: The Army National Guard (ARNG) combat brigades that were called up for Operation Desert Storm took longer to get ready than many people had anticipated. As a result, some steps were taken to improve the peacetime training of enhanced National Guard brigades, with an eye to improving their ability to respond to short notice contingencies. However, postmobilization training remains an issue, particularly in light of the substantial force reductions made since Desert Storm. Active duty combat units played a large role in helping the reserve component brigades prepare for deployment to the Persian Gulf, and it is likely that few if any will be available to provide such support in the future. The Arroyo Center was asked to determine whether there are adequate resources-sites, training and support personnel, and opposing forces - to prepare the seven enhanced heavy National Guard brigades for deployment. To make that determination, we developed a detailed training model that allows us to quantify the resources required to train a single heavy brigade and its support elements. We also examined different alternatives for implementing the model, that is, different numbers of sites.

: This report documents RAND research into the time it takes Reserve Component (RC) Support units (e.g., transportation personnel, engineers, military police, artillery personnel) to mobilize and prepare for deployment. The analyses are based on empirical data from 606 units that were called to duty during the Persian Gulf War in Operation Desert Shield (ODS). They provide a systematic method for estimating the post-mobilization preparation times of diverse types of support units. The analysis shows that the times depend on the unit's branch, size (weight of equipment), and mode of transportation (air or sea). Units deploying by air can be ready very quickly (8 to 25 days from call-up to the point when they are ready to load equipment for overseas shipment). Units deploying by sea take longer to prepare (typically 30 days, but up to 10 days more for heavy artillery units), but have more flexibility because they can continue some training while their equipment is in transit to the theater. The report illustrates how the results can make large differences in Active Reserve allocation decisions. The methodology, which was applied here to a notional Southwest Asia scenario, will allow defense planners to determine whether particular types of RC units can be available in time to respond to future contingencies. Section 2 provides an overview of ODS from the perspective of this study and describes the mobilization process followed by a typical RC unit in preparing for that operation. Section 3 describes the database used to support the quantitative analysis of the preparation times. Section 4 presents that analysis for units deploying by air and sea. Section 5 offers an example illustrating how the approach used here can help determine the division of support units between the Active and Reserve Components. The final section offers conclusions. (10 tables, 6 figures, 5 refs.)