Truth is a property of our statements and of our thoughts, but also what these aim at, and a norm for our thinking in general. But how to understand this normative tie between belief and truth? Norms by themselves seem unable to motivate or to guide us. These difficulties are stated, and the answer given is that the norm of belief is actually knowledge, which explains why we value it, and how it can also be a value.

Abstract French philosophy since 1800 has not been dominated by rationalism, but, instead, by various forms of rejection of reason inspired by spiritualism. Nonetheless, a small group of thinkers have defended various versions of what one may call intellectualist rationalism, promoting the primacy of concepts and scientific reason over that of life and emotion. This chapter describes this small and somewhat neglected tradition, starting from Cournot to Couturat, furthered by Nicod, Cavaillès, Granger, Vuillemin, and Bouveresse. Although these developments look to what later became analytic philosophy in the twentieth century, I explain that they constitute a distinctive brand of French rationalism.

On décrit ici les impasses du particularisme en sciences sociales (contextualisme, narrativisme, casuistique, pragmatisme, rejet de la distinction fait/valeur). Le causalisme et le généralisme ne sont pas dépassés.