. In this paper we report a new series of 46 young cancer patients who were exposed during military service to such radiation. Materials and methods: The new group of patients comprises Israeli soldiers previously exposed to occupational RFR. The patients were self-selected to enroll in the research in cooperation with an NGO assisting patients with administrative counseling and legal and social services. The new group of patients was studied with respect to distribution (proportion) of cancer types using the method of PF. When possible, cancer risk ratios (RR) were estimated too. The results are compared to those of other occupational groups in three countries. Results: Median age at diagnosis was 23 years; duration of exposure was between 1 and 3 years and the latencies were short, median 4.6 years. The PF of HL cancers was 41.3%, 95% CI (27%-57%), versus 22.7% expected in non-exposed subjects matched for age and gender profiles, p = 0.003; 19 out of the 46 patients had HL cancers. The PF of Hodgkin lymphoma cancers was 21.7%, 95%CI (11%-36%), versus 11.6% expected, p = 0.033. For a subgroup of 6 patients, the number of soldiers in the units was known, and we were able estimate approximately the overall cancer risk ratio (RR) after 8 years as being 8.0 with 95% CI (2.9, 17), p < 0.002, with only 0.75 cases expected from the Cancer Registry data. In this subgroup, there were 3 HL cancer cases and 3 non-HL cases. Sarcoma PF was higher than expected, 7 out of the 46 patients were diagnosed with sarcoma, PF = 15.2%, 95%CI (6.3%-28.9%), p = 0.04 versus the expected PF of 7%. Conclusion: The HL PF was high and consistent with previous reports. Epidemiological studies on excess risk for HL and other cancers, brain tumors in cellphone users, and experimental studies on RFR and carcinogenicity strongly point to a cause-effect relationship. It is mandatory to reduce the RFR exposure of all personnel to that of the typical community levels, including the peak level of radar pulses. Radiation protection, safety instructions, cancer risk warnings and quantitative data on individual exposure together with regular medical monitoring must be instituted for all personnel exposed to such risks. The findings from our study add to the growing body of evidence underscoring the gross inadequacy of the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Pro-tection (ICNIRP) thermal standards. Based on our findings and on the previous accumulated research, we endorse the recommendations to reclassify RFR exposure as a human carcinogen, International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) group 1.

In recent years, a burgeoning literature has emerged on the relationship between religion and conflict. Contradictory theories address the dynamics and termination of religious violent conflicts. Some studies focus on the destructive role of religion, arguing that religious conflicts are longer, more violent, and intractable. Others argue that religion has an ambivalent role, both destructive and constructive, and recognize religion as a force for peacebuilding. This study focuses on the relationship between religion and conflict termination by examining termination outcomes, based on the length and the level of violence, as well as incidents of reoccurrence. The study quantitatively examines 118 domestic conflicts between 1990 and 2014, utilizing the Political Instability Task Force and Religion and State datasets. The findings suggest that religious conflicts are likely to last longer than non-religious ones. However, the study reveals that religion has no strong significant influence on conflict termination as well as on the reoccurrence of conflicts and the violence level.

Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making armed conflicts longer and bloodier. We investigate these propositions by drawing on an innovative global dataset which codes ideological claims by rebel groups and governments in intrastate armed conflicts since 1946. Results demonstrate that although ideology increases conflict duration, these effects vary by type and timing. Whereas secular ideological conflicts tended to be more protracted during the Cold War, religious ideology has become increasingly important since. We, however, find little evidence that ideology increases conflict intensity. Rather, rebel criminality best accounts for intensity. So, while immaterial resources like ideology sustain willingness to fight, ideology’s influence upon conflict intensity is limited, especially after the Cold War. Future studies need to take ideology seriously and need to investigate its characteristics more in-depth and in conjunction with material, identity related and international variables.

In spring 2020, observers and practitioners warned that would increase violence in sub-Saharan Africa by creating an economic shock that would lead to distributional conflicts and government repression. Compared to before the pandemic, violence did increase in 2020, rising by 40 and 60 per cent in terms of fatalities and events, respectively. Controlling for important confounders, proves significant to the increase in violence in many models; however, a robust effect can be found only for COVID-19 unrest, which forms a fraction of the violence and stems from the stringency of government reactions rather than the pandemic itself. Pre-pandemic fragility accounts best for the region's rise in violence. Expert assessments confirm these findings but also yield evidence warning against prematurely announcing an all-clear. The fallout of the pandemic on conflict is likely to have a longer period of incubation, and there are initial indications that conditions will worsen.

Religion has been taking an increasingly contentious character worldwide. Deprivation, grievances and protest by religious groups seems to be on the rise. Previous research has shown that the marginalization of ethnic groups can contribute significantly to violent conflict. However, we know little about religious groups as existing research has lacked the necessary fine-grained data. This paper introduces the "Religious Minorities at Risk" dataset comprising data on 771 religious minorities worldwide for the period between 2000 and 2014. The dataset contains pertinent worldwide information on relevant characteristics of these minorities, especially those that may explain their motivation and capability to mobilize. Such characteristics include objective deprivation in religious, economic and political terms as well as corresponding subjective grievances and intensities. The dataset also includes group-related features and structural variables that arguably influence minorities' capability to mobilize. Moreover, while previous studies have focussed exclusively on violence, we now have more information available on the exact character of mobilization enabling scholars to distinguish between peaceful and violent forms of mobilization.