A cognitive theory is one which rejects certain assumptions of the theoretical tradition which has long dominated the study of animal behavior, namely, stimuli and responses (S-R) theory. If the fundamental assumption of S-R theory is a commitment to associationism, the most prominent assumption is that associations are formed only between specific classes of event, for the S-R theorist between responses and antecedent stimuli. Blocking was attenuated by a surprising change in reinforcement on compound trials but not by a change on retraining trials. The phenomenon of blocking appears to be only one example of a more general interaction between the elements of a compound conditioned stimulus. The course of conditioning to one element of a compound depends not only on the salience or correlation of that element with the reinforcer, but also on the salience and current and past correlation of the other element with that reinforcer.

Rats were trained in a triangular-shaped pool to find a hidden platform, whose location was defined in terms of two sources of information, a landmark outside the pool and a particular corner of the pool. Subsequent test trials without the platform pitted these two sources of information against one another. In Experiment 1 this test revealed a clear, although selective, sex difference. As in previous experiments, females spent more time in an area of the pool that corresponded to the landmark, but here only when it was a cone but not when it was a pyramid. Males, on the other hand, always spent more time in the distinctive corner of the pool. Experiments 2 and 3 were only with female rats. In Experiment 2 two identical shaped cylinders were used as landmark cues (one plain white and the other vertically patterned with four different patterns). The results of the preference test revealed that only the females trained and tested with the plain cylinder spent more time in the area of the pool that corresponded to the landmark than in the distinctive corner of the pool. Finally, Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2 while eliminating an alternative explanation in terms of differential contrast between the two cylinders and the black curtain.

In three experiments, rats of different ages were trained in a circular pool to find a hidden platform whose location was defined in terms of a single landmark, a cylinder outside the pool. Following training, two main components of the landmark, its shape and pattern, were tested individually. Experiment 1 was performed by adolescent and adult rats (Exp. 1a, males; Exp. 1b, females). Adult rats always learned faster than the adolescent animals. On test trials, interesting tendencies were found—mainly, one favoring males on the shape test trial, and another favoring females on the pattern test trial. Experiment 2 was conducted only with adolescent rats, and these males and females did not differ when learning the task. However, on test trials the males learned more about the landmark shape component than about the landmark pattern component, while the females learned equally about the two components of the landmark. Finally, Experiment 3 was conducted only with adult rats, and again the males and females did not differ when learning the task. However, on test trials the males learned equally about the two components of the landmark (shape and pattern), but the females learned more about the landmark pattern component than about the landmark shape component. This set of experiments supports the claim that male and female rats can learn rather different things about a landmark that signals the location of the platform, with age being a critical variable.

Many experiments on spatial navigation suggest that a rat uses the configuration of extra-maze landmarks to guide its choice of arm or location to visit. In the present study, based on Chamizo Rodríguez, Espinet, and Mackintosh's (2012) navigation paradigm, we conducted a series of experiments in which we focused on how changes to the configuration of stimuli surrounding the maze, implemented by transposing the location of both near and far landmarks, significantly affected rats’ performance (Experiment1, Test Phase 1). Subsequent tests demonstrated that it was the near landmarks that played the major role in this navigation task (Experiment 1, Test Phases 2 and 3). Experiment 2 provided evidence for a novel type of inversion effect in the water maze, by showing that rotation by 180° of the location of one set of landmarks relative to a directional cue also strongly affected performance.

We review evidence that supports the conclusion that people can and do learn in two distinct ways – one associative, the other propositional. No one disputes that we solve problems by testing hypotheses and inducing underlying rules, so the issue amounts to deciding whether there is evidence that we (and other animals) also rely on a simpler, associative system, that detects the frequency of occurrence of different events in our environment and the contingencies between them. There is neuroscientific evidence that associative learning occurs in at least some animals (e.g., Aplysia californica), so it must be the case that associative learning has evolved. Since both associative and propositional theories can in principle account for many instances of successful learning, the problem is then to show that there are at least some cases where the two classes of theory predict different outcomes. We offer a demonstration of cue competition effects in humans under incidental conditions as evidence against the argument that all such effects are based on cognitive inference. The latter supposition would imply that if the necessary information is unavailable to inference then no cue competition should occur. We then discuss the case of unblocking by reinforcer omission, where associative theory predicts an irrational solution to the problem, and consider the phenomenon of the Perruchet effect, in which conscious expectancy and conditioned response dissociate. Further discussion makes use of evidence that people will sometimes provide one solution to a problem when it is presented to them in summary form, and another when they are presented in rapid succession with trial-by trial information. We also demonstrate that people trained on a discrimination may show a peak shift (predicted by associative theory), but given the time and opportunity to detect the relationships between S+ and S−, show rule-based behavior instead. Finally, we conclude by presenting evidence that research on individual differences suggests that variation in intelligence and explicit problem solving ability are quite unrelated to variation in implicit (associative) learning, and briefly consider the computational implications of our argument, by asking how both associative and propositional processes can be accommodated within a single framework for cognition.

Two groups of rats received two trials a day in a runway in the sequence RN or NR, and were then extinguished either in a single session or at a rate of one trial per day. With massed trials, Group NR extinguished more slowly; with spaced trials, Group RN tended to extinguish more slowly. These results are consistent with Capaldi’s sequential theory. A second experiment, however, showed that the difference in spaced extinction was not due to differences in between-day transitions (as Capaldi’s analysis might imply), but depended on whether or not Trial 1 of each day in acquisition was reinforced.

The present set of experiments evaluated the possibility that the hormonal changes that appear at the onset of puberty might influence the strategies used by female rats to solve a spatial navigation task. In each experiment, rats were trained in a triangular shaped pool to find a hidden platform which maintained a constant relationship with two sources of information, one individual landmark and one corner of the pool with a distinctive geometry. Then, three test trials were conducted without the platform in counterbalanced order. In one, both the geometry and the landmark were simultaneously presented, although in different spatial positions, in order to measure the rats' preferences. In the remaining test trials what the rats had learned about the two sources of information was measured by presenting them individually. Experiment 1, with 60-day old rats, revealed a clear sex difference, thus replicating a previous finding (Rodríguez et al., 2010): females spent more time in an area of the pool that corresponded to the landmark, whereas males spent more time in the distinctive corner of the pool even though the remaining tests revealed that both sexes had learned about the two sources of information. In Experiment 2, 30-day old female rats, unlike adults, preferred to solve the task using the geometry information rather than the landmark (although juvenile males behaved in exactly the same way as adults). Experiment 3 directly compared the performance of 90- and 30-day old females and found that while the adult females preferred to solve the task using the landmark, the reverse was true in juvenile females. Experiment 4 compared ovariectomized and sham operated females and found that while sham operated females preferred to solve the task using the landmark, the reverse was true in ovariectomized females. Finally, Experiment 5 directly compared adult males and females, juvenile males and females, and ovariectomized females and found that adult males, juvenile males and females, and ovariectomized females did not differ among them in their preferred cue, but they all differed from adult females.

IQ tests are one of psychology's more visible and controversial products. For this reason alone, a student who has graduated with a degree in psychology ought to know enough about the subject to dispute some of the public's misconceptions. Controversy breeds disagreement, and although intelligence researchers are agreed on some of the conclusions suggested by their research, they disagree strongly about others. One reason is that many see desirable or undesirable implications of such research, and their evaluation of the research is influenced by those perceived implications. Another is that the nature of intelligence research, where well-controlled experiment is usually not possible, and conclusions are based on mere correlations or the results of necessarily ill-controlled natural experiments, means that not all conclusions are unequivocally dictated by the evidence. For these reasons an advanced course on human intelligence can teach a student how to evaluate necessarily ambiguous evidence, without being swayed by his or her prior beliefs or wishes.

When they are trained in a Morris water maze to find a hidden platform, whose location is defined by a number of equally spaced visual landmarks round the circumference of the pool, rats are equally able to find the platform when tested with any two of the landmarks (Prados, & Trobalon, 1998; Rodrigo, Chamizo, McLaren, & Mackintosh, 1997). This suggests that none of the landmarks was completely overshadowed by any of the others. In Experiment 1 one pair of groups was trained with four equally salient visual landmarks spaced at equal intervals around the edge of the pool, while a second pair was trained with two landmarks only, either relatively close to or far from the hidden platform. After extensive training, both male and female rats showed a reciprocal overshadowing effect: on a test with two landmarks only (either close to or far from the platform), rats trained with four landmarks spent less time in the platform quadrant than those trained with only two. Experiment 2 showed that animals trained with two landmarks and then tested with four also performed worse on test than those trained and tested with two landmarks only. This suggests that generalization decrement, rather than associative competition, provides a sufficient explanation for the overshadowing observed in Experiment 1. Experiment 3 provided a within-experiment replication of the results of Experiments 1 and 2. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that rats trained with a configuration of two landmarks learn their identity.

This study replicated a previously reported male advantage on certain items of Raven’s Matrices and found no sex differences in performance on other items. We refer to the latter as analytic (1) items and the former as analytic (2) items. Reasons for the male advantage were investigated by correlating scores obtained by male and female high school students on analytic (1) and analytic (2) items with their scores on tests of spatial, verbal and mathematical ability. There were no sex differences in the magnitude of the correlations between scores on analytic (2) items and the two spatial and verbal tests. In contrast, males but not females showed a significantly higher correlation of maths with analytic (2) than with analytic (1). The results suggest the Raven’s Matrices may engage different, more specific cognitive processes in males and more general cognitive processes in females.

Rats were trained in a triangular-shaped pool to find a hidden platform that maintained a constant relationship with two sources of information, an individual landmark and one part of the pool with a distinctive shape. In Experiment 1, shape learning overshadowed landmark learning but landmark learning did not overshadow shape learning in males, while landmark learning overshadowed shape learning but shape learning did not overshadow landmark learning in females. In Experiment 2, rats were pretrained either with the single landmark relevant or with the shape relevant, in the absence of the alternative cue. Final test trials, without the platform, revealed reciprocal blocking only in females; in males, shape learning blocked landmark learning, but not viceversa (Experiment 2a). In Experiment 2b, male rats received a longer pretraining with the single landmark relevant, and now landmark learning blocked shape learning. The results thus confirm the claim that males and females partially use different types of spatial information when solving spatial tasks. These results also agree with the suggestion that shape learning interacts with landmark learning in much the same way as does learning about any pair of stimuli in a Pavlovian conditioning experiment.

Rats were trained in a triangular-shaped pool to find a hidden platform, whose location was defined in terms of two sources of information, a landmark outside the pool and a particular corner of the pool. Subsequent test trials without the platform pitted these two sources of information against one another. This test revealed a clear sex difference. Females spent more time in an area of the pool that corresponded to the landmark, whereas males spent more time in the distinctive corner of the pool even though further tests revealed that both sexes had learned about the two sources of information by presenting cues individually. The results agree with the claim that males and females use different types of information in spatial navigation.

Although most studies of perceptual learning in human participants have concentrated on the changes in perception assumed to be occurring, studies of nonhuman animals necessarily measure discrimination learning and generalization and remain agnostic on the question of whether changes in behavior reflect changes in perception. On the other hand, animal studies do make it easier to draw a distinction between supervised and unsupervised learning. Differential reinforcement will surely teach animals to attend to some features of a stimulus array rather than to others. But it is an open question as to whether such changes in attention underlie the enhanced discrimination seen after unreinforced exposure to such an array. I argue that most instances of unsupervised perceptual learning observed in animals (and at least some in human animals) are better explained by appeal to well-established principles and phenomena of associative learning theory: excitatory and inhibitory associations between stimulus elements, latent inhibition, and habituation.