Abstract David Bohm’s notion of implicate order, while relatively well-known, is often said to be difficult to understand, and is almost completely absent in contemporary discussions in philosophy of quantum theory and relativity. Yet one can argue that it is a key part of Bohm’s and Basil Hiley’s research programme which anticipates currently fashionable topics, such as the idea of space-time as emergent. In this paper my aim is to briefly review the origin of Bohm’s focus on the notion of order, and the related notion that continuous space-time is an abstraction from a discrete structural process.

One of the more radical ideas to have emerged in recent metaphysics of quantum theory is wave function realism, according to which the fundamental spatial framework of the world is one of very many dimensions. At first sight this idea sounds similar to the notion of a multidimensional implicate order the physicist David Bohm proposed on the basis of quantum theory in the 1980s. This paper briefly considers Bohm’s various attempts to provide a realist interpretation of the wave function in order to clarify whether or not Bohm was anticipating and even endorsing wave function realism with his implicate order theory. The underlying question is what quantum theory — and non-locality in particular — is trying to tell us about the more fundamental nature of the physical world.

Perhaps more so than any other twentieth-century physicist, David Bohm was trying to develop an ontological interpretation for quantum theory, i.e. an interpretation which tells us what quantum theory says about the nature of reality. He is best known for presenting in 1952 an improved version of de Broglie’s ‘pilot-wave’ theory, which says that an electron is a particle always accompanied by a new type of quantum field or pilot wave which guides it. In later research Bohm realized that the pilot wave is not pushing and pulling the particle mechanically but rather contains information which guides the particle, analogously to the way radar waves guide a ship on autopilot. The postulation of such objective and active information to the quantum level is a radical metaphysical move which also opens a new way to understand how the material and mental sides of reality are related to each other. It might even make it easier to understand what phenomenal properties are and how they could play a causal role in the physical world. This paper provides an overview of not only the pilot-wave theory, but also Bohm’s other related frameworks, namely the implicate order and soma-significance. It is suggested that these views point to a new theory of the relation of consciousness and matter which we can call interactionist dual-aspect monism. This theory suggests, against illusionism, that phenomenal properties exist and, against idealism, that the world has a material aspect which exists independently of the human mind ‐ thus ‘real consciousness in a real world’.

AbstractThe paper proposes that quantum theory implies a radically new notion of matter which has not been properly understood before David Bohm’s groundbreaking work. Bohm proposed that the fundamental particles of physics (such as electrons) are not merely pushed around mechanically by classical forces but are also able to respond to information. Information is thus assumed to be an objective commodity which can exist independently of the human mind and which actively guides or instructs physical processes. This notion of active information also applies in computational, biological and psychological phenomena, thus helping us to understand how the mental and the physical sides of reality are related. It may even help us to understand the nature of conscious experience. The latter part of the paper considers the deeper mathematical and physical background of quantum theory and suggests that we need to revise our basic assumptions about quantum objects, such as the role of the wave function.

Researchers have suggested since the early days of quantum theory that there are strong analogies between quantum phenomena and mental phenomena and these have developed into a vibrant new field of quantum cognition during recent decades. After revisiting some early analogies by Niels Bohr and David Bohm, this paper focuses upon Bohm and Hiley's ontological interpretation of quantum theory which suggests further analogies between quantum phenomena and biological and psychological phenomena, including the proposal that the human brain operates in some ways like a quantum measuring apparatus. After discussing these analogies I will also consider, from a quantum perspective, Hintikka's suggestion that Kant's notion of things in themselves can be better understood by making an analogy between our knowledge-seeking activities and an elaborate measuring apparatus.

Emergent quantum mechanics (EmQM) explores the possibility of an ontology for quantum mechanics. The resurgence of interest in realist approaches to quantum mechanics challenges the standard textbook view, which represents an operationalist approach. The possibility of an ontological, i.e., realist, quantum mechanics was first introduced with the original de Broglie–Bohm theory, which has also been developed in another context as Bohmian mechanics. This Editorial introduces a Special Issue featuring contributions which were invited as part of the David Bohm Centennial symposium of the EmQM conference series (www.emqm17.org). Questions directing the EmQM research agenda are: Is reality intrinsically random or fundamentally interconnected? Is the universe local or nonlocal? Might a radically new conception of reality include a form of quantum causality or quantum ontology? What is the role of the experimenter agent in ontological quantum mechanics? The Special Issue also includes research examining ontological propositions that are not based on the Bohm-type nonlocality. These include, for example, local, yet time-symmetric, ontologies, such as quantum models based upon retrocausality. This Editorial provides topical overviews of thirty-one contributions which are organized into seven categories to provide orientation.

Emergent quantum mechanics (EmQM) explores the possibility of an ontology for quantum mechanics. The resurgence of interest in realist approaches to quantum mechanics challenges the standard textbook view, which represents an operationalist approach. The possibility of an ontological, i.e., realist, quantum mechanics was first introduced with the original de Broglie-Bohm theory, which has also been developed in another context as Bohmian mechanics. This Editorial introduces a Special Issue featuring contributions which were invited as part of the David Bohm Centennial symposium of the EmQM conference series (www.emqm17.org). Questions directing the EmQM research agenda are: Is reality intrinsically random or fundamentally interconnected? Is the universe local or nonlocal? Might a radically new conception of reality include a form of quantum causality or quantum ontology? What is the role of the experimenter agent in ontological quantum mechanics? The Special Issue also includes research examining ontological propositions that are not based on the Bohm-type nonlocality. These include, for example, local, yet time-symmetric, ontologies, such as quantum models based upon retrocausality. This Editorial provides topical overviews of thirty-one contributions which are organized into seven categories to provide orientation.

This paper briefly discusses some of David Bohm’s views on mind and matter and suggests that they allow for a stronger possibility for conscious free will to influence quantum dynamics than Henry Stapp’s approach.

A key idea in the field of “quantum interaction” or “quantum cognition” is that certain principles and mathematical tools of quantum theory (such as quantum probability, entanglement, non-commutativity, non-Boolean logic and complementarity) provide a good way of modeling many significant cognitive phenomena (such as decision processes, ambiguous perception, meaning in natural languages, probability judgments, order effects and memory.

The theme of phenomenology and quantum physics is here tackled by examining some basic interpretational issues in quantum physics. One key issue in quantum theory from the very beginning has been whether it is possible to provide a quantum ontology of particles in motion in the same way as in classical physics, or whether we are restricted to stay within a more limited view of quantum systems, in terms of complementary but mutually exclusive phenomena. In phenomenological terms we could describe the situation by saying that according to the usual interpretation of quantum theory (especially Niels Bohr's), quantum phenomena require a kind of epoché (i.e. a suspension of assumptions about reality at the quantum level). However, there are other interpretations (especially David Bohm's) that seem to re-establish the possibility of a mind-independent ontology at the quantum level. We will show that even such ontological interpretations contain novel, non-classical features, which require them to give a special role to "phenomena" or "appearances", a role not encountered in classical physics. We will conclude that while ontological interpretations of quantum theory are possible, quantum theory implies the need of a certain kind of epoché even for this type of interpretations. While different from the epoché connected to phenomenological description, the "quantum epoché" nevertheless points to a potentially interesting parallel between phenomenology and quantum philosophy.

Ladyman and Ross (LR) argue that quantum objects are not individuals (or are at most weakly discernible individuals) and use this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory (BT), according to which particles do have definite trajectories at all times. However, LR interpret the research by Brown {\em et al.} as implying that "raw stuff" or {\em haecceities} are needed for the individuality of particles of BT, and LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper we note that Brown {\em et al.}'s research does not imply that {\em haecceities} are needed. Thus BT remains as a genuine option for those who seek to understand quantum particles as individuals. However, we go on to discuss some problems with BT which led Bohm and Hiley to modify it. This modified version underlines that, due to features such as context-dependence and non-locality, Bohmian particles have a very limited autonomy in situations where quantum effects are non-negligible. So while BT restores the possibility of quantum individuals, it also underlines the primacy of the whole over the autonomy of the parts. The later sections of the paper also examine the Bohm theory in the general mathematical context of symplectic geometry. This provides yet another way of understanding the subtle, holistic and dynamic nature of Bohmian individuals. We finally briefly consider Bohm's other main line of research, the "implicate order", which is in some ways similar to LR's structural realism.

Advanced Series on Mathematical PsychologyContextuality from Quantum Physics to Psychology, pp. 325-334 (2016) No AccessChapter 14: Quantum Theory, Active Information and the Mind-Matter ProblemPaavo PylkkänenPaavo PylkkänenUniversity of Helsinki, Finland, and University of Skövde, Swedenhttps://doi.org/10.1142/9789814730617_0014Cited by:4 PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail Abstract: Bohm and Hiley suggest that a certain new type of active information plays a key objective role in quantum processes. This chapter discusses the implications of this suggestion to our understanding of the relation between the mental and the physical aspects of reality. FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited By 4Bohm`s Quantum Potential Approach to Consciousness from the Perspective of a Four-Valued LogicMarcus Schmieke31 January 2021 | Dev Sanskriti Interdisciplinary International Journal, Vol. 17Is the Universe Enough? Can It Suffice as a Basis for Worldviews?Mark Lupisella8 June 2021The Pauli–Jung Conjecture and Its Relatives: A Formally Augmented OutlineHarald Atmanspacher11 September 2020 | Open Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 1Conscious Experience and Quantum Consciousness Theory: Theories, Causation, and IdentityMika Suojanen31 Dec 2019 | E-LOGOS, Vol. 26, No. 2 Contextuality from Quantum Physics to PsychologyMetrics History PDF download

Recent advances in the field of quantum cognition (Pothos and Busemeyer 2013; Wang et al. 2013) suggest a puzzling connection between fundamental physics and the mind. Many researchers see quantum ideas and formalisms merely as useful pragmatic tools, and do not look for deeper underlying explanations for why they work. However, others are tempted to seek for an intelligible explanation for why quantum ideas work to model cognition. This paper first draws attention to how the physicist David Bohm already in 1951 suggested that thought and quantum processes are analogous, adding that this could be explained if some neural processes underlying thought involved non-negligible quantum effects. The paper next points out that the idea that there is a connection between fundamental physics and the mind is not unique to quantum theory, but was there already when Newtonian physics was assumed to be fundamental physics, advocated most notably by Kant. Kant emphasized the unique intelligibility of a Newtonian notion of experience, and this historical background prompts us to ask in the final part of the paper whether we can really make sense of any quantum-like experience (whether experience of the empirical phenomena in the “external world” or the “inner world” of psychological phenomena). It is proposed that intelligibility is a relative notion and that, regardless of initial difficulties, quantum approaches to cognition and consciousness are likely to provide valuable new ways of understanding the mind.

In recent decades some cognitive scientists have adopted a program of quantum cognition. For example, Pothos and Busemeyer (PB) argue that there are empirical results concerning human decision-making and judgment that can be elegantly accounted for by quantum probability (QP) theory, while classical (Bayesian) probability theory fails. They suggest that the reason why QP works better is because some cognitive phenomena are analogous to quantum phenomena. This naturally gives rise to a further question about why they are analogous. Is this a pure coincidence, or is there a deeper reason? For example, could the neural processes underlying cognition involve subtle quantum effects, thus explaining why cognition obeys QP? PB are agnostic about this controversial issue, and thus their kind of program could be labeled as "weak quantum cognition" (analogously to the program of weak artificial intelligence as characterized by Searle). However, there is a long tradition of speculating about the role of subtle quantum effects in the neural correlates of cognition, constituting a program of "strong quantum cognition" (SQC) or "quantum cognitive neuroscience". This paper considers the prospects of SQC, by briefly reviewing and commenting on some of the key proposals. In particular, Bohm and Hiley's active information program will be discussed.