HOW DO YOU measure economic development progress in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign? Clearly, one should conduct some sort of rigorous assessment to answer this imposing question. Everyone up the chain of command, all the way to congressional appropriators, demands assessments of COIN actions - and rightfully so. In simple terms, we all want to know if what we are doing (and paying for) is working. When the 25th Infantry Division served in Iraq as the headquarters for Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) from December 2008 to December 2009, the staff implemented a new concept known as OTES. Pronounced Otis, it stands for Operations, Targeting, and Effects Synchronization.1 Division staff members worked in one of four enduring effects work groups, one group for each line of effort in the campaign plan: security, governance, economics, and Iraqi Security Forces. The economics work group, charged with developing the commercial landscape of northern Iraq, grappled with how to assess economic progress and gauge the impact of our command's initiatives. We thought about assessments from the U.S. and Iraqi perspectives: was U.S. money spent on U.S. initiatives making a difference for Iraqis; and, was U.S. money, coupled with Iraqi money and effort and spent on Iraqi initiatives, making a difference for Iraqis? As we began to think about the problem, we speculated on Iraqi perceptions. If an Iraqi made more money in the present than in the past, would he consider himself better off economically? The easy answer would seem to be yes. However, what if the Iraqi 's salary went up 1 0 percent but the prices of consumer goods rose 20 percent? Or fuel prices rose 20 percent? Or the extortion costs to stay safe in business rose 20 percent? Clearly, the friction of war makes the difficult job of assessing economic health even harder. What pieces of information are most important - actual costs? attitudes? safety? job availability? access to job training? Measuring such things in a country emerging from regime change, wrestling with democracy, sitting on the world's fourth largest oil reserve, suffering in the midst of sectarian violence, and lagging behind the rest of the world in education and training was concerning.2 We postulated that these outside, yet real, factors would skew the results of our actions, even though the same initiatives are the ingrethents for positive results in COIN doctrine.3 The friction cannot be underestimated. It makes the task of assessment quite complex. The most difficult task in measuring economic development is simply gaining access to reliable data. In the United States, researchers often commission a survey designed to gather the target data (such as a written survey, personal interview, focus group discussion, phone survey, etc.) All of these methods become more difficult in a foreign country where travel and trust are major issues. Throw in the dynamics of COIN, sectarian violence, and hostility, and one has a recipe for unreliable results. Thus, determining if a certain economic strategy is working requires patience, tolerance of ambiguity, and collaboration across cultural chasms between the Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies. Operational and Tactical Measures of Economic Progress Organizations that survey extensively (such as Gallup) are not common in the Middle East, so contractors are often hired to perform necessary survey-related functions in COIN environments. The division staff had little control over how it received data, except for that collected through busy subordinate units. We relied on data pushed to us from the corps headquarters, which contracted Gallup workers, and we sought data from our U.S. interagency partners. This proved difficult. The hurdles to gain access to data from our interagency partners grew as we navigated through the U.S. bureaucracy. For example, we wanted to contact the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to find out how many jobs they created across MND-N. …
Summarizes discussions with over 450 Army officers (lieutenants through colonels) about leader development in Army units. These discussions revealed that the type and extent of leader development activities vary greatly across units, but that they are generally informal and most heavily influenced by the unit commander. The authors conclude with suggestions on how the Army school system can improve leader development.
Abstract : This monograph outlines an approach to building the capabilities and capacity of partner armies for coalition operations through the effective use of Army security cooperation. It is important to clarify two key terms in this study, specifically, the difference between capability and capacity. Simply put, "capability" is the ability to perform a function, and "capacity" is the extent of a capability present. Ongoing operations and emerging missions create competing demands for the Army's capabilities, resulting in requirement gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. Although there are other ways to fill capability gaps (e.g., with other Services, contractors, or increased Army end-strength), national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategic guidance emphasizes the need to leverage the capabilities of allies and partners to fill these gaps. Thus, this monograph is concerned with how the Army should focus its security cooperation activities to build the most appropriate capabilities in partner armies. As a supporting entity, it must use its limited security cooperation resources in a way that effectively builds partner army capabilities that support Joint requirements. To do this, the Army cannot work in isolation. Partnering with DoD and other U.S. government agencies provides the solution and also enables the development of partner capacity. This study is part of a larger RAND Arroyo Center effort to assist the U.S. Army in building partner capabilities through enhanced and focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and provides a process for matching them with potential partner capabilities. The study also provides insights into planning associated with Army security cooperation activities and discusses the importance of developing metrics that would allow the Army to assess its security cooperation investment over time.
Abstract : This monograph outlines an approach to building the capabilities and capacity of partner armies for coalition operations through the effective use of Army security cooperation. It is important to clarify two key terms in this study, specifically, the difference between capability and capacity. Simply put, "capability" is the ability to perform a function, and "capacity" is the extent of a capability present. Ongoing operations and emerging missions create competing demands for the Army's capabilities, resulting in requirement gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. Although there are other ways to fill capability gaps (e.g., with other Services, contractors, or increased Army end-strength), national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategic guidance emphasizes the need to leverage the capabilities of allies and partners to fill these gaps. Thus, this monograph is concerned with how the Army should focus its security cooperation activities to build the most appropriate capabilities in partner armies. As a supporting entity, it must use its limited security cooperation resources in a way that effectively builds partner army capabilities that support Joint requirements. To do this, the Army cannot work in isolation. Partnering with DoD and other U.S. government agencies provides the solution and also enables the development of partner capacity. This study is part of a larger RAND Arroyo Center effort to assist the U.S. Army in building partner capabilities through enhanced and focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and provides a process for matching them with potential partner capabilities. The study also provides insights into planning associated with Army security cooperation activities and discusses the importance of developing metrics that would allow the Army to assess its security cooperation investment over time.
