Most of us are likely at some point to observe wrongdoing in our organizations, and some of us will blow the whistle to someone with the authority to put a stop to the wrongdoing. Or we may be managers, inspectors, or auditors who serve as the official ‘complaint recipient’ when one of our colleagues wants to report wrongdoing in the organization. Whether we blow the whistle or are tasked with cleaning up after someone else does so, we are better off knowing in advance how the whistleblowing process usually plays out. In this article we discuss the pragmatic implications of 30 years of systematic research about whistleblowing: who does it and when, and why they choose to report the wrongdoing internally (within the organization) or externally (to outsiders). To avoid external whistleblowing, which entails all sorts of costs for the organization, we recommend that managers take clear steps: investigate the allegations, make the results of the investigation known to those affected, correct the problem if one is found, and avoid reprisal against whistleblowers. These actions can increase the chance that information about organizational wrongdoing stays inside the organization, where it may be remedied, instead of being made public.

Imagine you’re sitting in an empty bar and you strike up a conversation with another customer. He’s clearly very unhappy. You tell him you’re a journalist. Pretty soon he begins unloading to you about the unethical things happening at his work. The next thing you know he’s handing you a USB stick with 251 000 US State Department cables on it. Of course that’s not how it really happens. In real life, random barflies rarely provide closely guarded government secrets to strangers. Most reporters don’t really go creeping around darkened car parks waiting for Deep Throat to show up, as in All the President’s Men. As one national security reporter1 suggests: ‘It happens in Hollywood a lot more than in real life frankly.’ Yet, there is no underestimating the value of human sources. HUMINT (‘human intelligence’) has long been recognised as one of the core roles of an effective spy organisation. The information-gathering role of an investigative journalist is similar. Most investigative journalists depend on human sources: for leads, to verify a story, or both. These sources may be anonymous, confidential, or their identities may be publicly identified. In recent years, technology-led web publishers, such as WikiLeaks, have pioneered new ways to protect anonymity and confidentiality, although technology can also make it easier to link journalists and their sources. This chapter provides an in-depth look into one of the reporter’s most important human sources— the whistle-blower. ‘Whistle-blowing’ occurs when a member of an organisation discloses ‘illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices (including omissions) under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations who may be able to effect action’ (Near & Miceli 1985). The authors suggest expanding this definition further: whistle-blowing is the act of revealing inside information about serious

We compare results of several large-scale survey studies of whistle-blowing by public sector employees, from samples in Australia, Norway, and the United States. Specifically, we review incidence rates of wrongdoing, whistle-blowing and retaliation, as perceived by thousands of respondents employed by many government agencies in these countries. Despite differences in measurement in the studies and variation in results, findings suggest that wrongdoing was quite frequently observed and was reported in many cases. Retaliation resulted for far fewer than half of the whistle-blowers, in all three nations. We also compare findings from the various studies concerning variables that predicted retaliation against whistle-blowers in the different samples. Differences in results across the three countries add to existing evidence that country and workplace cultures can affect the whistle-blowing process.

News reports of organizational wrongdoing often pique interest in the question of how to encourage employees to report it. We used data from a survey of more than 3000 organizational members in the US to test a model of whistle-blowing. As predicted, observation of wrongdoing generally was associated with lower perceived organizational support and lower perceived justice of reporting channels (both procedural justice and distributive justice), suggesting that tolerating wrongdoing has negative effects for the organization itself, but there was also evidence that correcting wrongdoing may be nearly as positive as preventing it. Three previously untested variables – proactive personality, less co-worker invalidation, and leverage in the specific situation – predicted whistle-blowing, as did strength of evidence, a variable for which prior findings were inconsistent. Gender also was related to whistle-blowing. Finally, the predictors of blowing the whistle exclusively to one’s supervisor were similar to those of using other channels. Implications for theory, research, and practice are described.

Using data from nearly 2000 employees from 118 Australian government agencies who observed and reported perceived organizational wrongdoing, we tested hypotheses derived from a new model describing how observers make attributions about corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) (Lange & Washburn, in press). Results were largely consistent with the model. Employees who observed and reported wrongdoing rated their organizations’ CSI higher when they assessed higher levels of (a) undesirability of the wrongdoing, (b) organizational culpability in the matter, and (c) non-complicity of affected parties. Employees’ assessment of effect undesirability was positively associated with their identification with the affected party and negatively associated with their identification with the organization. One implication of these findings is that wrongdoing is not associated inevitably with employee perceptions of irresponsibility, but rather that this depends on a number of factors over which managers have some control. However, the results also suggest an employee may attribute irresponsibility after experiencing only one incident of reported organizational wrongdoing, which in turn could impact both the legitimacy and the overall performance of the organization.

Research on whistle-blowing has been hampered by a lack of a sound theoretical base. In this paper, we draw upon existing theories of motivation and power relationships to propose a model of the whistle-blowing process. This model focuses on decisions made by organization members who believe they have evidence of organizational wrongdoing, and the reactions of organization authorities. Based on a review of the sparse empirical literature, we suggest variables that may affect both the members' decisions and the organization's responses.

In 2010, Business Ethics Quarterly published ten articles that considered the potential contributions to business ethics research arising from recent scholarship in a variety of philosophical and social scientific fields (strategic management, political philosophy, restorative justice, international business, legal studies, ethical theory, ethical leadership studies, organization theory, marketing, and corporate governance and finance). Here we offer short responses to those articles by members of Business Ethics Quarterly's editorial board and editorial team.

Much of the unethical behavior occurring in modern organizations that comes to light is first identified and reported by insiders: organization members who are willing to blow the whistle. Data from surveys of federal employees conducted since 1980 by the U. S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) have been analyzed by researchers. These studies have taught us quite a lot about whistle-blowing, but we still need to learn much more. We present here a summary of results from research on the incidence of wrongdoing and whistle-blowing, predictors of whistle-blowing, predictors of retaliation against whistle-blowers, and predictors of overall effectiveness of whistle-blowers in getting wrongdoing stopped. We describe key findings and suggest new directions for future research and policy to address the critical questions still remaining concerning whistle-blowing.

Much of the unethical behavior occurring in modern organizations that comes to light is first identified and reported by insiders: organization members who are willing to blow the whistle. Data from surveys of federal employees conducted since 1980 by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) have been analyzed by researchers. These studies have taught us quite a lot about whistle-blowing, but we still need to learn much more. We present here a summary of results from research on the incidence of wrongdoing and whistleblowing, predictors of whistle-blowing, predictors of retaliation against whistle-blowers, and predictors of overall effectiveness of whistle-blowers in getting wrongdoing stopped. We describe key findings and suggest new directions for future research and policy to address the critical questions still remaining concerning whistle-blowing.

When successful and ethical managers are alerted to possible organizational wrongdoing, they take corrective action before the problems become crises. However, recent research [e.g., Rynes et al. (2007, Academy of Management Journal 50(5), 987–1008)] indicates that many organizations fail to implement evidence-based practices (i.e., practices that are consistent with research findings), in many aspects of human resource management. In this paper, we draw from years of research on whistle-blowing by social scientists and legal scholars and offer concrete suggestions to managers who are interested in encouraging internal reporting of problems requiring attention, and to observers of questionable activity who are considering reporting it. We also identify ways that research suggests policy-makers can have a more positive influence. We hope that these suggestions will help foster evidence-based practice regarding whistle-blowing.

Whistle-blowing represents an influence attempt in which organization member(s) try to persuade other members to cease wrongdoing; sometimes they fail; sometimes they succeed; sometimes they suffer reprisal. We investigated whether women experienced more retaliation than men, testing propositions derived from theories about gender differences and power variables, and using data from military and civilian employees of a large U.S. base. Being female was correlated with perceived retaliation. Results of structural equation modeling showed significant gender differences in antecedents and outcomes of retaliation. For men, lack of support from others and low whistleblower's power were significantly related to retaliation; for women, lack of support from others, serious wrongdoing, and the wrongdoing's direct effect on the whistleblower were significantly associated with retaliation. Retaliation in turn was negatively related to relationships with the supervisor for both men and women, and positively related to women's—but not men's—decisions to blow the whistle again, using external channels. We finish by discussing implications for theory and practice.

Whistle-blowers are a valuable resource when they alert authorities who can stop organizational wrongdoing that harms societal members. Yet, potential whistle-blowers may fear paying a high price for their actions. The purpose of this chapter is to describe what is known about organizational retaliation against whistle-blowers. After defining constructs, we discuss the legal protections for whistle-blowers. We review existing research examining when and why organizations engage in retaliation and its short-term and long-term consequences for whistle-blowers. Certain methodological problems inherent in studying whistle-blowing and retaliation seem insurmountable, but we encourage researchers to continue their efforts, because the results matter, both for theory and for our practical understanding of the importance of dissent in organizations and society.