In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, the Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade, the constitutional floor that had protected the abortion right for nearly fifty years, and returned the issue of abortion to the states to regulate, restrict, criminalize, or protect at the state-level. In the post-Roe era, states are increasingly turning to private law to restrict travel, access to medical care, and undermine privacy of individuals seeking abortion. Three states have passed antiabortion civil enforcement “bounty” provisions patterned on Texas’s SB8 that allows private citizens to sue providers or third parties who aid and abet an abortion that violates the state’s six-week ban. At least half a dozen states have signaled that they will pass their own civil bounty antiabortion provisions. Other states, such as Missouri, have introduced legislation that would permit any private citizen to sue anyone who helps a pregnant person travel out of state to obtain an abortion. Aggressive protesting at abortion clinics and surveillance of out-of-state license plates and people entering abortion clinics have also been on the rise as private citizens take up the charge of enforcing state antiabortion laws. Under this private law scheme, pregnant bodies become politicized legal subjects to be disciplined and surveilled by the public to enforce a state’s policy agenda without constitutional and civil law protections. This Article argues that the use of private law to enforce abortion bans — a function that had been previously exclusively patrolled through public law — is antithetical to the purpose and function of private law to protect individuals from tortious harms by third parties. Private law is designed to compensate individuals for harms and to protect the community more broadly by discouraging individuals from engaging in harmful behavior through the deterrent force of damage awards. However, civil enforcement regimes are eroding the boundary between public and private law and exposing people to private harms through state capture of private law. These civil provisions are often coupled with criminal enforcement regimes that deprive pregnant persons of necessary medical care. Rather than protect individuals from privacy invasions by third parties, these laws incentivize the surveillance and privacy intrusions that will necessarily result from the regime of private enforcement and aggressive protesting at abortion clinics. Thus, in the post-Roe landscape, abortion patients and providers have lost both constitutional protection and private law’s protection against harms inflicted by private actors. This Article sets forth a framework to both reassert tort law’s function to offer protection against privacy invasions by third parties and restore private law’s role in expressing normative values of the community — rather than of the state — that rests at the heart of a private law regime.It is a critical moment to challenge the emerging trend of state capture of private law and reestablish private law’s traditional role to guard against privacy intrusions by third parties. Torts such as intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, infliction of emotional distress, and federal civil rights violations, as well as tort claims for providers such as interference with prospective business relations and civil RICO to name only a few may serve to reclaim private law’s primary purpose to protect individuals from infringement by third parties. Shielding abortion patients and providers from surveillance, detection, and violations of medical privacy may limit overreach by bounty hunters and protestors. More importantly, it will reclaim private law’s role to protect individuals and providers in the constitutional vacuum left in the wake of Dobbs.

Scott Turow’s One L, the widely read account of his first year at Harvard Law School in 1975, is said to have “frightened, informed, and inspired a generation of lawyers-to-be” (xi). Beyond One L: Stories About Finding Meaning and Making a Difference in Law, published nearly 45 years later, is billed as a “collection of stories taking a further look at the often dramatic and sometimes traumatic experience of embarking on the study of law” (xi). While One L ostensibly described “universal truths” (xi) about law school in the 1970s, Beyond One L illustrates how dramatically the law school experience has changed since Turow arrived at Harvard as part of a first-year class that was overwhelmingly “male, white, and straight” (xii). At the same time, Beyond One L’s collection of essays, which includes entries from several well-known figures in legal education, reminds us how many aspects of legal education remain the same. In the face of difficult and polarizing times, when lawyering and the rule of law are frequently perceived as under attack, Beyond One L offers “an antidote to disillusionment with the legal profession” through storytelling (xiv). Contributors to this wide-ranging collection tell stories that deviate dramatically from Turow’s original perspective. The book, importantly, succeeds in elevating the perspective of attorneys who, unlike Turow, experienced law school through the lens of historically marginalized people and communities. The collection of essays is divided into eight parts, which are loosely organized chronologically around the decision to go to law school, the law school experience and the bar exam, post-law-school career paths and, finally, finding meaning and fulfillment in the practice of law. Collectively, these essays provide an array of perspectives that will likely appeal broadly to prospective law students and practicing lawyers alike. In Part I, One L: The View in the Mirror, Turow muses about the astounding and widespread popularity of his book, and on the ways that legal education has both changed and stayed the same in the ensuing decades. He acknowledges the persistent law school “profit center” model as a motivator for keeping faculties small and student bodies large, and notes the minimal change from

Two growing literatures critique Hobbesian corporate cultures. Management analyses document the way high-stakes/zero-sum bonus systems undermine, rather than enhance, productivity as they subvert teamwork, valorize self-interested behavior, and weaken ethical standards. This literature treats negative effects of such systems, including lawless and unethical behavior, as the unintended consequences of efforts to shake up complacent institutions or replace an insular old guard with an ambitious and meritocratic new workforce. A second, darker literature terms such Hobbesian environments "masculinities contests" that select for those executives who best exemplify masculine traits such as a single-minded focus on professional success, physical strength, and the willingness to engage in no-holds-barred competition. This literature treats the rule-breaking environment that results as an incidental byproduct of the way that such cultures valorize masculine traits. Drawing on insights from criminology, psychology, and feminist theory, this Article suggests another possibility: that certain management cultures intentionally design the competitions to facilitate breaking the rules with impunity. In a Hobbesian world, where some profit handsomely from defying convention, zero-sum competitions play a role that extends beyond valorizing alpha males. They select for leaders who will lie, shortchange their families, and break the law to get results-and do so without explicit orders that might subject upper management to accountability for the practices. In such a world, women fall behind not necessarily because of misogyny, though such environments often breed it. Instead, they lose because of a triple bind. First, women cannot prevail in such competitions unless they can outmaneuver men, credibly display greater devotion to the job, or more brazenly flout the laws. Second, they are disproportionately disliked and punished for displaying the self-centered, rule-breaking behavior of men. Third, women become less likely to seek positions because they correctly perceive that they could not thrive and are more likely than men to decide they do not wish to do so on such terms, reinforcing the male-identified character of such environments. Where these companies' business models depend not just on the ability to upend traditional practices, but to break the law, the companies cannot address gender disparities without addressing the business model itself. The Article concludes that gender inequality is intrinsically intertwined with the evisceration of the rule of law in corporate America.

Platform world is speeding the redesign of employment. Bricks-and-mortar firms once hired through narrow portals and then invested in the workers they hired, providing job security and predictable career ladders. Platform world flings the doors wide open to income-generating efforts, providing new opportunities but also offering security and predictable advancement to almost no one. Other legal scholars have mined these same data for gender disparities; they have found disparities in the platform economy arising from customer biases and individual preferences, and manifested in men’s and women’s different experiences in everything from pricing plumbing services to fraud prevention. Neutral-appearing algorithms may then amplify the impact on wages and opportunities. Because the outcomes are not equal, other scholars argue that these disparities should be actionable. Accordingly, they suggest various ways to adapt existing laws to remedy gender disparities. This Article is the first to develop an analysis of the multiple types of gender disparities in platform world. Rather than focus on the fact that disparities exist, this Article asks the question when—and even more provocatively, whether—they should matter. First, the Article documents the various sources and forms of gender disparities, setting up the argument that no one legal approach fits. Second, while some of those disparities are already actionable under existing antidiscrimination laws, even antidiscrimination law today rarely provides a viable cause of action simply because the results produce statistical disparities. In platform world, it’s not clear that the disparities are morally questionable, actionable under existing law, or appropriate subjects for regulation.The real issues in this new economy concern the lack of benefits,stability, and promotion opportunities. Antidiscrimination law can help those employed by platform companies, but not the gig workers who need health benefits and protection against harassment, nor the algorithms that need oversight. Consequently, existing antidiscrimination law is all but irrelevant except to address the most glaring discrepancies, and the real need is for a wholesale rethinking of the legal infrastructure necessary to realize the benefits of the platform economy for more than a few platform creators.

Fifty Ways is a collection of faculty development ideas to support and improve legal education. The ideas fall into five categories: institutional and administrative support for teaching, adjunct professor support, feedback from students, collaborations with colleagues, and self-assessment, reflection, and personal development as a teacher.

This Article maintains that the decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, which referred to the corporation as a legal fiction designed to serve the interests of the people behind it, signals the “death of the firm” as a unit of legal analysis in which business entities are treated as more than the sum of their parts and appropriate partners to advance not just commercial, but public ends. The Hobby Lobby reference to the firm as a fiction is a product of a decades-long shift in the treatment of corporations. This shift reflects both an ideological embrace of the free-market-oriented “agency-cost” school of corporate analysis and a material change from the brick-and-mortar corporations of the industrial era to the network-like operations of the technological age. As “the firm,” that is, the corporate form used to structure most business organizations, becomes less dependent on fixed supply chains and hard-to-assemble labor forces, the networks that determine employee motivation, security, and career mobility also change. These shifts fundamentally alter the relationship of people to companies, as owners, executives, shareholders, and employees all become more mobile. This Article is the first to link the Supreme Court’s revised conception of the firm to the role of the state. If Hobby Lobby owners have the First Amendment right to choose for their employees what publicly subsidized health care benefits to make available, the corollary should be that individuals should not be dependent on employers for access to basic public benefits. The new networked era should encourage individual as well as corporate flexibility.

Since the 1970’s, antidiscrimination advocates have approached Title VII as though the impact of the law on minorities and women could be considered in isolation. This article argues that this is a mistake. Instead, Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law attempts to reclaim Title VII’s original approach, which justified efforts to dismantle segregated workplaces as necessary to both eliminate discrimination and promote economic growth. Using that approach, this Article is the first to consider how widespread corporate tournaments and growing gender disparities in the upper echelons of the economy are intrinsically intertwined, and how they undermine the core promises of antidiscrimination law. The Article draws on a pending case challenging the “rank and yank” evaluation system at Microsoft, as well as social science literature regarding narcissism and stereotype expectations, to illustrate how consideration of the legitimacy of competitive pay for performance schemes is essential to combating the intrinsically gendered nature of advancement in the new economy.

Leading to Obergefell v. Hodges, the road to marriage equality was uneven. Several state courts in the 1970s rejected same-sex marriage, based on circular reasoning that avoided the critical constitutional question. The federal government entered the debate and enacted the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996. DOMA restricted the definition of marriage to one man and one woman; and, no state was required to recognize a same-sex marriage performed in another state. State legislatures that had not previously acted enacted mini-DOMAs and others passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage. Within two decades the Supreme Court reversed its position on the criminalization of sexual intimacy between consenting homosexuals. That same year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state’s legislative ban on same-sex marriage “confers an official stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships.” Other state and federal courts followed in finding bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. By the time of Obergefell, 37 states and the District of Columbia recognized same-sex marriage. While this turnaround was rapid in constitutional time, it was painfully slow for LGBT couples who were denied the right to marry. Obergefell is this generation’s Loving v. Virginia. Yet, the sad reality is that the right to same-sex marriage is just the beginning of a conversation. Since Obergefell, the backlash has been swift, with public officials refusing to issue marriage licenses because of individual religious objections; and, despite public accommodations laws, some merchants refusing to serve gay couples. The aftermath of Obergefell is just beginning. The authors in this symposium evaluate the opinion, reflect on it, and forecast for the future the anticipated legal and social consequences of the Court’s recognition of the constitutional right to marry a same-sex partner.

This bibliography covers law review articles published, for the most part, after 2006 on property issues within the context of family law. Articles for which the title is self-explanatory or that concern only a single case, state, or statute are cited, but not annotated. For previous annotated bibliographies regarding property issues, see Nancy Levit, Marital Property Annotated Bibliography, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 209 (2012), Nancy Levit, Unique Property: A Supplemental Annotated Bibliography, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 183 (2006), and Robert R.M. Verchick, Unique Property: An Annotated Bibliography, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 589 (2004).

This bibliography covers law review articles and supplemental A.L.R. entries published after 1997 on a variety of topics all within the characterization of “unique property”. We also include a handful of especially interesting pieces published in or before 1997, which we believe are just too good to pass up. A.L.R. entries, whose titles are usually self-explanatory, are cited, but not annotated. Similarly, articles that concern only a single case or a single state are cited, but not annotated. Illustrative topics include: Businesses, Career Assets, Educational and Professional Degrees, Intellectual Property, Pets, Gifts, Reproductive Material and Tort Damages.